Category: NCUSIF

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Three Notes on Matters of the Moment

A Member-Centric Approach to Overdraft fees: The Unicorn Theory

Fees are now front and center as a political and hence regulatory topic, not just a business decision.  Chairman Harper has said he intends to shed some light on the practice in credit unions by collecting data.

AT SECU (NC) the credit union developed an approach to this money management issue that was designed to help the member, not create a borrowing dependency.

Here is Jim Blaine’s description of the program which I assume is still in place.  If  you read his following day’s blog, he describes SECU’s $5.0  billion draw of the Federal Reserve’s Bank Term Lending Program (BTLP).   The analysis  includes the other top five credit unions by assets and their use/nonuse of this option.

The NCUA Board’s NCUSIF Discussion

Yesterday’s board meeting had one primary topic, the state of the NCUSIF and the related responsibility of setting the NOL.

Unfortunately the live stream broadcast cut out during Harper’s initial comments and then permanently as board member Otsuka began her comments.

The NCUSIF had its best year in a very long time.  Record net income,  no insurance losses, rising income and an NOL at 1.3%.   All that was missing was a dividend for the owners.

There were two disappointing aspects.  CFO Schied said the increase of credit unions in CAMELS 3 category was due to “liquidity, interest rate risk and risk management.”  He  then announced that the latest portfolio maturity of $700 million would be invested in two tranches-50% in overnights and the rest in the traditional ladder out to 7 or 10 years.

Since December 2021 the NCSIF’s portfolio has been underwater. The earnings of the NCUSIF have suffered greatly from this robotic IRR approach to portfolio management.

But no one apparently has learned anything from this ongoing underperformance, now in its third year.  The board members just nodded in tandem as this decision would produce a “good source of future  income.”  The board’s inability to even address their IRR  oversight was a failing to take proper care at best; or at worst irresponsible.

The second shortcoming was the failure to review and reset the fund’s Normal Operating Level(NOL).  This has been the standard bpard process every December.  The board would review staff’s five-year model with  its various scenarios and then approve a cap for the next year.

Not this year.  Schied who presented the modeling in year’s past, made an excuse about staff needed to do “more analysis.”  Harper who controls the agenda, obviously did not want the NOL to be reviewed as all the data would show the traditional 1.3% cap was more than sufficient.  If reset this historical limit would likely provide a dividend for credit unions in 2024 given the much higher earrings from the  fund.

Hauptman in the December 2022 board meeting in responding to Hood’s suggestion that the level should be 1.3% said it wouldn’t make any difference. He implied the fund could not possibly reach or exceed that level, so it didn’t matter whether it was 1.3 or 1.33.

This year his approach was even more cavalier.  He failed to note for the record that the staff had did not present their standard analysis of the NOL, the first time since 2017.  Then in a series of flippant remarks said in effect “I don’t know what the right number should be.  Is it 1.34? of 1.35 or 1.36?”

Since 1984 NCUA board members have had no difficulty setting a limit, a decision well understood and documented for forty years. This cap limit really matters to credit unions now.  Each basis point above 1.3% equals $175 million that could potentially be paid in dividend to credit unions.

Hauptman did not call out the chair’s failure to put the item on the agenda and just let the current cap slide through.   His dismissal of the staff process which he supported in prior years suggests either a lack of conviction or courage, or both.

In the end it probably doesn’t matter that the livestream went out.  There wasn’t any real engagement on matters of substance before the lights went out.

Callahan’s Trend  Watch Update for 2023

Yesterday’s 2023 yearend industry analysis by Callahans was a very useful summary of the sound state of the industry.  There were the standard summary slides showing macro trends.  These reflected a  slower growing system.

The presentation included a new effort to show  how larger credit union’s dominance of averages can be better understood by including the mean outcome for every ratio.

Finally there were several slides with a 20-year time horizon that demonstrated the inherit cyclicality of performance such as delinquency or share growth.

The full set of slides and the recording can be downloaded here.    https://go.callahan.com/rs/866-SES086/images/2023_Trendwatch_SlideDeck.pdf?version=0

The recording: https://creditunions.com/webinars/trendwatch-4q23/

 

 

 

 

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What Matters in Today’s NCUA Board Meeting

The centerpiece of today’s NCUA’s board agenda is a review of the NCUSIF’s 2023 performance.  Three areas are most important:

  1. Loss management and the reserving allowance estimate.
  2. Investment performance oversight.
  3. Trends in operating expenses.

The  2023 insured share growth was published in the audit preamble, so the NOL cap for yearend 2024 is the outstanding board determination.

This annual NOL review was a commitment by Chairman McWatters when the two-person board first raised the historic 1.3% cap in the NCUSIF in 2017. This change was to retain the inflow of funds from the merger of the TCCUSF. Credit unions uniformly questioned this process and urged a return to the 1.3% as soon as possible.  It has been seven years.

The Insured Losses Rate and Allowance Level

The 2023 net cash losses in the NCUSIF were minuscule, just $1.0 million.  In comparison the banking system has paid the FDIC $761 billion in premiums  for “receivership costs” through September 2023.  

CFO Schied stated in his board update last fall: Since the last taxi failure on October 2018, actual SIF losses are a total of $53.8 million or .0031% (.31 bps) of insured shares as of June 30, 2023.  

With the full 2023 results now in, this annual loss rate is less than .10 basis point per year.  A remarkable record during five years of economic ups and downs. 

The NCUSIF’s yearend $209 allowance account is 1.2 basis points of insured savings or 12 times this  annual loss rate.  Or five times the total for all dollar losses in the past five years.  

CFO Schied told the board that this reserve amount is determined  using a macroeconomic  model.  Will the numbers, assumptions and calculations in this model be available so users of the statements know how it works and its factual validity?

NCUSIF’s  Investment Portfolio Management

The $22.4 billion (book value) in total NCUSIF investments is the only revenue source for the fund, unless the Board chooses to assess a premium.  This has occurred only four times in the past forty years.

Since December 2021 the portfolio’s market value has been less than book.

This means the portfolio is not earning current market rates.  At yearend 2023 the NCUSIF’s term portfolio had a yield of just 1.4%;  the $5.2 billion in overnight funds earned 5.4%.  The combined yield for all 2023 was just over 2.0%.

During 2023 the buildup of portfolio cash  reduced the Fund’s weighted average yield by a full year, from 3.33 years to 2.30 years. This change reduces interest rate risk.    This number is the approximate time it would take the portfolio’s reinvestments from maturing securities to reprice  if rates normalized at their current level.

In last fall’s presentations to the NCUA board, the CFO indicated that the Fund’s investment policy had not changed.  And that having achieved the initial cash target ($4.0 billion), the committee would begin considering extending out the curve—even though the interest rate curve continues to be inverted.

Interest rate risk is the primary  threat to be managed consistent with optimizing earnings.  This is what I believe an NCUA examiner would write about the current Board oversight.  The wording is borrowed from a CAMELS code 3 exam of a multibillion dollar credit union:

Risk:  Strategic    Degree of Risk:  High

CAMELS Effect:  Management, ALM, Earnings, Capital

Reason for rating:  A capital planning discipline is not in place to manage the interest rate risk (IRR) that is commensurate with the size and complexity of (credit union). . . and the exposure presented to the NCUSIF.

The Credit union’s ALM (investment) policy establishes guidelines related to capital, net income, and net economic value of equity, but does not contain specific, established interest rate risk limits. 

Examination Requirements:  Matters requiring Board attention.

The board should further develop, document, and implement a policy to measure and monitor interest rate risk. The revised policy and plan should include the following actions at a minimum:

  1. Establish and implement maximum policy limits for the interest rate risk metrices used in the ALM/investment analysis.
  2. Evaluate and provide interest rate compliance and trending reports/charts based on the existing balance sheet under current rate forecasts monthly.
  3. Update projected yearend capital ratios on a monthly basis.

I could not have suggested a better approach for the Board’s attention.

Operating Expenses

Since 2008, 93% of the operating expenses of the fund are from NCUA’s overhead allocation of its expenses via the Overhead Transfer rate.   The OTR ranged from a low of 52% (2008) to 73.1% (2016).  For 2023, NCUSIF’s operating expenses increased 12.6% using an OTR of 62.4%.

From 1979 through 1984, the percent of NCUA’s expenses paid by the NCUSIF, were never higher than 26% (pg 39 NCUSIF 84 Annual Report).  Until 2001, the transfer rate had been fixed at 50%.

The current expense level equals approximately 1.3 basis points of insured shares.  In terms of yield on the entire portfolio, this requires the fund to earn 1%.  Operating expenses are a fixed cost, right off the top of revenue. If not controlled they take resources away from the Fund’s primary insurance resources.

Calculating the Normal Operating Level

With the audit numbers and the total of insured shares from December call reports in hand, the equity to insured shares ratio can be computed at yearend.  NCUA says the NOL number is 1.3%.

This ratio determines the prospect for a dividend when the fund’s net income raises retained earnings above the NOL upper cap.   This cap is set by board action each December.

The 2022 board meeting kept the 2023 upper limit   at 1.33 even though one member expressed the view that it should revert to the historical 1.3% which had existed until from 1984 through 2017.

When will the board make this determination for 2024?

The meeting starts at 10:00 AM.  For a full review of credit union’s financial performance, Callahan & Associates presents their quarterly Trend Watch analysis at 2:00.

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The NCUSIF’s Valentine’s Day Surprise

Late yesterday NCUA released the independent CPA audits of the four credit union funds it manages.

The one that matters most for credit unions is the NCUSIF’s performance.  Plumbing through the opaque federal accounting presentation reveals much good news.

Bear in mind  when reviewing the highlights below that the FDIC is struggling to increase its insurance ratio.  It has assessed increased premiums  to pay for the hundreds of millions of bank failures in 2023.

Some NCUSIF 2023 Highlights

  • Net income increased to $210 million. This is the best operating result ever and almost double the $119 million recorded 2022.
  • Net insured losses (cash payments less recoveries) were just $1.0 million. Nonetheless he allowance account was increased to $209 million, the largest total since the taxi medallion inflated reserve in 2017.
  • Insured share growth was flat ending at $1.7 trillion. The aggregate net worth ratio for all insured credit union increased to 10.95% from 10.78% at yearend 2022.
  • The Fund’s normal operating level (NOL) grew to over 1.30% at yearend. Each basis point equals $170 million.  Adding the allowance account raises total reserves to over 1.31% or a potential $1.9 billion cushion above the NCUSIF’s lower NOL limit of 1.20%.  Since 2008, the total losses for all the NCUSIF’s preceding 15 years equal $1.877 billion.
  • There is opportunity for even greater returns in 2024. The NCUSIF’s yield on its $22.4 billion investment portfolio was just over 2% in 2023.  Overnight rates are projected to remain above 5% for the first half of 2024.   Adding the current overnights of $5.2 billion plus the $1.4 billion maturing in the first five months, gives a cash portfolio of $6.6 billion yielding 5% or higher, until the Fed begins reducing rates.

The One Missing Number

In the December’s 2022 board meeting, NCUA set an NOL upper cap of 1.33% for the NCUSIF.  Board member Hood had urged that the historical .3% upper limit be restored.

This upper cap matters. All income above this limit in a year must be distributed as a dividend to the Fund’s owners, the credit unions.  This is the fundamental promise in return for credit union’s open-ended 1% deposit underwriting.

To date I have seen no upper cap set for 2024.  Hopefully this means the long term, historically validated limit will be in place for this year.

Restoring this 1.3% cap would make this the perfect Valentine for the credit union system’s uniquely successful  cooperative Fund.  Isn’t it time NCUA shared a little love with credit unions?

 

 

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Holding the NCUSIF to Its Promised Performance

This week NCUA will report on the 2023 financial audit of the NCUSIF in two days.  This will be the 42th external, independent certified audit of the fund.

The Good News: A Ratio Showing the Fund’s Stability

Multiple financial events have presented numerous stress tests for the NCUSIF since 2008.  These include  2008/9 Great Recession followed by quantitative easing and a period of abnormally low rates. Then came the COVID national economic shutdown. The current inflation has been countered by the Federal Reserve’s rate increases, the most rapid in 40 years.

Through all these scenarios, one trend line demonstrates the Fund’s resilience. The chart below is the ratio of retained earnings to insured shares for this 14-year period.

The blue line shows the Fund’s equity at or above the historical .3% upper cap.  The orange line adds the allowance account balance, which are additional reserves already expensed from equity.

The uniqueness of the fund is more than a steady  earnings base growing in tandem with insured risk.

This cooperative funding model aligns with the values, culture and balance sheet structure of the credit union system.  Every member contributes 1 cent of every $1 share for this collective insurance. In turn it is a resource available to assist any credit union that needs cash or other 208 assistance if facing insurmountable challenges.

The unique NCUSIF design works; however the history may not be known to current board members or to some credit union leaders.   Credit unions need to remind all of this important story and what this stability has meant for their members.

The NCUSIF’s Founding-Getting the Correct Numbers

Outside audits were not the practice from the NCUSIF’s founding in 1971 through 1981.  GAO had performed an audit every two years; the report came six months or more after the audit date. The 1982 NCUSIF Annual Report described this change from GAO to a private independent firm implementing GAAP accounting standards:

“To ensure the Fund’s statements are examined in the most timely manner and to seek an assessment of accounting procedure, the NCUA contracted for the first independent audit ever conducted of the Fund’s balance sheet by an outside accounting firm. 

In the years prior to fiscal 1982, the Fund recorded losses from financially troubled credit unions at the time these credit unions were ultimately merged or liquidated.  Additionally, losses on asset guarantees . . . were recorded at the time that payments were made under guarantee agreements. 

Beginning in 1982 the Fund began the process of conforming its accounting for losses from credit unions to GAAP.   (These) principles require that the fund record losses at an earlier point in time than had previously been the Fund’s practice.   In this respect the Fund recorded estimated losses under the cash assistance program of $14.1 million and of $15.6 million on outstanding asset and merger guarantees. 

In addition, GAAP generally required that the Fund record estimated potential loss accruals for credit unions identified as experiencing financial difficulties but not receiving cash assistance. . . The Fund did not attempt to estimate these additional losses for fiscal 1982 because it was not practicable to accumulate the information needed to make the estimates.

Equally as important as the change in accounting methods were the improvements to the fund’s records.  Ernst & Whinney worked with the Fund’s accounting staff identifying areas that were not properly recorded . . . As a result the Fund is now publishing monthly statements which will help all interested parties monitor the financial results.”  (pages 7-8 NCUSIF 1982 Annual Report)

The Report’s remaining 20 pages gave details of cash assistance, guarantees and merger costs along with an overview of all insurance programs and credit union trends.  Transparency in every respect was essential for confidence in the Fund’s management.

Chairman Callahan’s view was that, “We believe our “full and fair” disclosure should be no less than what we expect insured credit unions to give their members.”

A Radical Change in Accounting Accuracy, Timeliness and Transparency

In the 1984 audit, Ernst & Whinney gave the Fund its first ever clean opinion “in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent basis.”

Without this three-year effort (1982-1984) to improve the timeliness (monthly board reports), accuracy (GAAP accounting) and transparency,  the credit union system  might not have supported the radical redesign of the NCUSIF. This new approach  required  perpetual 1% deposit underwriting.

This cooperative model was passed by Congress in 1984 with full credit union support. To implement the 1% underwriting, 15,303 federally insured credit unions deposited $845 million into  the fund by January 1985.

The Last Shall Be First

The result was that the NCUSIF instantly became the strongest and, through time,  the most stable of the then three federal deposit insurance funds.

The NCUSIF never looked back or across the aisle.  The FSLIC merged with the FDIC.   The FDIC has reported negative net worth and periods of ever increasing premiums, such as now, to try to meet its minimum ratio level.

NCUA’s graph of this change in the standing of the three funds from page 37, NCUSIF’s 1985 Annual Report.

Vigilance-The Price for Performance

In a speech to credit union managers and the press following the 1984 recapitalization, Chairman Callahan gave the following “pitch”(his word):

“Don’t set it up and forget about it.  It’s unique. It’s a better way.  But just as important, it’s yours to monitor—it’s your responsibility to keep it working—because if you don’t it’ll go just like everything else the government touches.  When government gets more money, it wants to spend more.  Our goal is to spend less (on insurance). You’ll have to hold us to that promise.”

Then in 2010 there came a change in how the NCUSIF’s financials were presented.

The Change In Accounting Standards for the NCUSIF

The NCUSIF’s GAAP presentation was a financial format that all credit unions knew and followed. This GAAP audit is the only format used in NCUA’s Operating Fund and the CLF since they were both audited by independent accounting firms beginning in 1982.

On June 23, 2010 Credit Union Times printed a story with the headline, Auditors Fault NCUA’s Accounting.  The article in part:

“KPMG gave the NCUA an unqualified audit but found material weaknesses in the reporting and documentation methods.  . . NCUA Chairman Debbie Matz said the 2008 and 2009 audits (released on June 14, 2010) had been delayed because of the problems facing the corporate credit unions. . . According to the KPMG report, the NCUSIF does not have sufficiently comprehensive policies and procedures that document control activities and monitoring functions that should be embedded and/or performed within the financial and reporting process.”

In a June 17, 2010 Agency bulletin, the NCUA board announced it had adopted Federal GAAP accounting for the newly authorized TCCUSF.  The same bulletin had this statement:

The National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) is required by the Federal Credit Union Act to follow U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The General Counsel’s opinion concluded that “section 105 of the GCC Act, as interpreted by the General Accounting Office, does not preclude NCUSIF from using an alternative set of accounting rules such as FASAB in preparing the NCUSIF’s financial statements.”

Shortly thereafter there was a change as reported in this footnote in  the NCUSIF’s 2010 yearend audit: Basis of Presentation  The NCUSIF historically prepared its financial statement in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) based on standards issued by FASB, the private sector standards setting body. On September 16, 2010, the NCUA board authorized the NCUSIF to adopt the FASAB standards for financial reporting, effective from January 1, 2010.   Accordingly, this is the first year of the presentation of the NCUSIF financial statements in accordance with FASAB.

A Misleading Accounting Presentation

However, FASAB’s  form and content are very different from private GAAP. The account titles, presentation and interpretation are intended for reporting entries that rely on governmental funding.  The NCUSIF is totally dependent on credit union funding.  The FASAB format is completely alien to the accounting presentations familiar to and used by credit unions and CUSO’s.

A Strange Set of Federal Accounts

Some of the NCUSIF’s balance sheet accounts that are completely novel under federal GAAP include:

Balance Sheet headings and account categories: Intergovernmental.  With the public; Insurance and guarantee program liabilities;(Loss reserve); Net Position, and its cumulative results of operations (not the same as retained earnings)

The traditional Income Statement is replaced with two other presentations. The first is, “Statements of Net Cost”.  This includes Gross Costs followed by Less Exchange Revenues and concludes with a bottom line Net cost of Operations (which is not net income).

The second Statement is Changes in Net Position.  This includes net unrealized loss or gain on investments, and interest income, the primary revenue source for the NCUSIF.

In standard GAAP, Statements of Cash Flows is replaced with the governmental “appropriations terminology”: Statement of Budgetary Resources.  This includes subtotals for Total Budgetary Resources, Status of Budgetary Resources and Outlays Net.

These accounting concepts are far removed from any of NCUSIF’s actual operations.  When staff gives the board’s NCUSIF quarterly update, it converts the income and balance sheet statement to the traditional GAAP format.  However the monthly postings are not converted. They remain in the idiosyncratic federal GAAP Accounting format.

Understanding Critical Accounting and Finance Decisions

The NCUSIF’s federal presentation is misleading in its factual representation of transactions which suggests that the NCUSIF is a governmental appropriated fund.

Certain critical  concepts and terms are absent. The most important is “retained earnings.”  One looks in vain for the number which is used to compute the NCUSIF’s normal operating level.  Another concept is “fiduciary assets” which means AMC assets are not fully recognized on the NCUSIF balance sheet.

The NCUA Board’s Opportunity:  Enhance Transparency for the Fund’s Users

Eternal vigilance is hard when numbers are presented in a federal disguise. At a minimum, the NCUA board should request the auditor also represent the yearend audit numbers in private GAAP format.  Staff should also present the monthly updates in this standard.

Then users of the statements can easily understand the trends. More importantly they can fulfill the challenge from a previous NCUA chair for credit unions:  it’s yours to monitor—it’s your responsibility to keep it working. 

Restoring easily understood transparency to  the NCUSIF’s financial presentation would be an important step forward for the NCUA Board in its upcoming annual review.  

 

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Threats to Coop Democracy

There is much public political rhetoric currently  expressed under the theme of “threats to democracy.”

But America’s democratic experiment is not just in our national or state voting processes.   Democracy is a civic practice that characterizes the governance  of the vast majority of organizations, public and private, across the country.

These more local institutions, including credit unions, are where we learn and practice what responsible citizenship means.   It can mean paying attention to leadership, organizational performance, voting when called upon, and supporting, when necessary, with our presence or money.

When money and power are at stake, especially in credit unions, those benefiting from positions of responsibility can be tempted to manipulate the democratic process for their advantage.

Lincoln’s Lyceum address before he had formally entered politics addressed the fragility of democratic design.   Parts of his speech  in the context of today’s events were quoted by Heather Cox Richardson in a recent column:

On January 27, 1838, Abraham Lincoln rose before the Young Men’s Lyceum in Springfield, Illinois, to make a speech. Just 28 years old, Lincoln had begun to practice law and had political ambitions. But he was worried that his generation might not preserve the republic that the founders had handed to it for transmission to yet another generation. He took as his topic for that January evening, “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions.”

Lincoln saw trouble coming, but not from a foreign power, as other countries feared. The destruction of the United States, he warned, could come only from within. “If destruction be our lot,” he said, “we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen, we must live through all time, or die by suicide.”

Lincoln’s truth was that in democratic organizations, the greatest threat to sustainability is not external, but internal.

Lincoln’s last sentence above caught my attention.  The same word, suicide, was used in the final part of a blog Mike Riley wrote last summer. He was expressing concerns with specific credit union practices.  In a note of irony about his previous employer, NCUA’s role in these events, he closed with his inimitable sense of humor:

“If someone wants to commit suicide, it is a good thing if a doctor (i.e. NCUA)  is present.”

Democratic institutions survive not due to their special design, but rather because  leaders  believe and follow the values and processes required to sustain.

This week I will review events that are shaping the evolution of credit unions that are contrary to the principles implied by democratic governance.

Ignoring or overlooking our cooperative falls from grace is easy.  “It’s not my problem.”  But soon the examples of bad behavior and poor decisions become precedents for others.  These destructive events are not caused by outside competition; instead they reveal us becoming “authors” of our own finish.

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An NCUA Professional and Credit Union Believer Dies

Last Thursday, January 18, 2024 D. Michael Riley a career credit union professional died.  He was 77 years old and is survived by his wife of 41 years, Lori.

After serving in the military, Mike graduated from the University of Alabama joining NCUA as a field examiner in 1972.  A  little more than 13 years later (May 1985) he succeeded me as Director of the Office of Programs.   This responsibility included overseeing the newly capitalized NCUSIF, the CLF and the Agency’s Supervision and Examination programs.

Regional Director Riley speaking at NCUA’s December 1984 National Examiners and Credit Union Conference.

Rising to the Top

His meteoric rise to the highest responsibility in agency reflected his ability to get things done.  In 1982 he was reassigned from NCUA’s Central Office to become Director in Region Six-the Western part of the United States.

California was the epicenter of problem credit unions exacerbated by double digit inflation and unemployment and the number and size of  credit unions.   I believe Mike, at 35,  was the youngest examiner ever promoted to RD at NCUA.

Chairman Callahan believed that effective supervision required the leadership of the six RD’s, not rule-making in Washington.  They were the critical managers of the agency’s most important responsibility—the examination program.  Success was achieved not by cashing out problems with insurance money; but by developing resolution  plans unique to each situation and underwritten by cooperative patience.

Regional Directors Allen Carver, Mike Riley, Lyn Skyles and Executive Director Bucky Sebastian at the December 1984 NCUA Conference.

A Passion for the Movement

Mike’s  progress from new examiner to RD in a decade is a testament to his grasp of credit union operations. Most importantly he bought into the changes Ed Callahan was seeking.  He knew how to get things done, an uncommon trait in a bureaucracy.  He had the ability to work with everyone, but was not a “yes” person.

Last July I wrote a brief article about Ed’s time as a football coach and how that influenced his approach to leadership: The Roots and Legacy of a Credit Union Leader.

Mike responded:  Great article, I know he taught me a lot.  

When Ed left after three years and eight months as NCUA Chair, the small team of five whom he brought from Illinois also left.  Senator Roger Jepsen, the next NCUA Chair, did not have a background in either administration or credit unions.

This is when Mike made his most critical  contribution.  Significant change in a governmental bureaucracy will not last if successors do not believe in the new directions.

It is a bureaucratic reflex that when a Chair leaves, staff reasserts their priorities. This is especially the case when  incoming Board members have little or no prior credit union experience.  Instead Mike insured the fundamental tenets from the Callahan era of deregulation were sustained.

Hitting the Ground Running

When returning to DC in 1985 as Director of the Office of Programs, he testified with Chairman Callahan on the CLF’s annual budget appropriation within his first 30 days.  In September 11 and 12, 1985  he was NCUA’s spokesperson to the House Banking Committee on credit unions’ condition as the new NCUA Chair had yet to take over.

As reported in  NCUA News September 1985, he said “federal credit unions had strong gains and a remarkable track record in an increasingly competitive, deregulated environment.”  He called the capitalization of the NCUIF, “the most significant development since its founding in 1971. It had quadrupled in size solely through the financial support of insured credit unions.”

In the wake of the Ohio and Maryland S&L crises, he stated NCUA supports the dual chartering system and the option of private insurance for state charters.  “This arraignment has served the credit union movement well, providing strength and innovation out of competition.”

For the next ten years (1985-1995) as Director of Programs Mike continued the critical administrative and policy priorities that Callahan had implemented.  These included an annual exam cycle, total transparency of performance, expense control. the CLF’s expansion to every credit union and promoting the uniqueness of the credit union system.

In the years he led the Office, failures caused the downfall of the FSLIC and the separate S&L industry, the initial bankruptcy and refunding of the FDIC and ongoing economic cycles. However credit unions and the funds NCUA managed continued their steady progress. Growth in credit union service and members expanded across the country.

Continued Interest in the Movement

In May 2023 post I wrote about the dangerous goal of NCUA’s goal of seeking parity with other  regulators.  He commented: Outstanding article. Thanks for laying out so clearly. It’s hard to get into the nuts and bolts but somehow NCUA’s operating costs needs to be reduced, fewer administrators and more hands on folks.

He also had a dry sense of humor with an affable southern temperament.

I recall his moderating a GAC panel of two former NCUA Chairs, Ed Callahan and Senator Jepsen.  He led a revealing conversation with charm and wit. If someone has a cassette tape of this session, it would be illuminating to hear how Mike navigated the discussion of these two leaders.

People liked Mike.  His colleagues were family.  Lori and he would hold an open house every Christmas inviting both NCUA and credit union friends.

After leaving NCUA in the mid 1990’s, Mike worked with Callahan and Associates and then on his own as a consultant.  He was a Trustee of the TCU mutual funds family.

His Views on Today’s Trends

Mike wrote about current credit union events  in this  complete post in April 2023. He was concerned about  worrisome trends in credit unions leading to their “creative destruction.”  He draws from his early years as an examiner overseeing 30-40 credit  unions.  He closes with this observation on mergers:

This ongoing march continues. The merger of two sound credit unions without some legitimate reason doesn’t seem to be member oriented. I still think of the members of those small credit unions who received services such as buying a washer that no one else would do.

Bigger is not better if the member does not benefit.  How many of these mergers produce lower loan rates , higher dividends, or distinctly better products at a lower price? Carried to the extreme we will be left with 20 credit unions that are no different than large banks. 

(and on NCUA’s role)

Schumpeter opined “If someone wants to commit suicide, it is a good thing if a doctor is present.”

Memorial Service Details

A service of celebration and resurrection will be held on Saturday, February 10, 2024, at St. Luke’s United Methodist Church (UMC) at 304 South Talbot Street, St. Michaels, MD.

The family will welcome friends and relatives at St. Luke’s UMC from 11:00 AM to 12:00 PM, which will be one hour prior to the service at 12:00 PM.In lieu of flowers, memorial contributions may be made to Habitat for Humanity Choptank, Salvation Army, St. Luke’s UMC, or Talbot Humane.

 

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A Lesson from the Latest FDIC Premium Assessments on Banks

Last Friday the four largest banks in American announced their  4th quarter and full year financial results.

All had one new, significant expense in the 4th quarter.  Here are the numbers from the New York Times article: Biggest Banks Earn Billions, Even after Payments to the FDIC Fund-(January 13, 2024)

Bank                         $ FDIC Payment

JP-Morgan                  $2.9 billion

Bank of America        $2.1 billion

Wells Fargo                 $1.9 billion

Citigroup                     $1.7 billion

These premiums are necessary to cover the costs for the FCIC’s losses on bank failures earlier in 2023.   FDIC’s reported  loss expense through the first three quarters of 2023 was $19.7 billion.

The FDIC is collecting approximately $16.3 billion in this fourth quarter assessment. The four largest banks will pay the $8.6 billion shown above  or 53% of the total.

Premiums comprised more than 81% of the FDIC ‘s total revenue through the first three quarters of 2023.  Interest income from the FDIC’s investments, the other revenue source, would cover FDIC ‘s operating expenses.  But the $600 million excess would not even begin to cover the almost $20 billion in estimated  insurance losses.  (all data is through September 30, 2023).

FDIC Premiums and Insured Deposits Not Connected

There is no relationship between premiums and FDIC’s insurance coverage of $250,00 per account.  Instead premiums are calculated on  a bank’s net assets which is called its “assessment base.”  At September 2023 this was $20.7 trillion versus just $10.7 trillion of insured shares.

FDIC’s revenue is no longer based on its stated goal to protect depositors’ savings but rather the FDIC’s  role in stabilizing  the entire industry’s balance sheet.   When banks succeed, shareholders win.  When banks fail, everybody pays.

FDIC’s Complex Pricing Structure

The FDIC may set the premium at whatever level it deems necessary to achieve its minimum ratio goal of 1.35%.  The fund recorded an approximately $10 billion operating loss through the September quarter putting the ratio  at just 1.13%.    The $17 billion new assessment is needed cover this shortfall and grow the fund’s ratio target.

Moreover premium rates can vary from 2.5 to 42 basis points  depending on bank size, that is whether an institution is more or less than $10 billion in assets. The final rate is based on each bank’s CAMELS rating plus, for larger firms, a scorecard which measures  “complexity.”

The assessment rates are so complicated  that the FDIC  posts three different calculators for banks to determine what amount they must pay.

This premium system provides virtually no check and balance on pricing, except the rule making process.  It is frequently “updated” and always open- ended in amount. There is no incentive or check and balance on FDIC effectiveness in its oversight or problem solving roles.  Banks must bear the costs not only from institutional failures but also from FDIC’s supervisory effectiveness, good and bad.

The Cooperative Alternative in the NCUSIF

By comparison the NCUSIF is simple to understand, administer and monitor.  Statements are posted monthly.  Public board  updates on investment returns and overall financial trends are presented at least quarterly so credit unions can track their cooperatively designed fund.

The 1% deposit underwriting means premiums are extremely rare, assessed only four times in 40 years since the 1984 redesign went in effect.   Dividends have been paid out over a dozen times.

When the 1% deposits totals are added to the retained earnings, the investment portfolio remains relative in size to the insured risk at all times.  Investment income has proven adequate to  meet all of the fund’s operating expenses and sustain a stable operating level between 1.2 and 1.3% of insured savings.  Based on the latest November NCUSIF financial report the fund’s equity should be at or above the long-time upper cap of  1.3% at yearend 2023.

With NCUSIF equity at the high end of the .2-.3 range, it means there is over $1.7 billion in additional  reserve for any contingency.  In the October NCUSIF update the CFO reported the five-year loss average since 2017 was only .1 of 1 basis point.  The net actual cash loss so far in 2023  was just $1.0 million in the same update.

With over 40 years of data from all economic cycles, financial crisis and evolving credit union business models, there are decades of real data to validate the NCUSIF’s financial design.  This record shows that to maintain a stable NOL a yield  on investments of 2.5-3.0% would sustain the fund through virtually any growth or economic cycle and any operating contingency.

This historical 1.3 % cap is due for Board review in February based on 2023 yearend earnings.   This decision is an important commitment  of  NCUA  to the credit unions who  underwrite the fund.   Unlike the FDIC’s premium dependency, the NCUSIF’s investment portfolio return has proven to be a reliable,  predictable and sufficient model-in all environments.

Therefore, when net income exceeds the NOL cap, the credit unions are paid a dividend on the excess income recognizing their overall sound performance.  This return is a critical element of the cooperative design.

The FDIC’s premium model is unpredictable, subjective and arbitrary,  and most importantly unrelated to the actual insurance coverage per account.

Why the NCUSIF Design Works

The credit union model is based on the historical operational and cooperative  values on which credit unions are founded.  All participants are treated equally.  Risk and expenses are shared alike for all.  It is democratic and accountable in its structure.

The redesign was accomplished with industry-wide  collaboration and participation.  It required congressional approval. It was based on the oldest of cooperative concepts: self-help.  No government assistance or funding was sought or necessary.

Instead the credit unions put themselves in the law as the underwriters of the fund’s resilience, no matter the circumstance.  This is how they intend to maintain their independence as a separate financial system.  For example the S&L’s were merged with the banks and the FDIC when their system collapsed.   Unlike the for-profit, stockholder owned banking system, the moral hazard examples of excessive risk taking by management are extremely rare in the cooperative model.

Understanding NCUSIF’s unique history and design and why it fits credit unions so well is especially important whenever a new board member comes to NCUA.  It will be especially critical Tanya Otsuka be informed of NCUSIF’s special character and long term performance, as much of her professional background is within the FDIC.

The February NOL setting will be the first of many opportunities she will have to show her understanding of the differences between bank and credit union regulation.  Credit unions should be communicating that distinction now.

 

 

 

 

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Credit Union Shareholders Receive $16 Million; NCUA Receives Judge’s Reckoning

Yesterday the Dakota Credit Union Association announced that NCUA had agreed to pay more than $11.9 million to the former credit union members of Midwest Corporate Credit Union.  Their pro rata share of US Central’s capital, along with a similar recovery by Iowa credit unions, will bring the total payments to over $16 million.

This outcome culminates efforts commenced in 2021 by the two Leagues and their members.  Ultimately legal suits were filed when NCUA rejected the credit unions’ repeated recovery efforts.

In his October 2023 ruling the Chief Judge of the US District Court District hearing the case wrote: “simple logic and hornbook property law support construing the FCUA as including automatic transfer of assets.  In general, assets do not simply evaporate when the owner is unable to collect; rather the property must go somewhere.

Consequently, a credit union’s asset likewise do not cease to exist come the last day of a wind-up.  Instead, the most logical conclusion is that the assets vest in the credit union’s shareholders.”

A Three-Year Bureaucratic Slog

According to an August 29, 2022 statement by the Dakota League challenging NCUA “To Do the Right Thing”, the Agency had actually been ready to release checks in 2021. NCUA changed its mind when informed that the (federally chartered) corporate had been voluntarily liquidated years earlier.

North Dakota’s two Senators wrote NCUA Chair Harper concerning the nonpayment. He replied on September 2, 2022 that “After careful review and legal consideration, the liquidation agent determined that because Midwest no longer exists no distribution can be made to Midwest or its former shareholders.”

The League tried the administrative claims process. Again NCUA denied the request.   President Olson’s response to this final effort in February 2023 showed his frustration: “This is a clear case of obstruction through bureaucratic hurdles and complicated language where the process is the punishment, and does not provide justice.”

The North Dakota League filed its lawsuit in April 2023.  This was followed in June when 63 of Iowa’s 75 credit unions sued the NCUA for $4.2 million to recover their U.S. Central claims. Joining in the lawsuit was the Iowa Credit Union League, its foundation, political action committee and an employee benefits company.

A Lesson in Bureaucratic Obstinacy and Blindness

These years long efforts included all three branches of government.  The Dakota league attempted to play NCUA’s administrative game in which it learned that “the process was the punishment.” It requested and received support from North Dakota’s  two senators.  Chairman Harper stonewalled the appeal from the legislature.

The last remedy was the judiciary. The judge explicitly rejected NCUA’s logic.  “The fund’s vest in the credit union’s shareholders.”

It is not a comforting example of regulatory judgment when common sense or “doing the right thing” apparently had little role in NCUA’s decision.  When dozens of staff lawyers and three “independent” board members see only one position, this raises concerns about the agency’s deliberative processes and/or the competency of the advice being given.

CooperatIve Action in the Members’ Interest

The good news is that cooperative efforts, especially at the league level, persistence and advocacy did prevail.  It is hard for an individual credit union to counter an NCUA position.  Collective action is a credit union advantage even in regulatory judgments.

The credit union shareholders, the members of Midwest and Iowa corporate, have received their just due.  And that standard, what is in the members’ best interest, should  be the determining one.

Thank you to the cooperative leaders in these two states that stood by their members.

(Editor’s Note:  I first wrote about the situation in February 2023, urging NCUA to do the right thing.

 

 

 

 

 

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January 1985: An Historic Turning Point for Credit Unions

For forty years, the NCUSIF has maintained  not only its own financial integrity but more importantly, the trust and confidence of the credit union system’s members. This record of stability began in 1985 and continues unabated through 2023.

Over the same four decades the FSLIC, the separate S&L fund, failed and merged into the FDIC.  The FDIC has had negative net equity on several occasions requiring an explicit government guarantee.  It has constantly modified  its premium model to accommodate numerous industry crisis.  These  include multiple premium levels, risk based pricing, an expanded assessment base for premiums, differential pricing according to institution size and other financial or accounting maneuvers. It’s equity to insured deposits has fluctuated from negative to 1.1% at June 30, 2023.

During this same period of national economic and interest rate cycles, the NCUSIF’s unique cooperative design allowed it to remain strong. The fund’s yearend equity level  of 1.2-1.3% of insured shares has always been met.  Premiums have been necessary only four times in this four decades.

“D” For Deposit Day

This fundamental  redesign was a two-year industry wide effort.

This priority came to fruition in January 1985 when the first 1% credit union deposit underwritings for the new insurance model were delivered to NCUA.  The event was pictured in NCUA’s 1985 Annual Report (pg 21):

(caption:  NCUA Staff Member Wayne Robb accepts a hand-delivered capitalization deposit in the unheated Washington lobby of the NCUA.)

The Chicago Tribune described this historic change in an article later that year:

“The solitary messenger clutched a plain brown envelope as he picked his way carefully across a deserted, icy sidewalk near the White House.  In- side was a check for $13 million.

“It was inauguration Day, 1985, a morning most memorable for the raw cold that forced cancellation of a parade and drove President Reagan inside to take his second oath of office.

“But for the messenger, and for the trio huddled around an electric space heater waiting for the check, it was also the deadline for credit unions to deliver payments to the new-look federal insurance fund that backs the deposits of 51 million credit union members.

“The $13 million check, the largest single payment, was from the huge Navy Federal Credit Union in Washington.

“The little-noticed transaction–one of more than 7,000 totaling $480 million that frosty January weekend–illustrates how the nation’s 15,000 federally insured credit unions have quietly put their house in order.

“Edgar  F. Callahan Chairman of the National Credit Union Administration said credit union’s willingness to embrace a new approach to shoring up their insurance fund was just one example of how the industry has recovered from the hard times of 1981.  

The challenge for his successor, Callahan said, is to keep Congress and other policy-makers aware that credit unions are unique.

“You’re in an industry this often grouped with banks and S&L’s and there’s a tendency to get painted with the same brush,” he said.  

“There is a danger to getting sucked into that atmosphere.  My successor will need to maintain that credit unions have been ahead of the problem curve and need not be grouped with other financial institutions.”

The Workup for Change

The NCUSIF was created in 1970, with no government-provided startup capital.  The Fund’s design mimicked the premium base of both the FDIC and FSLIC each which had a 35-year head start accumulating retained earnings.  But from 1979 onward the premium approach, even with doubling assessments,  did not prevent the Fund’s equity ratio from decline.

In April 1983 the NCUA presented a Report to Congress on the Credit Union Insurance Fund.  The Report was over 130 pages in seven chapters responding to specific Congressional questions and making four recommendations:

  1. All credit unions, federal or state, should have a choice of insurer;
  2. Capitalize the NCUSIF with a 1% deposit of insured shares;
  3. Authorized at least one uninsured share per member as capital;
  4. Keep the  insurance fund independent from FDIC/FSLIC due to the unique nature and role of credit unions.

The Report included direct quotes from leagues, private cooperative insurers, credit unions along with a history of credit union stabilization options prior to NCUA insurance.

Following the publication of this Report, NCUA and credit unions working in partnership developed an alternative to the traditional premium model describing it as, A Better Way.  It drew upon the two decade experiences of private insurer alternatives.  It rested on the fundamental cooperative concept that members should own their own fund.

The financial logic and analysis was summarized in a video sent to all credit unions and interested parties on the NCUA’s Video Network.  The following is an excerpt from this longer analysis,  A Better Way:

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IlqxLeFkuLY&t=30s)

This redesign was achieved by challenging long time conventional governmental practice.  The alternative was drawn from cooperative experience and principles.

Trust in the Fund was not due to more regulation or open ended premium assessments.  It was constructed on mutual commitments including frequent and audited financial transparency, accountability for expenses and legislative guardrails.

This capacity to “imagine differently” resulted from collaboration and open communication at every step.  The historical financial analysis (above) and future forecasts were public, for all to review and refine.

The effort was not a sudden epiphany. Rather it resulted from hard work, shared viewpoints, a desire to create something better and courage to change.

The First Year’s Bottom Line

At the end of fiscal 1985, the fund held $883 million in 1% deposits.  Earlier in the year each credit union received a pro-rata equity distribution (in excess of the Fund’s .3% equity) of $80 million to meet the January 1% funding obligation followed by a $30 million cash dividend at yearend.

This 12.5% return on the 1% capital deposits was on top of fact that this was the first year since the Fund opened in 1970 that no premium was charged. (page 5, 1985 NCUSIF Annual Report)

In future blogs I will present how the fund  navigated specific economic and industry challenges.

Continued success does not rest on design alone.  Credit unions must also exercise continuous oversight of NCUA’s vital  responsibilities for fund management and supervisory oversight.

 

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The “Goldilocks” Interest Rate Curve

Yesterday the treasury market closed at these yields for the maturities listed:

Yield           Maturity

5.50%        Overnight

5.55%         One month

5.46%        Three month

5.24%        Six month

4,80%        One Year

4.33%        Two Year

3.95%       Ten year

This inverted yield curve, where short term rates exceed long term, can be an ideal time for asset management.

This is because return and liquidity are both optimized by staying short.   If an asset or investment  manager is matching with specific liabilities, the prospect of a duration gap between asset and liabilities can be minimized.

This is a Goldilocks ALM environment where return and liquidity are both optimized.   By going long now, an investment manager will have a lower return versus staying short.  That might seem like a surefire market bet as Chairman Powell has forecast several  rate reductions this year.   That is until inflation possibly comes back, and further reductions put on hold.

The Credit Union Opportunity

An additional advantage, besides reducing ALM mismatches,  is that it allows balance sheet management to remain agile.   Shorter maturities provide more opportunities to respond to market and/or liability changes.

A prime example is NCUA’s management of the $22 billion NCUSIF investment portfolio.  The fund continued its 7 year ladder as rates went to near zero in 2019-2021.   When the market turned, the entire portfolio was underwater, burdened with an average duration of almost three years.

Through October 2023, the year-to-date return on the Fund is 1.92% and the portfolio reports a $1.7 billion unrealized loss.

When looking at historical trends, a yield on the NCUSIF portfolio of just 2.5% would result in a breakeven, that is stable, equity ratio in almost all years.

Recognizing this liability target for asset returns, makes NCUSIF investment decisions easy in this rate environment.  By moving from overnight to maturities up to two years, the yields would be more than sufficient income to maintain the Fund’s equity ratio at or above 1.3% for any scenario.

Many investment managers were surprised by the Fed’s rate reversal to counter inflation.  Today’s interest rates provides a rare moment for stabilizing both liquidity and return for credit union portfolios and the NCUSIF.