Regulators Report to Congress

I have read the prepared testimonies of the FDIC Chair Jelena McWilliams and NCUA Chair Rodney Hood presented to the Senate Banking Committee.

The FDIC’s response to the coronavirus pandemic was clear. McWilliams’ summary:

“As it became clear that the public health emergency caused by COVID-19 would lead to a significant economic disruption, the FDIC took swift, decisive actions to (1) encourage banks to work with affected customers and communities, (2) increase flexibility for banks to meet the needs of their customers, (3) foster small business lending, (4) protect consumers and increase financial options, and (5) actively monitor the financial system.”

A Missed Opportunity

Chairman Hoods’ remarks listed every action and program that NCUA has undertaken during his tenure. These included not just responses to the supervisory and legislative COVID-19 changes, but also cybersecurity programs, diversity initiatives, the sale of taxi medallion loans and legislative changes the Agency would like to see. Not included in this legislative wish list was a request for NCUA vendor oversight, perhaps a positive indication of regulatory self-restraint.

While the focus on NCUA’s numerous rule making and emergency supervisory accommodations is understandable, I was also looking for a shout out for what credit unions were doing for members. Stories that would illustrate the cooperative difference. Numbers that would demonstrate how credit unions use their tax free capital accumulation to help members. There were only brief mentions of two credit unions’ loan volumes under the PPP program which is on point, but not unique to credit unions.

Crises are a time of heightened attention for financial services because of the vital role credit plays for members, small businesses and communities. Credit is credit unions reason for being. Retelling that story when people are listening, asking for updates, is a special moment to once again explain why cooperatives exist.

The three regulatory functions under the NCUA board are means to enhance safety and soundness. The goal of these tools is to enable each credit union to make a difference in members’ lives. The industry is doing that daily. But it didn’t get reported.

Three-In-One

Tuesday’s virtual oversight financial hearing before the Senate Banking Committee will be a dramatic way to demonstrate the credit union difference.  

For NCUA Chairman Rodney Hood represents all the cooperative system’s regulatory and supervisory roles as a single witness. It takes three bank representatives to cover the same responsibility for that industry.

These three are:

1. Randal Quarles Vice Chairman for Supervision at the Federal Reserve Board-Liquidity
2. Joseph Otting, Comptroller of the Currency-Chartering and Supervision
3. Jelena Williams, Chairman of the FDIC-Insurance

Cooperative Design’s Simplicity

The credit union system built its federal regulatory structure over five decades (1934-1984). As credit unions evolved, their supervisory system followed the same cooperative principles. The NCUSIF is a collaborative fund where each member contributes 1 cent of every share dollar as a capitalization pool. The CLF is a mixed ownership corporation whose credit union funding is the basis for liquidity borrowings from the federal financing bank.

The advantages of an integrated, collaborative based regulator which covers all three functions are obvious. Greater efficiency, coordination, and single point of policy and oversight at the federal level.

The Drawbacks

But the potential downside of one organization is that there is no check and balance from other expert agencies. The effectiveness of the single regulator’s role depends on one board with the Chairman as spokesperson.  

If the board’s leadership  is not familiar with cooperative design and credit union differences, there will be the temptation to look to their bigger regulatory kin, who have a longer, different history and a lot more resources. When that approach is used to justify an action, NCUA can get off track.

What to Watch for in the Hearing

Because the hearing is virtual, the side by side visual of one versus three may not be as dramatic were the hearing in person.

I’m listening to see if Chairman Hood presents the credit union role from a cooperative point of view. Are there reports of the unique initiatives credit unions have taken to assist members? Or will the ever-present temptation of “bank envy” characterize his comments?  

Credit unions were not meant to be banks. Level playing field arguments or changes because the banks can do it, are not the reason the cooperative option exists.  

Hopefully the Chairman will show the difference not just in the 1 vs 3 setting,  but also by presenting the member focused accomplishments the industry has achieved in this crisis.

A Stunning Confession of an Agency’s Leadership Shortcomings

What does it say about a federal government agency whose leadership collectively confesses to the inability to tell right from wrong, legal from illegal, good behavior from disreputable? Especially in the middle of a national crisis.

That was the stunning admission revealed by the NCUA last week as it announced a new personnel decision made at its March 19 closed board meeting.

Appointing a Chief Ethics Counsel

On April 22, NCUA announced the Board’s decision to hire a “chief ethics counsel.” Supervised by the chairman, the press release stated: “The Office of Ethics Counsel will certify the agency’s compliance with relevant federal ethics laws and regulations, promote accountability and ethical conduct, and help ensure the success of the NCUA’s ethics programs.” This had been a role of the General Counsel.

Senior federal executive appointments are traditionally selected based on candidates’ experience, convictions and proven character. Ethical obligations and moral behavior are presumed. This Presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed NCUA board trio has now conceded the Agency is failing in this basic discernment ability.

So, in addition to three board members, their personal policy advisors, senior staff including an executive director and deputy, a general counsel and deputy, and the full organizational capabilities of human resources department, the agency is unable to make ethical decisions.

It makes the story of the Greek philosopher and cynic Diogenes’ quest for an honest and truthful person more than prophetic.

A Partial Record of Agency Leadership Failings

The litany of disastrous and self-serving actions by senior agency personnel in just the past three years is lengthy.

  1. A March 2020 IG report: Misuse of Official Time, Illegal Drug Use, Time and Attendance Fraud) It described how NCUA General Counsel Michael McKenna (appointed 2011) and his deputy, Lara Daly-Sims, had visited strip clubs, consumed alcohol and possibly marijuana, while on government time.
  2. The betrayal of 4,500 credit union borrowers’ whose loans were sold to a hedge fund in February 2020 in a secret bidding process.
  3. The January 2019 release of a 25-page investigation by NCUA’s OIG of then Chairman McWatters and Chief of Staff Sarah Vega’s excessive travel expenditures.
  4. The May 11, 2018 Washington Post report of Chairman McWatters overseeing the NCUA from his home in Dallas: “almost unheard of for an agency leader, to routinely work from home.”
  5. The seizure of $3.0 billions of TCCUSF surplus due credit unions via merger with the NCUSIF.
  6. The lack of transparency in the management and expenditures of billions in liquidations of the five corporates.
  7. The operating loss reported in the December 2017 NCUSIF audit, the first since the fund was created in 1971.

Compounding Error with Folly: A Self Promotion Campaign Paused

As if this admission of collective moral bankruptcy was not itself damning, the agency on April 24 further proved its leadership vacuum.

On that day the credit union press reported NCUA’s contracts with three public relation firms’ for more than $500,000 to assess, compare and then rebrand the agency signage and logo. Deliverables also included responding to agency media requests and preparing testimony.

When the December 2019 contracts became public on April 24 through FOIA requests, the agency immediately said it would postpone, not cancel, the contracts.

The agency’s operational hold of this four-month effort was explained by the need “to spend more time addressing the coronavirus crisis.” This covering story fabrication is underscored by the fact that the President declared the coronavirus national emergency six weeks earlier on March 13.

Serving Members: We’re In This Alone

NCUA’s actions, putting its interests first, accumulating greater and greater credit union resources, and making unilateral decisions, erupted in the 2008-2009 financial crisis. And the tide never reversed.

In this crisis, the lesson for credit unions serving members tirelessly under the slogan “We’re in this together,” is that they are also in this alone.

The most important authority of any government leader is moral, not rules and regs. Without this “compass,” the regulatory instruments and collaborative resources at NCUA will not be directed to enhance credit unions’ fundamental values or purpose.

Instead, NCUA’s pattern of actions betray the basic values that make credit unions different. Cooperative success relies on self-help, mutuality, burden sharing and community well-being. These values, more than unique processes and services, make credit unions who they are.

The Challenge

Daily, credit unions are carrying out this cooperative philosophy and their “essential service” designation for millions of members—many laid off, most uncertain about their future, and everyone anxious for their personal safety.

The good news is that we have been here before, and the collective changes undertaken in 1980-1984 for example, served a whole generation that followed. How will this generation of credit union leaders fulfill its destiny?

Revealing Character

Many have observed, “crises do not create character; they reveal it.”

Recently a CEO asked if I had heard about PPF funding for credit union entities such as CUSO’s or foundations. Credit unions are not eligible. He heard reports that several entities had applied. That worried him. The concern was that such efforts compromised the claim that we take care of our own, the self-help basis of cooperative design.

I replied that if the economy continues to falter requiring hundreds of billions more of government grants, a much bigger challenge will confront the country and credit unions. Specifically, how will the government pay for all this additional spending and debt issuance. The answer is obvious: new taxes.

Therefore, credit unions must demonstrate and document our self-reliance, self-funding mutuality with members during this time. Did we use our tax-free net income and capital to benefit members, or did we just hoard it?

A Skeptical Take: Fake It Till the Fourth Quarter

Another view is that some will cry NCUA made them so dependent on “help from on high” that they could not stand alone with any integrity. Can this generation of credit union leaders rekindle the spirit of cooperative innovation and entrepreneurship? Or, will they be tempted to seek “paint by the numbers” handouts from bureaucrats who never met a payroll or face-to-face with members?

Is it possible to at least fake it until the fourth quarter and the clock runs out?

The Cooperative Way Forward

Credit unions’ purpose is to use each day as a day to do something better for members. It is reasonable to see the crisis as bigger than any one of us, as individual members or credit unions. But it is not bigger than all of us together.

That confidence arises from knowing we were created to do things that had not been done before. We do not shy away when that challenge comes again. That is why we are here.

NCUA’s Leadership In a Crisis

NCUA’s actions in a crisis matter–for good or ill. So far, its efforts have ranged between two poles. On the one hand there are moves to lessen regulatory and compliance restraints to enable credit unions to respond to member needs with innovative, non-traditional practices.

This instinct is excellent. For it recognizes two realities:

  1. Effective responses for members’ problems occur locally. The discrete, granular circumstances of each member are resolved best, on site, credit union by credit union. No national policy can substitute for the speed and wisdom of local responders.
  2. Nothing of consequence in a crisis can be accomplished alone. When NCUA has taken over credit unions through conservatorship or examiner dictates, this principle of collaboration is nullified. Cooperation and patience are uniquely credit union strengths.

One credit union veteran described effectiveness this way: “Government is too far away and too late to help one’s neighbor. Right now, it is our neighbor to neighbor approaches that auditors, regulators, and bureaucrats need to template. This is what makes future government responses relevant, or even come close to working. We, the citizens and community actors, must be the template for the approaches we hope to have and live with from government .”

The Second Response, Also Instinctive

The other extreme of “we’re all in this together” is the inevitable bureaucratic reach for more power and money. This has resulted in two legislative suggestions by board members at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum: Harper and McWatters.

Both endorsed new NCUA authority to examine third party vendors, a request rejected repeatedly over the past decade in Congress.

The second was to expand the cooperative system’s CLF liquidity options. Although unclear, the suggestion appears to be that liquidity should be on call, solely at NCUA’s behest. The current mixed ownership structure requires credit unions to subscribe capital shares to create the 16 times borrowing capacity at the Federal Financing Bank. Now, credit unions are the direct funders, agents and users of the system.

Contrary Crisis Response

The go-it-alone, we’re in charge approach, was disastrous in the Great Recession. NCUA’s unilateral actions destroyed the CLF’s three-decades long role as the cooperative system’s liquidity safety net. NCUA requested a special $6 billion borrowing line from Congress at same time the CLF had an unused $49 billion capacity.

In the 2009 crisis NCUA took over the daily management of $100 billion dollars in corporate assets without a plan or knowledgeable leadership. Today the $6 billion AME surplus from the liquidations of five corporates, shows the catastrophic misjudgment which NCUA estimated would cost credit unions $13-16 billion dollars.

The misjudgment was not just a dollar and cents forecasting error. Rather the fundamental mistake was that NCUA took over total control. They failed to work collaboratively and respect the expertise and experience in the corporate system. Instead NCUA bought plans from outsiders who failed to understand both cooperative strengths and the crisis itself.

Chairman Hood’s Silence

One reason for Chairman Hood’s silence may be he recalls his past tenure on the NCUA board. And he has reflected on the lessons from that time.

The beauty of the cooperative model is when consumers and leaders believe they can be owners of solutions and get to it. In any crisis we must use that spirit to be first to respond, solid in our belief we can overcome, and hopeful in the fact that things that work will be documented as historical markers for future actions.

Leadership in a crisis offers the chance to build a better system. This occurred in the 1980-1984 transition to deregulation. For that outcome to occur, the NCUA board must work collaboratively with those who man the front lines with members.

CLF: The One Thing Necessary

As of December 2019, approximately 1,468 credit unions with total assets of $1.4 trillion reported membership in the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system. These totals represent 27% of credit unions by number, and 88% of total assets.

By comparison, there were 278 credit unions that were Central Liquidity Facility (CLF) members holding $115 billion or about 7.2% of assets.

While numbers for Federal Reserve membership are not readily available, since NCUA requires by rule that all credit unions over $250 million be members of either the CLF or Federal Reserve, one can presume the overwhelming majority have opted for Fed membership.

Why this choice? If the Fed and CLF are both “lenders of last resort” why is the CLF deemed so unappealing? How is the FHLB system so much more relevant for credit unions then their own liquidity backstop?

NCUA’s Appeal for Credit Unions to Join the CLF

In its April 2020 meeting, the NCUA board approved final rules to make the CLF more attractive to join. Some changes were the result of the CARES legislation. They included opening membership to Corporates directly while changing their agent roles, expanding lending purpose, and increasing the borrowing multiple based on contributed capital from 12 to 16 times.

Rule changes eliminated the six-month waiting period after joining to borrow, the ability to withdraw membership upon demand versus the current 6-24 months delay, easing collateral requirements, and allowing corporates to borrow for their balance sheet. Staff also outlined improved loan processing capabilities.

The three Board members made individual appeals urging credit unions to join up now. They explained that the CLF, as now capitalized, could be inadequate to the crisis even at a multiple of 32 times member shares. NCUA could need liquidity for the NCUSIF and the Federal Financing Bank is the most reliable source for funding in a crisis.

The One Missing Element

The CLF is a “mixed-ownership government corporation” managed by the NCUA. The credit unions supply all the capital upon which total borrowing capacity is determined. Funding is direct from the government’s financing bank, unlike the FHLB system which raises its borrowings in the open market.

If the CLF is to be relevant in the future, the “mix” of the credit union and NCUA roles needs to be reassessed.

The historic agreement in 1983 for the corporate system to fully fund the CLF’s capital requirements for all credit unions  was ended by NCUA in 2012.  The NCUA failed to provide a design for the CLF to become an integral partner with its credit union members-owners.

In contrast today the FHLB system is credit union’s preferred lender because they are member-centric in their operations. Members buy capital stock to borrow in good times and bad; they elect the board, and individual banks proactively develop products and services to serve their various members’ needs.

The CLF has been used solely as a regulatory tool by NCUA. In the Great Recession, the primary borrower was the NCUSIF which forwarded $10 billion to the balance sheets of WesCorp and US Central. An effort designed by leading credit unions to create a “protracted adjustment credit” program for credit unions to refinance members’ mortgage loans became stillborn when NCUA staff took over the initiative.

Non Routine Borrowings to Resolve Problems

Credit unions seeking liquidity assistance will almost always be under some form of financial stress. This can be due to market dislocations making  assets difficult to value, unplanned share outflows, or earnings pressures from increased delinquency or  sound loan growth options.

By “normal” operating criteria, credit unions needing liquidity will be under financial strain and often under examiner constraints. Recent NCUA practice is not to provide workouts with problem credit unions via NCUSIF 208 and CLF assistance. Rather NCUA prefers to direct the credit union to downsize to fit its reduced capital ratio.  For contrast, this was not the policy when the CLF was used to alleviate the stress from the non-earning receivers’ certificates issued by the FDIC after the Penn Square failure in 1982.

NCUA has not sought credit union input for changes to better fulfill CLF’s legislative purpose to ”encourage savings, support consumer and mortgage lending, and provide basic financial resources to all segments of the economy.”

If credit unions are to be asked to fund the CLF more fully, they must be included in the conversation about the CLF’s future.

Reversing an Historic Catastrophe

At year-end 2011 and until October 25, 2012, the CLF was fully funded and covered all credit unions for membership. At the 2011 annual CLF audit, it had an estimated draw of $49.8 billion from the Federal Financing Bank. Total credit union assets at that time were $974 billion.

NCUA described events following the audit in 2012 in the annual report: “Neither USC bridge nor NCUA were able to secure the transition of USC’s products and services to a successor entity, thereby leading the Board’s decision to wind-down and liquidate USC Bridge’s operations as of October 29, 2012.

Accordingly, USC Bridge discontinued its role as the agent group representative for CLF and CLF redeemed USC Bridge’s capital stock on October 25, 2012. The result of the liquidation of the agent group representative is that as of December 31, 2012, CLF membership comprised solely regular members and no agent membership is in place.”

NCUA controlled both the USC Bridge and the CLF. NCUA unilaterally shut down the CLF’s thirty-year record of covering every credit union in the cooperative system.  

US Central was never insolvent when liquidated by NCUA.  US Central’s asset management estate (AME) today reports a positive balance of over $1.7 billion.

The Challenge at This Time

Two of the three current board members were involved in these prior events. Rodney Hood was on the NCUA board that conserved US Central in April 2009, even though solvent and fully reserved for losses. From February 2011 Todd Harper was NCUA’s Director of Public Affairs and senior policy advisor to Chairman Matz when the CLF’s comprehensive industry role was terminated in October 2012.

If the Board can learn from these previous events to again develop a partnership with credit unions about the role of the CLF, they will rectify one of the most unfortunate actions ever taken by NCUA.

Credit unions’ strength is their ability to collaborate, work for shared purpose and exercise patience when resolving problems. If the Board reaches out and listens, real change can be made in the next covid congressional package that will be coming down the congressional pike.

Such a re-design could make the CLF central to the future of the cooperative system and enhance the role laid out for it by Congress. That would be a tremendous opportunity in the current crisis to reverse a mistake from the prior one. Is the Board up to the challenge this time?

A Culture of Impunity

A February 10, 2020 Inspector General Report describes personal indiscretions by Michael McKenna, NCUA General Counsel (July 2011 to November 2019) and his Deputy General Counsel Lara Daly-Sims.

The report details strip club visits and drinking while on the job from February 2017 through the beginning of the investigation in November 2019. Several members of the General Counsel legal staff and the Executive Director were also interviewed about the conduct of the two.

While the report is about personal peccadillos, that is not what is significant about this event.

McKenna was Deputy General Counsel in 2004 and became General Counsel in 2011 upon the retirement of Robert Fenner.

As shown in the blog below from Jim Blaine (reprinted with permission) the professional judgment of NCUA’s General Counsel has been a public topic for over five years.

GC Is Not an Independent Position

The General Counsel is a staff position providing interpretations and support for decisions taken by the line staff and the NCUA Board. Jim’s blog below is one example of the Board’s skepticism of McKenna’s counsel. But McKenna did not originate the RBC rule. Senior examination staff and the Board did.

Throughout his career his role was to defend Agency decisions that seemed contrary to common sense and the explicit language of the FCU Act. Actions included rejecting appeals from credit unions and individual members for merger misconduct, denying FOIA appeals, approving Board actions opposed by 95% of credit union commentators and providing legal cover for whatever supervisory actions the agency wanted to take.

His role as General Counsel was to endorse the agency’s conduct regardless of the fact situation. His personal conduct is not acceptable. But the real issue is his professional shortcomings which contributed to a series of agency outcomes that have hurt the credit union system’s reputation, severely damaged its institutional capability, and has cost members billions in misused funds.

McKenna’s personal failings are merely a symptom of an agency unaccountable to any outside authority. One that always places its institutional self-interest ahead of credit union members’ welfare.

McKenna is an example, not the cause, of NCUA’s culture of impunity from top to bottom. If the agency had been a credit union with the public missteps from the last three years or longer, they would have been conserved a long time ago.


Jim Blaine on Credit Unions

Sunday, January 25, 2015

“And What Am I – A Potted Plant !?!”

Chief Legal Eagle

Mr. Michael McKenna is the General Counsel of the NCUA; has been with the Agency for over 25 years; and has held the top legal position for the last few. He is one of the highest paid lawyers in all of Federal government.

Don’t know Mr. McKenna on a personal basis; but would assume from his resume, background, experience, and current position, that he is probably the # 1 U.S. expert on the Federal Credit Union Act (FCUA) and the rules and regulations controlling federal credit union supervision – or should be! 

After all, he has spent a lifetime focused specifically on credit union statutes and rules; has helped draft and craft many of those laws; and is intimately familiar with the logical subtleties and historical compromises underlying their promulgation.

“RBC”(Ringling Bros. Circus)

As you may have noted, there is “a slight disagreement” on the legality of NCUA’s rule-making in the area of risk-based capital (RBC). Who is right concerning the legality of RBC is open to debate, but few will dispute that NCUA, over the last two years, has played the clown on the RBC rule repeatedly – and convincingly!

Three questions come to mind when listening to the legal arguments:

1.) What is Mr. McKenna’s , the #1 U.S. FCUA expert, opinion on the legality of RBC?

2.) Why would Chair Matz feel compelled to pay an outside law firm $150,000 “to do my own due diligence”, when she had Mr. McKenna sitting down the hall?

3.) Given that extraordinary $150,000 outside legal expense, can you determine which of the following. . .

. . .is an expensive, exotic potted plant?

 A) The one on the left.
 B) The one on the right.
 C) Either.
 D) Both.
 F) All of the above.

13 comments:

Anonymous said…

She sought out 11 outside firms! Speaks volumes! McWatters is certainly paying attention and understands the legal and ethical issues.

Jan 25, 2015, 7:57:00 AM

Anonymous said…

Who provided the list to her? The Democratic National Committee?

Jan 25, 2015, 10:15:00 AM

Anonymous said…

Isn’t it rich? Isn’t is queer?
Losing my timing this late in my career
But where are the clowns? Send in the clowns
Well, maybe next year

Jan 25, 2015, 10:20:00 AM

Jim Blaine said…

…should note that you missed the penultimate verse of the Sondheim song;

“But where are the clowns?
Quick, send in the clowns.
Don’t bother, they’re here.”

Jan 25, 2015, 10:31:00 AM

Anonymous said…

Matz has stayed far beyond her shelf life date, expect the stench to continue to grow.

Jan 25, 2015, 10:50:00 AM

Anonymous said…

There is something happening here.
What it is ain’t exactly clear may ass! Ms. Matz is spending credit union member’s money to politically connected law firms! Probably connected to Mr. Matz. Time we demanded real accountability from the head of NCUA. NCUA is uniquely paid for by credit union members. She has a fiduciary responsibility to the credit union membership.

Jan 25, 2015, 11:32:00 AM

Anonymous said…

Does Ms. Matz really believe that wasting a lot of money on a bogus legal opinion makes the incredible credible?

No matter how you slice it, bologna is still bologna!

Jan 25, 2015, 12:30:00 PM

Anonymous said…

McKenna is the General Counsel of NCUA. Generally, speaking it is not within the authority of the NCUA Board to change the FCUA. This is the specific authority of Congress.

If you want a different opinion, you have to pay a lot of someone else’s money to a Specific Counsel for an opinion to specify that the NCUA Board has authority for what they generally do not have under the FCUA.

Jan 25, 2015, 12:48:00 PM

Anonymous said…

So who are the clowns? Is it the NCUA Board? Is it the outside law firm? Is it the credit union industry for condoning this fraudulent waste of money?

Jan 25, 2015, 12:53:00 PM

Jim Blaine said…

Je Suis Les Clowns.

Jan 25, 2015, 1:26:00 PM

Anonymous said…

If the credit union industry allows Ms. Matz, her Lapdog and her Potted Plant to get away with the purloining of Federal Credit Union Act authority, than:

Nous Sommes Les Clowns!

Jan 25, 2015, 2:06:00 PM

Jim Blaine said…

Much better grammar…

Jan 25, 2015, 2:18:00 PM

Geoff Bacino said…

Jim states that he doesn’t know Mike McKenna on a personal basis…but I do. Mike served as my Senior Policy Advisor during my time on the NCUA Board. There are few that have a better understanding of the Federal Credit Union Act than does Mike. Apparently, Chairman Matz chose to seek outside counsel as a way to insulate the agency from appearing to be “too close to the situation.” That this outside counsel did not feel that the agency’s case is ironclad should not reflect on Mike but rather the interpretation of the firm and what might happen if this rule was legally challenged.

Jan 26, 2015, 12:25:00 PM

Shakespeare on NCUA’s Sale of Members’ Taxi Medallion Loans

In the play Timon of Athens, the central character lives lavishly beyond his means. It shows a society that thinks having money and spending it is proof of one’s moral goodness.

Several observations about human nature appear relevant to NCUA’s action to sell 4,500 members’ future fortunes to the investment fund Marblegate.

From William Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens:

‘Tis not enough to help the feeble up,
But to support him after. . .

Men must learn now with pity to dispense;
For policy sits above conscience. . .

I wonder men dare trust themselves with men. . .

When the Regulator and Credit Unions Worked for Common Purpose

In 1984 Ed Callahan delivered the customary NCUA Chairman’s speech to CUNA’s Governmental Affairs Conference.

His title this February was “Finish the Job.”

In the talk Ed outlined the incredible success of deregulation, credit union’s “fantastic” performance, and how the movement was fulfilling the founders’ visions for serving America.

He directly challenged critics who accused NCUA‘s policy initiatives as “competition in laxity.”

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UcXPyUMtic)

The Final Action Required

But there was one further institutional reform needed to ensure the industry’s future in the new market driven environment.

That change was to redesign the NCUSIF from an annual expense premium to a self-funding model based on 1% of insured deposits as the core.

Speaking with Logic and from the Heart

As you hear Ed’s voice, note the former football coach’s style:

  • He talks about the team’s success;
  • He gives them facts about their situation;
  • He speaks from the heart with an exhortation to finish the job.

Ed never used a script. But his logic was so clear you could transcribe his words verbatim. While the circumstances Ed addressed have changed, his authenticity marked by  directness, transparency and passion are needed all the more today.

Listen for the rouser at the end. It was his signature moment!

The Betrayal

NCUA’s sale of 4,500 credit union members’ loans secured by taxi medallions to a private equity firm is a betrayal of everything the credit union cooperative system represents. Credit unions were founded to protect consumers from being exploited by loan sharks preying on those who have the least or know the least about financial services. NCUA’s sale just put these members and their families at the mercies of Marblegate Asset Management LLC, a firm that exemplifies capitalism’s limitless profit ambition.

These 4,500 borrowers have invested years, some decades, establishing an equity stake with the sweat of their brow, in an earning asset to help them realize the American dream of financial well-being. They joined credit unions and trusted their interests would be treated fairly. Instead the agency regulating the industry sold them out to add additional pieces of silver to a fund bulging with more than $16 billion in liquid assets.

This action irredeemably harms these members whose interests are exactly opposite Marblegate’s. NCUA’s fundamental responsibility is to protect credit union members. This sale places a stain on the entire credit union system. It contradicts Board members’ individually stated policy priorities to treat members fairly, to support financial inclusion, or follow the rule of law.

This deliberate action is an agency wide effort. There was no emergency dictating the disposal of these loans. Rather, NCUA planned for over a year to shed responsibility for the safety and well-being of the very persons credit unions were intended to serve: the member-borrower.

The agency says it worked on this effort for 18 months. When confronted earlier this year with widespread requests by New York City, Congressional and credit union leaders to work collaboratively with the 4,500 members affected, the agency claimed it had to act now or lose its credibility for future asset sales.

It put the buyer’s and its own self interests ahead of the members. Seldom has the well-being of the powerless few been so completely trampled by those with money and authority.

A 2019 New York Times investigation found 950 licensed taxi drivers have declared bankruptcy since 2016. The crushing debt has led to driver suicides. NCUA has now transferred the fate of these credit union borrowers to an investment fund whose reported plan is to acquire the largest share of New York’s 13,500 medallions.

What is Known About the Sale

NCUA provided no facts about this sale. Rather, the media has reported the only public details of this regulatory tragedy.

On February 20, the Wall Street Journal reported the sale to “an investment firm known for buying up distressed assets, will now become the largest single owner of New York City Taxi medallion loans” with this purchase.

Sale price of 31 cents for each $1 of book value

The Journal reported the price of $350 million was for a portfolio of 3,000 New York medallions, 900 Chicago medallions, 500 Philadelphia medallions and 100 from other cities.

This is an average loan value of $77,800 each, all secured by medallions. The estimated par value of these loans is the purchase price of $350 million plus the loss NCUA says it has taken on the portfolio of $760 million. Combined, these two numbers add up to an average book value per loan of approximately $245 thousand.

This total par value of $1.11 billion also suggests that the average price per loan was approximately 31 cents on the dollar, or a discount of more than two thirds from the portfolio’s original book value.

We don’t know what proportion of these loans are receiving regular payments. But many are earning assets backed up with years of payment history. Some will have been rewritten. In every case the medallion security minimizes the possibility of any downside loss. For if the borrower defaults, the security has a cash price that can be monitored in each market.

For example, individuals are offering to buy New York medallions for prices from $125,000 to $135,000 on multiple websites today. The actual sales price for a Chicago medallion since January 1 has ranged from $24,000 to $40,000.

In Boston offers to buy on the web range from $27,000-$40,000.

The following news articles suggest that Marblegate is not interested in loan assets yielding 6% or, if bought at the estimated discount, a yield of 18-19%.

The Buyer: “Profiting from the Misfortunes of Others”

Marblegate Asset Management LLC formed in 2009, is an investment fund focused on buying distressed assets.

A Wall Street Journal article from April 11, 2011, describes Marblegate’s corporate strategy.

For ‘Vultures,’ Slim Pickings — Facing Default, Publisher Lee Enterprises Sells ‘Junk’ to Foil Distressed Investor

The following excerpts from the article describe how these funds try to make high returns, an effort foiled in this case by Lee Enterprises which had been the target of a takeover through purchase of the company’s debt by “vulture” funds. The tactic failed when Lee found alternate financing.

Newspaper chain Lee Enterprises Inc. is on the verge of saving itself from bankruptcy — and many of its debt holders are livid.

Lee, weighed down by about $1 billion of debt, has long been high on the list of potential bankruptcies. But thanks to the roaring market for debt of risky companies, Lee is preparing to sell junk bonds that would enable it to pay off its obligations and give it a new shot at survival.

But what is good news for the company has thwarted the plans of a flock of “vulture” investors — Monarch Alternative Capital, Alden Global Capital, Marblegate Asset Management and a unit of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. — which have been buying Lee’s loans. The group had been betting the company would default, and that they could turn their holdings into an ownership stake, giving them access to the company’s assets, which include St. Louis Post Dispatch and the Arizona Daily Star newspapers.

Instead, they will get repaid, but miss out on the chance to make even bigger profits as owners.

Lee isn’t alone in its sudden pullback from the brink of bankruptcy, thanks to the frothy state of the high-yield bond market. One by one, distressed companies have been able to sell debt as money floods into the debt markets.

That has left few money-making opportunities for distressed-debt investors, who engage in a type of financial schadenfreude: profiting from the misfortunes of others. Vulture investors typically buy debt at low prices, expecting to turn that debt into equity in the company, giving them ownership. Then they can sell off assets or run the company, making more money than they would by simply owning the debt. [emphasis added]

An October 15, 2018 Wall Street Journal article, “Hedge Fund Bets on the Taxi Business” reports Marblegate’s efforts to acquire a dominant share of the New York taxi medallion markets.

Vulture investors are circling the beleaguered New York City taxicab industry.

Hedge funds that specialize in distressed investing have been kicking the tires of the New York taxi market after prices for medallions plummeted amid competition from ride-hailing upstarts. Marblegate Asset Management LLC, a Greenwich, Conn., hedge-fund firm, decided to place a big bet, and over the past year or so has scooped up about 300 medallions for a total price of more than $50 million, according to people familiar with its strategy. (note this would be an average price of $167,000)

Owners of taxi medallions and their drivers in New York and other cities have been hobbled by the flood of app-based ride-hailing services such as those run by Uber Technologies Inc. and Lyft Inc. There are more than 80,000 vehicles used for ride-hailing services in New York City, more than triple the number in 2015, regulators say. They now dwarf the roughly 13,500 yellow cabs. The competition has led to declines in yellow-cab trips and fare revenue even as the number of passenger trips in for-hire vehicles has soared.

New York City this summer instituted a one-year freeze on licensing new for-hire vehicles while it examines ways to raise driver wages. (note: tis freeze has been extended)

Marblegate, which began buying up medallions last fall at prices between $175,000 and $200,000, isn’t trying to call a bottom, according to people familiar with its strategy. Instead, it plans to operate its own fleet of taxicabs and believes it can run a better business than existing operators — in part by improving working conditions and benefits for its drivers.

At current rates, owners can lease out a medallion to a fleet operator for $15,000 a year, people in the industry said. The operator takes care of cars, drivers and vehicle dispatching, meaning that a buyer of a $175,000 medallion can expect an annual return of 8% to 9%. The price of the medallion is also tax deductible over 15 years.

By operating its own fleet, Marblegate’s returns could be significantly higher. [emphasis added] Aleksey Medvedovskiy, chief executive of NYC Taxi Group, a fleet operator based in Brooklyn, said that some of the better owner-operators today earn about $30,000 annually per medallion, or a 17% return on a $175,000 investment.

Distressed investors buy assets in industries in which disruption has caused prices to decline, wagering they have fallen too far. Investors see New York as the city where traditional taxis — which have the exclusive right to pick up street hails in Manhattan — have the greatest chance of survival. One million passengers hop in a cab, a town car or an Uber each weekday across the city, according to regulators.

“As long as there’s a hail system and a central business district, there will always be business for them,” said Matthew Daus, a lawyer at Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf LLP who specializes in the medallion industry.

Marblegate’s Strategy: “Furthest Along”

In a July 18, 2019 Crain’s New York Business article, “Mystery Buyer Snaps up taxi medallions as prices fall further“, the state of the taxi medal market is described:

Taxi medallions might be worth less than ever. But in some ways, there has never been more interest in the troubled asset.

Private-equity firms have been circling for the past two years as prices have continued to fall. Marblegate Asset Management of Greenwich, Conn., is the furthest along, having acquired a little more than 300 medallions, starting with purchases at an auction in September 2017.

The firms have different strategies for how to profit from the medallions, according to insiders, but agree that taxis have a future as a key part of New York’s transportation infrastructure. Some see their interest as a bet on the industry’s eventual recovery.

“There are multiple players now—it’s not just Marblegate,” said Matthew Daus, a former Taxi and Limousine Commission member, who is a partner at Windels Marx, a law firm that represents taxi interests. “This is a positive sign.”

The article’s final observation about medallion sales values is also relevant to NCUA’s action: “Bulk sales typically fetch lower prices per placard than individual sales.”

Credit Union Borrowers’ Interests Conflict with Marblegate’s

Even at the discounted prices of the loans which would result in double digit yields, Marblegate’s strategy is to dominate the market for New York taxi medallions to enhance their profitability. Owning medallions is the firm’s operating goal, not administering borrowers’ loans. Refinancing to help individual borrowers pay down loans would just prolong the time before Marblegate might foreclose on a medallion due to driver’s payment defaults.

NCUA has turned these credit union members’ financial fate over to a fund whose sole goal is to maximize return on invested funds.

The New York Post directly addressed this issue. The story was published February 20,2020, the date of NCUA’s board meeting, titled Cabbies Worry as Hedge Fund Snaps Up Taxi Medallions:

Some industry sources said they were skeptical whether Marblegate would be interested in taking a haircut on the loans to help out taxi drivers. “Marblegate is happy owning these assets because they want to own a superfleet and build economies of scale,” according to one industry insider. “The idea is to keep buying the loans, keep foreclosing on them and keep gobbling up medallions until you control the market.”

How could any individual borrower ever hope to renegotiate loan terms with Marblegate? They want the medallion, not a loan, that if paid off would take away their prospect of owning the medallion via foreclosure.

A Credit Union Times story the same day quoted the Bhairav Desai, executive director of New York Taxi Workers Alliance that they hoped to restructure the loans at uniform value of $150,000 each. Instead NCUA sold the loans for $77,000 each. The borrowers received no benefit from this sale and are still burdened with debts incurred in very different market circumstances.

Marblegate acquires the debt at a very steep discount. The members are shut out from any upside potential from the sale.

NCUA’s Moral Blindness and Administrative Stonewalling

NCUA has turned its back on common sense and its fiduciary obligations to the cooperative system.

NCUA has charged the cost of the resolution of liquidations to the credit union system but then given all the potential upside profits to the private sector to reap. Co-ops pay for all losses. For profit firms reap the gains.

There are no facts provided in the NCUA press release, the FAQs or board oral statements defending the sale. The rhetorical explanations are entirely unsubstantiated. There have been no criteria for the solicitation process, no details about the financial advisor’s purpose or recommendation, no comparison of different options, no data on administrative costs, and no information on portfolio performance provided to explain this decision.

Somehow the general press (Wall Street Journal, MSN and New York Post) were able to find these details. This fact vacuum suggests NCUA either does not have data to support the sale process or is afraid the data would not justify their action. Vague assertions and generalizations replace evidence.

NCUA’s Illogical Explanations

The hollowness of NCUA’s arguments is staggering. McWatters is quoted: “We are fiduciaries for the insurance fund. We needed to take this offer.” Without a single fact to back up why a $16 billion fund needs more cash liquidity.

The most absurd statement in NCUA’s press release is “Private entities have specialized skills and greater resources and flexibility to work with borrowers in ways the NCUA cannot.” I will not argue with NCUA’s confessed lack of competence. But are they also ignorant of the billion-dollar credit unions and CUSO’s that manage taxi medallion loans as an everyday part of their business with specialists that know how to work with members?

NCUA has dissed the expertise, capabilities and experience of the credit unions they oversee in turning the future of these members to a “vulture” fund over which they have no control. They have sold out not just 4,500 members, but the entire cooperative system’s reputation and replaced it with a private, profit maximizing fund’s financial ambitions.

Compounding this demeaning assessment of credit union’s expertise, this bulk disposition of distressed assets will only harm credit unions with loans secured by the same collateral. The public fire sale which writes off two thirds of the book value of loans, can only harm the valuation of loans now held by credit unions in the same asset class.

As for NCUA’s claim that this was “the least long-term cost” every known fact about this case suggests just the opposite conclusion. The agency took the highest and greatest loss possible forgoing all future revenue from these loans. The upside opportunity is not tied to medallion values, but rather to the borrowers’ abilities to make affordable payments on their debts as they strive to achieve full medallion ownership.

At a fire sale average price of $77,000 (or the higher $150,000 amount proposed by the Workers’ Alliance), it is inconceivable that these experienced borrowers and taxi drivers could not meet rewritten payment terms and create a win-win for them and the NCUSIF.

Invoking Congress and “Mission”

The statement that “failure to achieve an orderly liquidation at the lowest long-term cost would violate the NCUA’s Congressionally mandated mission of protecting the insurance fund” is nonsensical. It is supported with no facts and in essence suggests that Marblegate doesn’t know what it is doing due to these so-called long-term costs. I suspect that this investment fund knows exactly what it is doing and has calculated that the long-term revenue returns that will enable it to dominate the taxi medallion business in New York and other cities. The statement merely confirms the agency’s analytical myopia.

When has NCUA ever justified an action by invoking a “Congressional mandate? If that is the reasoning whatever happened to the “Congressionally mandated mission” to help cooperative borrowers?

The sudden action (Feb. 19) by NCUA after numerous inquiries and efforts by the New York City Council and other interested parties suggests NCUA wanted to lock in the loss on these liquidations. Before the liquidation of the two credit unions, the NCUA-appointed conservators had estimated the combined negative net worth of LOMPTO and Melrose at $150 million at June 2018. In the September 2018 liquidation, NCUA recorded a $760 million expense against the allowance account.

This was an estimate already recorded in the December 2017 NCUSIF audit, over two years before this February 2020 sale. Any resolution that would contradict this prescient estimate would be embarrassing for all involved. So best to lock in the loss projected with amazing foresight so there is no need to explain how a $150 million deficit balloons to $750 million three months later.

And the $350 million just happens to be the net recovery value NCUA estimated when they expensed the allowance account over two years earlier. It is indeed remarkable how accurate this loss forecast proved to be compared to the absence of any contemporary data to support the sale today.

Who Will Join the Members’ Voice?

Following the NCUA meeting on Feb. 20 in which the taxi drivers’ signs were taken away and many routed away from the board room, one taxi representative summarized the board’s actions: “They sold us out today.”

The day following the Board meeting the New York state attorney general ordered the city to pay $810 million to debt-hit taxi drivers. The demand stated that the city allowed brokers and top players to collude on prices. The demand claimed the Taxi Limousine Commission marketed the new medallions as a path to the American dream.

Some commentators question whether this demand has any merit, but it shows two things. The possibility of assistance for taxi borrowers from unexpected sources. More importantly for NCUA, it demonstrates a government entity willing to try to help the borrowers, not walk away as NCUA has done.

NCUA’s explanations of the sale are neither credible nor convincing. The entire process was done in secret. Those most affected were never consulted.

This event raises the prospect that NCUA has become the weakest link in the cooperative network. For if members cannot rely on NCUA to protect their interests in this relatively small, highly visible event, what confidence should the 100 million plus members have that their interests will be safeguarded in the future?

This event is not an individual failure in which an examiner or survivor made a mistake or showed poor judgment. Rather this is an institutional failing from top to bottom over an extended period.

And that is why this betrayal has significance for every person concerned for the future of the cooperative system. To be silent is to give consent. Leadership tales courage. Shouldn’t Congress ask how this sale of members’ future fulfills NCUA’s cooperative mission?

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