A Short History of Federal Credit Union Regulators

History matters.  It provides perspective for how we  arrived at our present circumstance.  This context can highlight critical prior assumptions.  It teaches about successes and failings.

Most critically, knowledge of the past can help identify important issues for future sustainability.

In the summary which follows, Ancin Cooley provides insight about the motivations during credit unions founding era.  And what has been lost from that generation’s experiences.

Tomorrow I address the underlying question from this history lesson: What kind of regulator is most likely to sustain an independent cooperative financial option for America?

A  Short History of Credit Union Federal Regulation

By Ancin Cooley

Did you know that between 1934 and 1970, credit unions had four different federal regulators, and none of them actually wanted the job?

Here’s the journey:

1934–1942: Farm Credit Administration
When the Federal Credit Union Act was passed, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury Department were the “logical agencies” to oversee a financial institution. Both said “Nah, we’ll pass.”

1942–1948: FDIC
During World War II, credit unions were temporarily transferred to the FDIC. But the FDIC didn’t want them either.

1948–1953: Social Security Administration
When the FDIC pushed credit unions out, they didn’t go to another financial regulator. Credit unions were placed in the Social Security Administration.

1953–1970: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
When HEW was created, credit unions moved again.

In 1970, the NCUA was established and the NCUSIF created.

What does this tell us?

Credit unions weren’t seen as financial institutions in the same category as banks. The St. Louis Fed wrote: “Credit unions are exempt from federal taxation because Congress views them as member cooperatives and, therefore, quite different from banks and thrifts.”

But why?

Why were credit unions classified differently and given a non-profit status? Many credit unions from that era were born out of crisis. The Great Depression wasn’t an abstraction for the people who built these institutions; it was a lived experience.

From the 1929 crash through 1933, about 9,000 U.S. banks failed. Those failures resulted in approximately $1.3B in losses. (I am sure someone can convert that into today’s dollars)

If you’ve ever known someone from that generation, you know it changed them. My grandmother is 93 years old. She hid money in places we have not yet found. That era shaped how an entire generation related to trust, to institutions, and to one another. Credit unions didn’t grow from a clever marketing campaign. They grew as a community in response to a collapse of trust.

A note on where we are now.

I’ve been wondering why the norms in the credit union movement began to deteriorate about 25 to 30 years ago. I believe the early builders reached a point at which they could no longer protect their institutions.

Many of the things we are watching today would have been harder to pull off if those original guardians were still in the boardroom. I find myself often whispering to myself, “Now, you know this wouldn’t have gone like this if Mr. John were still alive.”

The people who built many of these institutions carried a lived memory of bank failures. They remembered what it felt like to lose everything. That memory did something important. It created guardrails. Because when you have experienced a trust collapse, you do not treat a cooperative as a commodity.

Next post: how the S&L crisis reshaped the credit union landscape, including the entry of bankers who both helped and harmed the movement.

Editor’s note:  I will post my response to Ancin’s insight tomorrow.

 

Can Credit Unions Buy Their Way to Success?.

For the first 75 years of credit union history, member, share and asset growth was from internal, “organic “ business efforts versus external acquisitions.

Some of the factors requiring this approach were regulation, field of membership limits, the absence of external capital or liquidity, and the cooperative design’s  “local” advantage.

After deregulation of financial services became government policy in the 1980’s, many of these constraints were modified.  Growth options expanded. FOM regulations were broadened.  New membership strategies such as indirect lending were introduced.  Credit union leaders expanded their market ambitions.

Purchasing New Accounts

Today many credit union strategies involve both organic and external acquisition growth tactics.

This market bidding for new members is illustrated by financial institutions’ multiple offers for new checking accounts. Here are some recent cash bounties sent to me:

From an airline credit card issuer:

 As a valued  Chase customer we’re thanking you with an up to $900 offer.  Open a new Chase total Checking account and the new Chase Savings account with qualifying business activities. 

One of my credit unions emailed this offer:

Dear Charles,  

You can still earn up to $100 when you open a new Patelco Checking and Money Market account.  Here’s how.

USAA’s post card appeal had this headline; $400 Cash Bonus.  The offer:  When you apply for and open your first USAA Classic Checking account and receive a qualifying direct deposit.  Offer is nontransferable.

A new local bank, Atlantic Union, promised  a $400 welcome bonus in three easy steps.

  1. Open a checking account.
  2. Set up direct deposit.
  3. Collect you $400 bonus.

Not to be outdone, PenFed offers up to $300 for opening a new checking account with  a qualified deposit.  To receive the full $300  requires an initial $20,000  deposit.  The average daily balance must remain above this amount for five months to receive the $300.

Can Credit Unions Win These Bidding Battles?

Indirect auto loans illustrate the ultimate challenge of external asset purchases. Can these new customers  be converted to loyal members.  Or is the transacton a one and done event?

Before deregulation the credit union option was itself compelling.  Word of mouth was the most common marketing effort.  Credit union membership was thought to be a valuable benefit.

One proof of this belief is the many times members moved away from a job or their community, but chose to retain their credit union affiliation-just in case I need it.

In what some CEO’s  view as a commoditized financial services arena, the quickest way to grow is to go buy it.  These efforts include third party loan originations, purchasing individual participations, acquiring whole banks and the ever present offers to merge facilitated by golden parachutes for the selling CEO.

Is offering a better price sustainable?

Will these “bonus” pricing strategies result in long term  loyalty?

What is the Coop Competitive Advantage?

Buying growth seems easy at first.  The costs and immediate increases in size are seen.  The longer term question of whether these relationships last, is down the road.

The tactics of purchasing initial market success raises important  questions:

  • Does cooperative design, other than the federal tax exemption, give the credit unions a competitive advantage in these price/bonus competitions?
  • Does acquisition of new accounts via third parties result in new member relationships, or a temporary lift?
  • If growth via acquisition becomes an important strategic effort, does a cooperative’s internal capability for organic market efforts atrophy?

Buying growth is not a unique market capability.   It is very visible and easy.  Just call up a broker or other third party originator. The real work of relationship building just begins with the booking.

Purchasing growth is constrained by internal resources and market competition. Is attracting new members with a better price the best way to present the cooperative value advantage?

Learning from the Past

The capabilities and reputation that created a $2.3 trillion ciiperative financial system today were built on a foundation of multiple factors.  These included convenience, personal service, local familiarity and a fair price. All wrapped in values centered on collective community care.

The challenge of creating real organizational value is ever present.  The answers are not simple and often unique to a credit union’s situation and leadership skills.

The response is not to go back to a prior era or model. Rather it is a simple lesson from generations of coop success.  If an organization wants to be a credit union, then it must decide to be one.  Not perfect, but at least good.  America has plenty of banks.

P.S.  Here is a case study published by CUDaily of a credit union expansion effort based on credit union advanages: Why a California Credit Union Intro’d a New Digital Brand in Georgia.

 

 

 

 

 

A Startup Story: The Decatur-Wabash Credit Union

In his 1951 book Credit for the Millions, author Richard Giles has just one data chart.   It is used to document an extraordinary example illustrating the author’s thesis of the criticall role of credit unions providing loans for working class Americans.

The  first two decades of the Decatur-Wabash Credit Union chartered in 1928  are told in a case study of a whole chapter,  Working for the Railroad.  The success of this state charter was so great that by 1945 the credit union’s loan outstandings of  $1.005 million were over .80% of the total loan balances for all credit unions.

Following are highlights from the case study.   Its evolution is a remarkable tribute to the power of cooperative credit.

A Roy Bergengren Beginning

The chief rail clerk of the Decatur roundhouse of the Wabash Railroad was Richard Long.  He had read about the new credit union idea.

Railroad’s clerks need for credit was “insatiable.”   Credit union founder Roy Bergengren made a brief transit stop in Decatur to change trains, met with Long and left the legal forms to start a credit union.

By yearend 1928 this new charter had 142 members, 44 borrowers, assess of $1, 738 and  an average loan balance of $22.25.  The following year the credit union “took off” with 732 members and total assets over $22,000.  The average loan balance doubled in size.

Then the Great Depression hit.  New loan balances fell from $40K per year to $10K.  But in 1935 the credit union took three initiatives that recaptured its growth momentum.  As industrial activity began to recover, the credit union opened its membership to all employees of the Wabash railroad from Buffalo to Omaha.

Secondly it offered life savings and loan protection insurance after CUNA was organized in 1935.   Finally, to serve all Wabash employees, the credit union began payroll deduction for its savings and loan accounts. Credit union policy required a regular savings program to obtain a loan.

Membership took off growing from 1,000 in 1936 to 6,702 in 1949.  The free life savings and loan protection insurance was an important benefit drawing new members. The treasurer (CEO) of the credit union stated the benefit was  the primary reason for  extraordinary growth. The author provides specific examples of insurance payments for individual accounts and circumstances.

The Member’s Voice

The one policy that was not universal among credit unions was the compulsory savings requirement to obtain a loan.  As summarized by the author:  “Most credit unions were afraid that it might alienate borrowers. The fact that it has not done so to any perceptible degree in Decatur-Wabash seems to prove that perseverance and sincerity can overcome almost any obstacle.   Perhaps it should also be pointed out that the policy, like all the other Decatur-Wabash Principles is subject to review at all time by the membership, who can unseat their board of directors or reverse their policy at any time. The members have accepted compulsory savings because it presumably makes savers out of borrowers.” (pages 117-118) 

The book’s purpose is to describe how critical credit unions were in meeting consumers’ need for credit.  In this case study he describes the circumsances that made its lending so pivotal.  Loans secured by savings were granted immediately.  Emergency loans are granted by telephone.  The two primary loan purposes were for medical expenses and household improvements.  The credit union had not entered auto lending at that point.

Proving a Point

The only chart in this 200 page book is the yearend loan balances of all credit unions from 1940 through 1947 compared to Decatur-Wabash’s total loans outstanding (page 119).  This one credit union’s loans grew from .25% to . 62% of all credit union outstandings in these eight years.  The peak percentage was in 1945 at .80%.

In 1947 there were 8,930 active credit unions (3, 845 FCU’s and 5,085 state chaters).  In less than one generation of leadership, Decatur-Wabash had become a leader showing how a single startup can lead an industry even in the uncertainty of the depression and the the financial priorities of WW II.

It is a case study which is a factual and detailed tribute to a remarkable run of performance and the power of democratic governance.   My only question:  What happened to this charter?  I have not found the rest of the story, if anyone has this information.

The Most Consequential GAC Speech in Credit Union History

NCUA Chairman Ed Callahan  spoke to CUNA’s GAC conference in Washington DC on February 8, 1984.

He urged his listeners to support the most vital change in the system since the passage of the FCU Act in 1934.

His title was Finish the Job.  He challenged credit unions to strengthen their NCUSIF insurance fund by backing legislation redesigning it using cooperative principles.

The talk is  11 minutes.  Ed provides an update on the state of the credit union system in one word, “fantastic.” He puts the current situation in the context of 75 years of credit union history.  He describes how deregulation is meeting the needs of the country’s changing economy.

An Advocate for Credit Unions

His closing is a call to support a Better Way for  the NCUSIF.  He asks credit unions to compare the cost savings under the 1% solution to the current two premium model.  And then to champion the change in a bill introduced by Senator Jake Garn.

The recording is from a cassette of the live speech with the video overlays added later.

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UcXPyUMtic)

This is an example of the profound change possible for credit unions when all parties work together to benefit members.