Category: NCUA

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‘It’s the End of the World as We Know It’ (and I Don’t Feel Fine)

The title is from a Commentary by William Reinsch written four days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

He is the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His professional specialty within government and outside is international commerce and trade policy.

His article projected the end of the rules-based system of international trade that had been developed post WW II.

He foresees the war causing economic chaos, a return of power politics, and resurgence of authoritarianism.  The world will not be the same; unintended consequences will proliferate.

Turning Points in History

In individual, organizational and country’s histories there are moments that are eventually understood as turning points.  Sometimes these are sudden and instantly consequential.  Like Ukraine.

Other changes occur slowly, but inexorably, in a new direction with the outcome unseen for years.   For example the evolving demographic composition of the American population; or even the  inevitable forces leading to the deregulation of financial services in the 1970’s and 80’s.

I believe the century long credit union movement is in one of these transformational periods. This  involves significant changes in the regulator’s role,  credit union business priorities, accepted performance norms and the ambitions of leaders.

These cooperative developments are occurring as economic trends are moving away from the two decade  experience  post 9/11.   Inflation is nearing 8%, unemployment is at historic lows, worker shortages are occurring in many sectors, and interest rates  are projected to rise to potentially the highest level this century.

The juncture of these economic and industry changes could significantly alter the institutional makeup of the cooperative system. They could result in the loss of credit union’s independent identify and purpose.

The Breakdown in the Regulatory-Industry Relationship

The seeds were sown in the disruption of the Great Recession in 2008-2010.  The scope of the potential corporate problem created a rupture between NCUA and the industry.

NCUA leaders whether through fear, inexperience or bureaucratic instinct distanced itself from credit unions.   The agency took  the sole role of developing one all encompassing solution for five distinct corporate balance sheets.  The results were disastrous for credit unions, the corporate system and the credit unions that relied on them.  Additionally, 30-year industry partnership for the CLF was ended.

The most critical long term loss however was not financial, but the agency’s ability or willingness to work collaboratively with the industry—on all issues and in all circumstances.

Instead of viewing their role as empowering a system of cooperatives, NCUA positioned itself as rulers over the credit union system.

At the March 2022 Board meeting this view was expressed by Chairman Harper in comments on the agency’s Annual Performance Plan:  With the geopolitical crisis unfolding in Ukraine, the NCUA will also continue to prioritize cybersecurity and guide the credit union system through the economic uncertainty caused by inflation, rising gas bills, and continued supply chain woes.

This paternalistic or in loco parentis approach to regulation and supervision emerged from the agency’s ability to impose solutions and rules unilaterally following  the corporate crisis.

The agency publicly proclaimed its independence under Chairman Matz from both credit union involvement and external oversight.  No one at the board or staff has been able to replace the critical experience and knowledge credit unions brought to all issues.

Credit union experience is absent in the regulatory bureaucracy. Credit unions manage over $2.0 trillion for over 100 million members but they have little to no voice in policy priorities.   Stakeholders, both members and the professional leaders, are viewed simply as recipients of perceived regulatory wisdom.

Increasingly credit unions are developing new financial schemes with the regulator seemingly oblivious to their impact on these credit unions or the member owners.   The wheeling and dealing in mergers, bank purchases and raising external capital is accelerating.

The makeover of a number of credit unions from member-centered to financial strategists, gamesman, hustlers and horse-traders is well underway.

This failure to interact removes NCUA’s most important resource – the industry’s professional leadership experience.   Mistakes will continue to be made and paid for by credit unions due to the missing counsel of those who make the system work on a daily basis.

Overcoming the Schism

Credit unions created NCUA and designed and passed in Congress all of its constituent capabilities specifically the NCUSIF and CLF.

Board members seem divided between two binary positions:  let the free market determine outcomes or, NCUA must pass rules to micromanage every credit decision and balance sheet IRR risk.

Effective NCUA regulatory policy is not democratic or republican, or even bipartisan; it is pragmatic supported by facts, logic and cooperative purpose.

Rules and manuals in the thousands of pages cannot replace business judgments and may in fact result in reducing sound operational choices.

Mutual respect is missing.  Credit unions are intimidated or consider fruitless any effort to critique ineffective agency actions.   NCUA’s most frequent justification for more rules is comparison with other financial regulators.

Mutual dialogue creates respect and enhances understanding of shared responsibility.  Future posts will describe changes in priorities, norms and professional ambitions shaping industry character.   All are examples of events occurring without the benefit of public dialogue.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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A Fee that Credit Unions Should Review for Appropriateness

Increasing attention is being given to all financial institution’s overdraft/courtesy-pay/nsf fee structures.   An excellent summary of many of the issues is in this article from CUSO magazine.

After the reassessments of these fees, there is another one that credit unions may want to proactively review.

The Unclaimed Property/Inactive Account Fee

A member recently told the story about learning of this fee the hard way.   She had been a loyal credit union member for over two decades and had left a small balance of $500 in case a family member needed to borrow.

The regular savings account paid interest of .05%, offered only online statements and had no activity for over two years.  When checking her 2021 yearend balance online she discovered that the amount had fallen by 20%.

The explanation: a $3 per month inactive account fee was being assessed.  She knew nothing about the fee or how long it had been in place.  In essence she felt the credit union had effectively free use of her money and was charging her on top of that!

When contacted, the credit union explained the fee and offered to refund the money for the last two years, which was as far back as their system would go.

Credit Union’s Responsibility for Inactive Accounts

When Ed, Bucky and I went to NCUA in 1981, I can remember credit unions approaching the agency about charging inactive account fees, which in essence was the step prior to forwarding these accounts to the states as unclaimed property.

In Illinois the Department of Financial Institutions was responsible for administering the unclaimed property act and ensuring funds were properly reported, returned to the state after five years of inactivity so the owners’ names could be publicly listed to  reclaim their funds.

My colleagues believed charging a fee during this inactive period was counter to both the spirit of the act and for a cooperative financial institution.

Credit unions claimed  the accounts were costing them money: maintaining the account, mailing monthly or quarterly statements and plus interest.  Even as they tried to reactivate them, they wanted to be reimbursed for the operational “costs” of the accounts.

For others, the not so hidden motive was to fee the account to $0, especially smaller balances,  close out the member, and not worry about reporting it as unclaimed property.

Others asserted that the fee was in fact an incentive for members to reactivate their accounts.

Inactive accounts come in all flavors:  parents opening accounts for their children, now long gone; accounts left when members move out of the area; the account opened for an indirect loan member, etc.

The common characteristics are there is no member-initiated account activity, the relationship is static, and there is high probability the owner is unaware of any fees being charged.   Therefore it is an easy fee to assess as it is mostly invisible to the account holder.

Other Credit Union Examples

One CEO I talked with said they charge $3 a month on about 500 accounts generating $1,500 in revenue.   At any point in time about 40% of the accounts will be sent to the state.

Another CEO said the credit union charges $10 per quarter.   In both cases the fee had not been evaluated for decades.

Both recognized that in an era of virtual accounts, minimal interest on savings and near zero marginal operating costs, the credit union should focus on contacting members, not seeing the issue as a revenue item.

I would urge credit unions to look at their current inactive account policy and fees.   It may not be as consequential as overdrafts, but if a class action attorney situation arrives, just looking up the years of records, charges and potential refunds, would seem to suggest any income is not worth the potential cost.

Also don’t forget abandoned safety deposit boxes must also be reported as unclaimed after the statutory period of inactivity.

NCUA’s Unclaimed Policy

Just as a footnote, NCUA also acquires unclaimed insured share accounts when liquidating credit unions.

It is interesting to note that the agency’s policy is contrary to the legal practice required of credit unions.

As stated on the website, if NCUA cannot locate the party after 18 months, it converts them to “uninsured” and retains the balances for use by the insurance fund.

Invariably, some items may remain unclaimed. Some checks are never cashed; or the credit union’s address information was incomplete. There are also cases when we don’t have a recent address and are unable to get a forwarding address from the post office.

Share accounts claimed within the 18-month insurance period are paid at their full-insured amount. At the expiration of the 18-month insurance period, shares that are not claimed are considered uninsured and written down to share in the loss to the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund. Even if shares are uninsured when they are claimed, there may still be a distribution.

On rare occasions, the liquidation of a credit union may result in surplus funds. If a surplus remains, a distribution to the shareholders is required. This may occur several years after the credit union is liquidated and it is sometimes difficult to locate these members.

This is another example where NCUA exempts itself from the rules credit unions are required to follow to protect member’s assets.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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RBC Update: 257 Credit Unions in NCUA’s “Hotpot”

In two weeks, credit unions will be able to calculate their newly imposed capital ratios.  Three different calculation requirements are now in effect.

Using yearend 2021 data, there are 212 credit unions over $500 million that will likely have to use RBC (risk based capital) because they had net worth below 9% at December 31.  Another 45 credit unions between $400 and $500 million reported net worth below 9%.  They will be subject to RBC when their total assets exceed $500 million.

This total of 257 credit unions is probably the minimum number as credit union share growth is usually seasonal, concentrated in the first four months of the year.  That is, assets will increase faster than capital can be earned at the same pace.

RBC’s Impact

RBC has still not hit home for some. These credit unions are telling members they are well capitalized because they exceed the 7% net worth level. Those so doing often fall short of the new 9% minimum.

The impact of RBC is best described with the boiling frog analogy.  A frog put in boiling water will immediately jump out. But put the frog in a pot of cold water, slowly raise the temperature and the frog will hot-pot to death.

Many large credit unions view RBC similar to  a pond Kermit.  As the RBC multiplex calculations slowly engulf quarter by quarter many will find themselves in unfathomable amounts of  creeping normality.

Some will immediately jump to the seeming sub debt life preserver to stay above the 9% threshold.   Soon they will realize that  option itself requires more leverage just  to  breakeven.  Sub debt  just made the water deeper and harder to jump out of the pan.

RBC and NCUA’s Record of Risk Analysis

In an April 30, 2010 speech to the Illinois Credit Union League 80th Annual Convention Chairman Matz  offered these remarks on the corporate crisis:

“Let me start by assuring that I fully recognize the legitimate anger many of your feel.  The anger has come through loud and clear. . .I have heard directly about the pain you have felt. I know that many of you blame NCUA: After all, two examiners were on-site at US Central and WesCorp.  NCUA definitely shares some of the blame (and then comes the big qualifier) but there is plenty of blame to go around.”

What she forgot is that the regulator’s role is because crises are to be expected.  And when they occur, to be managed prudently.

The Irony of the RBC rule which is supposed to “protect the insurance fund” is that NCUA is often the source of the problem.  As one veteran CEO observed:

“All the losses -excluding a relatively low level of cu management  fraud – that NCUA has incurred is the result of errors in risk analysis by NCUA. They don’t like to acknowledge that fact, but the logic is inescapable.

By decreeing that most assets are now in complex credit unions, the industry is far more subject to the whims of a less than stellar team of NCUA executives who are increasingly enthralled by the “predictive” accuracy of astrologically and phrenologically based statistical models.”

The most catastrophic error in risk analysis is the Corporate crisis referred to by Chairman Matz. NCUA is now projecting a minimum of $5.7 billion in recoveries from the corporate AME’s.  Over $1.2 billion is still due shareholders of the four corporates.

This is the exact opposite result projected for years after the conservatorship when total costs of $13.5 to $16 billion  were estimated by NCUA.  The agency never revealed their analysis always referencing the results of their “engaged securities expert, Black Rock.”

 Learned Helplessness and the Actions of Others

With RBC it is easy to slip into a state of “learned helplessness.” That is  behavior exhibited when a person is repeatedly exposed to negative stimuli beyond their control.  Think regulatory burden.

The term describes experiments in which humans subject to loud noises, did nothing. seemingly helpless to change.

Not all the human participants responded the same way. Many blamed themselves for “failing,” but others blamed the way the experiment was framed. They knew it set them up for failure. In other words, not everyone is equally susceptible to learned helplessness.

Those who do not become passive when confronted with apparently uncontrollable situations are because they see others act with courage, overcoming difficult odds.  These leaders actions inspire others not to give up.

There is an initial segment of 257 credit unions who will be subject to the sophistry and real burden of RBC.  Some will throw in the towel, some will try to comply, and others will look for an “out” such as RBC or shrinking the balance sheet.

The hope is that most will have the courage and resilience to persevere until wiser heads prevail in Alexandria.

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The Fix is In: Members Act When Denied the Right to Stand for the Board

Credit union’s democratic member voting is a critical feature of cooperative design.

However the practice of democracy can become a charade if those in control fail to follow long standing practices to make it a reality.

A Board Controlling Their Re-election

At December 2021 yearend Virginia Credit Union (VACU) reported $5.0 billion in assets with 310,000 members, 22 branches and 731 employees. The net worth ratio was 9.8%.

In yesterday’s post I shared the member Notice from my credit union’s annual meeting and the fact there would be no voting for four open board seats.  The number of nominations equals the number of vacancies.

Then I received this email from a credit union member about the board of VACU trying to control their own reappointment.  And members’ response.

“Are you aware of this? [link] It appears that VACU needs a mechanism for members’ self-nomination for board elections. Find that hard to believe but VACU is a state-chartered CU and the VA credit union act gives them much discretion.

“Although the nominating committee can send forward more than one candidate for each board vacancy, if they don’t, then nominations from the floor are not allowed and the vote at the meeting shall be by voice vote – which precludes any write-in votes!

“Under any circumstances, if only the uncontested nominees selected by the board appointed nominating committee are eligible to run…it ain’t right…talk about the destruction of cooperative principles?!?!?.

“The fix is definitely in!”

We Own VACU

The link in the email is to a petition in which four members of VACU state their interest in serving on the board.  They describe their efforts as follows:

The Virginia Credit Union Board is trying to rig their election so that YOU lose your right to vote for four amazing community leaders who are running for the board. 

Credit unions are financial cooperatives. They are owned equally by the members with a democratically elected board of directors – one member, one vote. The Virginia Credit Union (VACU) is a Community Development Finance Institution (CDFI) with a responsibility to invest federal dollars alongside private sector capital in the nation’s most distressed communities.

Four outstanding Richmond community leaders and VACU member-owners filed paperwork by last year’s deadline to run for the board in the March 23rd elections — Frank Moseley, Kati Hornung, Richard Walker, and Tori Jones — to bring a different direction, a different relationship with the Richmond community, and accountability for VACU’s atrocious pandemic response to an out-of-touch board of directors that needs all three.

VACU’s board has not only refused to allow their names on the ballot, it didn’t bother to interview or respond to the candidates. Instead the board is planning to hold a Soviet-style election at our annual member meeting on March 23rd, with three board-chosen candidates running unopposed for three seats. You can read the full story here, and learn more about the candidates here.

Tell VACU this is not democratic ownership and we will fight for our voting rights at the credit union the same as anywhere else they are under attack. 

A longer  post called We Own VACU provides the back story of their efforts.  They show the board chair appointed the nominating committee, which in  turn nominated the chair as one of the candidates for the four open seats.

Complaint Filed with NCUA

Where can members go if their efforts are denied?  Who is to call a foul on those in charge if they do not follow their own rules?

The members appealed to NCUA.  Yesterday they filed a formal complaint which can be read in full. The complaint gives the history of their attempts to be nominated starting in September 2021 and the repeated no responses or rebuffs by the board.

They attach their documentation and ask NCUA to vacate the “sham election scheduled for March 23 and require a new election with all four names included on the ballot.”

However their most important request is that NCUA make a policy statement declaring  that:

No credit unions in the country will be permitted to remove member owner oversight, participation in governance, or democratic control, thereby removing the temptation of misguided boards to try.

NCUA has published many such interpretations of acceptable bylaw implementation such as this:

  1. Nomination procedures: Under all options under this Article, the nominating committee must widely publicize the call for nominations to all members by any medium. This requirement can be satisfied by publicizing the information to a large audience, whether by newsletter, email, or any other satisfactory medium that reaches as many members as possible. The NCUA emphasizes that member participation is important during an election, and FCUs must make sure that members are aware of the nomination process. (emphasis added)

But in practice the Agency has shown no interest in member rights even when confronted with documented evidence of board manipulation of voting and annual meeting misconduct. A prime example is the denial of member rights in the Cornerstone Credit Union merger with Belco Community Credit Union.

As a result member participation in annual elections is increasingly a shadow exercise with no substance.  With more virtual annual meetings, the process becomes even more controlled.

As members are removed from the governance process, board and management are free to follow whatever course they alone believe is in the members’ interest. Even when this means giving up sound charters via merger or using member’s collective reserves to buy troubled banks.

Regulatory Leadership or Continued Neglect?

Chairman Harper in last week’s GAC address gave this view of his regulatory approach:

One of my favorite quotes by Molly Ivin’s reads: “I think government is a tool, like a hammer. You can use a hammer to build with or you can use a hammer to destroy with. Whether government is good or bad depends on what you use it for and how well you use it.

He then says how he intends to use his regulatory hammer as Chairman:

Protecting Consumers

Since joining the Board, I have focused on strengthening the NCUA’s consumer financial protection and fair lending resources. Given the consumer compliance examination program for comparably sized community banks, our program’s scope is insufficient, especially for those credit unions between $1 billion and $10 billion in assets. We should be doing more, and we can do more.

I understand this is not a popular opinion in this room. Many within the industry maintain that the NCUA should primarily focus on its safety-and-soundness mission or that the agency has not demonstrated a significant rationale for a stronger consumer compliance program.

Some also contend that the cooperative nature of credit unions prevents their lending practices from being discriminatory because their primary purpose is to serve their members’ needs. However, the logic that credit unions do not discriminate because they are owned by their members is a dangerous myth and one that should end.

Confusing Consumers with Member-Owners

Chairman Harper wants to protect consumers but not coop member-owners who are his primary responsibility.  The GAC comment suggests he has yet to grasp what it means to regulate cooperatives with their system of member governance.

The VACU members’ complaint and the ever-spreading practice of board’s ignoring the critical role of member’s franchise role will demonstrate whether the NCUA Board believes in member rights—or just wants credit unions to see their owners as only consumers.

The VACU members requested a straight forward policy statement that all credit unions could embrace.   It’s much shorter than a GAC speech. It doesn’t require a hammer. Just a reminder of who credit unions are.

I bet such a statement, recognizing members’ governance role,  would also enhance whatever shortcomings there might be in consumer compliance!

 

 

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Credit Union Leadership as a “Civic Trust”

In describing Jeanne D’Arc’s 110 year history yesterday, I said their leadership was fulfilling a “civic trust.” What does that mean when describing a credit union’s role?

The word “trust” refers to the fiduciary responsibility  of  credit union leaders to be conscientious  stewards of the member’s resources and affairs.   “Civic” enlarges the scope of that oversight to the entire community of citizens from which members join.   This public duty is confirmed by credit union’s tax exemption and their democratic one-person, one-vote governance.

As I researched Jeanne D’Arc’s legacy, an article about a credit union’s conversion to a bank was published.   The occasion was the retirement of Jim Blake the CEO of Brockton Credit Union, founded in 1917, which he rechristened HarborOne Credit Union in 2004.

As the credit union’s President, one of his industry honors was to be chosen by his peers as Chairman of the Massachusetts CUNA League.

In 2013 he initiated a controversial two-step conversion to make HarborOne a stock owned bank.  At the time the 96-year-old, $1.8 billion credit union was the largest state charter in New England.  The move was controversial.  The member vote was just over 60% in favor.

The result of the conversion was to transfer the “common wealth,” that is the approximately $200 million in reserves, to private owners. The new bank’s shareholders received the benefit of this equity but no payouts for credit union owners.

In his February 27, 2022 retirement interview with the Banker and Tradesman Blake shares his thinking about this decision.

The excerpts below  illustrate a different understanding of cooperative’s obligations than that followed by Jeanne D’Arc’s leadership.  I have added emphasis to certain of his statements.

Q: How did you end up at Brockton Credit Union?

A: A search firm that had called me over the years called because Brockton Credit Union was looking for a CEO. I didn’t know what a credit union was. The company told me about them, and I went to the commissioner of banks’ office and talked with them about Brockton Credit Union and then looked at their financials. When I looked at it, I said, “This looks like a mutual savings bank, and they don’t pay taxes.”

Brockton Credit Union at the time was the largest community credit union in the country. I was hired as the chief operating officer, and the expectation was that if things worked out, the CEO was going to retire and I’d take over.

Most of the people that were CEOs of credit unions grew in the credit union industry, and so their view of the industry was guided specifically toward credit union structure and financial capability. I’m not saying anything bad there – I’m saying it’s good.

That wasn’t my focus. I looked at the organization as a financial institution, and we had a credit union charter. The more I got into it, the more I liked it because we were doing really good things, and it was consistent with the history of what credit unions were about at the time.

Q: What led you to convert to a bank?

A: My position had always been that as a credit union, the charter worked for us. As long as the credit union charter worked, we would continue to be a credit union. But if the charter got in the way of the success of the company, then the organization should consider what other options were available.

That was unusual in the sense that credit unions didn’t want to hear comments like that. But the industry changed, and the economy changed. Then we started moving toward the Great Recession, and from my standpoint, that was the real issue for us. We didn’t have much in the way of foreclosures during that period.

What was obvious, as I pointed out to the board, is that we are the only financial institution in the country that has no ability to raise capital.

“We’ve just gone through a Great Recession where it hasn’t impaired us in capital,” I said, “and if this is what we’re dealing with, what do you think the next recession is going to look like? As a board, are we in a position to risk the future of the institution because of the charter, as opposed to having the capability to raise capital if needed?”

And we then talked about all the other issues that, from a product standpoint, we couldn’t get into. We couldn’t do business in Boston; we couldn’t do mortgages over $225,000; and we wanted to get into the indirect auto lending business.

Q: What was the process like?

A: It was a difficult decision to make because we knew that the entire industry was going to attack us. And they did. There were only 35 credit unions that had ever converted to banks. We were the largest credit union to convert to a bank.

Additionally, we were the largest community credit union in the country, and we had received numerous national accolades and trophies about what we do in the community.

We had the [National Credit Union Administration] that was absolutely opposed to us becoming a bank. The NCUA changed their policies as to how a credit union can become a bank, and we were required to send three proxy documents to all of our depositors that said that there’s really no reason for the credit union to convert to a bank.

We had our membership vote in Randolph at Lantana, and we had staff and police prepared in case there were protests. We had one of the largest in-person votes that had taken place in a conversion, and 96 percent of the customers said “yes” to convert to a bank. So, needless to say, it worked well for us. 

Q: When you converted to a bank, did you plan on going public as well?

A: No. When we became a bank in July 2013, we had a couple of things we wanted to do. We wanted to have the ability to go into Boston, and we wanted to buy a mortgage company. It worked for us until we began to get to a point where we needed capital for the growth that we were looking at in the future.

Q: Is HarborOne different from what you envisioned in 2013?

A: We’re totally different because I never had a vision of us being where we are, in terms of the business we’re in and the size that we’re at. This is a tough business, and I say that because the regulatory requirements and competitive environments and credit cycles that you go through – you do the best you can, and you still get bit.

We’ve never had a regulatory issue of any kind. We’ve never had a quarter in our history of losing money. Most of the years when we’ve had CRA ratings, they’ve been outstanding. I just wanted to grow the bank and certainly had no vision of anything like this at all.

End of Interview.

To see HarborOne’s regulatory environment as a bank, one can review the 110 page 2020 SEC 10K filing for the bank and its holding company here.

Other readers might find this link more appropriate.

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The President and NCUA Board Members Provide their States of the Union

Today’s post includes excerpts from the speeches of the three board member at the GAC conference in DC this week.

At the same time President Biden gave his administration’s agenda update, NCUA board members were given the opportunity to share their leadership perspective with thousands of credit unions in person at CUNA’s GAC.

Whether their remarks are described as a “state of the industry,” “regulatory update,” or even a “future vision,” I thought about topics they might  address.

My focus was on issues that would most directly affect credit unions and their members.

Will their remarks offer insight?  Will they enhance the credit union brand? What are their priorities? Their tone: concerned or upbeat?  Words to be remembered or quickly forgotten?

How might the extraordinary role of credit unions with members during the two years of the Covid economic crisis be celebrated? And the movement’s political standing enhanced?

Below is my “listening” list with any relevant comment by a board member.  The link to their speeches are on NCUA’s website.

My GAC Topic Checklist

  1. Why the Board decided to implement the new three-part RBC/CCULR capital requirement within days of being posted in the Federal Register. The rule immediately restricted use of over $26 billion in credit union reserves and required $4-6 billion more in additional capital to avoid the RBC regulatory burden. What was the evidence of a capital adequacy shortfall in the system?

Board Member comments:

  1. What are board members’ views of mergers of long standing, well-run, and well-capitalized credit unions that result in fewer choices for members and reduce the movement’s financial diversity?

Board Member comments:

  1. Do board members believe that members’ collective savings compiled over decades should be used to pay off bank owners at premium prices in whole bank purchases? If yes, what should members be told in advance about this expenditure of their reserves?

Board Member comments:

  1. What do board members believe will be the consequences of low-income designated credit unions’ (LID) increasing reliance on subordinated debt from outside investors to comply with higher new capital requirements and for “acquisitions”?

Board Member comments:

  1. How will the agency’s two-year experience with remote exams and work from home impact agency costs and effectiveness? Will future staffing needs be lessened?

Board Member comments:

  1. Is there a special role for the not-for-profit, tax exempt $2.2 trillion cooperative system in American finance? If so what is it?   Or should credit unions be part of a level regulatory playing field?

Board Member comments:

  1. When will the credit union shareholders of the four corporate AME’s  $1.2 billion surplus, receive their final payment as the NGN program ended in June 2021?

Board Member Comments:

  1. Would board members encourage an enhanced democratic member governance role in cooperatives especially at the annual meeting’s election of directors? Would NCUA consider developing a cooperative scorecard, with the industry, to enhance awareness and better implementation of the seven principles?

Board Member comments:

  1. As individual board members frequently voice a commitment to transparency, when will details of the NCUSIF NOL modeling and the Cotton accounting memo be public so credit unions can understand the logic behind NCUA’s financial decisions? Both are subject of FOIA requests.

Board Member comments:

  1. Are there any areas where the agency is willing to work collaboratively with credit unions to develop better solutions such as a wider role for the CLF, a more supportive new charter process, or even succession planning resources?

Board Member comments:

  1. Please share your vision for the future of credit unions given the their record setting performance during the Covid economic shock and recovery?

Board Member comments:

My Summary

Obviously my list and board member priorities differ.   None commented on any of these topics directly.

The themes from the talks included fintech partnerships, crypto and block chain’s future, and an important insight from Chairman Harper:  Leaders of this industry, like all of you gathered here today, should prudently use your hammers to positively affect the financial prospects of all your members.

Harper did not explain the credit union hammers he was referring to.  He made clear the agency would use its hammers for increased consumer compliance. “However, the logic that credit unions do not discriminate because they are owned by their members is a dangerous myth and one that should end.”

If my topics for board members are not yours, it just shows every person has their meat or their poison.   Skim the talks.   They may respond to  your interests or not.

They do however provide an insight on each board member’s view of the industry and his role as a regulator.  And maybe you should go out and buy some hammers!

 

 

 

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Where’s The Rest of Credit Union Members’ $1.2 Billion?

In early January following NCUA’s posting of the September 30, 2021 AME financials for the five corporates, I published an analysis of the forecasted amount to be paid to credit unions.

That analysis showed NCUA projected total distributions of $3.185 billion to shareholders of four of the five estates.  The $569 million in additional payouts NCUA announced on February 28 brings actual payments to $2.010 billion.

Even with  these latest payments, there is still $1.2 billion due to credit union members based on NCUA’s financial projections.

The portion that NCUA announced as dividends on February 28 will go to the former Southwest Corporate shareholders.  They already received their entire capital contribution and are projected to be paid a $330 million liquidating dividend.   After this initial “dividend,” they will be due $120 million more.

Questions Abound

 

The NGN program ended in June 2021.   Why has it taking so long to return the remaining $1.2 billion balance to credit unions?   Will NCUA post a list of the remaining legacy assets and their current market  value with its December 2021 AME financial statements?

The five spread sheets of every legacy asset updated through September 2017 for each estate are already completed.  Shouldn’t NCUA now update these and publish the current market value for every remaining asset?

Is it fair to conclude that 12 years after the 2010 liquidation of the five corporates, only one was actually insolvent?   The other four were deemed insolvent because they were victims of exaggerated and inaccurate loss provisions projected decades into the future?

At this time NCUA forecasts total cash recoveries over $5.7 billion. Of this amount $2.6 billion was the TCCUSF surplus merged into the NCUSIF on October 1, 2017.

Is it correct to say this cash surplus occurred only after the agency subtracted $3.6 billion in liquidation expenses as reported in section B 1 Liquidation Expense in the AME financials?  Are these expenses approximately the same amount as the net legal recoveries?

The so-called legacy assets seized in 2010 have never changed.  Is it reasonable to suggest that this regulatory modeling miss-estimate of $6 to $8 billion was how NCUA determined the corporates to be insolvent?  Moreover, the vast majority of the projected credit defaults had not occurred when the corporates were seized.

If these erroneous projections of at least the $5.7 billion cash surpluses are reasonable, does this suggest why a look back at the entire event should be undertaken?  How can such misleading estimates be avoided in the future?

The Critical Work Still to be Done

 

NCUA’s errors in models and their assumptions resulted in irreversible damage for the credit union system and the individuals involved.   It continues still today in the diminished role of the corporate network.

While many might say let bygones be gone, the processes and powers that created this regulatory debacle have not been assessed or even changed.

The real work of the Corporate Resolution Plan remains to be completed.   Paying out the recoveries from events that should have never taken place should not be the end.  Rather it should compel a thorough look at what caused these errors and miscalculations in the first place.

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Two Reactions to NCUA’s Proposed Succession Rule

In January the NCUA board in a 2-1 vote issued a proposed rule to implement new requirements for succession planning.  Two observers’ responses follow.

One approach to succession planning.

Credit union consultant Ancin R. Cooley’s solution.

Her name is Asha Monroe Cooley.  There are two interpretations of this strategy.

  1. Ancin is hoping Asha will be his business partner and successor.
  2. He is perpetuating the Cooley brand, but in another context.

The message for credit unions:  either perpetuate yourself or create new models to sustain the movement.

The Most Important Thing is Not the Person in Charge  (excerpt from CUSO Magazine by Randy Karnes)

“I agree with planning for leadership changes, planning your response to them, organizing for the potential deer in the headlights look you get when your leader decides or has it decided for them now is the time to step off.

“But I do not agree with many of the things that succession consultants and “we can fix it people” will cast upon organizations in the quest to “predict the future and pick people now.”

“By forcing your hand to do something, NCUA has made it all too easy to simply check the box (possibly at great expense) and move on. But succession planning is important for an organization’s longevity. To be successful at succession/continuity planning and its execution:

  • Create an organization that expects, demands, and wills the organization to have a future that needs a leader. Build that expectation every day.
  • Present a firm to the marketplace, candidates, and stakeholders that is based on a dynamic mission worthy of its individual contributors’ time and efforts.
  • Focus on the key processes to complete the task more than you are on the subjective evaluations of human social tradeoffs. It’s a project with tasks to manage, not a social dilemma for the ages.
  • Focus on expected outcomes and their priorities more than the way to achieve them. A prospective CEO needs the assignment as the compass and goal more than a blank page to assign leadership skill to.
  • You need everyone to lighten up and avoid the drive for certainty and perfection from ensuring the paralysis and regrets of failure. It’s a 50/50 proposition picking a new leader, and one that gets better with doing it multiple times, not just once.

“Have plan, budget a course of action, and trust the future. And then get back to building the will, the confidence, and the positive belief that your organization will survive. Because the most important thing to your team’s future is not the person in charge; it is the confidence that your design, your stakeholders, and your membership can sell their intent to survive.

“I hate that so few credit unions today can proudly declare we are valuable, we are the ones our members need, and we see this mission as important, intoxicating, and something to hand off to our future leaders.

“Please do not see this as a task to simply put a new butt in a seat… it’s not. It is a constant culture of building a case to always be in the game and trust the future to those willing to lead.”

 

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A Potentially Pivotal NCUA Board Meeting

Last Thursday’s NCUA monthly board agenda seemed light.  It started at 11:30 and lasted less than an hour.  But the ultimate outcomes could be consequential.

The main topic required no action: the report on the NCUSIF 2021 yearend audit by KPMG. And an extension of PCA covid waiver.

However I believe seeds were planted that could have a significant impact on credit unions and the NCUA’s management of the NCUSIF for credit unions. Here’s why.

The NCUSIF Dialogue: Planting seeds for Change

Chairman Harper opened the NCUSIF review with these words:

For nearly 40 years now, the NCUA has earned an unmodified opinion for the audits of its funds. This sustained achievement underscores the NCUA’s commitment to transparency, accountability, sound financial management, and the careful stewardship of the resources entrusted to the agency.

NCUSIF is the only federally managed insurance fund to require an outside independent CPA audit.  GAO audits the FDIC and the FSLIC– when it existed.

An important difference is the establishment of a loss allowance account following GAAP accounting standards.  The process took three years (1982-1984) for NCUSIF’s reserving process to be independently  validated by the auditors with a clean opinion.

Harper then stated: As a regulator, we need to hold ourselves to the same standard that we expect of the credit unions we oversee.

The Chairman’s commitments to “transparency” and following “the same standard we expect of credit unions” could be critical if followed through with actions on topics raised by his fellow board members.

Hauptman on Investment Policy

After noting the NCUSIF’s sound performance, he made the following comment:

The National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund is a mutual asset — both reported and controlled by the NCUA and an asset reported by the credit unions. Credit unions are required to supply the majority of the fund’s equity through a 1-percent contribution of their insured shares. Just like any credit union board, the NCUA Board has the responsibility to regularly review its investment strategy . And for the sake of transparency and clarity, to do so at an open Board meeting.

He asked questions about the fund’s current investment approach and how to respond to “critics” of recent decisions.   The NCUSIF investment policy last updated in 2013,  is  now being posted with the audit. Hauptman committed to “working with my fellow Board Members on reviewing and updating the investment policy soon.” 

I believe credit unions should also comment on the policy, especially the fund’s duration management.  In the last seven years the NCUSIF portfolio’s weighted average  life (duration) at yearend was reported as follows:

2021 – 1,306 days

2020 – 1,204  days

2019 —   971   days

2018 —   901   days

2017 —   951   days

2016 —  1,864  days

2015 —  1,815 days

Under one policy, these numbers show a 100% change from the lowest 2.5 year duration, to 5.1 years.  Staff maintains this was just maintaining a consistent ladder, not timing the market.

In 2021 the investments robotically followed a seven-year ladder that extended the duration when the interest rate cycle was at an historically low point.

Effective investment management is critical to the fund’s operational design, but also, as Hauptman noted, for credit union confidence in NCUA’s oversight of their 1% asset.  If the policy is updated for more effective monitoring and performance, this could be an important improvement. The sooner the better.

Hood on Accounting Options and Understating the NCUSIF’s NOL

In Hood’s remarks he addressed the fund’s NOL (normal operating level ratio) “true-up” at yearend and its impact on the equity ratio.  He pointed out a “timing difference” in that the 1% share deposit is from June 30, but the insured shares and retained earnings in the ratio are from December 31 numbers.

If the ratio used the same balance sheet dates, the NOL “pro-forma” would be 1.29% not the reported 1.26% at December 2021.

Each basis point (.0001%) is $166 million.  This “timing difference” understates the actual financial position of the NCUSIF by $500 million at yearend.

In the dialogue that followed,  the CFO said this understatement averaged 2 basis points over the last ten years, and has been as high as 6.

Hood then quoted from a memo by Cotton and Company:  the memo produced by the outside accounting firm states that the timeliness and accuracy of data is required in the Federal Credit Union Act so this provision in the law “may provide some latitude from a strict interpretation that the equity ratio must be calculated based on the financial statements amounts, particularly given the knowledge of the timing effect on the calculation of the equity ratio…. Accordingly, it may be permissible to use the pro-forma calculation of the contributed capital amount, when calculating the actual equity ratio.”

When Hood remarked that he would like to see the full Cotton memo published, the CFO replied, “Okay.”

Two Commitments for Greater Transparency

Improved investment transparency and management and better presentation of the NCUSIF’s financials would greatly benefit credit unions.   Moreover, the NOL “true up” is just one of several changes that would make the financial reporting more useful.

In 2010 NCUA changed the accounting standard for the NCUSIF from private GAAP to federal GAAP practice.   There are numerous presentation differences that make the federal approach more difficult to understand because that format was intended for entities that rely on federal appropriations.

Each of the other three funds managed by NCUA report their financial performance and audits using private GAAP.  Given Chairman Harper’s intent  that NCUA follow the “same standard that we expect of the credit unions we oversee,” changing the NCUSIF to the practice followed in its first 30 years would certainly be appropriate.

Sounds of Silence or What was Not Said

The context around the NCUSIF’s financials was all positive with the overall CAMEL ratings showing improvement.

After Harper’s opening recognition of the NCUSIF’s and credit union soundness, he ended with his obligatory theme of future fears:  Nevertheless. . .

  • If the elevated growth of insured shares continues, we can expect a further erosion of the Share Insurance Fund’s equity ratio;
  • the emergence of inflation—something many Americans have never experienced at this rate before—means that the interest rate environment is uncertain.
  • Additionally . . . in my view, the system has not experienced the full extent of the pandemic’s financial and economic disruptions just yet.

Yet despite these uncertainties none of the board members, including the chair, made any mention of assessing a premium which the board had authority to do as long as it did not raise the NOL above 1.3%.   Given Chairman Harper’s previous statements about the fund’s adequacy, this is an interesting silence.

Moreover, the board’s acknowledgement of the yearend NOL at 1.26% (or 1.29%) shows their recognition that the NOL is a range with a low end of 1.2% and a high end cap, currently 1.33%.  The NOL is not a single magic number, but rather an outcome with a “buffer” above 1.2%  that varies depending on current assessments.

This silence after so much talk in early in 2021 about a possible premium, is hopefully a recognition of the flexibility and resilience of the fund’s design.   When combined with enhanced board reporting of NCUSIF investments and a reexamination of accounting presentation, credit unions could be a much better position to understand their fund going forward.

The Board’s public commitments to transparency of the fund’s modeling, the Cotton accounting memo and its presentation options, and the investment policy enhancements would be vital steps to bring the NCUSIF into full cooperative sunlight.

 

 

 

 

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Presidents and Credit Unions

There have been two noteworthy moments when Presidents have saluted the credit union movement.

One was by democrat and the second a republican president, 46  years apart.

“We might do something to push this. They are popular”

Here is President Roosevelt’s “shout out” in 1936:

From 1934 through 1940, there were 4,793 new federal charters issued.  A rate of 600 per year.

Since NCUA’s three person board was established in 1978, there have been 1,958 additional charters.  A rate of only 45 per year.  In the last decade that number has fallen to  two per year.

“I want to congratulate you. .. “

The White House,

November, 17, 1982:

Dear Ed:

I want to congratulate you on the progress  you have made as Chairman. . .

It was refreshing for me to learn of the accomplishments of the Board and the 17,000 federally insured credit unions across the country. . .there has been remarkable progress toward self-help solutions to the problems facing the credit union industry.   I applaud your efforts to meet the growing competition among financial institutions through the reduction of unnecessary regulations, decentralization, and improved communications.

I especially want to note the way your were able to guide the credit union movement toward restoration, on its own initiative, of the financial health of the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund. . .  (emphasis added) This effort illustrates a basic tenent of our administration, that, given the leadership and the opportunity, individual citizens acting together can often find solutions to their problems and need not turn to the government to bail them out.

Keep up the good work.

Sincerely,

Signed Ronald Reagan

Source:  NCUA’s 1982 Annual Report page 4

In April 1982, NCUA had completely deregulated the savings rules controlling all federal credit unions.  From 1982 through June 1987,  the credit union system’s share growth exceeded 15% annually.

In this same six years, 511 new federal charters were granted, a rate of of almost two per week.

The rules controlling bank and S&L deposit products were not fully ended until June 1987.  The April 1982 NCUA board action gave credit unions a five year head start competing in the new era of deregulation.