Taking Time for Bipartisan Laughter

President Ronald Regan, House Speaker Tip O’Neill, and Senate Majority Leader Baker and their wives are sitting together in the front row of Ford’s Theater.

The comedic juggler Michael Davis is at his deadpan best. His timing and interactions with this high-powered front row are showmanship at its finest.

The most fascinating scene clips for me are the total joy shown by the three political families sitting together. One of the reasons they were able to work together in their political roles is because they could laugh together.

So, enjoy this 9-minute excerpt of a memorable performance, both on stage and off.

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n6mbW-jMtrY)

Words of Wisdom During the Pandemic

  • I started life with nothing and still have most of it.
  • In our house we have done so much walking that the dog has lost ten pounds.
  • The stay-at-home orders are going to accelerate the digital revolution in society by at least ten years.
  • The reason for my hope is the re-creation of an overriding common purpose.
  • “We shall not cease from exploration, and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time.” – T. S. Eliot

NCUA’s Leadership In a Crisis

NCUA’s actions in a crisis matter–for good or ill. So far, its efforts have ranged between two poles. On the one hand there are moves to lessen regulatory and compliance restraints to enable credit unions to respond to member needs with innovative, non-traditional practices.

This instinct is excellent. For it recognizes two realities:

  1. Effective responses for members’ problems occur locally. The discrete, granular circumstances of each member are resolved best, on site, credit union by credit union. No national policy can substitute for the speed and wisdom of local responders.
  2. Nothing of consequence in a crisis can be accomplished alone. When NCUA has taken over credit unions through conservatorship or examiner dictates, this principle of collaboration is nullified. Cooperation and patience are uniquely credit union strengths.

One credit union veteran described effectiveness this way: “Government is too far away and too late to help one’s neighbor. Right now, it is our neighbor to neighbor approaches that auditors, regulators, and bureaucrats need to template. This is what makes future government responses relevant, or even come close to working. We, the citizens and community actors, must be the template for the approaches we hope to have and live with from government .”

The Second Response, Also Instinctive

The other extreme of “we’re all in this together” is the inevitable bureaucratic reach for more power and money. This has resulted in two legislative suggestions by board members at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum: Harper and McWatters.

Both endorsed new NCUA authority to examine third party vendors, a request rejected repeatedly over the past decade in Congress.

The second was to expand the cooperative system’s CLF liquidity options. Although unclear, the suggestion appears to be that liquidity should be on call, solely at NCUA’s behest. The current mixed ownership structure requires credit unions to subscribe capital shares to create the 16 times borrowing capacity at the Federal Financing Bank. Now, credit unions are the direct funders, agents and users of the system.

Contrary Crisis Response

The go-it-alone, we’re in charge approach, was disastrous in the Great Recession. NCUA’s unilateral actions destroyed the CLF’s three-decades long role as the cooperative system’s liquidity safety net. NCUA requested a special $6 billion borrowing line from Congress at same time the CLF had an unused $49 billion capacity.

In the 2009 crisis NCUA took over the daily management of $100 billion dollars in corporate assets without a plan or knowledgeable leadership. Today the $6 billion AME surplus from the liquidations of five corporates, shows the catastrophic misjudgment which NCUA estimated would cost credit unions $13-16 billion dollars.

The misjudgment was not just a dollar and cents forecasting error. Rather the fundamental mistake was that NCUA took over total control. They failed to work collaboratively and respect the expertise and experience in the corporate system. Instead NCUA bought plans from outsiders who failed to understand both cooperative strengths and the crisis itself.

Chairman Hood’s Silence

One reason for Chairman Hood’s silence may be he recalls his past tenure on the NCUA board. And he has reflected on the lessons from that time.

The beauty of the cooperative model is when consumers and leaders believe they can be owners of solutions and get to it. In any crisis we must use that spirit to be first to respond, solid in our belief we can overcome, and hopeful in the fact that things that work will be documented as historical markers for future actions.

Leadership in a crisis offers the chance to build a better system. This occurred in the 1980-1984 transition to deregulation. For that outcome to occur, the NCUA board must work collaboratively with those who man the front lines with members.

Dual Pandemics

About this Cartoon

On Monday I showed a Norman Rockwell inspired illustration We Can Do It from the Vermont News Guide.

I contacted the artist, Noah Regan, to ask if he might create images that show credit unions’ unique roles during this pandemic crisis.

He said yes. Believing that a picture is worth at least a thousand words,  we intend to bring you periodic illustrations capturing the themes of the times we are going through.

Noah is accomplished in many different artistic genres: cartoons, portraits, illustrations and graphics. He lives in Iowa and is a member of Veridian Credit Union. His interests outside of art include cycling, listening to podcasts and audiobooks, writing in the third person, and discovering music (both old and new) on Spotify. More of Noah’s work can be found at ArtHouse Illustrations: https://www.arthouseill.com/about

We are seeking photos of credit unions doing the right things for members to inform Noah’s compositions.  Please email your ideas to me.

Art for Our Time

A combination of Norman Rockwell and Rosie the Riveter.

Illustration by Noah Regan and Joshua Sherman as it appeared in the Vermont News Guide (vtnewsguide.com)

(C) Joshua Sherman Productions, LLC.  2020.  All Rights Reserved.

For the story behind this illustration, the business pivot of Vermont Glove to making medical masks, click:  https://vermontnews-guide.com/recent-emails/

CLF: The One Thing Necessary

As of December 2019, approximately 1,468 credit unions with total assets of $1.4 trillion reported membership in the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system. These totals represent 27% of credit unions by number, and 88% of total assets.

By comparison, there were 278 credit unions that were Central Liquidity Facility (CLF) members holding $115 billion or about 7.2% of assets.

While numbers for Federal Reserve membership are not readily available, since NCUA requires by rule that all credit unions over $250 million be members of either the CLF or Federal Reserve, one can presume the overwhelming majority have opted for Fed membership.

Why this choice? If the Fed and CLF are both “lenders of last resort” why is the CLF deemed so unappealing? How is the FHLB system so much more relevant for credit unions then their own liquidity backstop?

NCUA’s Appeal for Credit Unions to Join the CLF

In its April 2020 meeting, the NCUA board approved final rules to make the CLF more attractive to join. Some changes were the result of the CARES legislation. They included opening membership to Corporates directly while changing their agent roles, expanding lending purpose, and increasing the borrowing multiple based on contributed capital from 12 to 16 times.

Rule changes eliminated the six-month waiting period after joining to borrow, the ability to withdraw membership upon demand versus the current 6-24 months delay, easing collateral requirements, and allowing corporates to borrow for their balance sheet. Staff also outlined improved loan processing capabilities.

The three Board members made individual appeals urging credit unions to join up now. They explained that the CLF, as now capitalized, could be inadequate to the crisis even at a multiple of 32 times member shares. NCUA could need liquidity for the NCUSIF and the Federal Financing Bank is the most reliable source for funding in a crisis.

The One Missing Element

The CLF is a “mixed-ownership government corporation” managed by the NCUA. The credit unions supply all the capital upon which total borrowing capacity is determined. Funding is direct from the government’s financing bank, unlike the FHLB system which raises its borrowings in the open market.

If the CLF is to be relevant in the future, the “mix” of the credit union and NCUA roles needs to be reassessed.

The historic agreement in 1983 for the corporate system to fully fund the CLF’s capital requirements for all credit unions  was ended by NCUA in 2012.  The NCUA failed to provide a design for the CLF to become an integral partner with its credit union members-owners.

In contrast today the FHLB system is credit union’s preferred lender because they are member-centric in their operations. Members buy capital stock to borrow in good times and bad; they elect the board, and individual banks proactively develop products and services to serve their various members’ needs.

The CLF has been used solely as a regulatory tool by NCUA. In the Great Recession, the primary borrower was the NCUSIF which forwarded $10 billion to the balance sheets of WesCorp and US Central. An effort designed by leading credit unions to create a “protracted adjustment credit” program for credit unions to refinance members’ mortgage loans became stillborn when NCUA staff took over the initiative.

Non Routine Borrowings to Resolve Problems

Credit unions seeking liquidity assistance will almost always be under some form of financial stress. This can be due to market dislocations making  assets difficult to value, unplanned share outflows, or earnings pressures from increased delinquency or  sound loan growth options.

By “normal” operating criteria, credit unions needing liquidity will be under financial strain and often under examiner constraints. Recent NCUA practice is not to provide workouts with problem credit unions via NCUSIF 208 and CLF assistance. Rather NCUA prefers to direct the credit union to downsize to fit its reduced capital ratio.  For contrast, this was not the policy when the CLF was used to alleviate the stress from the non-earning receivers’ certificates issued by the FDIC after the Penn Square failure in 1982.

NCUA has not sought credit union input for changes to better fulfill CLF’s legislative purpose to ”encourage savings, support consumer and mortgage lending, and provide basic financial resources to all segments of the economy.”

If credit unions are to be asked to fund the CLF more fully, they must be included in the conversation about the CLF’s future.

Reversing an Historic Catastrophe

At year-end 2011 and until October 25, 2012, the CLF was fully funded and covered all credit unions for membership. At the 2011 annual CLF audit, it had an estimated draw of $49.8 billion from the Federal Financing Bank. Total credit union assets at that time were $974 billion.

NCUA described events following the audit in 2012 in the annual report: “Neither USC bridge nor NCUA were able to secure the transition of USC’s products and services to a successor entity, thereby leading the Board’s decision to wind-down and liquidate USC Bridge’s operations as of October 29, 2012.

Accordingly, USC Bridge discontinued its role as the agent group representative for CLF and CLF redeemed USC Bridge’s capital stock on October 25, 2012. The result of the liquidation of the agent group representative is that as of December 31, 2012, CLF membership comprised solely regular members and no agent membership is in place.”

NCUA controlled both the USC Bridge and the CLF. NCUA unilaterally shut down the CLF’s thirty-year record of covering every credit union in the cooperative system.  

US Central was never insolvent when liquidated by NCUA.  US Central’s asset management estate (AME) today reports a positive balance of over $1.7 billion.

The Challenge at This Time

Two of the three current board members were involved in these prior events. Rodney Hood was on the NCUA board that conserved US Central in April 2009, even though solvent and fully reserved for losses. From February 2011 Todd Harper was NCUA’s Director of Public Affairs and senior policy advisor to Chairman Matz when the CLF’s comprehensive industry role was terminated in October 2012.

If the Board can learn from these previous events to again develop a partnership with credit unions about the role of the CLF, they will rectify one of the most unfortunate actions ever taken by NCUA.

Credit unions’ strength is their ability to collaborate, work for shared purpose and exercise patience when resolving problems. If the Board reaches out and listens, real change can be made in the next covid congressional package that will be coming down the congressional pike.

Such a re-design could make the CLF central to the future of the cooperative system and enhance the role laid out for it by Congress. That would be a tremendous opportunity in the current crisis to reverse a mistake from the prior one. Is the Board up to the challenge this time?

Singing Affirming Community

The TV is filled with instances of persons singing during the pandemic. An opera tenor from his balcony in Italy; students from their dorms in Princeton NJ. Clapping, pot banging and yes singing, on the streets of New York for health care workers.

Singing comforts and transcends the moment. It creates and affirms the communities we all belong to. And it can inspire.

Down In the River

For Mennonites, music is integral to their religious services. Their a cappella four-part harmonies of familiar tunes effortlessly engage the listener’s full attention.

An example is this three-minute video recording of Down In the River.

The five verses invite first sisters (women singers) followed by brothers, mothers, fathers and finally all “down in the river” to pray. The swelling chorus walking to the stage adding voices and parts with each verse, repeats the same question. The white, plain headdress on singers and audience reinforces the simplicity of the music’s message.

Going IN the River

But how does going down IN the river relate to now? When uncertainty causes each person’s fate to be more contingent than ever, deeper questions of meaning arise. This reflective instinct is heightened when walking to water-streams, ponds, rivers, ocean fronts. There is a double meaning in the “reflecting pool” in front of Lincoln’s monument in Washington D.C.

In the opening pages of Moby Dick, Ishmael declares, “Yes, meditation and water are wedded forever.” Is covid-19 this generation’s white whale?

For me, this gentle folk tune invites us (show me the way) to go down IN the river and asks: “Who shall wear the starry crown” in this moment?

Why Do We Walk Toward Danger

A college friend who became a doctor and author (pen name Samuel Shem) sent a message about his recent experiences at the NYU Grossman Medical Center. He was lecturing there on March 4th, caught the virus, and transmitted it to his wife. Both have now recovered.

Being on the front lines prompted him to reflect on why health service workers willingly take this risk. Day in and day out. Part of his thoughts follow:

Why do we walk toward danger?” Treating hundreds of patients afflicted by this high-virulence pathogen is scary. Our contact with it can kill us. And we risk infecting our loved ones at home. . .

What brings out our best in horrific times is our connection with each other, our “being with.” The danger mobilizes our shared relationships and focuses our skill. In any of these good connections, we feel more energy, value and understanding of each other, more empowered to act, and a desire to connect again. We come out of these encounters more ready to “do the right thing” for patients, our team, and our selves. We might have felt that we could not go on for another minute, but then—in the connecting—our resilience and energy returns! Good connection makes good care. . .

This is what keeps us going through hard times like these. Simply put, it’s a shift to the “We.” Working together under this pressure brings forth the “we”—and then the “we” strengthens the connection.

Or as Navy Federal Credit Union headlined their annual report several decades ago: “Our strength is our union.”

OIG Report on The FDIC’s Readiness for Crisis

Completed in 2019, the FDIC’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) reissued this report yesterday to assist in responding to the current crisis.

There are two takeaways that could help the credit union system.

The first describes how the FDIC performs self-evaluations of its performance in past crises. This process is summarized in the following paragraph for the Great Recession. To my knowledge, NCUA has never conducted any study of its actions in this event.

Two current board members were directly involved, at different times, in the implementation of the Corporate Resolution plan begun in 2009. The current surplus of over $6 billion from the five corporate liquidations, versus NCUA’s projected costs of $13-$16 billion, suggest the urgency of understanding how such a catastrophic supervisory misjudgment could have occurred.

Below is how the FDIC’s evaluated its role:

“Since its inception in 1933, the FDIC has responded to several financial crises in the banking system. In 2012 and 2017, the FDIC completed two Agency-wide studies of its response to the financial crisis of 2008-2013. These studies identified challenges that the FDIC experienced and addressed during the prior financial crisis, such as those related to staffing, contracting, and information technology. The studies also identified lessons learned and recommendations, some of which the FDIC has incorporated or planned to incorporate into its operations and crisis readiness planning. Such operational improvements have helped the FDIC continue to enhance its readiness for crises impacting insured depository institutions.”

A second benefit of the OIG report is the identification of best practices in crisis management. It evaluated the FDIC’s capability on each of these. These seven practices are listed as follows:

“The OIG identified that guidance established by the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Emergency Management Agency on planning for crisis events could be used as best practices by the FDIC. Additionally, best practices from non-Federal sources reinforce the concepts articulated in Federal best practices.

Our review of these best practices identified seven important elements of a crisis readiness framework that are relevant to the FDIC – (i) Policy and Procedures; (ii) Plans; (iii) Training; (iv) Exercises; (v) Lessons Learned; (vi) Maintenance; and (vii) Assessment and Reporting.”

The 73-page, reissued OIG report is available on the FDIC OIG website.