Category: NCUA

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The $846 Million Missing Item From Thursday’s NCUA Board Agenda

While NCUA’s $350 million annual budget is the primary Board item, that is not the most important financial issue.   For there is unfinished business stretching back over a decade.  The agency owes credit unions an amount that is 250% greater than the budget it will be discussing.

Here’s the details.

In March 2009 NCUA Board member Rodney Hood along with Chair Michael Fryzel and member Gigi Hyland voted to conserve US Central Credit Union and WesCorp, the two largest corporate credit unions.

My hunch is that board member Hood never expected to be overseeing the continued distribution of US Central’s almost $2.0 billion surplus thirteen years later during a second term on the Board.

Credit Unions Due $846 Million

As of the March 2022 AME financial reports for the five liquidated corporates, NCUA projects over $846 million is remaining to be paid. The majority, $556 million, is from US Central’s estate.

When completed total AME payments to credit union member shareholders will exceed $3.2 billion.   As a comparison, the total capital of the eleven active corporates at December 2021 was only $2.5 billion.

Put bluntly, the collective funds returned by the four liquidated corporates is 132% great than all the equity in corporates active today.  Closing these solvent corporates was a catastrophic error in  judgment!

The March 2022 AME financials presents the total forecasted payments to the four corporate’s members and the remaining amounts due.

US Central:     $1.832 billion with $ 556 million due

Mbrs United:  $  622  million with $130 million due

Southwest:      $  613 million with $127 million due

Constitution:   $     48 million with $  32 million due

There are no payments for the $1.1 billion of credit union member capital at WesCorp.  NCUA projects a WesCorp deficit after all recoveries at $2.1 billion.  This is the only loss to the NCUSIF from the five corporate liquidations.  (from line B4-Due to Government March 2022 AME financials)

Total Corporate Surplus Now Tops $5.8 Billion

The above amounts do not include the $2.563 billion added to the NCUSIF when the TCCUSF surplus was merged on October 1, 2017.   Adding this amount brings total recoveries to almost $5.8 billion.

This surplus continues to point the need for an objective review of the entire corporate resolution effort.

When US Central was seized in March of 2009 NCUA Chair  Fryzel was quoted in a Wall Street Journal March 21 article:  “With us in control, we’d get honest numbers.”

If subsequent events have shown anything, it is that  “honest” numbers in an environment of uncertainty depends on who does the accounting.   Especially when the underlying process relies on valuation  models that claim to project the economic climate and related cash flows  years or even a decade into the future.

The Core Regulatory Failure

The problem is not the models or their incorrect assumptions, both of which were wrong.  The error is that predictions should not be the primary basis for resolution strategy.  All models are wrong; some are useful.

The required response is managing the daily dynamics as markets change.  Trying to predict the future  as the basis for today’s tactics led to disastrous decisions in NCUA’s  assessment of the corporate assets.

With NCUA’s ALM/NEV supervisory tests becoming more prominent in today’s rising rate environment, the limitations of financial modeling  is a much needed lesson to bear in mind.

The Need for a Look Back

But a look back is important for another reason.   Still today NCUA Chair Harper and senior staff use the apocalyptic estimates and conjectures thrown out in 2009 as NCUA  projected future events.  The hyperbolic forecasts were incorrect then; it is double injury to repeat them today when the actual facts are known.

In the same WSJ article above, Chairman Fryzel was quoted:  “regulators aren’t concerned about the health of any other wholesale credit unions besides the two brought into conservatorship.”  Yet just a year later when no longer chair, member Fryzel supported the liquidation of three more corporates, a decision that was devastating for the system and individual corporates.  Both Southwest and Members United are paying liquidating dividends on top of returning all their members’ capital shares.

By forecasting disaster, NCUA took unilateral action without any industry involvement except paying the bills.  There was no check and balance, no transparency and no alternative solutions developed.

Unfortunately, that unilateral regulatory mindset continues today.  It undercuts the unique cooperative advantage of collaboration represented in the common credit union funded resources  in the NCUSIF and CLF for individual turnarounds.

The most important takeaway from the corporate debacle is not estimation failures or the value of patience when resolving problems.  Rather it is NCUA’s failure to understand the unique cooperative capabilities when developing regulatory work out plans.

That lesson should include respect for the institutions in difficulty and a willingness to work together for solutions versus liquidating problems to make them go away.

The one board member who is best positioned to state the importance of this learning opportunity is Rodney Hood.  He was there at the Alpha and now hopefully, the Omega.

His counsel should be heard.  And credit unions should get their funds back ASAP. Enough delays!

PS:  I hope a board member will ask what the additional $10 million in liquidation expenses paid (outside the NCUA budget) in the first quarter from the AME recoveries was used for.

 

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When Less Is More: NCUA Board’s Mid-Year Operating Budget Review

This coming Thursday the NCUA board will review the agency’s midyear budget.  To do so thoughtfully, it is useful to put the operating budget’s long term and recent trends in perspective.

Below is a summary of the growth rate of NCUA’s operating fund budget from 1999-2001.  The first column shows the compound annual growth (CAGR) for the entire period; the second column for the most recent five years.   Note the annual growth rate is per year.

  Annual Growth of NCUA’s Operating Fund Expenses (1999-2021)

 

Account CAGR’99-’21 CAGR ’16-’21
Beginning Cash Balance $MN 11.47% 22.43%
Operating Fee Receipts $MN 4.27% 8.97%
Operating Expenses $MN 3.66% 9.48%
Net Fund Bal at Yearend $MN 16.92% 26.01%
Ending Cash Balance $MN 12.32% 21.33%

What the Recent Numbers Mean: Expenses Out of Control

During these 22 years, NCUA has transferred ever higher amounts of its operating expenses to the insurance fund.    This is via the Overhead Transfer Rate (OTR) process. That rate of expense allocation has been as low as 52% in 2008 and as high as 73.1% in 2016.   Currently it is 62.7% an increase from 2021.

This overhead transfer has exceeded 50% even though state charters have always had fewer than 50% of total insured shares this entire time.  NCUA is subsidizing its regulation of federal charters by shifting costs  onto state credit unions.

Following this arbitrary, open-ended expense transfer however, operating expenses still increased 3.66% annually or faster than inflation for the entire period.  Most recently in the five years 2016-2021 this annual growth accelerated to 9.84 % or three times faster than the overall 22 year average.

NCUA invented inflation five years before the rest of the economy could catch up.

After this OTR allocation, the Operating Fee charged to FCU’s exceeded actual operating expenses by an average of 104.5% for this entire period– some years more than 100% and others less. Since 2015 however, the NCUA’s the operating fee collected has exceeded actual expenses every year.

Building NCUA Cash  from Credit Union Funds

The result of these excess fees is that yearend cash on hand has grown from $13 million to $129.6 million (or ten times-1000% ) in this 22 year period.   During these same years, while  annual expenses grew by just 3.6%, NCUA grew cash balances at 12.3%, or four times as fast.

The 2021 year end cash balance of $129 million was 110%  more than that year’s total expenses, and  double the 46% average for the entire period.

NCUA held cash balances for the first 16 years of this analysis  between 30-40% of the actual expenditures.  Since 2016 NCUA has retained  more and more credit union funds.  Yet there has been no change in either the agency’s ability to assess its fee or in its operations to require this ever growing cash and fund balance.

The Latest Numbers: May 2022

As of end of May, cash balances are $191.8 million slightly higher than 12 months earlier.   Operating expenses for the first five months are $48.3 million exactly the same as the prior year.

The net fund balance (equity) is at an all-time high of $141.3 million for this time of year.  In 1999 the net fund balance was just $6 million.   The numbers and trends suggest that  $75 million or more of this excess cash could be returned to credit unions and NCUA still have more than enough to cover all operating expense.

The Board’s Budget Review

American author Edward Abbey observed:  “Growth for the sake of growth is the ideology of the cancer cell.”

This Thursday if expenses lag budget, the NCUA’s habit is to repurpose unspent funds  and/or approve new positions not in the original budget.

Normal business practice would be to reduce the budget, not find new ways to spend a surplus.

How will the board view this ever-growing cash hoard? The traditional government mindset is to spend all the money on hand, whether that is necessary or effective.  Staff is always fearful that if money is left over, it will justify reducing the budget request for the following year.

Chairman Harper has been very public in of his ambition to grow staff, the NCUSIF and the budget at every opportunity.

Will the rest of the board go along with this six-year pattern of uncontrolled operating expenses and buildup of excess cash? Or will they stop the spread of NCUA’s operating fund cancer?

After all this is the members’ money.

 

 

 

 

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A Review of the NCUA Board’s Oversight of the NCUSIF

NCUA’s open board meeting In May had only one agenda item, the quarterly staff update on the NCUSIF.

This was an opportunity to focus on many topics that have swirled around the management of the Fund over the past year.   These include:

  • The fund’s investment strategy especially in the rising rate environment;
  • The accounting confusions using  Federal not private GAAP presentation;
  • Projections for the fund’s operating outcomes later in the year;
  • Options to more accurately present the Normal Operating Level (NOL). The ratio now uses two separate accounting period’s data;
  • The prospect of lowering the NOL to its historic range of 1.2 to 1.3% from 1.33%.

The NCUSIF’s $22 billion  is its largest asset . The fund’s unique cooperative design means credit unions have a direct financial stake in its performance.  Credit unions  should receive a dividend in years of strong performance and pay a premium in the event of mismanagement or a catastrophic loss.

As noted by Vice Chair Hauptman in the meeting:  it’s a mutual asset of the credit union movement and NCUA. . . it’s worth reminding everybody that every dollar of that one percent contribution belongs to credit union members and no other.  NCUA has the obligation to credit unions and their members to manage that fund prudently and effectively.

Board member Hood reiterated:   The 1% capital deposit which comprises most of the Share Insurance Fund’s equity is also an asset of the credit union.  We should never forget this.

I would add that the unique coop design intended the 1% deposit be an earning asset for credit unions.

The Fed’s Response to the Current Economy

As reported by CNBS:  Minutes from the Fed’s June meeting, which were released Wednesday, revealed that the central bank is prepared to use even more restrictive measures to tame surging inflation. They indicated that July’s meeting would bring another rate hike of up to 75 basis points, and acknowledged that the economy could suffer a slowdown.

“Participants concurred that the economic outlook warranted moving to a restrictive stance of policy, and they recognized the possibility that an even more restrictive stance could be appropriate if elevated inflation pressures were to persist,” the minutes said. Treasury yields, meanwhile, continued to rise.”

This is not new news.   Since October 2021 the Fed has indicated that it would change its accommodative monetary policy in response to signs of growing inflation.   That intent became explicit in December with forecasts of interest rate hikes from the historically low levels engineered in 2020 to respond to the Covid economic shutdown.

The market’s response was swift.   Through this year’s second quarter,  bond  fund valuations have fallen almost 20% in market value. The NCUSIF has gone from a market gain of over $500 million in 2020 to a market valuation loss of $1.1 billion as of the April 2022 NCUSIF report.

The NCUSIF Staff”s Response to Rising Rates

The staff’s response to this dramatic change in rates was provided in May’s presentation:  Extend the investment portfolio further by going from a maximum term of 7 years to 10 years.   Rick Mayfield, capital market specialist. stated  this strategy would place approximately 10% of the portfolio in annual buckets over the 10 year range in a one to two year time frame.

The result would raise the average weighted duration from 3.5 years to almost 6 years—at a time when the overwhelming consensus and Fed intent is that rates will continue to rise.

The continuing decline in the NCUSIF’s market value in the past 18 months shows how far the portfolio is falling short of current rates.  This below market return is lost revenue in the tens of millions of dollars.  The continuing decline is a specific indicator of the portfolio’s performance gap from current market rates.

To mechanically continue  investing in equal “buckets” over ten years is a failure of  management.

This investment extension aligns with neither the current policy nor experienced investment judgment.   No objective data or analysis was offered to support this extension to a 5-6 year duration.

Extending a portfolio does not automatically bring higher rates.  Yield curves do not always slope upward.

As an example, when yield curves invert, that is the two year bond pays more than the 10 year,  how does purchasing the lower return 10 year bond “maximize yield” per fund policy?

Managing the portfolio’s duration is the most critical function to match the liabilities for which the fund is responsible.  These include  paying operating expenses, growing retained earnings in line with insured shares, and if necessary, covering insurance losses.   Those expense liabilities can be easily quantified and monitored monthly to align with investment earnings (yield) decisions.

For example, a 2% fund yield would generate $400+ million in revenue easily meeting the operating expense and projected equity growth goals.  A 3% earnings rate should result in a dividend to the owners if insurance losses are at, or below, long term trends.

This is the integrated ALM/IRR management NCUA expects all credit unions to practice.   This management responsibility is not a fixed formula followed routinely whatever the market conditions or future outlooks.  Rather modeling tools, forecasts and judgment are used to align asset returns and the cost of  liabilities as market events change.

No Free Lunch

Even more disappointing was the assertion by CFO Schied that the portfolio’s new extension to ten years would be initiated this quarter-despite the explicit forecast of further raises from the Federal Reserve.

“ . . .with respect to the investment portfolio and consistent with the existing board approved investment policy. the investment committee has decided last month to begin to extend the portfolio ladder out to 10 years.  This is not reflected in today’s quarter one presentation because the decision to do so does not show up until quarter two which will be evident in my quarter two presentation as well as our monthly reporting that we post on the website going forward.”

Naively extending investments to “chase yield” is a common examiner criticism of poorly documented credit union investing.  Such extensions  may produce a short term income jolt but at significantly increased ALM/IRR risk.

Vice Chair Hauptman remarked:   I can say as somebody who worked in fixed income markets for years you know there is no free lunch.  We can get more income by taking more risk and in no other fashion.

There was no data presented to justify a decision to extend from 7 to 10 years in a rising rate environment, an action contradictory to traditional sound portfolio practice.  This extension was also taken in the face of increasing market losses.  This mechanical approach underperforms in the current interest rate environment.

Making a fixed rate 10-year investment  in the face of inflation and other economic uncertainties, is extremely speculative.  It severely limits management options for responding to market events and any changes in credit union insurance needs. It results in  a fixed revenue cap for an even longer period than the current practice.

The result is that NCUA’s hands are tied responding to events during this extended average life of almost 6 years. The Fund becomes dependent on other sources for liquidity or revenue, a contradiction in the fund’s fundamental financial role.

This extension announcement doubles down even after the mounting evidence of NCUSIF investment management shortcomings.  The investment policy referenced has not been updated since 2013.   But most concerning is that there appears to be no ability to objectively evaluate investment practice.

Projecting the Equity ratio And Slowing Share Growth

In addition to presenting the current investment approach, CFO Schied’s projected the NCUSIF’s NOL to June 30, providing two interesting data disclosures.

The first is that he projects an operating loss of $68 million for the NCUSIF  in the second (June) quarter versus a net income of $54.4 million in the March quarter.  That is a $122 million reversal in operating results.

Since investment revenue more than offsets operating expenses, the only possible reason for such a reversal is insurance loss reserves.  Yet all the CAMEL results are positive.  There was no indication of any major unaddressed issues.  So why this dismal forecast?

Secondly Schied also gave the agency’s 12-month insured share growth forecasts for 2022.  Actual share growth was 9.3% for the March quarter.  The projections are  7% growth at June 30, year over year; and only 4.3% for the full calendar 2022.  A significant slowdown from the past two years.

A Board Meeting with Mixed Outcomes

 

The Agency’s mechanical NCUSIF investing in the face of dramatic rate changes and increasing portfolio devaluations was a disappointment.  Extending the investment duration to almost six years (versus current 3.5 years), will only reduce the Fund’s flexibility responding to changing rates and future industry risk events.

Both Chair Harper and CFO Schied downplayed or even denied there was any real risk to extending the portfolio. Here is the Chairman’s summary observation:

The changes in the value of these(investment) assets were expected. That is because as interest rates go up the value of these bonds go down. I learned that in my finance 301 class back in college.

These unrealized losses fortunately do not impact the equity ratio and do not increase the likelihood of a premium just as unrealized gains do not increase the equity ratio. What the unrealized losses signal is a change in the interest rate environment. We are moving forward to address this issue.   The NCUA is adjusting its investment strategy from a seven year ladder to a ten-year ladder. . .

This observation is incorrect in two respects:

  1. Extending the ladder increases the portfolio’s risks, especially as it relates to meeting its matching  liability/expense requirements.
  2. As the portfolio continues to carry underwater investments, that is returns below market, then the fund’s revenue is short changed. It is credit unions that may have to pay a premium for NCUA’s mismanagement due to potential  revenue shortfalls.

Confusing Financial Presentations

The staff continues to present financial information following Federal GAAP that both confuses and misinforms readers about the actual state of the NCUSIF.

The federal presentation of the balance sheet shows that both the assets and Fund equity  have fallen this year from yearend.  That is because the decline in market value is is subtracted from both investment assets and the cumulative results of operations (equity) on both sides  of the balance sheet.  This understatement is $1.1 billion as of April 30 and increasing each month as portfolio valuations decline further.

To the user of this information, the NCUSIF appears to be reducing in size and value.

The accounting category, year to date retained earnings, is not reported under Federal GAAP.  Calculating  the Fund’s NOL trends requires this number.  However it  is not  presented in the financial statements, but must be derived from the information presented.

Finally the issue of how the NOL is being calculated using numbers from two different accounting periods was again raised by Board Member Hood. He referenced the Cotton accounting firm’s review from  2021 and its reported description of several ways the 1% true up could be presented in the  Fund’s yearend financial statements.

CFO Schied’s response to Hood’s query was:

We are reviewing and doing the due diligence over alternative approaches including that pro forma idea that you’ve mentioned in order to have a complete picture of the relative costs and benefits and to understand any potential hidden implications of any alternatives. 

Because I’m not sure back then that they realized that the change was going to lead to the timing gap that we have today.  I would look forward to updating you on these findings over the summer.

Credit unions will certainly be looking for this review!

Overall  this single-topic open board meeting identified, but failed to resolve, these ongoing  issues of NCUSIF investment management, fund financial presentation and more accurate NOL calculation.

(Editor’s note:  Later updates corrected earlier spelling error of Vice Chair Hauptman’s name)

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The Supreme Court,  The Administrative State and NCUA’s RBC/CCULR Rule

The new RBC/CCULR net worth rule is the most comprehensive, intrusive and costly regulation ever passed by NCUA.

The agency’s staff’s initial estimate of the funds now restricted from increasing member value is over $24 billion. From  their December 2021 board presentation:

Under the CCULR, if all 473 credit unions opted into the CCULR and held the minimum nine percent net worth ratio required to be well capitalized, the total minimum net worth required is estimated at $111.8 billion, an increased capital requirement of $24.3 billion over the minimum required under the 2015 Final Rule. 

This is a minimum 30% increase of capital, restricting its use for members, and imposed just nine days after the rule’s printing in the Federal register.

RBC/CCULR is both procedurally and substantively deeply flawed. Instead of implementing the  legislative intent that PCA be applied to a limited number of “complex” credit unions, the regulation passed covers 85% of all credit union assets.

But what can be done especially as the NCUA board composed of different philosophies approved the rule 3-0?

A Future Opening

The recent Supreme Court 6-3 ruling in the West Virginia v. EPA case suggests there is another opportunity to withdraw the rule or to challenge its validity.

The EPA case is about much more than regulating pollution.  The 89 page opinion is here.

As summarized in a New York times article:

It . . . signals that the court’s newly expanded conservative majority is deeply skeptical of the power of administrative agencies to address major issues facing the nation and the planet.

Chief Justice Roberts, employing the phrase for the first time in a majority opinion, said it applied in cases of unusual significance and was meant to address “a particular and recurring problem: agencies asserting highly consequential power beyond what Congress could reasonably be understood to have granted.”

Another account of the decision in The Hill explains the broader significance of the Court’s reasoning:

In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on the controversial “major questions doctrine.” The major questions doctrine is a relatively new interpretative maxim that directs courts to presume that Congress does not intend to vest agencies with policymaking authority over questions of great economic and political significance.

Only Congress’s “clear statement” that it did intend to confer the claimed authority can overcome this presumption. When a court employs this maxim, it reads statutes narrowly, stripping the agency of the power to address the major question that the statute, on its face, gives the agency the authority to address.

Unsurprisingly, the main focus of the media, scholars and the public is on the consequences of the court’s move for the size and contours of the federal administrative state.  . . 

The impact of the court’s ruling on federal agency authority and power cannot be overstated.

A lawyer friend when asked,  opined: “what I’ve read about it suggests the Court is going to take a very restrictive view when assessing agency claims of regulatory authority (effectively dispensing with Chevron deference).  When the authority to regulate is clear, I have no idea how much discretion the agencies will be afforded when exercising that authority.  I’m not sure what category the RBC rules fall into.”

The  RBC/CCULR rule’s flaws include the following;

  • The agency provided no “substantial objective evidence” that the system’s capital levels were inadequate under the existing RBNW rule. Staff admitted that only one troubled credit union in the past ten years would have been subject to RBC’s higher net worth ratio.
  • The agency wrongly applied the “comparable” standard to implement a clone of bank regulations. This approach clearly contradicted the statutory intent that RBNW cover only an identified small number of “complex” credit unions that presented unusual risks. As staff confirmed in its board action memo: A special note that most, if not all, of the components of the CCULR are similar to the federal banking agencies’ CBLR.
  • There was no statutory authority for a CCULR option which Congress, in legislation, authorized only for banking regulators.
  • Nine days for implantation violates the “reasonable period of time” statutory requirement for a change in PCA capital levels.
  • The rule imposes significant financial harm to members by reducing the value they receive,  beginning with the $24 billion staff estimate. That is just the initial number. It will grow every year.
  • The compliance burden is unreasonable. It mandates a one-size-fits-all mathematical capital formula for every credit union independent of hundreds of individual risk circumstances.

A Way Out of the RBC/CCULR Morass

Credit unions can sue the agency for the substantive violations noted.  But that takes years and the harm done members will just continue in the meantime.

The most feasible course of action will be for a more informed NCUA board, responsive to the needs of credit union members, to use this Supreme Court precedent to withdraw the rule entirely.

That will require leadership, courage  and insight from current or future board members.   The first test is to ask the sitting members their views on this deregulation opportunity.

What would Hood, Harper and Hauptmann say in response to this Supreme Court interpretation?

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85% of Credit Union Assets Subject to RBC/CCULR at March 31, 2022

In December 2021 the NCUA Board passed a completely new regulation of over 500 pages to imposing a new RBC/CCULR net worth requirement.  The rule took full effect on January 1, 2022, or just 9 days after posting in the Federal Register.

It instantly raised the minimum net worth ratio to be considered “well-capitalized” by 29% that is, from 7% to 9%.

All credit unions over $500 million in total assets were immediately placed under this new capital standard.   As of March 31, 2022 these 701 credit unions manage 85% of the industry’s total assets, or $1.809 trillion.

No CCULR “Off-Ramp” for 193 Credit Unions

Those subject credit unions with less than a 9% net worth ratio must comply with the Risk Based Capital (RBC) computation.  It takes five pages of call report data to calculate this one ratio.

As of March 31, there were 193 credit unions with $345 billion in assets that reported less than 9% net worth.   For them there is no CCULR off-ramp.

They are thrown into a financial, accounting and classification “wonder-land” of arbitrary ratios, regulatory accounting decisions and almost 100 distinct asset classifications.

Following the RBC requirements is a complicated mess.

For example, individual credit unions have at least four options for calculating the net worth ratio. They can use average daily assets for the quarter, or the average of the three-month end quarter balances, or the average of the current and preceding three quarter end balances, or the quarter end total.

NCUA doesn’t even try to present the industry’s total net worth in this multiple manner, just asserting that the 10.22% is the industry average even though many other calculations are authorized.

Depending on which denominator a credit union chooses to determine the ratio, the outcome may or may not be a net worth over 9%.   Net worth comparisons become much less informative for members and the public without full disclosure of the methodology used.

Changes in the ratio, higher or lower,  may reflect nothing more than different calculations, not actual soundness.

RBC’s Reach Goes Beyond the $500 million level. Another 123 credit unions with total assets between $400-$500 million are within range of the $500 million RBC/CCULR tripwire.  46 of these have net worth below 9% and hold 37% of this segment’s total assets of $55 billion.

(Data update:  324 CUs completed the RBC ratio, and reported a value on the 5300.  324 minus the 193 under 9% is a difference of 131.  These completed the RBC ratio despite qualifying  for CCULR, or they may have failed one of the tests.

This suggests credit unions want to know their requirements under either net worth option to make the optimum decisions about which to follow.)

The Members Will Pay

The increase in regulatory net worth is a tax on asset growth. It requires resources be directed to reserves held idle on the balance sheet, instead of being used for investment in credit union products and services or higher returns on savings and lower fees.

Credit unions must choose to slow deposit and asset growth to build their net worth or increase their ROA by paying less or charging more.  Whatever financial choice is made, the members will pay the cost for this additional capital.

This burden occurs at a time when members are coping with a rate of inflation not experienced in 40 years.  Instead of serving members’ needs, credit unions must first serve the regulator which provided no factual basis for the rule.

A Unnecessary Rule Not Authorized by Congress

The passage of the RBC/CCULR capital regulation met no objective safety and soundness need and contradicted the express language imposing PCA on credit unions under the Credit Union Membership Access Act in 1998.

When presenting the rule, NCUA staff stated  their analysis of credit union failures for the past decade showed that this new requirement would have established a higher capital threshold for just  one problem credit union over $500 million.

The last minute addition of the so called CCULR off ramp in 2021 was defended as a way to reduce the acknowledged new and enormous burden of RBC.   Congress passed legislation permitting banking regulators this CCULR exception.  That statue did not include NCUA or credit unions.

The fact that credit union CCULR has no Congressional authorization is just one of many improper steps NCUA took when imposing this regulatory monstrosity affecting every asset decision made by a credit union.

The regulation  is the Fruit of a Poisonous Tree failing at least five explicit requirements of the PCA legislation and the Administrative Procedures Act.

So why didn’t credit unions sue?  Why did two board members go along with this deeply flawed regulation and process to make the passage unanimous?

What options are now possible to overturn a regulation  that injects the federal insurer into literally every specific balance sheet and asset decision made by credit unions?

Tomorrow a new approach to eliminate this rule, take away the burden, and return responsibility for the management of the credit unions to the members and their board and managers now appears possible.

Note:  Additional details of this flawed regulation can be found in these articles.

https://chipfilson.com/2022/02/cculr-rbc-unconstrained-by-statute-an-arbitrary-regulatory-act/

https://chipfilson.com/2022/02/thedisruptive-costly-reach-of-cculr-rbc-30-40-billion-for-initial-compliance-no-longer-available-for-members/

https://chipfilson.com/2021/12/why-the-rbc-cculr-should-be-abandoned/

https://chipfilson.com/2022/02/cculr-rbc-unconstrained-by-statute-an-arbitrary-regulatory-act/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Rating Examiners for a Stronger Cooperative system

Net promoter scores.  Five star yelp ratings.  Uber driver feedback.   Multiple processes measure customer satisfaction.  Especially where consumers have a choice of service.

But there are few examples tracking the interactions between those exercising authority and the public subject to it.  A most critical area for this need is law enforcement policing.

Warrenton Virginia is a small, traditional rural community of 10,000 residents, most of whom are republican.   The community is conservative, wary of government and proud of  its long local history.

It is one of the least likely towns  to implement an innovative feedback process to manage the relations between the police and citizens.   But since the George Floyd murder in 2020 every community has sought out methods to incentivize fair and ethical law enforcement.

Warrenton’s police department of 29 officers and three civilian employees is one of three early adopters of the Guardian Score system of monitoring policy and community interactions.

Guardian Score’s Feedback Process

After every significant encounter with residents, officers are required to hand out their business card on the back of which is a QR code which asks for feedback on the interaction.  The questions use a star-based system to rate officers on their communication, listening skills and fairness.

The feedback is anonymous.   It can be given any time after the event.  It provides the department another tool to evaluate performance beyond data on arrests, fines or other required interventions.  It is similar to an Uber driver rating, yet the power dynamics are much different.

There have been 179 reviews so far in 2022. Guardian provides a score dashboard visible to the Chief.  The officers’ overall rating is 4.94 out of five stars.

A System for Cooperatives

The Guardian Score effort is in the pilot phase.  But the one-sided relationship between those in authority and citizens is not limited to policing.   The credit union system and its regulators have experienced this imbalance which has been the subject of several  recent articles.

As one writer summarized:  Yes, (NCUA) has become an entity that has lost its way in helping small credit unions succeed. Or, They are Coming to Bayonet the Wounded.

NCUA Board member Hauptman has encouraged credit unions to record their meetings with examiners as one way to encourage  open and honest interactions.

The Texas Credit Union Depart has conducted an annual “customer satisfaction survey” of its state charters for the past twenty five years.   The department publishes the complete results and comparisons with earlier years.  The latest report can be found here.

Neither approach enables the comprehensive and timely monitoring possible from the Guardian process.

Why a Dynamic Scoring Process Is Needed

There are times when NCUA and credit unions act as if they are not mutually dependent on each other’s success.  The cooperative model is not the banking model in which  shareholders try to maximize their independent ownership returns.

The coop system’s  interdependence  relies upon collaborative solutions among credit unions and with the regulator, especially when the relationship is working productively.

However  there is no ongoing monitoring of the quality of examiner and regulatory interactions with credit unions. Public speeches and anecdotal news stories are insufficient and irregular.

The Guardian Score process is dynamic, easy to implement and can be tracked daily at both the regional and main office level.   It is ready to go.  It is inexpensive.  The cost for Warrenton is $4,500 per year.

This feedback option would promote a better balance between examiners and credit unions under their oversight.  It  measures quickly the quality of the interactions that take place:  listening, explaining and helpfulness.

Moreover it could be easily extended to other areas of regulatory interactions to monitor the responsiveness of agency personnel.

In Warrenton the initial worry was that negative reviews would affect performance evaluations.  Of the 170 submissions, all have been positive.  The program is even used to celebrate  thoughtful interactions reported in the surveys.

An Opportunity for NASCUS

Where to start?  This initiative is an ideal one for NASCUS as an element in its state accreditation program.   It would provide specific, continuous data on examiner effectiveness-a traditional advantage for state charters.

Innovation at the state level has been a hallmark of the dual chartering system.   This is an opportunity to respond to a growing worry openly expressed  by credit unions. It is a process to raise the quality of cooperative oversight and community trust.

Which state regulator will be the first to step up?

 

 

 

 

 

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“Protecting the Insurance Fund”

From NCUA board members’s statements in Senate confirmation hearings  to the examiner on the street, the most frequently stated goal stated by NCUA staff is  to “protect the insurance fund.”

This goal is repeated even though the NCUSIF is a means and not an end in itself.  The ultimate purpose of NCUSIF is to safeguard member assets.

The primary venue in which Board members demonstrate their responsibility to “protect the fund” is the quarterly statistical report  provided by staff and discussed in an open meeting.

The NCUSIF’s status was the principal topic of May’s board meeting.   I was unable to listen to the live broadcast.  All I have is the  slide deck from the agenda and posted board statements, not the actual live exchanges  that took place.

Questions on the NCUSIF’s  from the March Update

Here are some  initial questions from the  information presented.  I would hope that some or many of these would be  part of the dialogue in the Board’s duty “to protect the fund.”

  1. Since December 2021, total NCUSIF assets have declined by $130 million even after recording $578 million in new capital deposits receivable. The cumulative results of operations (equity) shows a decline of $727 million in the first quarter.  How did these declines occur?  How should users of this data understand Fund performance?
  2. The March report shows that the market value of the portfolio has fallen $806 million below cost or book value. What does this decline indicate about the management of the Fund’s interest rate risk?
  3. The Fund’s yield year to date is only 1.22% What is the required breakeven yield to cover the Fund’s operating expenses?  How large is the revenue loss in the next 12 months as indicated by the current and  continued decline in market value?
  4. How did the Fund’s investment committee modify their approach after  the rise in rates initially forecast last October/November  by Chairman Powell?
  5. How will the investment committee deploy the approximately $4.0 billion in funds arriving in the next 12 months from maturities, new capitalization deposits and interest payments?
  6. The Fund reported net income of $54.4 million in the 1st However Slide 13 shows estimated retained earnings of $4.792 billion, or an anticipated loss of $68 million in the current quarter.  That would represent a $122 million net operating decline for the June quarter.  How was this projected?  What is causing this loss?
  7. Insured savings growth is estimated at 7.1% at June 30, 2022, down from 14.2% at the June 2021 quarter. Actual twelve month share growth was 9.3% as of March 31, 2022. How much additional growth  slowdown is projected for this year?
  8. In Slide 13, the numerator and denominator use data from two different time periods to calculate the NCUSIF’s equity ratio (NOL).  If the same June 30 data were used for both parts of the ratio,  the resulting NOL would be 1.283 % versus 1.25 %.   This three basis point difference is over $500 million at the current level of insured shares.   Shouldn’t this more timely ratio be used in reporting the Fund’s actual financial position?

Fund Performance and Investment Policy

The NCUA’s immediate and ongoing opportunity  to “protect the fund” arises from its  management of its current $22 billion and  ever growing asset base.

The questions above are vital to understanding how NCUA staff implements the Board’s twin NCUSIF investment policy objectives  “To meet liquidity needs” and “To invest. . .seeking to maximize yield.”

The March financial statistics raise critical question of how the NCUSIF responded to the changed interest rate outlook over the past 12 months.  And, more importantly how it will respond going forward.

I will report on Board member’s interactions and assessments to NCUSIF’s   March information  when the May meeting video/ transcript is available.   That dialogue will be a useful example to learn how NCUA board members see their role  “ to protect the fund.”

 

 

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A Merger for a New Future or a Rescue Operation?

The largest merger announced so far in 2022 is the combination of the $2.8 billion Cap Com FCU with the $5.6 billion State Employees FCU, both in Albany, New York.

Cap Com’s web site has a link promoting the merger.  It includes a video from the President and Board Chair, FAQ’s,  merger updates and a description of the voting process.

In these explanations and in the required Member Notice dated April 8, 2022, the justifications (excerpts below) are general and rhetorical.

The combination will result in a different brand and new name which will  operate state wide.  The site even highlights a critical benefit  members will be able to keep: their free checks and coin counting machines!

There is  a  link to nine merger myths which are then dismissed with a contrary assertion.  For example:

Myth #6: Bigger is not better.
Often, that’s true but having more resources will allow us to do more for members, employees, and the community. This includes enhancing technologies that make banking affordable and easy.

In all the communications, both required and marketing the decision, there is a complete absence of specific benefits except those achieved by adding together existing branch, ATM, video tellers and other operational access already in place.  No savings or loan rate benefits are presented, nor any mention of new products or services.

The March 31, 2022 Financial Reports

 

While State Employees is almost twice as large as Cap Com, the most recent call report suggest it is confronting headwinds.  Total first quarter revenue declined and net income fell 50% to $6.8 million from the 2021 first quarter. Cap Com’s first quarter net was $7.1 million.

State Employee’s loans are just 51% of assets.  The investment portfolio shows a $105 million decline in market value.  The net worth ratio has barely increased over the past 12 months,  going from 6.8% to 7.06% at March 31 of this year.

State Employees would be subject to NCUA’s RBC net worth requirement.  Whereas Cap Com’s 9.86% net worth would allow them to elect the simpler CCULR capital compliance option.

35 Years as CEO

State Employees President Michael Castellana has been CEO since April 1988, or 34 years and two months.  From the Member Notice: As part of  the merger agreement Chris McKenna, Cap Com CEO/ President would become President and Castellana CEO of the new credit union.

The board chair of Cap Com will become the  chair of the combined entity.  This and the other circumstances give  the impression that this merger  is  a CEO succession plan for the larger State Employees.

This “solution” will cost Cap Com members their independent, locally focused, sound organization.

Misleading and incomplete statements about the event are a suspect foundation for a new credit union launch.   It erodes trust in leadership.  It undermines promises about the future.

If that is the intent, it should be disclosed to Cap Com members.  It puts a very different framing for motivation and outcome.  For in this instance, the asymmetries in size, performance results, and financial situation  suggest the smaller credit union is rescuing the larger.

Members sense that something does not compute in this decision by Cap Com’s board and CEO to end their independent charter.  They, and even a SECU member, have made their views known on NCUA’s website.

Members’ Comments on the Merger Proposal

  1. I have grave reservations about this merger. There was not enough due diligence to provide a transparent account of why two thriving institutions must merge, and members have not been given enough complete information to make an informed vote.

I think that this is a disservice for members and the community and I would urge you to reject this merger as not enough was guaranteed to members, and the board of directors (which includes the proposed entity’s CEO) is not making decisions that favor employees or members of either credit union.

Thank you for your time.   (Jennifer Smith)

  1. Good afternoon,
    I have grave reservations about this merger. There was not enough due diligence to provide a transparent account of why two thriving institutions must merge, and members have not been given enough complete information to make an informed vote.
    I think that this is a disservice for members and the community and I would urge you to reject this merger as not enough was guaranteed to members, and the board of directors (which includes the proposed entity’s CEO) is not making decisions that favor employees or members of either credit union. (Justin Williams; similar comment from Paul Lenz))
  2. I am a Capcom account holder and I have reservations about this merger. This is being pushed down our throats and we are not being given full information to make an informed decision. Both credit unions are doing well and the merger is not needed. They have given us vague promises about “efficiencies”, while downplaying that there will be negatives.

There must be, because mergers result in lowered competition, leading to reduced benefits, increased costs, decreased customer service, layoffs, etc. If they want to say this will not happen, then I ask, then how do these “efficiencies” happen?
Please do not approve this “merger.” ( S Price)

  1. I am leaning heavily against this merger. I maintain 14 separate accounts at CapCom and just feel the information that has been released is spotty at best, and reads as if it came from a marketing company. The special member meeting is scheduled for twenty minutes before online voting ends (24 hours before mail-in ballots must be received).From the notice that was sent to CapCom members: “Both credit unions are flourishing, so this is a ‘merger of opportunity’ with the ongoing needs of the members at its core.” What are these needs? Where have they been expressed?What about:

Higher nickel and dime fees (a SEFCU speciality – Google “Story vs SEFCU”)?
What happens if the merger is voted down?
Is CapCom over-extended on its loans (a popular theory floating around)?

Sorry. There are way too many issues here and very little substance offered for anyone to make an educated decision.  (David H)

  1. As a member of Sefcu for ove 15 years, I am appalled that this so called merger of equals is going to be allowed. It was announced last July as a merger of equals. If that is the case then not only should the capcom membership get to vote but so should the Sefcu members. You can’t have a merger of equals if it’s only going to get voted on by one side . I also would like you to look into the multiple conflicts of interest on both sets of leadership. I truly don’t feel that the members of both institutions are truly going to benefit in any possible way from this proposed merger. (Russel Kuhls)

MyAssessment

Despite the asserted benefits, this looks like a merger of necessity  to extricate State Employees from a downturn.

The members of Cap Com correctly see this as not in their best interests.

With a new  name and brand, a state wide operational commitment, a below average combined capital ratio, and required conversions from different data processing and other third-party providers, this merger is  a recovery operation not a launch to the future.  It will be costly.

State Employees could recruit Cap Com’s CEO to  be Castellana’s heir.  However bringing Cap Com’s resources to the project appears to be throwing good money after bad.

Cap Com members are being asked to rescue State Employees members in a time of heightened economic uncertainty.

Where Has NCUA Been?

The members of Cap Com are also covering for a lack of effective supervision by NCUA.   It was NCUA’s Chair who in January asserted  the need for succession planning by proposing a new rule.  Merging Cap Com to provide the  leadership  to turn around State Employee’s  trends is the exact opposite of the rule’s intent.

This rescue requires that members vote to approve and then exercise patience, of uncertain duration, to endure numerous technical conversions  for operational integration.

Whatever the outcome, credit union members are being tasked again to pay for the shortfalls of the regulator in its examinations and assessments of the management and board performance of State Employees, that is the M in CAMEL.

References:

From the Member Notice on NCUA’s Website. 

No specific member benefits are provided.

Reasons for merger: The Board of Directors of CAP COM unanimously concluded that the proposed merger with SEFCU is desirable and in the best interests of the members. Although CAP COM thrives today, there is no guarantee it will be immune to the ever-increasing competitive pressures that can blunt success in the future. Throughout the United States, credit unions face immense challenges from digital only banking services, industry disruptors, and powerful mega banks. This merger will increase operating efficiencies and offer the potential to expand products and services for credit union members sustainably over time.

Joining forces with SEFCU is the ultimate collaboration. This merger will benefit members, employees, and the communities across the combined organization’s new, expanded footprint. The merger would capitalize on the cooperative spirit of the two credit unions, their distinct strengths, talent pool, and significant financial resources. It is from a position of financial strength that CAP COM seeks to merge with SEFCU. Both credit unions are flourishing, so this is a “merger of opportunity” with the ongoing needs of members at its core.

Changes to services and member benefits: Banding together, CAP COM and SEFCU can expand affordable, easy-to-use, life-enhancing services. A unified credit union would possess the scale necessary to deliver greater value to members – beyond what CAP COM and SEFCU could deliver individually.

The fiscal strength, and safety and soundness, of the combined organization paves the way. The expanded and diversified balance sheet and membership composition will reduce financial and membership concentration risk and increase opportunity. The combined capital of the two credit unions, once merged, is estimated to be approximately $702 million, cushioning against unforeseen economic downturns or other financial challenges.

The merged organization would have the largest branch presence of any financial institution in the Capital Region of New York State. In terms of number of members, it would rank among the largest credit unions in New York and the top 30 in the United States.

Through this merger, CAP COM members will realize gains in excellent rates, favorable pricing, and innovations that enhance their banking experience and financial wellness, thanks to the operating efficiencies of a larger organization that reduces expenses and generates revenue. The personalized service for which CAP COM is known will benefit from a larger membership across New York.

Making banking more convenient, affordable, and easy is a primary goal of the combined organization. The merger would enable members to gain access to more branches along commercial corridors and in diverse neighborhoods across the Capital Region and upstate New York (including areas where members prefer to bank today). More surcharge-free ATMs throughout the United States would also be available, along with more robust call center services and the convenience of 24/7 digital banking. Below you will find the retail expansion opportunities you will benefit from through this merger.

  • Capital Region, Central NY, Western NY, Southern Tier
  • 61 full-service branches (CAP COM currently 12) and two mobile branches
  • 27 video tellers (CAP COM currently 0)
  • 130 on-site ATMs (CAP COM currently 13)
  • Nationwide 85,000 surcharge-free ATMs (Allpoint®, CO-OP) More than 5,600 shared branches

Along with enriching the service offerings and benefits for members, this merger will create countless opportunities for employees to hone their skills, apply their talents, and grow in their careers with the combined organization, which will ultimately benefit members. All staff of both the merging and continuing credit unions will be offered continued employment following the completion of the merger.

Members of CAP COM will be well represented in governance of the combined organization. The Chair of the Board of Directors of legacy CAP COM will assume the role of Board Chair in the new credit union. In addition, Board members of the former CAP COM will occupy seven of 15 total seats on the newly expanded Board, along with committee assignments. As stewards of the unified credit union’s mission, fiscal soundness, and strategic direction, the Board of Directors will possess decades of institutional knowledge and continue to be advocates for members.

Finally, community outreach with generous financial support are hallmarks of both credit unions. Larger philanthropic efforts, and a greater number of employee-volunteers statewide, will support a more sustainable and equitable future across communities where members live and work.

Merger-related financial arrangements:

Two CAP COM executives, Chris McKenna, President & Chief Executive Officer, and David Jurczynski, Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer, are covered by a collateral-assigned split dollar life insurance plans (the Plans) that were established in 2019, prior to any discussion of merger with SEFCU. The Plans include a standard “change in control” provision requiring that, given certain circumstances including a merger as proposed to the membership herein, any unvested benefits that may be subject to a vesting schedule under the Plans, become 100% vested on the merger effective date.

Footnote:

More information on CapCom’s business strategy here:

(Opening paragraphs) For the past three years, CAP COM Federal Credit Union ($2.6B, Albany, NY) has been honing its abilities to reduce risk and maximize reward — taking care to not throw out the BABI with the bathwater.

“BABI” is shorthand for the business analytics (BA) and business intelligence (BI) division the cooperative created in January 2018. The BABI team generates and interprets data as well as makes intelligible reports available to stakeholders across the enterprise.

 

 

 

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Today’s NCUA Board Meeting: an Opportunity for Insight into the NCUSIF

With only one agenda item, the NCUSIF’s March quarterly update, today’s NCUA board meeting presents an in-depth learning opportunity about the fund’s management.

With almost $22 billion in assets, the NCUSIF is the largest investment under NCUA’s control.

Because NCUA publishes monthly updates on its three major funds, credit unions are able to monitor how their members’ funds are being used.

The public board discussion is a vital part of this process for credit unions and board oversight.

What I Am Listening For

  1. There is much confusion caused by the NCUSIF’s use of Federal GAAP versus private GAAP accounting, the standard credit unions must follow. The Federal accounting terms, presentation and practice are different from private GAAP.

This is because Federal GAAP was intended for use by entities which rely on government appropriations.

Some examples.  Cumulative results of operations: Following SFFAS No 7 the NCUSIF recognizes interest on investments as “non-exchange revenue” which in turn means unrealized holding gains and losses are reported as part of revenue.

In contrast, credit union “available for sale” securities are reported at book value with unrealized gains or losses recorded in a valuation account, not as an income or expense.  This  account is not included when computing the net worth ratio.

Credit unions report retained earnings.  Federal accounting has no comparable account. This and other differences mean that NCUA staff transform NCUSIF Federal presentation into a private format, but then do not follow private accounting practice.

For example the 1% deposit true up (or refund) is treated as revenue in the NCUSIF; however credit unions record this adjustment as an investment asset on their books.

Will this confusion be addressed?   How will this affect the calculation of the 1% true up when presenting the NOL ratio for the fund?  Private GAAP recognizes the true up as a receivable or payable on the insurer’s books when the insured risk is reported triggering the required deposit adjustments.

  1. How has the NCUSIF investment committee responded to the rising interest rate environment? The market value of the NCUSIF’s investments may have fallen by as much as $1.5 billion from the peak in 2021.   What changes have been made in response?  How will the below market income stream from the fixed rate, lower earning. long-term bonds, affect the income of the fund and projections of the NOL in 2022?
  2. Credit union’s first quarter results have been summarized in Callahan’s Trendwatch. How does the first quarter’s 9.3% actual share growth compare with NCUA’s projections for the year? What impact, if any, will the rise in interest rates have on CAMELS ratings?
  3. What changes in NCUSIF investment policy and accounting presentation/practice is staff proposing? Or will be requested by the board?

Over the past 16 months, I have written several blogs about NCUSIF investing and accounting anomalies.   Here are selected observations and additional background for the questions that may be raised in today’s meeting:

I’ll follow up next week on the board’s dialogue.  Hopefully this will be a fresh start for improving the fund’s financial practices.

 

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Cooperatives and Awakening the “Sleeping Giant”

Three recent observations:

  1. While reviewing an exam for a billion-dollar credit union of 25 pages, nowhere was the word cooperative used.  There were no  comments on any of the credit union’s responses to members during COVID, their PPE loans and multiple  community involvements including expanded DEI.   If the name were removed from the exam,  it would be impossible to know it was a credit union, not a bank.
  2. Two readers commented on REI’s values approach to its “brand:”

“While I am a fan of REI, I would like to mention (and this is probably not a surprise to you) that they too have a tendency towards oligarchic governance you have talked about in the context of credit unions. If I recall correctly, to be eligible for a candidacy in board elections you have to have leadership experience in a Fortune 500 company.

“We desperately need legislation that ensures fair electoral practices in co-ops. Glad you are advocating for this in credit unions. REI is a great company and credit unions are great – but they also need some tough love. “  (Leo Sammallahti)  

“I’m sure REI is admirable in its promotion of important values. However, the current unionizing effort does not seem to put REI in a good light.

“My own experience in a nonprofit progressive worker-rights advocacy organization (prior to joining the credit union movement) was that the management vigorously fought our efforts to unionize. It’s not an uncommon story among “liberal” organizations. Our effort was ultimately successful, but it taught me a lingering lesson about progressive hypocrisy. The co-op world is not exempt.”  (Cliff Rosenthal)

  1. Here is a small sample of the number of  job openings from Sunday’s CU Insight:
  • 77 positions at Lake Michigan Credit Union
  • 65 or 5.4 percent of NCUA’s authorized staff of 1,201. Fifteen were at Head Office and 50 in the regions (from NCUA Operating Fund report)
  • 40 positions at Michigan State University FCU
  • 37 positions at True Sky Credit Union

What do these Observations Mean?

Is our cooperative model struggling?   Is our business merely subject to the same economic forces affecting every other firm?  Are credit unions even addressing the multiple challenges of  inequality existing in every community?

In some respects the cooperative model is not working well.   On the surface we increasingly appear as just another financial option.  In many cases, let’s be frank, credit unions are not much different from many other financial choices in their behavior and impact on their communities.

Instead of transforming financial opportunity, credit unions increasingly embrace the tactics of their competition including purchasing banks, mergers (sell outs) of sound long- serving coops, and measuring performance by strictly financial and growth goals.

Recapturing our Promise

Occasionally a story appears in the press about a find in a flea market or an opportunity shop.  A person discovers an antique looking Roman bust selling for $34.99 in a Goodwill store.   She later learns it is 2,000 years old and priceless.

Sometimes in  life we do not understand the value of what we have.

But every credit union, not matter its size, has a founding story and purpose.  Every board inherited a legacy of power, fortitude and energy to make life better for members.

But does senior management and the board know what they have?  That is, an institution with the power to override the ever present push and pull of market forces of greed, domination and even exploitation?

The credit union charter is intended to enrich its members versus building institutional glory.  Every charter comes with that hope and potential.

So what is lacking today for why this transformative promise seems to be missing?

In One Word: Imagination

One of the examples of creative capability was Ed Callahan’s way of presenting the potential for the credit union movement, both as Chairman of NCUA and as CEO at Patelco Credit Union.

He believed the credit unions were “a sleeping giant,” or America’s “best kept secret.” They should be an option for all Americans.  Whether retired, between jobs or even for college and high school students.  The field of membership was an inclusive, not an exclusive concept.

In practice he did not let current reality limit what the future could be.  The NCUA exam cycle was over two years for federal charters when he arrived.  He held a “fire drill” that resulted in every federal credit union filing, for the first time ever, the yearend call report.   Working with regional directors, every federal credit union had an exam contact in 1982, and each year thereafter.

To celebrate the 50th anniversary of the passage of the Federal Credit Union Act, he announced a movement goal of 50 million members by 1984.   He inspired the largest credit union conference attendance ever in December of that year when state and federal examiners and credit union leaders came together in Las Vegas to debate their future.

Working with credit unions, the NCUA’s share insurance fund and CLF were redesigned following cooperative principles to create a three-part regulatory framework for the cooperative system.

These transformative events were inspired by the promise of what credit unions could be.  He recognized that in the new era of deregulation not all would perform with the same capability.  But working together, the system could position every credit union to be a competitive and valued experience for members.

Imagination was fueled by belief in what the pioneers had envisioned.  While the three current observations above may seem like challenges, they are opportunities to create a better coop system.

Let’s be honest.   Credit unions have always been understood, even trusted, as more than another financial choice.  They represent a member-centric focus dedicated to improving members’ lives and community options.

They are more than a financial institution.  Credit unions at their best represent the common hopes of young and old for a better life and a meaningful role in their chosen community.

The tools for transformative change have been a part of the cooperative model from the beginning.    What is needed is imagination tempered with vision and compassion.

Then indeed, the “sleeping giant” will be truly awakened.