Credit Union Learnings from the Costs of Regulatory Mismanagement

With this morning’s announcement of First Republic Bank’s failure and subsequent sale to JP Morgan, the total cost to the FDIC of the three recent bank failures is approaching $35 billion.

The banks will pay for these losses through greater FDIC insurance premiums.  That additional  bank expense will be passed on to their customers.   There is no government tax money being used.

I believe there are important initial  lessons from these current failures for credit unions:

  1. Regulatory mismanagement is extremely costly. The institutions and their customers will pay for these shortcomings.
  2. The initial response will always be to issue more regulation-in this case both capital and liquidity requirements.
  3. The problem is  “bureaucracy,” not individuals with responsibility in the agencies.
  4. All of the explanations offered below have been part of NCUA’s own playbook in the past.

The question for credit unions Is whether NCUA is exempt from the internal bank regulatory shortcomings described below?   Or is it that the problems have yet to surface?

Regulatory Self-examinations

Before today’s announcement of this third failure, last week the FDIC, FED and GAO had issued preliminary postmortems of why SVB and Signature banks had failed.  The headline summaries of these reports signaled the “self-criticism”  of the agency’s performance.

However before turning the spotlight on themselves, the reports pointed directly at the banks’ management, from the Wall Street Journal’s account: 

The Federal Reserve report — commissioned on March 13 by Michael Barr, vice chair of supervision at the Fed — argued that SVB failed on March 10 because of “a textbook case of mismanagement by a bank,” and said its senior leadership “failed to manage basic interest rate and liquidity risk.” 

The FDIC report — authored by chief risk officer Marshall Gentry -– offered similar criticisms about the management of Signature Bank, which was seized by regulators on March 12. The FDIC said that Signature Bank failed to prioritize good government practices and often ignored FDIC advisory recommendations prior to its sudden collapse. 

“The root cause of Signature Bank’s failure was poor management,” the report said. “[Signature Bank’s] board of directors and management pursued rapid, unrestrained growth without developing and maintaining adequate risk-management practices and controls appropriate for the size, complexity and risk profile of the institution.”

The obvious political and accountability question is why weren’t the regulators up to the task of effective oversight of these “basic risk”management failures.   The reports then become more self-focused as reported in the Journal:

“Federal Reserve supervisors did not fully appreciate the extent of the vulnerabilities as Silicon Valley Bank grew in size and complexity,” Fed regulators said, adding that “when supervisors did identify vulnerabilities, they did not take sufficient steps to ensure that Silicon Valley Bank fixed those problems quickly enough.”

The two federal regulators also pointed the finger at themselves for failing to adequately supervise both institutions, and emphasized that new guardrails must be put in place to stave off another regional banking catastrophe. Both agencies said they missed weakness in both banks prior to their collapses, with the FDIC blaming a lack of staff to conduct targeted reviews of Signature.

The Federal Reserve’s Mea Culpa

Michael Barr, the Fed’s vice chair for supervision, issued a 114 page analysis.  Here are some of his summary findings in his short introduction:

Our first area of focus will be to improve the speed, force, and agility of supervision. As the report shows, in part because of the Federal Reserve’s tailoring framework and the stance of supervisory policy, supervisors did not fully appreciate the extent of the bank’s vulnerabilities, or take sufficient steps to ensure that the bank fixed its problems quickly enough. 

Higher capital or liquidity requirements can serve as an important safeguard until risk controls improve, and they can focus management’s attention on the most critical issues. As a further example, limits on capital distributions or incentive compensation could be appropriate and effective in some cases.

We need to develop a culture that empowers supervisors to act in the face of uncertainty. . .

Last, we need to guard against complacency. More than a decade of banking system stability and strong performance by banks of all sizes may have led bankers to be overconfident and supervisors to be too accepting. Supervisors should be encouraged to evaluate risks with rigor and consider a range of potential shocks and vulnerabilities, so that they think through the implications of tail events with severe consequences.

Oversight of incentives for bank managers should also be improved. SVB’s senior management responded to the incentives approved by the board of directors; they were not compensated to manage the bank’s risk, and they did not do so effectively. We should consider setting tougher minimum standards for incentive compensation programs and ensure banks comply with the standards we already have. . .

This report is a self-assessment, a critical part of prudent risk management, and what we ask the banks we supervise to do when they have a weakness. It is essential for strengthening our own supervision and regulation.

The Journal’s analysis of  Barr’s report: “Of the four top takeaways about the events leading to SVB’s collapse, three are tied to perceived shortcomings with the Fed’s banking oversight. The report focuses on errors by the agency but not on individuals’ responsibility.

The Fed also pinned some blame on its own bureaucratic structure. Authority for overseeing banks is parceled out to the Fed’s regional bank branches, but in practice, the central hub in Washington provides extensive input and must approve some enforcement actions.”

“Self-assessments-A Critical Part of Risk Management”

Over two years ago, one of NCUA’s board members requested a “look back” on the NCUA’s analysis and response to the corporate resolution.  A response was promised.  Nothing has been done, at least publicly.

Regulatory failures are costly.   Is the credit union system and its oversight subject to similar the bureaucratic shortfalls as the FDIC, Federal Reserve and OCC?

To retain, or recover, confidence in its own analysis, the Fed’s report includes details of its examiners’ findings, board presentations and other verbatim accounts of its oversight.  Transparency is the first step in accountability and trust.  That is certainly a model NCUA could emulate.

 

 

 

 

 

 

University Student Entrepreneurs Win–but Credit Union Charter Still Distant After Six Years

The current generation of students is attracted to business and social startups.  Many major universities now offer competitions encouraging students to design and launch new business and non-profit ideas.

These efforts are so widespread that there are now multiple rankings of the leading programs at colleges and universities across the country.  Here is one showing the top 20 competitions.

One of the leading forums is at  George Washington University, here in DC.  The results of its annual New Venture Competition were just announced.

In their 2023 contest, 417 participants spread across 161 teams participated. Judges awarded $357,200 in prizes, including $163,000 in cash to the winners.

Twelve finalists received a minimum of $5,000, across four tracks: Business Goods and Services, Social Innovation, Consumer Goods and Services and Healthcare and Life Sciences Tracks.

Participants represented nine of the 10 GW schools resulting in a diverse range of innovative startup solutions.

GW President Mark S. Wrighton commented on the outcome: “If this is an indication of the next generation of problem solvers, then we are all in good hands. It is extraordinarily impressive to hear about the diverse set of new businesses.” 

The full profile of all winners in all five tracks and their ideas can be seen in this listing.

A Credit Union Winner

In April 2018 three GW freshman from  different academic schools devoted much of their first year in college to this competition.  They reached the finals and were awarded $10,000 to continue implementing their project.

Their new venture proposal was to charter a credit union for the GW students and community.  I recorded their five minute “pitch” on my iPhone from the audience.

Their words provide the promise that every credit union offers including the need and importance of financial literacy, member ownership and direction, online delivery, better rates, and strengthening the community with a firm “run by students for students.”  Their slides are in the background on stage.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s_xCpDe9a3U

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s_xCpDe9a3U)

What Happened?

Dozens of students volunteered their time to complete the charter application, the group raised over $100,000 in donated capital and recruited an experienced advisory board of credit union professionals and GW faculty.

NCUA has twice rejected hundreds of pages for the  charter applications.  The agency has requested updated market surveys, revised financials, and numerous other shortcomings, all the while hinting that more capital would be desirable.

Meanwhile the three freshman who devoted a significant part of their college career to this effort have graduated; however two still serve on the advisory board.  New student volunteers have persevered to carry on the founders’ original concepts.

NCUA has not assisted but rather stalled this six- year effort.

This status occurs despite the words in the February 28 presentation by NCUA’s Vice Chairman, Kyle Hauptman at this year’s CUNA’s GAC conference:

Our society isn’t the best at getting people to save and invest. This is where credit unions come in, with financial literacy and savings programs that improve their members’ financial wellness.

Financial wellness can save relationships. Financial wellness is a great product that we only buy if we value it more than all the cool ways to spend money. Credit unions help people achieve financial wellness. . . Financial issues can be a dry topic, but it’s not about the money itself – it’s about living your best life.

My three personal priorities for my term are:

  • Revamping the de novo chartering process. . .

I’ve good news on all three fronts.

On the issue of de novos, we’ve revamped and streamlined the chartering process. We will be rolling out a provisional credit union charter that fixes the chicken & egg problem, whereby a potential credit union wants to get its initial capital from a CDFI but can’t get that capital until we’ve issued them a charter. Still, we wouldn’t issue the charter until that credit union has the capital.

I’m proud of these improvements – I think it’s a part of facilitating true financial inclusion. I love seeing announcements about new charters. . .

Except this streamline chartering process does not exist. When asked about this “improvement” and the “provisional credit union charter”, there is no response.   That effort, like credit union chartering, is stillborn.

Instead of supporting the next generation’s startup energy and goals to serve their community via coops, the NCUA is teaching potential supporters about the age-old witticism, “I’m from the government and here to help you.”

Apparently even board members cannot accomplish their priorities.  How can de novo credit unions overcome the bureaucratic obstacles that even NCUA’s leadership is unable to move forward?

New credit unions are an endangered species.  The future of the coop system is at risk.  Not because the billion dollar segment which manages 75% of assets will disappear.

Rather it is because this generation of student entrepreneurs is unable to overcome government impediments.  The result is that  these motivated, creative individuals will find their opportunities for the benefits presented in the “pitch” above through other creative organizations.  I suspect they will be called FinTechs.

 

A Prophetic Voice

Last week I asked if credit unions today needed a prophet’s wisdom.   I was motivated by one of C-Span programs which presents recordings of historical speeches by leaders at important moments in American history.

Hearing the original voices of leaders summoning their listeners to action still inspires today. The experience is both fruitful and edifying.

The reason is that the truths contained within these appeals transcend time. They are not merely words that endure in time, they are words that are beyond time.   Their underlying truths do not change with circumstance, nor are they changed by it.

The actions called forth do not merely meet the challenge at a moment in  time; they are the standard by which time itself is tested.

The paradox is that the timeless is always timely. If it is timeless and, if it’s always true, it is always relevant.

The Context for Chairman Callahan’s 1984 GAC Address

The 1980-1982 economic crisis was over.  Interest rates and inflation were in back to single digits.  Deregulation was well underway.  Credit union growth and financial performance led all financial institutions.

The NCUA’s DC bureaucracy had been reorganized to reduce central office roles and put the six regional directors in positions of administrative leadership.   The CLF had been capitalized in partnership with the corporate network so that every credit union had access.

There was a common commitment by the cooperative system to support expanding credit unions services to all Americans through new charters and increased FOM options on the 50th anniversary of the Federal Credit Union Act.

But there was one institutional innovation still needed to solidify an independent and sound cooperative system.  This was the primary topic of Chairman Callahan’s 1984 GAC presentation.

He called on credit unions to “Finish the Job.”  Here is a recording of that request which which is 12 minutes following CUNA President, Joe Cugini’s brief introduction.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UcXPyUMtic&list=PLfsu0zcct30-jB6oqaROWiXhaJ6xTBuLd&index=2

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UcXPyUMtic&list=PLfsu0zcct30-jB6oqaROWiXhaJ6xTBuLd&index=2)

The call was answered. Today the NCUSIF is still the example of insurance that has stood the test of time.

 

D. Michael Riley’s Observations on “Creative Destruction”

In response to last week’s post on the impact of mergers on the future of the cooperative system, this former NCUA senior executive sent the following comment.

Mike Riley, December 1984

“Creative destruction” is uncomfortable to see in print. But it existed before Adam Smith, Malthus, Marx. Keynes, Schumpeter, and others began to try to explain the economic drivers and motivations that shape our world.

Cultural changes seem to be the main driver today. The personal seems to have switched to the impersonal, i.e. give me what I want on my terms with not  much regard to others. Fast and low cost are the motivators. (disclaimer: I love Amazon.)

We have to deal with what we have.  I am concerned about sound credit unions merging.  When I was a new examiner, I had 30 -40 credit unions who were below $100,000 and none of the rest I had were over a million. And no, I did not start in 1934.

This was in the seventies. They were basically in small towns or in rural areas where there was a factory of some sort. As I visited them (most were happy to see me, albeit a regulator, to hear about the outside world), it was obvious that the Board and Committees were involved in the credit union. Their members and the Treasurer were most involved of all. They were making loans on washers, dryers, refrigerators. Most of their members had no real access to credit except at an exorbitant rate. No savings accounts available to the members.

The credit unions really cared about their members. I remember one credit union was trying to decide on whether to make used car loans. They wanted some advice from me.  About 8 months later I came back and before I could start the exam they wanted me to go out and look at this used car and meet the borrower.

They were so proud of this accomplishment. (As a good regulator, I did check to see if the loan was to a Board member or family member.)  It seemed to be a good loan. Not to get maudlin, but this shaped my views of what credit unions are. And fortunately, the larger credit unions were much the same.

After I moved on, I tried to keep track of these credit unions. Around 1990 I put together a list of where these credit union were. I couldn’t find a few; but a little other 20 had liquidated because the factory closed down or the key people left or retired. Another 30 or so had merged either voluntarily or involuntarily. About 6 were still alive and functioning. To be fair, at the same time the American economy was undergoing a major transformation and jobs and manufacturing were moving overseas.

Ongoing Mergers

This ongoing march continues. The merger of two sound credit unions without some legitimate reason doesn’t seem to be member oriented. I still think of the members of those small credit unions who received services such as buying a washer that no one else would do.

Bigger is not better if the member does not benefit.  How many of these mergers produce lower loan rates , higher dividends, or distinctly better products at a lower price? Carried to the extreme we will be left with 20 credit unions that are no different than large banks.

NCUA’s Role

Schumpeter opined “If someone wants to commit suicide, it is a good thing if a doctor is present.”

A Former Fed Regulator On Reasons for SVB Failure

A segment from the March 14, Marketplace daily report on NPR follows.  The interviewer is host Kai Ryssdal and the guest commentator is  Daniel Tarullo who teaches at Harvard Law School.

Between 2009 and 2017, Tarullo was on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors; specifically, he served as oversight governor for the supervision and regulation committee.

Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) analysts are looking for situations where there are balance sheet or business model parallels that could lead to more bank failures. Tarullo asserts that management will always be first in line when  blame is assessed.

However that is not the full story.  He believes the proximate cause is closer to home–a regulator with a light touch.

I believe  his last comment highlighted below describes NCUA’s approach to supervision.  How else do you explain a credit union CEO and Chair giving themselves a $10 million fund under their sole control or $1.0 million dollar credit union CEO bonus upon merger, among other abuses?

Interview Excerpts:

Ryssdal: All right, so look, that’s why we got you on the phone. You ran, among other things you did at the Fed, the committee on supervision and regulation. And I am not the first person to ask, nor will I be the first person to ask, where were the regulators? Why did this come out of the blue?

Tarullo: That’s a huge question, isn’t it? There are two places to look: One is to supervision and the other is to regulation. Now, of course, we’re stipulating that there’s a management failure, but I think everybody would agree with that. So in terms of the government, the debate publicly has been, “Gee, were the 2018-2019 changes in the [Dodd-Frank] law and Fed regulations respectively to blame?” And, as I think you know, I was opposed to both the [rollback of the] law and the changes in the regulations.

But I don’t think there’s that direct of a connection between those specific changes and Silicon Valley. And so what that tells us is the failure was in the oversight by supervisors — people who were supposed to be watching whether things like the proportion of uninsured deposits was creating some unusual risks for that particular bank.

Ryssdal: That’s not terribly reassuring, I gotta tell you.

Tarullo: No, it’s not. And I think that the review that the Fed has launched — and it’s significant that it’s headed by the vice chair for supervision, Michael Barr, who is, you know, relatively new — I think the significance of having him run that rather than staff is precisely because they want to find out where the supervisory failures lay. Were they with the specific team that had responsibility for Silicon Valley? Or were the failures more widespread in the sense that Washington was providing kind of a light touch supervisory direction to them?

Ryssdal: What do you think?

Tarullo: I suspect that it’s a combination of the two. But given the signals that the Fed was sending, you know, in the last several years, I believe that part of it is just the “don’t be too tight in your supervision, you need to find legal problems before you tell the banks to change what they were doing.”

 

Respecting Cooperative Owners: The One Thing Essential

This past week’s financial runs show how fragile consumer confidence can be.

A critical distinction in credit union design is democratic ownership-one member one vote.

One of the challenges however is that it is easy to treat owners only as customers.  The fact is that many “owners” today are ordinary consumers attracted by a competitive rate or other marketing message.  In some cases, the customer is just an indirect loan borrower who had minimal voice in the selection of where the loan was made.

There is a difference between customers and owners in a financial institution.

Customers do not vote for directors at the annual meeting;

Customers do not vote on merger proposals for their institution;

Customers do not have a residual interest in the reserves of their firm.

Ownership is traditionally honored in other communications such as members’  founding stories or recognizing those who have played special roles in the credit union or cooperative system.

The One Thing Essential

Transparency is one critical leadership characteristic that acknowledges the owner’s role.

Without full, continuous and open communications, the default is to treat owners as customers.  That unfortunately is the attitude of many in positions of leadership today.

Most importantly lack of transparency on specific credit union commitments means the owners have little or no basis for their responsibility of electing directors.

A Regulatory Shortcoming

An example is from last week’s subordinated debt rule approved by NCUA.  Every party to the transaction is provided full information:  Senior management/boards, the brokers, the consultant, NCUA, and most importantly the individuals and entities (including other credit unions) that buy the debt.

Debt issuance of $100 and $200 million have been completed in the past 12 months. The only persons not provided the details of these events are the owners.  It is their loyalty that is the basis for issuing these borrowings that can now extend as far as 30 years.

Without transparency, there is no possibility of accountability.  The owners are removed from any role in governance.  NCUA presumes its in loco parentis role if something doesn’t go according to plan-a distinct prospect with terms of 10, 20 and now 30 years.

Senior Management and Board Compensation

Only state-chartered credit unions are required to file IRS form 990 which discloses senior management and board compensation, political donations and other activities such as grants for all non profits.

These disclosures are essential for owners to know the incentives and circumstances board and management have agreed to in leading the credit union.

Compensation consultants today are plentiful  with four part plans and multiple ways to structure payments now or later.  There are increasing references to a “change of control” clause which would trigger executive payouts no matter other merger bonus and benefits negotiated by the CEO.

Without compensation transparency there can be no accountability.  State charters have disclosed this for decades.  The same logic applies to federal charters.  This information is an important step in owner oversight, even consumer protection.

The Place and Time to Start Showing Trust in Owners

In the months ahead, most credit unions will hold their annual meetings-in person and virtual.  In preparation the annual audit will be available, a Chairman’s report prepared and other required business conducted including election of directors.

Some meetings will include updates on projects such as a new building or branch expansion, a report by a foundation or community activity.  Others will include an educational presentation, an outside speaker and even a meal.

The annual meeting is a primary opportunity for leadership to engage with owners in open and full conversations.

It is especially important in light of recent examples about the resilience of regional and smaller banks.   Confidence in an institution is based on trust.   Trust is not created in a day or by a special press release about a firm’s financial standing.  It is a relationship founded on open communication as both customers and owners over years.

Nothing could be more important this year than showing coop owners that the CEO and board  deserve their trust by being fully transparent with facts and open to the members’ questions and points of view.

That is how free markets are supposed to function in a competitive economy. That is how democracy is supposed to work.

 

 

 

 

 

 

When Actions Speak Louder Than Words

Last Friday I received the following email from a credit union’s CFO:

“My CEO and I were discussing the new offering from the Feds, the Bank Term Funding Program (BFTP).  We have outstanding borrowings due over the next few months.  Liquidity is still tight.  I am considering utilizing this program as the current rate offered is almost 65BPs less than the FHLB 1-year term.

“I sat in on an “Ask the Feds” session on Wednesday to learn more about the program.  I’m curious as to your thoughts on utilizing this source of funding for Credit Unions.  Do you know of any CUs that have received any funding?

“Also, I’d love to hear what you think as far as there not being any negative stigma attached to institutions that do receive funding from this source.  Borrowing from the FRB is usually viewed negatively as it is seen as the “lender of last resort.”  During the webinar, the speakers assured everyone this would not be the case with this program.”

The follow query was posted by a credit union member on LinkedIn early last week:

I am thinking of transferring all my money. To my 2 credit unions !!!  Why is it more secure??

Latest Actions Taken

The following are reports  by the Fed and the FHLB system to respond to the financial firms’ liquidity needs. From a Reuters report on the FHLB system on March 13, 2023:

U.S. Federal Home Loan Banks beefed up their lending war chests on Monday to provide more liquidity to banks amid continued higher-than-usual demand for funds as the fallout from the collapses of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank reverberates through medium- and smaller-size financial institutions.

The FHL Bank system raised $88.73 billion by selling short-term notes with maturities from three months to one year on Monday afternoon, according to Informa Global Markets, a provider of syndicated bond data. The offering was raised from an initial $64 billion due to high demand.

Bloomberg on the Fed’s lending ;program as of March 16, 2023: 

Banks borrowed heavily over the last week from two Fed backstop facilities. Data published by the central bank showed $152.85 billion in borrowing from the discount window—the traditional liquidity backstop for banks—in the week ended March 15. It was a record high and a staggering increase from the $4.58 billion borrowed the previous week. The prior all-time high? It was $111 billion during the 2008 financial crisis

“Talking Points”

From press releases by CUNA’s CEO Jim Nussle: “Credit union deposits are safe, secure and insured.”  A March 17, CUNA  headline: “Credit unions are a safe harbor.”

Chairman Harper ‘s words at NCUA’s Thursday. March 16,  monthly board meeting:

Consumers can remain confident that their hard-earned deposits at federally insured credit unions are safe, just as they always have been, and that the NCUA will continue to act expeditiously, when needed, to preserve the stability of the credit union system.”

Vice Chair Hauptman offered no liquidity initiatives. Rather he lists actions NCUA has taken he believes relevant to the current situation.  (emphasis added)

“Even though there’s no analogy to the Silicon Valley Bank and credit union system, previous boards and this board have been urging credit unions to ensure they have appropriate sources of emergency liquidity.

“At the same time, we have urged Congress to strengthen the Central Liquidity Facility, the CLF, by allowing corporates to act as agents for subsets of members. When interest rates started rising, we published guidance on NCUA’s NEV, Net Economic Value methodology – that guidance clarified that credit union management must have an appropriate plan for managing interest rate risk.

“I’ll also note, a little while back, we encouraged the use of interest rate derivatives for exactly situations like this. The events of this past week underscore exactly why we were so concerned about interest rate risk. And this board is very aware that it is fairly unprecedented the rate-hiking cycle we’ve been in. We know it’s not easy to manage, but that is what credit union management is paid to do.

“I’m grateful for the hard work by credit unions and NCUA to ensure confidence and a safe and sound system. I know springtime is often annual membership meeting season for a lot of credit unions. No doubt, some members will have questions. I hope you credit unions out there will use this opportunity to educate members not only on your credit union, but the credit union difference.” (end excerpt)

His message is clearly a preemptive defense of the regulator’s accountability.  “NCUA did all we could.  If there is a problem in a credit union, it is not on us.”

Credit unions might wish the NCUA board in is quarterly updates had been more diligent in monitoring the NCUSIF’s interest rate risk.  Or that the CLF had been made “shovel ready” versus asking for more resources and authority when existing ones had not been used since 2009. For that’s what the NCUA Board is paid to do.

When Action Counts

The two federal “agencies” that credit unions are using (after the corporates) are the FHLB and the Federal Reserve.

The CLF is missing in action , and silent, even though it has the same “protracted lending authority” as does the Federal Reserve.

This is not a credit issue. In each bank failure to date no one has pointed to an absence of capital compliance. There have been other regulatory shortcomings mentioned, but not capital. As one observer noted: The main takeaway is capital is not king; it’s a court jester.  Confidence is king.  Runs start from lack of confidence, and no amount of capital is enough.

The foundation for system stability is action not words. Confidence comes from seeing those with responsibility being proactive versus  reactive; public versus silent; and fact-based versus rhetorical reaffirmations.

CLF Missing In Action

Credit unions and their members are addressing similar concerns about their ability to access funds.

What’s going on at the CLF?  Where is the initiative shown by both the FHLB system and Fed with actions now to meet liquidity needs? Is the CLF capable of providing same, or even next day, liquidity?

This is the moment to show that the CLF can be relevant, responsive and a vital factor in coop resilience.  If the NCUA and credit unions fail to join together in this moment, this week, then why have a CLF at all?

 PS:  If a credit union can share their experience borrowing from the FED and provide answers to the CFO’s questions above, please post in the comment section.  Thank you.

An Irish Weekend and Remembrance

As Bucky Sebastian reminded me many times about this past weekend, “Everyone’s Irish.” St. Patricks Day comes in the middle of Lent because an Irishman could not go for forty days without a drink.

At least that’s one theory.

So I got out my best Irish hat and tried out his thesis with a dark lager and two helpings of shepherd’s pie. There was even a vegan option.  Here’s the outcome.

Ed Callahan Remembered

Which reminds us of the great Irishman who believed in his deepest being, the potential for credit unions. This is Jim Blaine’s, March 17, 2016 portrait of Ed.

“Always suspected that the problem with Ed Callahan was that as a youth he was beaten too often by Nuns in parochial school or, perhaps, not beaten enough. Well, whatever, either way the Nuns left their mark – an indomitable spirit!

Ed Callahan was Irish – brash, pugnacious, loud, hard drinking, fun loving – alive! But why be redundant? I said he was Irish!


For over a quarter of a century, we all watched and observed as Ed Callahan created shock waves in the credit union world. No one was neutral about Ed Callahan. His friends were fiercely loyal, his enemies equally committed. Ed inspired many and angered quite a few. Ed had style; he had presence. With Ed, you weren’t allowed to make contact without becoming involved, excited, immersed, engaged.


At Marquette, Ed must have played football in the same way he played life – without a helmet. You had no doubt that Ed Callahan always played for keeps. He had no intentions of losing, that was not one of the options. Ed was very straight-forward; your choices were always clear. The mission was defined; and, there was only one direct path to the goal. That path was either with you, around you, over you, under you, or through you; you could step aside or get on board. It was your choice; but your choice never changed the mission, nor the path, nor the goal.


Some said that Ed was a visionary…

… they were wrong. Ed Callahan was a revolutionary. Visionaries talk about change, revolutionaries take you there. Ed led from the front – a leader of conviction, rather than convenience; principles above posture – courageous. Revolutionaries, by definition, create problems; overturn apple carts; rebuke the status quo. That happened at NCUA. Appointed by President Reagan, Ed arrived at NCUA in the midst of turmoil. Ed defined the mission; he reformed and remolded the Agency. He taught a regulatory agency how to stop working to prevent the last crisis. He explained that a coach never executes a play and that on Monday morning it’s never hard to see what went wrong – but it is rarely relevant. Teacher, coach, lessons in life; hopefully well learned, hopefully still remembered.

But let me celebrate the essence of the man – that indomitable spirit – one last time, for those who never had the opportunity; for those who still have doubts; for those who never fully understood. One of Ed’s harshest critics, noted with much wryness, that even in death Ed “couldn’t get it right”. Why, I asked? “Because Callahan died on March 18th instead of on the 17th, his beloved St. Patrick’s Day.” You know this type of critic – cynical, smug, self-assured without much basis, not really worth the effort, but…


Just for the record, I would simply like to point out one final time that – first and foremost – Ed Callahan was a fully-fledged, fully-flagrant Irishman – body and soul! And, no self-respecting Irishman would ever celebrate the end of St. Patrick’s Day until the last bell at the pub had rung. That would have meant that Ed Callahan’s “last call” would have come sometime after 4:00 am – on the morning of the 18th. Style, presence, courage – true to the last! A shamrock of joyful vigor and purpose!  

And one last thought… in the final analysis you can say many things about a great man’s life… some men are admired, some are respected, some are envied, some are feared… and countless other adjectives and accolades. But, in the final analysis, the most important thing you can say about a great man is… he will be missed. ” 

And, Ed Callahan will be missed…  

 

THE Credit Union Lesson from SVB and Regulation

In a news conference following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, President Kennedy remarked:  “Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan.

The SVB’s failure proves this adage untrue.  The press and numerous pundits have already assigned multiple parentage: the CEO and management, the Fed’s rapid rate increases, regulatory and examination shortcomings, the external auditor’s clean opinion, the Silicon Valley customers $40 billion twitter run, Trump’s deregulation in 2018 and the Biden administration DEI policy objectives.

When everyone and everything is to blame, then no one is accountable.  Just another “black swan” event. With more investigations/hearings to come, each new revelation will just add to the piles of condemnations.  No lessons taken away.  More regulations of course, for this is the default response whenever the barn door is left open.

A Spotlight on One Factor

From all these commentaries, I want to highlight one aspect that contributed to overlooking this risky situation. This factor has just become a part of the credit union regulatory eco-system.

In responding to my analysis earlier this week, Doug Fecher, the retired CEO of Wright-Patt Credit Union in Ohio, commented:

This situation makes me wonder if NCUA’s new “RBC” standards would have flagged the risks to SVB’s balance sheet. From what I can tell, much (most) of SVB’s investments were in “risk-free” treasury bonds and high quality agency securities, which in NCUA’s RBC formula would have earned some of the lowest risk multipliers.

To me it is another example of the folly of RBC-style risk management regimes … and why NCUA was wrongheaded in its pursuit of RBC.

This point of view is not limited to Doug’s observation.

During his time as Vice Chair of the FDIC, Thomas Hoenig challenged the agency’s reliance on risk-based capital requirements.  He questioned both the theory and practice, pointing to the lending distortions which contributed to banking losses during the Great Recession.

He wrote about the SVB failure in this commentary:

The regulator apparently relied on the bank’s risk-weighted capital standard for judging SVB’s balance sheet strength. Under the risk weighted system government and government guaranteed securities are not counted as part of the balance sheet for calculating capital to “risk-weighted” assets.

This allowed the bank to report a ratio of around 16%, giving the appearance of strongly capitalized bank. However, this calculation failed to account for interest rate risk in its securities portfolio or the risk of having a highly concentrated balance sheet. It misled the public, and apparently the regulators.

In contrast, if the regulator had focused on SVB’s ratio of equity capital-to-total assets, including government securities, the ratio falls to near 8 percent; and if they had calculated the ratio as tangible capital-to-assets (removing intangibles and certain unbooked loses from capital) the ratio would have fallen to near 5%.

What this would have disclosed to the world is that the bank’s assets could not lose 16% of their value before insolvency but only 5%, a stark contrast.

Had the regulator not relied on the misleading risk-weighted capital measure, it might have take actions sooner. A simple capital-to-asset ratio, tells the regulator and public in simple, realistic terms how much a money a bank can lose before becoming insolvent. The regulatory authorities need to stop pretending that their complex and confusing capital models work; they don’t.

RBC and Credit Unions: A First Birthday

RBC became the surrogate capital ratio for all credit unions with assets greater than $500 million one year ago on January 1, 2022.

Before this in a September of 2021 analysis, Why Risk Based Capital is Far Too Risky. Hoenig is quoted:

“A risk-based system  inflates the role of regulators and denigrates the role of bank managers. 

We may have inadvertently created a system that discourages the very loan growth we seek, and instead turned our financial system into one that rewards itself more than it supports economic activity.”

RBC and Asset Bubbles

Shortly after the critique of regulatory incentives induced by risk weighted assets, in Asset Bubbles and Credit Unions (JANUARY 10, 2022) the consequences from potential Fed tightening were noted:

When funding looks inexpensive and asset values stable or rising, what could go wrong?

The short answer is that the Fed’s inflation response will disrupt all asset valuations and their expected returns.

The distorted results  caused by RBC was presented in Credit Unions & Risk Based Capital (RBC): A Preliminary Analysis in February of this year.  Among the findings:

The 304 credit unions who adopted RBC, manage $822.7 billion in assets.  But the risk weighted assets total only $479 billion.  That 58% ratio is the NCUA’s discounting of total assets total by assigning relative risk weights. and,

One credit union with assets between five and ten billion dollars, reports standard net worth of 12.5% and an RBC ratio of 48.3%.  

This February analysis using June 2022 data of RBC credit unions showed that:

250 of these 308 credit unions reported unrealized declines in the market value of investments that exceeded 25% of net worth.   Four credit unions reported a decline greater than 50% of capital.  This was before the five additional Federal Reserve’s  rate increases through the end of the year. 

RBC’s primary focus is credit risk, the loss of value from principal losses from loans or other assets.  Balance sheet duration mismatch is not captured as are other common management errors:  concentration in either product or market focus, limited or no diversification of product or market, or  just simple operational mismanagement.

These common challenges become amplified by insufficiently considered non-organic growth forays such as third party loan purchases or originations. Whole bank acquisitions are an example of such risks often accompanied (disguised?} by growing amounts of the balance sheet’s intangible asset, goodwill.

The RBC proxy indicator for safety and soundness creates a distorted impression of real institutional risks.   Managers learn to game the system so that boards, members, and regulators fail to understand the institution’s total financial situation.

And when along comes a change in underlying assumptions, like the Fed’s rate increases, the previously unrecognized vulnerabilities quickly appear.

RBC creates for some institutions a theoretical capital ratio that is nothing more than a “regulatory  house of cards.”  SVB will not be the last example.

As Doug Fecher recommended in his 2016 comment letter on the proposed rule, “RBC should be a tool, not a rule.”

To his credit,  Kennedy learned from the Bay of Pigs misjudgments when the Cuban missile crisis occurred in 1962.

 

 

Subordinated Debt: The Fastest Growing Balance Sheet Account in Credit Unions

In 2022 subordinated debt issued by credit unions grew to $3.381 billion, a 257% increase from December 2021.

The number of credit unions using this form of temporary capital grew from 105 to 150. They represent about 7.3% of total system assets.

While still a very small percentage (1.4%) of the system’s total year end capital, its use is highly concentrated in a few credit unions.

NCUA is presenting a final rule on subordinated debt at this Thursday’s board meeting.  A point of interest will be how much detail is given the board and public about how credit unions used the funds, the various sources, and the reliance on this debt to meet capital compliance ratios.

These details are especially relevant today when bank failures wiped out not only all stockholder equity and retained earnings, but also all bond debt.

Rented Capital or Buy Now, Return Later

By rule subdebt is an unusual financial instrument.

Subdebt is reported as a liability, that is a borrowing, on the credit union’s books.  But because of the structure of the debt, NCUA considers it to be capital when calculating net worth for RBC-CCULR and low-income credit unions.

Subdebt can be sold to other credit unions as well as outside investors. Purchasers perceive it to be an investment, but technically it is a loan to the credit union which makes it as an eligible “investment”  for credit unions to hold.

In the event of credit union failure, the subdebt is at risk if all the credit union’s capital is depleted.

A Financial Growth Hormone

Unlike traditional retained earnings capital, subdebt is not free, with the interest rate varying depending on the structure and the credit union’s financial situation.

Because its inclusion in computing capital ratios is time-limited, the most common justification given by credit unions for raising the debt is to accelerate balance sheet growth.  Book the capital upfront, then leverage it for additional ROA to have increased earnings to repay the “borrowed” capital down the road.

This financial leverage requires raising more funds matched with earning assets to achieve a spread, or net interest margin, to make the process earning accretive. Buying whole banks is one obvious tactic to accomplish both balance sheet growth goals at once.

The process refocuses credit union financial priorities from creating member value to enhancing institutional financial performance through leverage.

Most Use Is by a Few Large Credit Unions

Community development credit unions are major issuers of subdebt.   The two charters under the Self-Help brand have together raised over $700 million.  Hope FCU in Mississippi and Latino in North Carolina have issued over $100 million each.

Bank purchases have been an important part of other credit union’s use of debt:  VyStar, GreenState, and George’s Own for example.

In other situations where the amounts are more modest, the intended use is less clear.  Is it just a form of “capital insurance” to meet the increased capital ratios of RBC/CCULR?   Is it to “test the waters” to see how the process works? Issuing subdebt is not a simple effort as for example, opening a FHLB account.

The Most Important Missing Rule Requirement

Subdebt has been bought by banks, insurance companies, investors and even other credit unions.

Sometimes the events are announced publicly either by the broker facilitating the transaction or the credit union.   The purpose is rarely specified other than to seek new opportunities for. . .  and then fill in the blank with a generality.

It is the members who pay the cost of the debt. The interest on the debt is an operating expense that comes before dividends.  If the only use is capital insurance or assurance, then the members should be informed as to the terms, cost and role of this approach to meeting regulations.   It is a management and board responsibility to be transparent and accountable to their owners.

If the goal is more ambitious, to capture new growth possibilities, the disclosure is even more critical.   Financial leverage, especially non-organic growth, increases risk.

In both instances the commitments undertaken can extend as far as ten years.  That term reinforces the need for full disclosure so members are aware of the commitments being made on their behalf.

The most important requirement that should be part of the revised subdebt rule is for full transparency for each transaction.  The purchasers of the debt are given all the details of the borrowing as their funds are at risk should the credit union fail.

Shouldn’t the member-owners also be informed of the commitments and terms made using their long-standing loyalty which, in reality, is underwriting the transaction’s terms?

It’s an opportunity for credit union members to be treated as actual owners, not just customers.