What kind of financial regulator would be most effective to carry on the purpose of the credit union system stated in the FCU ACT?
Should the credit union system be overseen by a regulator of cooperatives or of financial institutions?
The arc of federal regulation from 1934 to today is simple. The federal regulator evolved from the role of chartering, promoting and supervising cooperatives to just another financial supervisor safeguarding an insurance fund.
The coop design is unique in American financial options. The users are the sole owners of the service. The intent was to create shared community resources not private wealth. The structure was to be perpetual with the common equity always “paid forward” to benefit future generations.
Moreover, financial soundness was underwritten by this shared purpose of borrowers and savers. Governance was democratic–each member-owners had one vote. No proxies.
The Impact of NCUSIF On Coop Regulation
The turning point in cooperative regulation was the 1970 passage of a federal deposit insurance (NCUSIF) option modeled after the FDIC and FSLIC. The banking funds were created in the early 1930’s in response to the “banking holiday” failures in the depression. The nascent state chartered credit union movement had no such system failures. Deposit insurance was not part of the FCU act passed in 1934. It wasn’t needed.
The need for the NCUSIF was much debated by credit unions in the lated 1960’s. CUNA opposed the option arguing such an institution would eventually dominate the system’s functioning. A new trade association, NAFCU, was formed to lobby for and pass this federal option for cooperatives.
The NCUSIF was not created because of system failures. Rather it was a recognition that cooperatives, while different in design, were just as safe as any for-profit banking option.
As NCUSIF insurance spread, so did federal regulation mimicking other banking regulations.
From Cooperative Partner to Financial Overseer
When implementing deregulation from 1981-1985, NCUA Chairman Callahan asserted credit unions were unique. The so-called level playing field arguments, he believed, would undermine the cooperative advantages of member-ownership.
Callahan believed regulations should promote cooperative purpose and collaborative actions. Both tenants were key tp the financial restructure of the NCUSIF and achieving 100% credit union participation in the unique CLF’s-coop system liquidity partnership.
But the bureaucratic pull of Washington prompted later NCUA leaders to emulate the example and practices of banking regulators. Safety and soundness, not member service, became the regulator’s mantra.
Both NCUA and credit unions sought Congressional hearing seats at the tables with the titans of America’s financial services.
Today NCUA has copied banking regulators with rules such as risk-based capital and, expanding market sources of capital. New charters are non-existent. Cooperative purpose is never mentioned in supervisory priorities.
NCUA oversight has fluctuated between laisse faire (let the free market decide) to embracing the administration’s political ideology from DEI to government downsizing.
The absence of any reference to coop design is that there is no protection for for member-owner rights or their collective savings. NCUA like the banking regulators has reduced their oversight to merely offering a $250,000 payout in the event of institutional failure.
This neglect of member-owners’ rights has resulted in boards staying in power perpetually. Owners are kept out of any governance or voting role. Bylaws are modified with NCUA approval to prevent member initiatives. Boards and CEO’s feel free to take the credit union’s business model and its billions in legacy assets in any direction they choose.
Transparency for cu leaders’ conduct is non-existent. Director fiduciary duties flouted. Accountability for outcomes occurs only after a financial crisis. Then the system’s leadership shortcomings are quickly swept under the rug via mergers.
When new CEO’s arrive from outside the coop system, often former for-profit financial professionals, they bring their prior experiences with them. They act like teenagers given a new high-powered formula 1 car. With board assent, they jump into the driver’s seat and try to see how fast they can make their new institution grow.
The NCUA’s Future
Today NCUA acts and sounds like the other banking regulators. Credit unions applaud the Trump adminisration policy of government tear down and relaxed o exam oversight. NCUA appears alongside the other financial overseers in Congressional hearings, states all is well, and makes no effort to describe how the tax exempt coop system is fulfilling any public duty.
The consequence is that credit unions no longer see their organization as part of an interdependent financial system. Institutional success is celebrated versus cooperative’s ability to create better financial solutions for those who have the least or know the least about personal finances.
Individual credit union priorities look more and more like capitalist business plans. They attempt to acquire, not support their peers, via merger acquisitions. If that fails, just buy a bank.
With self-perpetuating board oversight, regulatory withdrawal, no transparency about transfers using tens of millions of member-owners’ capital, the cooperative system may lack the capacity for self-correction. Industry hegemony, not cooperative purpose, becomes the institution’s endgame.
How much longer will Congress or public policy think tanks not pose the existential questions: Why does America need a financial system that emulates its competitors, but with a tax exemption? Will NCUA become part of Treasury’s financial oversight, just like the OCC? Why have two federally managed deposit insurance funds that provide the same function?
“It Makes No Sense:” One Analyst’s Assessment
Yesterday’s post gave a brief history of federal regulatory evolution, It tracked the various federal governmental departments that shepard credit union’s evolution. And subsequent events under NCUA as an independent agency. This is that author, Ancin Coolley’s concern, about where the coop movement stands today.
When you read credit union regulatory history and go back to the arguments, it keeps bringing me to this point: the FDIC and other agencies did not want credit unions. And it calls to mind the question, why did they not want them?
They did not want them because credit unions were not treated the same way as other financial institutions. They were viewed as something that drifted into a social-services posture.
And honestly, the more I dig into the history and the legal history, the more it feels like I’m finding out Santa Claus isn’t real. The more I learn about the lack of standing for members in court, and the reality that there’s often no remedy for members against directors who effectively give away capital, the more disorienting it feels.
It’s like there’s the reality I want to believe in, and then there’s the legal reality of what a credit union actually does.
And what I can’t even begin to reconcile conceptually is this: credit unions want to maintain their tax exemption while also purchasing banks. In good conscience, I can’t even argue against someone who says, “How are you going to maintain your tax exemption if you’re buying a bank, when you were originally given a tax exemption for not being a bank?”
It makes absolutely no sense.