Category: credit union data

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For Members’ Sake: Let’s Start Recognizing the Real  “Market” Value of a Credit Union

Today credit unions operate in two financial worlds.  One is the so called “free market.” This is where open competition, winner-take-all, buying and selling happens. Members/consumers make their buying decisions comparing options.  The winners are firms with superior value propositions including better products, service, convenience and sometimes marketing.

This is the market credit unions enter when buying banks or  investing in other firms (CUSO’s, Fintechs) to advance their credit union’s competitive position. Corporate transactions are marked by due diligence assisted by external experts, and financial projections with ROI’s and cash flow forecasts.  Often these deals are subject to close regulatory scrutiny in addition to buyer and seller’s close analysis.

Transactions in credit union’s “off market” financial  activity are not based on transparency, superior performance or even shareholder/owners best interest.  This is the “insiders game” of private deal making, self-enrichment and public misinformation and rhetoric to benefit the players’ personal agendas.

Today this is the world of credit union mergers.  It is increasingly  a cesspool of pretend member advantages disguising payoffs  to facilitate changes in control of sound long-serving institutions.

There is no owner payment or recognition as occurs in the “free market” transactions.  In fact these are totally “free” transfers  in which the continuing credit union is paid to take over the business.  The owner’s net worth is transferred intact to the acquirer. This is the complete opposite of an open market transaction.  It would never happen in a fully transparent actual market sale.

The Critical Issue

The critical question for the credit union system’s future is why aren’t members paid for their ownership interest when there is a change of control.  It happens some with market facing events, but never in mergers. Without any payments upon a charter’s dissolution, member-ownership is a fiction.

Credit unions do know how to value a financial institution, their own coops and other for profit firms.

Credit union  capacity and interest in buying other financial institutions, particularly banks is ever-increasing.   These all-cash purchase and assumptions totaled 16 in 2022, 11 in 2023 and at least 17 announced so far in 2024.

In most purchases, the transaction price ranges from 1.5 to 2.0 times book value.  Where the bank is publicly traded, the offers always exceed the last market quotation prior to the sale announcement. Here is an example.

The Most Recent Bank Purchase Announcement

Yesterday  the $9.2 billion ESL FCU announced the acquisition of the $401 million Generations bank (Nasdaq: GBNY).  Prior to the announcement GBNY’s one day high for the past year was $10.76.  Today, post announcement, it closed at $15.75 per share.

In the announcement the bank estimates the range of final cash payments for each share to be $18-$20.   From the joint press release:  “ESL Federal Credit Union will pay Generations $26.2 million in cash and Generations Bank will retain its equity at the effective time of the P&A Transaction.”

Generations Bancorp has 2,241,801 outstanding shares of common stock.  If $20 is the final disribution per share, then the bank owners will receive a total of $44.8 million, that is their equity and ESL’s $26.2 million payment.

We know there must be some pretty sharp financial analysts at ESL which is paying $26.2 million cash for an institution whose track record includes the following:

  1. The bank has lost money, every quarter, for the last three quarters.
  2. The bank has an efficiency ratio over 100%, every quarter, for the last three quarters.
  3. This means the bank lost money, before factoring in provision for loan loss expense.
  4. Since 2015, the bank has produced an ROA over 0.50% just once.
  5. It’s pretax ROA through 6/30 of this year is negative 0.90%.

How  Bank Purchases Should Inform Credit Union Owners

The example of credit unions paying cash in a bank P&A, effectively a liquidation, demonstrates credit union’s willingness to analyze market value and to pay up for performing financial assets.  In these deals, there is no charter acquired. just an operating business.

Moreover each of these transactions is reviewed and approved by at least three very interested parties:

  1. The owners who will ask is this price fair and a better option than not selling?
  2. The FDIC will examine for any residual risk to the bank fund.
  3. The NCUA will review for any safety and soundness implications and compliance with credit union regulations for acquired assets and FOM limits.

The point of this example, and almost 50 recent bank acquisitions is that credit union’s know how to value the potential future ROI of a financial institution’s assets.

So how might this skill apply to valuation of a credit union?  While there are not many recent examples, there is one thoroughly documented transaction.

The Nationwide FCU Sale to Nationwide Bank

In 2006 the sponsor of Nationwide FCU announced its intent to buy its credit union to accelerate its banking operations.   Founded in 1951, the single sponsor credit union was almost an extension of the insurance company. Almost all of its members were Nationwide employees, former employees or retirees and their families. The CU’s employees were all Nationwide Insurance employees and the CU performed very few of its administrative functions on its own.

The first question for the members was: “Will the 45,000 owners of the $564 million Nationwide FCU be offered enough money for their credit union?”

The credit union’s key numbers at December 2006, right after the vote were:  Assets $564.1 million;  Loans  $  418.3 million;  Net Worth $61.5 million (12.7%); shares $489.3 million; and Members, 45,002.  Nationwide was the 4th largest of Ohio’s 495 credit unions.

Further comments from an August 8, 2006 Credit Union Times article about the sale:

“When what is happening in so many other merger and charter conversions amounts to little more than thievery, the fact that Nationwide was willing to try to do the right thing means a lot,” said Jim Blaine, CEO of the $13 billion State Employees’ Credit Union. 

Blaine said that his comments and support for the purchase reflected the degree of transparency that the CU has offered. “If that transparency were to diminish, if the CU were to hold back on letting its members and the public at large know about how it and Nationwide Bank arrived at the $79 million price tag, then the deal might face more of an uphill climb,”  Blaine explained. 

The final member Notice disclosures were significant including full details of merger costs, loss of member control, and that taxation of the bank might lower returns to savers. The article continues:

McCune and other banking analysts note that a premium of even 150% or 200% of equity for an independent CU might not be out of line and would still be considered inexpensive compared to the prices commanded by independent thrifts. . . 

“The phenomenon (of a credit union sale) is more likely to remain an occasional development where banks might approach CUs which have access to particular markets or market niches and where CU members would be willing to sell. Everyone has a price,” the analyst noted, 

The Nationwide sale was approved by a wide margin in as reported in this November 7 article:

CEO Paula Edwards said that almost 17,000 of the CU members took part in the election and that almost 90% of the members who voted cast ballots in favor of the merger. 

Approving the deal means that Nationwide’s members will receive $79 million total, or roughly 15% of their account balances as of the end of March of this year as the price for the sale. The new bank will benefit from the purchase by having a readymade customer and deposit base that would have taken it months or years to develop otherwise. 

The Significance of Nationwide FCU’s Sale

Members were returned all of their cooperative capital plus an estimated premium of $17 million more.  This represented a gain of approximately 15% on their individual share balances.  In banking sales, this valuation is often referred to as the deposit premium when valuing a transaction.

According to CU Times, there were some who thought this transaction could be an example for additional deals.

Some view the Nationwide deal as the model for the potential takeovers of credit unions. Nationwide was a very unique case, , , CEO Paula Edwards is one of the true good credit union people and had little choice in that deal. The reasons behind it can be thrown out, but what can’t be thrown out is the premium on capital Nationwide Bank was willing to pay, that’s the potential model going forward. 

“This proposed merger ensures credit union members receive a financial benefit in the transaction. Nationwide has agreed to give members a payment for their ownership interest in the credit union,” said NFCU CEO Paula Edwards.

The Irony of This Transaction

On May 7, 2018 Nationwide announced it was getting out of the retail banking business.

The insurer said Monday that it has decided to move away from operating as a full-service, federally chartered retail bank — the kind of place where people cash checks, sign up for CDs and the like. Instead, it plans to focus its bank-related services on those that support its retirement-plan business. 

Implementing this intention, Nationwide made a follow on announcement August 3rd, 2018:

Nationwide has taken a big step as part of its plan to get out of the retail banking business. 

The insurer said Friday that it is selling $3 billion in deposits at Nationwide Bank to BofI Holding, the parent of BofI Federal Bank, in a deal that is expected to close before the end of the year. The sales price was not disclosed. 

BofI Federal Bank, based in San Diego, is a nationwide bank that provides financing for single-family and multifamily residential properties and small and medium-sized business in certain target areas. 

Even selling to a new charter or transferring control does not assure financial longevity.

How NFCU and Bank Transactions Are Relevant Now

There are two immediate conversions from a credit union charter that will entail a valuation with  potential member payout.

June 23, 20 24 the FDIC announced the following:

The FDIC approved a deposit insurance application submitted by Thrivent Financial for Lutherans in relation to a proposed Utah industrial bank, Thrivent Bank. The FDIC also approved a related merger application that will permit Thrivent FCU to merge the operations of its existing credit union into the newly formed Thrivent Bank. 

The newly approved Thrivent Bank will not operate physical branch office locations and intends to deliver all bank products and services exclusively online, offering a diversified loan portfolio centered in consumer loans and funded primarily by core deposits, following a traditional bank business model.  Thrivent Bank will offer products and services without regard to religious affiliation.

Thrivent FCU has total assets of $930 million and a net worth of $129 million . What will member-owners receive in this sale to an industrial bank charter formed by the Sponsoring company?   Will it follow the Nationwide payment precedent?

The second event is the combination Arrah Credit Union with the $378 million, mortgage centric, Pittsfield Cooperative Bank.  The details are in this August  14, 2024 Credit Union Times report:

Chartered in 1929, Arrha’s 27 employees operate three locations, and manage $110 million in loans, $122 million in total shares and deposits, and $12.4 million in equity, according to NCUA financial performance reports. The credit union posted a loss of $9,222 at the end of the second quarter.

The process to combine is very cumbersome. A minimum of 20% of the eligible members are required to vote for the transaction to proceed.

Arrha’s NIMRA application, under review by the NCUA, included 15 different documents and statements such as the merger plan, the proposed merger agreement, a copy of the bank’s last two examination reports, copies of all contracts reflecting any merger-related compensation or other benefit to be received by any director or senior executive, a statement of the merger valuation of the credit union, and a statement of whether any merger payment will be made to the members and how much of a payment will be distributed among members.

The question raised by these two current events, the growth in bank purchases and the Nationwide sale and other conversion precedents is why aren’t credit union being  member-owners compensated today? When  members are asked to approve the transfer and control of all their assets and common wealth to another credit union via merger, shouldn’t they be treated as least as well as when credit unions pay out bank owners?

Time to Take a Stand and Act

Its time for those who believe in a cooperative system to take a stand and ensure that intra-industry mergers reflect the same process and member-owner payments as every other credit union financial transaction requires.

Without change, the industry will be in  a race to the bottom.   As I described yesterday, one predatory credit union, PenFed, has cancelled 30 long serving credit union charters via merger between 2003 and 2022.   Even as PenFed hits a financial stall, this activity is being imitated by others daily.

Credit unions want all the authorities and options to compete in the open financial markets, but not when it comes to their own brethren.   These industry predators want the opportunities of the free market, but not the responsibility of transparent dealing and ownership reward when taking over another credit union.

These “off market” dealings are corrupting leaders, perverting normal financial practice and encouraging credit unions to go out and “roll up” their kindred in bigger and bigger combinations.  This trend is subverting not just the traditional practice of market based firms, but driving a consolidation eliminating one of the most stratgic advantages of a credit union charter: local control, investment, relationships and community building.

Why can’t the Nationwide outcome be the standard for all credit union mergers as well.  From the above event:

what can’t be thrown out ( of the outcome) is the premium on capital Nationwide Bank was willing to pay, that’s the potential model going forward. 

Shouldn’t that be the model today for all change of control credit union transactions?

 

 

 

 

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How Mergers Tear Down the Credit Union System

The front page headline in the June 18, 2003 American Banker was “Pentagon Continues Merger Binge.”

The opening paragraph provided the details:

Pentagon FCU was approved to acquire its third credit union in the past six months, the $26 million Fort Hood Military FCU, in Fort Hood Texas, NCUA said Tuesday. That follows two December acquisitions for the $5.8billion credit union, those of $46 million Fort Shafter FCU in Hawaii and $13 million Coast Guard Employees FCU in Maryland.

This twenty year old description was before mergers of sound, long serving independent credit unions became much more widespread. A decade later credit union system CEO’s, consultants and regulators openly promoted these acquisitions as a quick and easy alternative to internal organic growth.  After all isn’t success just a factor of size?

This industry competition for acquisitions was based on offering private personal inducements for CEO’s and senior managers.  The practice became so blatant that in 2017 NCUA passed a rule to bring more transparency to the process.   The rule didn’t slow the wheeling and dealing.   It may have even legitimized these payoffs.

Now credit unions could routinely add wording to the required Notice and Disclosures of these payments and state that the regulators have approved the merger subject only to the member vote.

A Case Study Lookback

Two weeks ago I described the final step in PenFed’s 2021 merger with the $36 million Post Office Credit union in Madison, WI.  In August 2024 PenFed announced the closing of its only office in Madison. Since the 1934 chartering, Post Office’s 3,153 members (at time of merger) had received personal service.  No more.

I called this closure the final step in “asset stripping.” This is the practice in a takeover acquisition to maximize the profit and eliminate any future investment or expenses. All of Post Office’s resources, reserves, member accounts were transferred to the control of the Virginia based PenFed.  There is no longer any local presence, nuance or leadership roles in the community. With this branch closure, all member relationships are now virtual and remote.

The Final Cashout

Last week the land and building of the former Post Office location were put up for sale.

An internal view.

When the merger occurred, Post Office’s call report showed these assets with a book value of $589,222.  The real estate listing on September 17, 2024 had a list price of $1,260,000.  This is an increase of $671,000 (113%) in the three and one half years since the merger.   The net gain on sale all goes to PenFed as “other operating income.”   This is the final liquidation step of this 90-year old credit union which had 22% net worth at the merger date.

All Gain, No Risks, Members Left Behind

Paying nothing in these acquisitions for total control of  all of another credit union’s members’ net worth and reserves makes these takeovers a very profitable practice.  Systematically  stripping out all of the most valuable assets for maximum cash value puts the icing on the cake.  No worry about local commitments or member and community relationships.

Such takeovers are a common strategy in for-profit companies.   However in credit unions there is no acquisition cost, just a few crucial payouts to the CEO and perhaps,  other senior executives whose approval and pitch to the Board is required. It is literally free assets for the taking.

This practice is becoming more widespread.  It is  self-immolation, a systematic  institutional dismantling of the credit union system driven by greed and personal ambition, not member benefit.

In many situations today, the merger destroys the local advantages, loyalties and relationships that are the foundation for credit union’s success. The acquiring credit union’s field of membership, or market focus, has no center or rationale. There are no “network effects” for branding or service delivery that would create operational efficiencies.  Most critically the headquarters and leadership is  hundreds or thousands of miles away.  Local familiarity is all lost.

The consequence of credit unions preying and suborning their fellow CEO’s and boards is systematically demolishing the credit union advantage at both a market level and in the public’s eye.  The coop model is seen as no different from other financial options.  Especially in an era when virtual relationships are available from all financial providers.

And a credit union’s values are the same as every other market participant.  The winner takes all.

The rationale is that growth and size will guarantee success, an assumption frequently at odds with the facts and members’ experience.  Size does not automatically correlate with efficiency, growth or other financial metrics let alone operational excellence.

The PenFed Merger Demolition Derby Takes Off Again

Penfed pulled back from the American Banker’s “binge” strategy during the initial years of this century.  It should be noted that the three mergers listed in the article were all military bases.  One could argue that these were natural affiliations consistent with with PenFed’s focus and traditional brand.  In 2010 there was a single merger with the $11.6 million Tripler FCU in Hawaii.  And then a lull until 2015.

The Merger Frenzy Begins

In 2015 PenFed undertook an aggressive acquisition campaign that lasted until 4Q 2022.  They took over 25 credit unions located in 14 different states in under eight years.  The majority had no military affiliation, such as Post Office, McGraw Hill, Sperry Associates and Progressive.

Progressive, a New York state charter with a single office focused on taxi medallion lending.  This merger of a “troubled” institution resulted in a gain in the year acquired; more importantly it gave PenFed a field of membership open to anyone in America (the old Progressive state charter’s FOM).

The combined  assets of these 25 acquisitions at the time of merger was almost $3.0 billion.    As in Post Office’s example, control over all the assets, reserves, allowances and  member relationships were transferred to PenFed’s head office.  In some instances such as the very successful $265 million  Perry Associates single office credit union, the office was closed immediately after the merger. The employees  were let go, and all members forced into a virtual, remote service model.

Dismantling the Coop System

This systematic dismantling of credit unions and their successful local market positions is being emulated by other credit unions.  The hunt is  supported by a host of hanger’s on who benefit by facilitating this organized tear down of the cooperative alternative.

In many of the combinations below, the members, if a merger were really necessary, would have been better off with a local option familiar with their market and bringing real operational synergies.  But  in these private deal makings, the largest payoff to the CEO wins.  And besides no one ever looks back to see what happened.  Except for the members who begin to vote with their feet.

PenFed’s Eight Year Acquisition Spree

But  Does It Work?

One could still ask however if the strategy works as a growth enhancement to normal organic tactics. When PenFed completed the final Allus acquisition in 4Q 2022, it reported total assets of $35.9 billion.

At June 2024, PenFed’s total assets were $33.5 billion.   It would take more time to calculate all the other merger downsides such as local branches closed, the employees laid off and the number of members who left after being turned over to an organization with which they have no connection.   In its initial merger frenzy, PenFed’s growth looked easy and free of any cost or risks.

However members soon see the asset stripping and the absence of local leadership. Moreover, PenFed lost every credit union’s most important strategic advantage: the hard earned, unique value of long lasting member relationships.

When CEO’s care more about themselves then they do for members’ well being, the difference that makes cooperatives successful is gone.

PenFed is not alone in its disruptive wasting of long standing successful cooperative charters.  The question for those who believe in the unique role and purpose of cooperative design, is whether this faux capitalistic model becomes the norm for the system.  Or  like all false idols, will be defeated by the example of those who think the credit union model is first and foremost for members’ benefit, not managers or boards’ personal ambitions.

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Are Members “Gaming” Their Credit Union?

From the field. A recent story by a colleague working on site with a client.

I just wrapped up a meeting with a $6 billion CU that does a lot of indirect lending.

  1. Used car values are falling.
  2. Manufacturers are providing strong incentives for new vehicle purchases.
  3. Some credit unions are desperate for income and are attracting business with below market rates via their indirect relationships.

The CFO shared that members with an expensive to own, drive, and insure car are going out and buying another car that is much cheaper to own, drive, and insure–both new and used models.   But from a different funding source. For example,  another credit union who will extend credit because the member’s credit score is still good, but about to take a nosedive.

The member knows they can’t afford to keep their existing vehicle.  Then after they purchase the “cheaper to own” car, they bring the “expensive to own” vehicle to the credit union and hand over the keys.

The result is that the credit union is experiencing higher than expected losses because used car values are falling, and the cars being turned in are more expensive to own.

Long Story Short

The  member lowers monthly payments and the cost to own a vehicle.  The old car is turned back to the credit union.  The member is unconcerned about how it impacts their credit score going forward.

The credit union has limited recourse because the “member” has just a “$5 savings account” required to join the credit union.  (This is an indirect relationship only)

I am hopeful for a soft landing from this financial substitution scheme, but not everyone is on the same flight.

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From the Rust Belt to the Sun Belt and Back?

Two days ago CNBC host Kelly Evans in her periodic column The Exchange offered the following observations (excerpts):

“Owning real estate in the “sun belt” has probably been one of the greatest money-making opportunities of the past twenty or thirty years. And Covid, and the rise of remote work, has only accelerated all of that. 

“Or has it? The San Francisco Fed just put out a new study suggesting that it could be the “End of an Era” for the snow-belt-to-sun-belt migration which has been the distinctive feature of U.S. population shifts over the past 50 years. Their argument? The South is getting too hot. 

“It may sound like a reach, but their data on population shifts is worth considering. It shows many more parts of the sun belt losing population from 2010 through 2020 than in prior decades. Places in particular like Western Texas and Louisiana. (Although Florida–experiencing an influx of New Yorkers in recent years–remains an exception.) 

“The U.S. population is starting to migrate away from areas increasingly exposed to extreme heat days,” the researchers write, “toward historically colder areas, which are becoming more attractive as extreme cold days become increasingly rare.” Cities like Baton Rouge, Jackson (Mississippi), Shreveport, Garland (Texas); and Long Beach (California) stand out as seeing population declines both pre- and post-pandemic, according to Census figures. 

“Even Phoenix’s population growth has been slowing. By last year, it grew just 0.4%–a quarter of the growth rate it enjoyed pre-pandemic. Houston saw big declines in 2021. . .

“The Midwest could be a big beneficiary of a re-shift.  “Markets that are more affordable, that are enjoying 80-degree summers while other people are boiling, might become a lot more attractive–like Cleveland,” real estate expert Ivy Zelman says, which could be one market in particular to watch. 

“On top of the heat and storms, sun belt populations are also grappling with issues like soaring home insurance premiums (in Florida), or flood insurance premiums (in Louisiana). Real estate prices have also risen significantly in recent years, negating a big part of the cost savings in relocating from the north. 

“And you know what? New Jersey (where author Kelly lives) is lovely, actually. The towns are small and walkable. Errands are all pretty close. The hospital I had my kids at was seven minutes away. Some towns even pick up your trash from the backyard! And being close to Manhattan is a pretty nice perk. Last year was the first year since 2010 that the state actually saw positive net migration. 

“If by some twist of fate this continues, parts of the country that were previously left for dead might be the biggest economic beneficiaries in years to come.”

Strategic Assumptions Turned Upside Down

A significant credit union advantage has been their local roots.  This is partly a function of the field of membership and initial sponsor support; partly the limits of capital; but mostly because this market focus and knowledge created a major strategic advantage over much larger, often out-of-area competitors.

Local meant being part of the community with loyalty passed down through generations.  Then multiple economic shocks and changing regulatory options provided credit unions opportunities to move beyond their historical boundaries.  Select employee groups, multiple counties and even whole states defined new market potential.

After the financial crisis in 2008/09 some credit unions began to seek out of state expansions to diversify beyond their local economy into more appealing growth markets.

A major focus was the sunbelt states, especially Florida. Florida has no state income tax, strong growth, favorable weather and is a retirement destination for credit union executives from the colder states in the northeast and Midwest.

Since 2015, investments via bank purchases, mergers and some new branches have been made by out of state credit unions.  Here is a current estimate of the totals of this activity in Florida by the home state of these “foreign” credit union expansions:

Florida’s Out of State Credit Union Branches

CUs                          Branches
AL 2 6
CA 3 11
GA 2 2
ID 1 1
IL 1 2
MI 2 26
MN 2 2
MO 1 3
NC 1 8
NY 2 2
PA 1 1
TX 2 7
VA 3 36

Totals                  23                                107

These 107 branches are 10% of the 1,045 credit union locations in the state.

Some of these locations undoubtedly serve existing FOM’s such as Navy, Pentagon, and Walt Disney World.  But many represent investments to diversify from cold weather states to warmer climes as in the case of the 26 Michigan branches.

In Nevada, 25 credit unions manage 120 branches.  Of these totals, 11 credit unios are from out of state and manage 50 of the in-person locations.  Mountain American based in Utah has the most branches in the state.

Now Climate Change

While the economic outlook, warmer weather and personal tax advantages may cause Florida and Nevada to appear as attractive expansion opportunities, managing a single branch or small system away from the home office market is a challenge.  The network effects from expansion in adjacent markets are lacking.  There is no brand awareness or legacy reputation in these new locations. Any existing members may live in the area only temporarily.

Are these out of state, diversification outposts hundreds or thousands of miles from a credit union’s primary service area worth it?   What is the ROA of these investments?

Might more stable and innovative future growth now be in areas around major cities in the northeast and midwest such as Detroit, Cleveland, Toledo, Buffalo. Grand Rapids, Milwaukee?  Will local and national infrastructure investment and less extreme climate now make these THE future growth markets?

Is a compilation of “odd lot” branches around the country via mergers or occasional bank purchases a coherent strategy or merely ambition ungrounded by reality?

 

 

 

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What the State of Credit Union System in 1944 Means Today

As the 80th Anniversary of the June 6, 1944 Allied landings at Normandy draws to a close, we listen with great interest to the living participants’ stories of that consequential event. They did their part. Now it is up to us that their examples of duty, service and honor be carried forward for freedom’s fight

One might also ask about the state of the credit union experiment at this time.  Are there any lessons relevant for today from four score years ago? What examples might inspire current cooperative leaders?

The first surprise is that there is a very comprehensive analysis on the cooperative system including details that are directly relevant for today’s priorities.   The source for this information is Bulletin #850, from the Department of Labor titled:  Activities of Credit Unions in 1944. 

This 16 page report contains historical tables, state and federal totals for numbers of credit unions, total assets and members, number of loans made and dollar amounts outstanding in each state and for national totals.  One table records the number of state and federal charters that are active from 1925 through 1944.  The cost of the report was just five cents.

Observations on 1944 Credit Union Trends

The impact of the war on credit union lending is central in this analysis:

The entry of the United States into the war was followed by a sharp decline in the credit union movement. Many associations were liquidated, membership fell off, and credit union loans showed a precipitous drop.

This was caused by a number of factors. Among them were the issuance by the Federal Reserve Board of Regulation W (limiting to 18 months—later to 12 months—the period of repayment of installment purchases or loans made for that purpose), the disappearance from the market of higher-priced consumer goods (automobiles, refrigerators, etc.) for which many credit union loans had previously been made, the restrictions on the use of building materials, the emphasis on repayment of debts and the inadvisability of incurring new obligations of that nature, and the increased wartime earnings of wage earners which resulted in a lessened need for credit.

However, some trends were looking better:

Reversing a trend that has been sharply downward since the beginning of the war, both the membership and business of credit unions showed an increase in 1944, although the number of associations was smaller than in 1943.

At the end of 1944 the number of associations on the register totaled 9,099, as compared with 10,373 in 1943. The 8,702 associations active and reporting for 1944 had 3,027,694 members and made loans aggregating $212,305,479. These represented increases, as compared with 1943, of 0.1 percent in members and 1.7 percent in loans.

Total assets which have continued to increase all through the war years, even while number of associations, membership, and business were declining, mounted to $397,929,814, or 12.0 percent above 1943.   

The Bulletin also provides a brief history of credit union chartering.  Here is one excerpt: 

. . .in 1934, therefore, a credit union act was passed by the Congress of the United States and the Credit Union Division was created in the Farm Credit Administration to oversee the carrying out of the law and render various services to the associations formed under it.

From that time onward, until checked by wartime conditions, the credit union movement expanded at an accelerated pace. Not only did the associations with Federal charters spring up and grow, but the older State-chartered movement also seemed to be stimulated to growth considerably faster than its previous pace. The rate of growth of the Federal credit unions, however, was consistently higher than that of the State-chartered associations, and by the end of 1944 the Federal credit unions accounted for 43.1 percent of the members, 36.9 percent of the loans made, and 36.3 percent of the total assets of the credit union movement.

The FDIC Supervises

In 1942 the federal Credit Union Division which was first placed under the Farm Credit Administration was transferred to the FDIC.  The FDIC administered the Federal Act but did not insure credit unions, only banks.

What makes the financial details in this report so remarkable is that the totals for the 9,099 credit unions were all maintained by hand.  Credit unions used only hand posted card ledgers and total tapes run on mechanical adding machines. There were no databases for quick comparisons, summaries and trends.  Given these conditions, the report’s historical tables and graphs are even more remarkable for their thoroughness and timeliness. (the Bulletin is dated October 16, 1945)

The Status of Negro Credit Unions

One of the most enlightening analysis is under a section called Experience of Federal Credit Unions.  Here are the details:

The Federal Credit Union Division of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has made available to the Bureau of Labor Statistics certain information on Negro credit unions and on all liquidations of associations organized under the Federal Credit Union Act. Unfortunately, similar data are not available for the State associations.  

Negro credit unions 

By the end of 1944 a total of 91 credit unions had been organized, under the Federal Act, among Negroes. Of these, 74, or 81 percent, were in active operation at the end of the year, and the remainder were inoperative or had had their charters canceled. For the entire group of Federal credit unions 74 percent were active.  

The following tabulation compares the 72 Negro associations for which data were available with the whole group of 3,795 reporting Federal credit unions. As it indicates, the Negro associations, although smaller than the average for all Federal credit unions and less well financed, were holding their own very well and even excelled the showing of the whole group as regards bad loans that had to be written.

Liquidation Information

Information for 1,109 Federal credit unions that were discontinued during the period from June 26, 1934, through 1944 indicates that the liquidated associations were in the main small. Over a third had share capital amounting to less than $500, and 68 percent less than $2,000. Only 18 (1.6 percent) had capital amounting to $20,000 or more.

Of the 1,109 credit unions, 785 (71 percent) returned to the members all of the share capital they had invested and some paid back even more; altogether the members of this group of associations received back $164,955 (or an average of about $2.60 per member) more than they had put into the organization.

The members of the 234 associations that paid less than 100 cents per dollar of share capital sustained an aggregate loss of $20,889 (about $2 per member). Some 65 percent of this loss was accounted for by the associations with capital of $2,000 or less, and 97 percent by those with capital of $5,000 or less.  

Sixty-three percent of all cancellations, mergers, and revocations of charter made in the 9 ½ year period took place during the war years of 1942-44.

What This Report Reminds Today

This remarkably candid and thorough report concludes with two pages of updates on Developments in the Credit Union Movement in 1944.  This section describes changes in league and CUNA organization and in state chartering regulations.

In just a few pages one finds an important factual and analytical record of the emerging credit union system by 1944.   In wartime we rightly honor the contributions and sacrifices of all who serve.  How in moments of extreme challenge, ordinary people do extraordinary deeds.

But these same contributions occur on the home fronts, unheralded and frequently taken for granted by their successors.   This unique Bulletin is a valuable document about the early contributions of the founders of the credit union system.  It is their efforts and commitment, the seeds they planted, that created the foundation on which today’s credit unions built their success.

Ordinary people doing extraordinary things for their communities in the past, now and into the future.

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A Relevant, Insightful Economic & Industry Update

Callahan’s May Trendwatch with first quarter 2024 data opened with an economic update from Alloya Corporate Federal Credit Union.

This opening analysis was one of the most thorough, well documented presentations on macro economic issues, credit union trends and Alloya’s own recent financial experience I have seen.

Todd Adams, CEO and Andy Kohl, Chief Investment Officer were the presenters of over 20 slides.  They covered trends in consumer spending, interest rate volatility and future outlooks.  They showed how Alloya navigated the dramatic inflows and then liquidity shortfalls in 2022/2023.

Below I excerpt several slides to provide examples of their analysis.   The full Trendwatch slide deck from May 14 can be accessed from Callahans here.

A key macro economic trend

The mortgage fixed interest rate advantage

Lower income groups most affected by price increases

Alloya’s balance sheet flows 12/19 to 4/24

Alloya’s lending to members in 2022/2023

The outlook for short term rates.  A Fed Funds of 2.5%?

So that you don’t overlook the rest of the industry analysis, here is Callahan’s opening slide on credit union’s core balance sheet growth trends as of March 31, 2024 versus one year earlier.

 

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How Long Have Bankers Opposed Credit Unions?

With the help of a young progressive, attorney Willard King, and several years efforts, the Illinois General Assembly passed the first Illinois Credit Union Act in 1925.

The Act’s purpose was “to safeguard the monetary deposits and other financial instruments of Illinois credit union members” through a system of supervision and regulation.

Bucky Sebastian was the internal counsel for the Illinois Department of Financial Institutions (DFI) from 1977-1981. One DFI responsibility was to charter and supervise the largest number of credit unions of any state system.  At yearend 1977 there were 1,095 Illinois charters, managing $1.8 billion in assets for 1,274,732 members.

Sebastian and King became good friends discussing the legal history of the Illinois credit union system and their shared interest in the life of Abraham Lincoln.

In 1977 the bankers were challenging the Department’s authority to permit share draft (checking) accounts for Illinois state charters.  There were also initial thoughts about how to update the Act to respond to deregulation. King’s knowledge of prior credit union legal changes was very useful in understanding the legislative politics for coops.

One of the stories King told was overcoming the opposition from established commercial and financial interests in 1925 to the new credit union option.  King shared the position of the Chicago Association of Commerce which was: “This is a bill to permit a lot of ordinary people such as blacksmiths and bricklayers to go into the banking business, where they will certainly lose their money.”

To answer how long credit unions have been opposed by banking interests, there is a simple reply: Forever.

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A Valuable Library Resource from NCUA

In following up an article by David Bauman in which he referenced his FOIA request to NCUA, I was directed to  NCUA’s FOIA Library.

Under the Frequently Requested Information section was what I had asked for:  NCUA’s response to Congressman French Hill on December 14, 2023.   Other items in this section included previous multiple requests that can be accessed by just clicking on the link.

Another section of the Library was the FOIA Request Logs  which include 474 requests going back to 2019.  I scanned the requests that were open and closed for 2023 to see what information had been asked for.

The log table has the date of the request, sometimes the organization, a description of the information sought and final disposition: granted-partial or full, denied, or “no records” responsive to the request.

I have reached out to NCUA to ask if anyone can use the FOIA log number to review previous responses without having to submit a whole new request—just to learn about the agency’s response.  When the reply is received, I will add to this blog.

In the meantime here are some of the more intriguing request descriptions, all of which were filled in whole or in part.

Selected Titles In the FOIA Library from 2023

Copies of all FOIA appeal logs by year from 2010

Records sufficient to identify all employees who entered into a position at the agency as a Political Appointee since January 20, 2021, to the date this records request is processed, to include a list of enumerated parameters to include resumes and waivers.

Documents and data sufficient to account for the monthly occupancy or vacancy rates for the agency’s five largest buildings (measured by square footage) from January 1, 2020, to December 31, 2022. 

A list of federally insured credit unions with agricultural loan portfolios greater than $100 million.

The application, approval, and any attached materials from the most recent field of membership change by Thrivent Federal Credit Union, headquartered in Appleton, WI.

A copy of the charter for NBC (N.Y.) Employees Federal Credit Union, charter 22351, prior to its merger into XCEL Federal Credit Union, charter 16218. 

A list of nationally insured credit unions that have failed and/or been acquired since January 2001 to include credit union name, charter number, opening date, failure date, and acquiring institution. 

The most recent NCUA salary data.

1)The number of federal credit union mergers completed each year between 1980 to 2020; and 2) The number of active federal credit union charters each year from 1980 to 2020 (as of 12/31 or other uniform date for each year). Note: If information is not available going back to 1980, please provide information going back as far as NCUA records allow. 

A list of all credit union CEOs and volunteers as of March 31, 2023.

NCUA salary data specifically under the category of political appointee.

Quarterly lists of all credit union board members for each quarter from Q42012 through Q42022.

1)Field of membership (“FOM”) criteria and approval documentation for FirefightersFirst Federal Credit Union (“Firefighters”); 2) Firefighters’ application and documents related to add “employees of non-profit foundations authorized by their organizing documents to be for the benefit and support of firefighters” (“Foundation”) to its FOM; 3) OGC’s legal opinion and analysis that supports the addition of the Foundation to Firefighters’ FOM; 4) CURE’s office summary that supports the addition of the Foundation to Firefighters’ FOM; 5) CURE’s approval letter and GENISIS worksheets reflecting approval of the Foundation to Firefighters’ FOM. 

Entire consumer complaint file from 2013.

An Important Resource

This is a partial 2023 listing.  In addition to some interesting reading, it also shows the agency as a resource for names of CEO’s and volunteers (including even CUNA and NAFCU) and for credit union data or other files going back years.

There might even be some valuable credit union press stories in following up some of these past requests.

 

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Three Examples of Credit Union Success

Credit unions can be inventive when communicating their special nature.  Here are three different approaches.

A Few Great Numbers (KPI’s)

This traditional view of success is from the yearend numbers of an exceptional coop. This CEO’s team focuses on the 5 key performance indicators (KPI’s) in 2023 as shown below.

metrics goal actual
member growth 5.10% 4.10%
net earnings 1.00% 1.23%
service quality 82.25 83.3
P&S per member 4.64 4.61
deposit growth 10.00% 12.80%

These along with many others not shown (net worth, loan growth etc.) would be outstanding in any year.  However in this year of flat to down trends overall, they are extraordinary.   How was it accomplished?

This credit union implements the most traditional and important strategic advantage credit unions enjoy–“relationship banking.”  It provides stable deposits, long term members and intense focus on their community and its well being.

The organization does this by putting people first. The CEO tells employee and member care stories as a central part of his monthly updates.  Not words, but deeds, sometimes confessing honest shortcomings.

The credit union leadership has set boundaries, what to do well and what not to attempt.  No mergers, no bank buys.  They are in a market dominated by a super coop competitor ten times their size.

For those who believe scale is necessary for success, this credit union grew to over $700 million in 2023. It did so while recording the fifth consecutive year of lowering its operating expense to average assets ratio. In this five years the ratio has fallen every year going from 3.08% to 2.55%.

That result  is lower than the majority of credit unions over $5 billion.  It is because they know who they are as a credit union.

Celebrating a Community That Cares

For any credit union striving to communicate its role in the communities served, I would urge you to look at this latest video from Whitefish Credit Union in Montana.

It is from Josh Wilson, Senior Vice President for Marketing.  The video centers around people in all walks of life serving their community in local food banks.

It is a moving documentary.  So powerful it should be entered in the Sundance film festival. The stories honor those who serve and are being served.  It is a tribute to the small rural towns and the natural environment in which the credit union operates.

Watching it makes you feel good about this example of caring for others.  There is not a word about Whitefish’s financial services, which says everything you need to know about the credit union.  Enjoy.

(https://youtu.be/9t7xl3IQRw4)

The Special Opportunity for Credit Union Leaders- I Feel Like Makin’ Love

Yesterday I linked to a song by the rock group Green Day.  A fan, Bob Bianchini, sent me their latest video from two weeks ago.  It is a real picker-upper to start your day.

You might ask who is Bob Bianchini?  He is the only League President who simultaneously served in the state legislature.  That was in an era when credit union leaders knew how to get things done.

This video reminded me of Rex Johnson’s exhortation to the credit union audiences who attended his many lending symposiums.   He would close by telling them, “your job is to treat your members so well that they become fans for your credit union.”

Here is what genuine fandom looks like-in a New York subway station from Bob and Green Day.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EiF28zBaOlI

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EiF28zBaOlI)

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Credit Unions Top Users of Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP)

At the end of the September quarter, credit union total assets of $2.25 trillion were just 9.7% of total banking assets.  However their participation in the special emergency Federal Reserve lending program equaled 27% of the BEFP’s loans at yearend or three times their share of total assets.

The September 2023 call reports show 307 credit unions with Federal Reserve borrowings  of $34.9 billion, an average of  $114 million.  For these credit unions, the Federal Reserve represents 66% of their total borrowings.  For 112 of this group, the Federal Reserve is their only source.  The largest reported loan is $2.0 billion and two credit unions report draws of just $500,000 each.

In an ironical coincidence with the BTFP participation, this total was also 27% of all credit union borrowings at the quarter end of $130.3 billion.  Moreover this $35 billion was only a small portion of the reported $173.4 billion in total lines these credit unions  had established with  the Federal Reserve.

Most of these loans were drawn following the banking liquidity crisis in March.  The Fed created the  emergency Bank Term Funding Program (BTFP) after the Silicon Valley Bank failure to prevent a system wide run by uninsured depositors on other depository institutions.

This facility was different from traditional Federal Reserve programs.  Eligible collateral security was expanded,  all collateral was valued at par, not market , and draws could go up to one year.  The rate for term advances under the Program is the one-year overnight index swap rate plus 10 basis points. The rate is fixed for the term of the advance on the day the line is drawn down.

What Happens Next?

In a January 9, 2024 speech to Women in Housing the Federal Reserve’s Vice Chairman  for Supervision, Michael Barr, was  asked about the program’s future when the initial one year life is over. Here are portions of his reply:

Moderator: I wanted to ask you about the future of the BTFP. We are rapidly approaching the one-year mark, is this something where the Fed is planning on extensions, or any information to be released to the public on usage?

Vice Chair for Supervision Barr:  So when the funding stress happened in March 2023, over the weekend the Federal Reserve, FDIC and Treasury agreed to a systemic risk exception to least cost resolution for the FDIC. And the Federal Reserve and the Treasury worked together to create an emergency lending program for banks and credit unions, the Bank Term Funding Program that you are referencing. And the Bank Term Funding Program enables banks to use collateral that was in place as of that time – as of March of 2023 – that is, essentially Treasuries and agency mortgage-backed securities, to pledge those, and to be able to get borrowing against that up to a year at the par value of those securities.

That program was really designed in that emergency situation. It was designed to address what in the statute is called unusual and exigent circumstances – you can think of it as an emergency. . .we want to make sure that banks and creditors of banks and depositors of banks understand that banks have the liquidity they need. And that program worked as intended. It dramatically reduced stress in the banking system very, very quickly. And deposit outflows which had been very rapid in that short period of time normalized to what had been going on before and in fact maybe flattened out to some extent a little bit.

So that program was highly effective, banks and credit unions are borrowing under that program today, but it was really set up as an emergency program. It was set up with a one-year timeframe, so banks can continue to borrow now all the way through March 11 of this year. . .a bank could continue to borrow or refinance under the program and in March of this year have a loan that then extends to March 2025. 

I expect continued usage until that end date of March 11, but it really was established as an emergency program for that moment in time.

Arbitrage Opportunity Grows Outstandings

Two days after Barr spoke, the Wall Street Journal published an update on the program: Banks Game Fed Rescue Program.

The article reported that the BTFP pricing, based on the benchmark interest  rates average  plus 10 basis points, was less than the 5.4%  the Fed was paying on overnight excess reserves. This arbitrage opportunity has resulted in an increase of  $12 billion in more drawdowns since yearend even though  no liquidity strains were apparent in either system.

Credit unions can request extensions up to one year until March 11, 2024.   After that date, the statement above and the most recent activity suggest the program will end.  Credit unions should plan to either repay or tap other sources of liquidity.

And the CLF?

It should be noted that the Central Liquidity Facility reports no loans this year as of its November financial statements.   In fact it has initiated no new loans since 2009. The BTFP participation suggests credit unions certainly have liquidity needs. However  the CLF, designed to serve and funded totally by credit unions, is not as responsive as the Federal Reserve Banks.