What Impact Might the Trump Administration Have on Credit Union Oversight

Writing about the future is easy. Rarely do readers look back when events have unfolded.  Moreover such forecasts often reflect, not insight or wisdom, but rather one’s own efforts to protect vested interests.

However there are some reference points which can help us think about what a credit union might do going forward into a possible disrupted regulatory future.

Today I will review what Project 2025 says about federal regulation.  I could find no direct reference to credit unions although I did not review all 900 pages.

Published in 2023, President-elect Trump has denied association with the ideas presented in the document.  More than 100 conservative organizations were involved in its creation.  I found the brief section I cite below had over four pages of extensive reference notes.

IMPROVED FINANCIAL REGULATION

From page 705: One of the priorities of the incoming Administration should be to restructure the outdated and cumbersome financial regulatory system in order to promote financial innovation, improve regulator efficiency, reduce regulatory costs, close regulatory gaps, eliminate regulatory arbitrage, provide clear statutory authority, consolidate regulatory agencies or reduce the size of government, and increase transparency. 

Merging Functions. The new Administration should establish a more streamlined bank and supervision by supporting legislation to merge the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Federal Reserve’s non-monetary supervisory and regulatory functions.

U.S. banking law remains stuck in the 1930s regarding which functions financial companies should perform. It was never a good idea either to restrict banks to taking deposits and making loans or to prevent investment banks from taking deposits. Doing so makes markets less stable. All financial intermediaries function by pooling the financial resources of those who want to save and funneling them to others that are willing and able to pay for additional funds. This underlying principle should guide U.S. financial laws.

Policymakers should create new charters for financial firms that eliminate activity restrictions and reduce regulations in return for straightforward higher equity or risk-retention standards. Ultimately, these charters would replace government regulation with competition and market discipline, thereby lowering the risk of future financial crises and improving the ability of individuals to create wealth.

From page 706: Direct government ownership has worsened the risks that government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) pose to the mortgage market, and stock sales and other reforms should be pursued. Treasury should take the lead in the next President’s legislative vision guided by the following principles:  

  • Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (both GSEs) must he wound down in an orderly manner.
  • The Common Securitization Platform57 should be privatized and broadly available.
  • Barriers to private investment must be removed to pave the way for a robust private market.
  • The missions of the Federal Housing Administration and the Government National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae“) must he right-sized to serve a defined mission.

(End Quote)

The text also states that Congress should repeal titles of the Dodd-Frank Act that created the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), a federal government organization which identifies risks, promotes market discipline and responds to emerging threats. Project 2025 defines the FSOC as a “super-regulator tasked with identifying so-called systemically important financial institutions and singling them out for especially stringent regulation.”

A Learning Event: The S&L Dissolution

In the late 1970’s the S&L industry held the largest deposit market share in California, much larger than banking competitors.  This was before deregulation.  Most depository firms were limited to operating in a single state or in some cases, a single location (Illinois).

Today S&L’s no longer exist as a separate industry even though 555 savings institutions with $1.2 trillion in assets still operated at June 2024.  All deposits are FDIC insured.  Of the total institutions, 241 are supervised by the OCC, 276 by the FDIC and 37 by the Federal Reserve.   While state and federal chartered institutions still function, the system is under federal direction.

While there are many reasons for the loss of the S&L’s as a separate, independent financial segment, the dominant factor was that many of the causes were self-inflicted.  These included a loss of special purpose, rapid multistate expansion through acquisitions, and balance sheets weighed down with fixed rate mortgages in a deregulated deposit funding environment after 1981.

After the mid 1990’s, there was no separate FSLIC insurance fund, no Federal Home Loan Bank Board to oversee the industry, and the FHLB liquidity system survived by serving all real estate lenders including credit unions.  In most states the mutual charter exists as an anachronism, with no new charters being issued.  At the  state level supervision is provided by a single banking/financial institutions department.

While external financial events did contribute to the industry’s collapse, competitors did survive and thrive, especially credit unions.  At the February 1982 GAC in D.C., CUNA President Jim Williams told new NCUA Chairman Callahan there was only one topic on credit union’s minds: survival.

Together credit unions and NCUA embraced deregulation and the changes in structure and oversight the new environment would require.  Hunkering down , protecting existing ways and asking for more funding to address problems was not the approach.

Whether the new administration will be as disruptive of federal regulators as indicated in campaign rhetoric, remains to be seen.  The lessons from an earlier era can be helpful:  remember  who you are and build on what brought success to this point in time.

Many of the factors in the S&L demise were self-initiated with leadership failures.  Cooperative success in navigating external changes was accomplished though enhanced collaborative efforts between credit unions and their regulators. not each trying to go their own separate ways.

 

 

 

 

What to Do When Credit Unions Go Rogue?

Synopsis:  This detailed analysis of Credit Union 1 (Illinois) presents a pattern of declining financial performance covered up by multiple merger acquisitions, one-time sale events and rented capital.  The future fortunes of eleven local sound credit unions have been destroyed in just two years.  I believe this kind of predatory activity, left unexamined by all those in positions of responsibility, will lead to a reassessment of the advantages of the credit union charter by external legislators. 

The article’s length is to present as much of the facts from these events so readers can make their own assessments. The situation summarized is I believe an example of internal industry reckless actions which present a false perception of success. The question for readers is: Does something need to change?

When there are no guardrails for a financial institution, anything goes.  It is the law of the jungle; or what some describe as free market capitalism.

The dictionary definition of rogue is “an elephant or other large wild animal driven away or living apart from the herd and having savage or destructive tendencies.”  Another reference is to unprincipled behavior by a person or persons.

This word rogue came to mind as I reviewed the activities and results  of Credit Union 1 in Lombard, Illinois, since its conversion from ASI share insurance to NCUSIF in February 2022.  A summary of the credit union’s merger tempo since this insurer changeover is shown in the following table for the ten already completed or scheduled to be by the 4th quarter of 2024.

In addition, the $12 million Synergy Partners CU, Chicago announced on October 17 a members’ vote for January 2025 to merge with Credit Union 1.  That would increase to 11 mergers in only two- and one-half years.  These will transfer over $650 million in total assets and over 62,000 members’ financial futures to Credit Union 1’s control.

In its October 2024 Member Notice, Synergy listed 23 Credit Union 1 branch  operations in six states including the head office in Lombard, Illinois.  The two furthest branches are in Bradenton, FL (1,230 miles) and Henderson, NV (1,750 miles apart).

Other new or ongoing initiatives along with this accelerating merger expansion activity include:

  • The credit union’s continuing and new sponsorship and marketing promotions with four outside organizations:

Official Banking Partner of Notre Dame Athletics

Naming rights to the UIC Pavilion, Chicago, for 15 years and $750,000 in  scholarships for a total of $10 million

Credit Union 1Amphitheater, Tinley Park  naming rights

The Western Conference tie-in:  On October 3, 2024 the Big West Athletic conference announced Credit Union  1 had become its official financial and literacy partner and the entitlement partner for the Mountain West Basketball Championships and all Olympic Sports Championships.

  • On June 3, 2022 Credit Union  1 announced agreement to purchase  the $311 million NorthSide Community Bank, located an hour north from Lombard  in Gurnee, IL.  Both boards approved the transaction subject to regulatory and bank shareholder approval.   The deal was not completed.  There was no public explanation.
  • In May 2023 Credit Union 1 announced it would serve New York cannabis entrepreneurs who plan to open marijuana businesses as part of the state’s CUARD coalition. The same CUTimes article reports, “Credit Union 1 has been selected to participate in the Illinois Department of Commerce’s Cannabis Social Equity Loan Program and is also the preferred banking partner of the Chamber of Cannabis in Las Vegas..”

The Merger Frenzy

Even with these multiple marketing and business initiatives, the core of Credit Union 1’s growth efforts are mergers. The operational intensity of acquiring and converting 11 credit unions (six outside Illinois) and all associated member and vendor relationships in just over two years would be a major operational challenge for any organization.

The immediate question is how will the members of the merged credit unions benefit?

In the Member Notices posted on NCUA’s website for these combinations, the wording used under Reasons for Merger, Net Worth and Share Adjustment or distribution are identical. Members’ collective reserves are never distributed to owners even when the merged ratio is higher than Credit Union 1’s.

But zero is not what several of the merging CEO’s and senior staff are gaining.

Rewards for the Enabling CEOs

In the case of the $34.4 million Enterprise CU in Brookfield, WI, the  24-year tenured CEO, Jeff Bashaw, will receive a minimum ten-year contract with a base salary increase of $38,000 on top of his current compensation. I estimated (absent the required 990 IRS filing) that to be a minimum of $125,000 per year plus a $100,000 bonus upon closing. Total minimum amount $$1,350,000.

The credit union is in sound shape at 10.6% net worth, a profitable, single branch with low delinquency.  After turning over his CEO responsibility, Bashaw’s role if any will be a branch manager or other honorary title.  This ten-year contract with a pay raise seems merely a lengthy sinecure.  The 8 employees and 2,815 members receive nothing-except the retiring CFO who will receive a bonus and severance of $110,000.

A Minority Depository Institution Leader?

At the $34 million Financial Access FCU in Bradenton, FL, the situation is more complicated.  The credit union prior to merging, reported a 1Q ’24 loss of $517, 310.  However, its net worth was still high at 18.4% ($6.4 million) and delinquency of only .39%. Was this a temporary loss or other problem?

In this merger CEO Sherod Halliburton is receiving a total of $3.2 million composed of a bonus of $125,000, an eight-year employment contract at $200,000 per year, and 100% immediate vesting of a $1.5 million split life benefit plan.  He no longer has any CEO responsibility as the credit union will become merely a branch operation. The 15 employees and 2,577 members of Financial Access received nothing for their loyalty.

In a CEO Profile published by Inclusiv in February 2022, prior the merger efforts, Halliburton is lauded for his leadership.  The article remarks on “his strong community ties and business acumen and how he decided to “bet on me” when offered the CEO position” eight years earlier.  Further he points out that he is “one of a limited number of African American men running a financial institution and he accepts the great responsibility accompanying that honor.”

The profile lists his efforts “toward racial equity and responsibility.”  He states, “We’ve gone from a somewhat negative perception . . . to now being viewed as a vital part of the economic infrastructure.”  The credit union received two technical assistance grants to upgrade technology to meet his goal to double membership in three years. He closes with this affirmation: “We’re here to change lives. I want that to be the enduring message even when I’m gone.” 

This Bradenton community credit union which he described as “a vital part of the economic infrastructure” no longer exists. Halliburton is now a Market VP for Credit Union 1 for the next eight years.

An October 2024 Approved Merger

The most recent example of CEOs cashing in is the $116 million Illinois Community CU with over 11% net worth and delinquency of .5%.  In this acquisition, CEO Thor Dolan will receive a minimum in immediate total benefits of $1,904,494.

This total is  described in the Member Notice as follows: a retention bonus of $150,000; deferred compensation of $50,000; a salary increase of $33,724 added to his 2023 reported 990 compensation of $245,770  or $279,494 per year (no employment length given}; and immediate 100% vesting of a $1,425,000 split dollar 20-year life insurance benefit plan.

This salary increase is despite the fact he is no longer CEO, either managing branches or a regional rep, both with no CEO operating responsibilities. Every additional year he remains employed will add another $280,000 to the package. There is no indication the 38 employees (except the CEO and CFO) gain any assurances of employment; and the 10,482 members receive nothing.

The Fates of the Merged Employees and Members

Each Member merger Notice posted by NCUA which I reviewed includes two standard assertions:

  1. The credit union’s branch location(s) will remain open and become a part of Credit Union 1’s nationwide branch locations.
  2. Employee Representation: Employees of the credit union will be offered employment with Credit Union 1.

However intended, neither of these statements have proved lasting in practice.  Comparing the branch listing in the August 2023 Kankakee Valley Notice with the latest listing in the Synergy’s October 2024  Notice, six of the branches in the earlier Notice no longer exist, including three for Emory CU in Georgia and three for Illinois credit unions with single branch operations.

As for employees’ fate, for the twelve months ending June 2024, Credit Union 1 reported a reduction of 67 FTE from 418 to 351.

As a result of Credit Union 1’s merger strategy, there will be eleven fewer local charters which were operating well, a reduction of 70-80 volunteer directors and member committees, and loss of all local relationships and legacy brands.

All member savings and loans, collective capital, liquidity and fixed assets are now in the full control of an institution for which the members have no connection or first-hand knowledge.  And in some cases thousands of miles distant. Ironically, Credit Union 1 states in all its promotions that anyone can join, so if members really thought this was a better deal, they could join anytime.  But that would be a much harder marketing task than just purchasing the business by paying the CEO—and getting the members’ accounts and accumulated reserves for free.

Members also have a totally new financial institution relationship to navigate. The Credit Uniion 1 material sent to each member post-voting is a 15 page pdf system conversion process and timeline.  Member instructions include setting up new payment and loan options, establishing digital accounts and using online financial tools.

Depending on the version usent, the membership agreement for each merged credit union is a minimum and 20 pages. It contains essential information about fees, rates, funds availability, mandatory arbitration and multiple other disclosures which few will be able to read through.  The members will learn through experience how everything has changed.

An important difference in Illinois state versus federal charters is the use of proxy voting in all member required elections, including mergers.  For Illinois credit unions, proxies are controlled by the board.  I did not see this fact disclosed in the FCU mergers, where proxies are not permitted.  In essence, FCU members turn their voting governance power over to a new board.  These directorst can routinely reappoint themselves without any member vote. More about this later.

Implementing a Capital Markets Strategy-Without the Risk

Credit Union 1’s merger campaign is an adaptation of a traditional capital market strategy of hedge funds and investment firms.  Except these buyouts of numerous, smaller independent firms in an industry (think hospitals, barber shops, rental housing, or local HVAC firms) require putting their own capital at risk.  These new hedge fund owners then burden their acquired firms with the debt used to finance the buyouts, strip and sell the highest value assets, reduce costs and services to pay for the debt coverage, and ultimately resell the merged business back to the market for a capital gain.

Credit unions reverse this model in mergers—they use the acquired assets, not their own members’ capital, to finance these acquisition sprees.  Except when buying banks. The equity in these “mergers” is often transferred in full with no payout to the owner-members.  The only necessary sales pitch required is to convince the CEO to bring the board along.  There is zero risk to the continuing credit union. The “acquisition” is free. The members lose all their financial and institutional legacy and become subject to the control of a board and CEO that will be completely new to them.

We learn in the Notices that no staff or board due diligence or alternatives is presented. There is rhetoric about “technology and systems that align with members needs.” And, how “internal core values align with our own and .  . . confident (that) members will experience a much needed upgrade in the quality of service.”  No facts, just vague promises.

These same words were used in the eleven Notices showing the abdication of any director or CEO independent assessment.  The words are merely a formula from previous transactions to pass regulatory approval.   The members are given no objective measures or specifics that would identify better rates, fees or specific services.  Just indefinite promises.

As for core values, institutions don’t have values, people do.  So the acquirer’s goal is to find CEOs willing to cash out of their leadership role, rather than evaluate what is in the members’ best interest.

The Numbers Show the Urgency in Credit Union 1’s Merger Efforts

Some readers may believe this is just another example of self-dealing in mergers.  It is.  But there is a major financial imperative driving this effort.

Credit Union 1 is desperate for mergers not simply for growth, but because its financial performance is a house of cards.  For the past five years it has been unable to generate a normal operating net income from its own balance sheet assets.  As a result, it has turned to non-operating gains, acquired and borrowed capital (sub debt) and other financial options that disguise its very poor or sometimes non-existent internal rate of return. Here are some of the numbers.

At December 2021, Credit Union 1 had $106.8 million net worth ($98.9 Undivided Earnings -UDE- and $8 m other reserves). The net worth ratio was 8.7%.  Net income of $13.8 million that year was largely driven by a $7.5 million non-operating gain on sale of fixed assets.

At June 2024, the credit union reports just $88.6 million in undivided earnings, $8 million in other reserves for a total $96.6 million, that is $10 million lower than at December 2021 total.

To report an acceptable net worth ratio the credit union now includes $20.5 million in subordinated debt (borrowed capital), $45.1 million in equity acquired from credit union mergers, and a $7.1 CECL transition reserve.  Without these non-operating additions to reserves, Credit Union 1’s net worth ratio would be only 5.8% versus the reported 10.2%.

But even the $88.6 million in UDE at June 2024 is misleading.  At yearend 2020 the credit union reported $16.9 million in land and buildings. Three and a half years later, June 2024, the total is just $2.9 million. In the same period the credit union reported $15.1 million gains on sale of fixed assets.  In the 18 months ending June 2024, the credit union also had non-operating gains on loan sales of $4.6 million.

It is not possible to determine how much of these sales are from Credit Union 1’s own assets or from the loans and fixed assets acquired via mergers.  These sales amount to almost $20 million of the $88.6 reported UDE in June 2024. These are one-time events that are reported in net income thereby adding to retained earnings, but in fact are non-operating, one-off gains.

Safety and Soundness Questions

If these one-time gains are subtracted to show actual operating net worth generated from continuing operations, the net worth ratio from internal operations would be only 4.6%. Hence the credit union’s drive to raise external capital (sub debt) and acquire other credit unions’ reserves.  Its dependence on external capital and one-time sales raises significant safety and soundness questions.

Internal operations are not generating sufficient capital to maintain required net worth minimums.  For example, in the full year 2023, the credit union would have reported an operating loss of $429,000 except for the one-time gains on sale of fixed assets and loans.  Through the first six months of 2024, the credit union’s ROA is only .39% or just .23% without extraordinary gains.  (all data from NCUA tables)

The financial results are in even steeper decline than what is presented.  If one considers the impact of adding merged shares and loans from the preceding four quarters prior to June 2024, there are critical balance sheet trends.  These five mergers added approximately $210 million in loans and $346 million in shares to Credit Union 1’s balance sheet.  Without these external gains, the credit union’s decline in outstanding loans for the 12 months ending June 2024 would have been $288 million or 24%.  For shares, the falloff would be $73.3 million or a negative 5.5%, not the 4.6% increase reported.  The credit union also relies on $35 million in external borrowings for funding.

Since converting to NCUSIF, the credit union has reported growth and acceptable ratios only through the acquisition and then sale of fixed assets and loans, and using the free transferred capital to maintain its required net worth.

What to Do About a Runaway Credit Union?

 

Once NCUSIF-insured in 2022, Credit Union 1 has been on a merger and marketing binge which is hiding serious financial performance shortcomings.

In all credit unions the Board, as a group, holds the direct, legal fiduciary responsibility for the performance of the credit union. The Board members approve all policies and hire the leadership. The buck stops with the Board members – all of them.

This is especially true in Illinois which has an unusual provision in the state act that allows the board to collect proxies from all its members, thus giving the board full decision-making authority in all areas, including mergers.

This is the reason for the extended proxy explanation in the Notices of Merger of the five Illinois chartered credit unions which reads in part:

Illinois permits voting on merger proposals only at the meeting or by proxy.  If you do have a proxy. . . you may do nothing, and the board will vote in favor of the merger in your sted. . . If you have a proxy on file, to vote NO you must revoke that proxy by giving written notice to the board secretary. . . and then assign a new proxy to an attending member. 

This is why all mergers of Illinois’ state-charters are reported as virtually unanimous.  The process also puts a higher standard for due diligence and fiduciary responsibility on board members as they are now acting directly for the member.

There have been several recent class actions against credit unions around improperly disclosed overdraft fees and cyber breaches.  When merged Credit Union  1 members confront the reality of losing their independent cooperative some may be deeply upset. With their board’s unilateral actions and failures to document their duties of care and loyalty, these transactions could become fertile ground for such actions.

Where Are the Regulators?

Except for the several federal charters merged, initial approval is by the state as Credit Union 1 is Illinois chartered.  Most of the credit unions merged in MI, WI, GA, IN and IL are state chartered.   All the data cited above is in public call reports and in multiple year analysis formats on NCUA’s website.

The trends for Credit Union 1 are clear, the extraordinary payments to CEOs presented in the Notices, the copy-book wording in the Notices all the same, and the vigorous public marketing communications easily reviewed for this nationally aspiring credit union.

NCUA routinely signs off on all mergers even those characterized by extraordinary self-dealing (eg. CEO contracts with change of control clauses), no clear business logic or member benefit, and Notices with misinformation, disinformation and missing critical facts for any member to make an informed vote on the issue.

There are indications that this hands-off response is the NCUA staff and board’s preferred laissez faire policy. The outcome is fewer credit unions by encouraging smaller credit unions to merge with larger ones driven by monetary payouts  to achieve their policy of industry consolidation.  But of course there are no asset limits as recent merger announcements have demonstrated.

The explanations for this dual chartering supervisory failure are wanting.  In some instances, it may be a repeated failure by staff to do any elemental analysis. To my knowledge, there has never been a regulator “look back” to see if any of the merger commitments were followed up—even in a situation involving $12 million in members’ capital diverted to the merging CEO and Chair’s newly organized non-profit.

Regulators appear to lack a common sense understanding of events, not wanting to see or address the obvious conflicts of interest and board fiduciary failures.  They thereby become part of the problem, abetting the worst aspects of cooperative leadership.

The result is no regulatory guidance or even backbone to stand up for members‘ interests or rights.  There is no director-board check and balance on CEO’s ambitions or performance.  And no regulatory effort to hold accountable those credit union CEOs who use their positions of power and institutional wealth to take advantage of the member-owners of acquired credit unions.

A System Circling the Political Drain?

Instead of expanding member economic opportunity, credit unions are imitating the tried and profitable capital market efforts to roll up their smaller locally focused brethren though payoffs and the rhetorical promises of better service through—even if only virtual.

Credit Union 1’s “purchased members” have lost the heritage and identity their cooperative predecessors passed on to them.  Trust and loyalty earned over generations is gone.  Members will vote with their feet when they learn there is no more advantage to being with Credit Union 1 versus dozens of other online financial offerings just as easily accessed.

Credit Union 1 has maintained its regulatory financial requirements only by acquiring other credit unions’ capital reserves, one-time sales of fixed assets and loans, closing local branches and letting employees go, and borrowing sub debt capital.  These are efforts to buttress its balance sheet and cover its inability to earn an acceptable return on its own assets for its member-owners.

This practice will eventually be found out, the mergers will end. and the credit union’s safety and soundness will be much more closely scrutinized.

However, in the meantime, eleven local credit union charters are destroyed, their professional and community leadership roles ended, members’ long-time relationships to their credit union dissolved and the industry’s reputation put at political risk.

As Credit Union 1’s financial short comings become increasingly apparent, their external relations with Notre Dame athletics, the U of  I Chicago campus, the new WCC partnership and Tinley Park Amphitheater will be in jeopardy.  So too the industry’s public image.

I believe Credit Union 1’s actions are a threat to the future of the cooperative model.  Every system has “bad actors.”  That is why there are regulators. When directors fail in their fiduciary roles, and supervisors abdicate their appointed oversight responsibilities, the system’s integrity is at stake.

When other credit unions remain silent, state regulators default in their oversight, and NCUA  appears unconcerned about the consequences of these events, it is only a matter of time until cooperatives forfeit their  unique role in the American economy.

And should that day of reckoning come, thousands of credit unions  trying to do the right thing will be end up in the same reduced status as their rogue colleagues.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Join or Die: Credit Unions, Social Capital and Democracy

A 2023 documentary film’s message puts credit unions right at the center of our current political angst.

The film is Join or Die. ( this is the 3 minute trailer) It is based on the work of social scientist Robert Putman who in 2000 published a book called Bowling Alone.   It documented the decline of local organizations that create the connections on which individuals built their trust in and sense of community.

The author calls this foundation of mutual confidence and relationships “Social Capital.”  In his analysis,  these organizational connections have real value.

The film updates this  decades long continuing trend of increasing social isolation.   He believes the loss of local networks has contributed to the decline of confidence in American democracy.   For it is in our connections with multiple organization that we develop awareness of mutual obligations and the common good.

The Credit Union Example

The cooperative movement, and especially credit unions, were founded with social capital.  Unlike other profit making firms, only minimal shares were pledged by organizers to receive a credit union charter.  The Field of Membership was the existing external network that provided the connections giving a new charter its mutual  support and market focus.

The net worth or financial capital requirement was a flow concept.   Either 10% or 5% of revenue had to be set aside into reserves until a certain ratio of net worth to risk assets was attained.

In the 1998 Credit Union Membership Act this “flow” concept of capital adequacy was replaced with a “stock” measure–that is the ratio of net worth to assets.  This financial point in time definition was expanded by the 2022 imposition of a risk-based capital.  This raised the  well capitalized ratio from 7% to 9%.

The founding cooperative bond of social capital was replaced with financial ratios.  This transformation was accelerated as credit unions evolved their fields of membership into new groups, areas or criteria with little connection to each other.  Instead of established connections,  credit unions began relying on new brand creations and marketing to establish a their presence in the markets they sought to serve.

A Second Factor

As credit unions moved further and further from points of connection with relationships of trust, a second decline was in member-owner governance.   The annual meetings no longer featured contested board elections; rather the board nominated the same number of internally selected candidates as vacancies.  No member votes were cast; the positions were filled by acclamation.

This resulted in the erosion of any pretense of democratic governance.  Increasingly self-appointed boards grew further and further away from their members.  Credit unions were not alone.  Putman’s work suggests that over half of America’s social/civic infrastructure has disappeared since he first wrote.

As these foundational experiences of local connection are lost, individuals become more isolated. And with that feeling, so does confidence in the governmental process, both locally and nationally.

One can debate whether credit unions contributed to, or are just another example of, institutions caught up in  a fundamental transition of community relationships.   It is  certainly possible to find longstanding  successful credit unions still serving their core markets.  One indicator is a credit union’s name such as Wright-Patt Credit Union. The counter evidence would be examples where the institution has repositioned itself with growth efforts  based on leveraging of members’ financial capital with mergers or bank purchases.

The film highlights Putman’s analysis of what makes American democracy work.

It explains  why our traditional political process of compromise is much more difficult.

Finally he suggests what can be done about it.

While the film documents the loss of social infrastructure, there is good news.   As the trends are laid out, the film closes with the message, “You can decide to change history.”   The “financialization” of credit unions with their loss of a social capital bonding can be recovered.  But how to start?

Re-establishing Credit Union’s Social Capital Advantage

A recent communication from the Texas Credit Union Commission’s monthly newsletter provides a place to reaffirm this core cooperative asset.  Change comes from the top.  Here is an excerpt from their Newsletter that I believe directly speaks to Putnam’s concerns.

The Importance of Board Meeting Attendance in a Time of Rapid Technological Change

Critical to the long-term success of a credit union is an active, involved board that provides proper oversight of operations and a sound strategic direction for the future of the credit union. One of the keys to ensuring that a board is successful is regular, participatory attendance.

This is particularly true given the rapid pace of technological change and the need for partnerships with financial technology companies (“Fintechs”) to provide services wanted by your members. . . Management and the board must ensure that . . .the Fintechs chosen are a good fit for the credit union and the membership.  

Board involvement is important in Fintech selection and other important strategic decisions affecting your credit union. The issue of board attendance is a tricky one. Board members are volunteers with their own jobs, families, and busy lives to balance in addition to the voluntary obligations of serving on a credit union board. However, missed meetings seriously diminish the effectiveness of the entire board, and a director’s irregular or inconsistent meeting attendance could result in removal from the board. . .

It is important for board meeting minutes to reflect if a director’s absence is excused or unexcused. The lack of a record of an affirmative vote by the board is construed as an unexcused absence. . . Once a director misses . . . the prescribed number of meetings . . .there is nothing the board can do except to fill the vacancy with a new person within sixty days. . .

This Texas regulator’s message is a clear reminder of every board’s guiding role and responsibility, from NCUA’s three directors to the system’s smallest of credit unions,

This is an important leadership statement from one component of the credit union’s unique dual chartering system.  Board members should actively Join in their roles, or credit unions could Die.

 

 

 

 

Celebrating a Year of Extraordinary Credit Union Accomplishment

There have been pivotal years in credit union history, none more so than 1984.

NCUA and credit unions celebrated unprecedented market place, legislative and industry financial success.  NCUA issued over 100 press releases over the 12 months.  These announcements covered credit union performance, agency initiatives, and multiple press and political comments on the cooperative system.  Here is a very small sample, in date order, of these Agency communications:

Jan  4:   American Banker reports credit unions grow faster.

Jan 11:  CLF pays quarterly dividend of 9.0%.

Jan 16:   NCUA Acts to recover Penn Square losses

Feb 15:  Credit Union Stamp Released in Massachusetts

Feb 29:  Symposium on College Student Credit Unions

Mar  6:   Financial Performance Reports a Hit

Mar  9:   NCUA Board to Meet in Tucson

Mar 14:  Credit Unions Fastest Growing Financial Institutions

Mar 21:  Callahan Testifies Before Senate Banking Committee on Insurance Fund Capital

Mar 24:  NCUA to hold First Conference of Federal and State Examiners

Apr   4:   Banking Committee Approves Capitalization Bill

Aor  18:  NCUA Names Koppin Supervisory Examiner of the Year

Apr  30:  Credit union Statistics for March

May 15:  NCUA Central and Regional Office Realignment

May 24:  NCUA Investment Hotline Unveiled

May 30: Credit Union chartered for Cannon Hills Employees

June 19:  50th Anniversary Celebration

June 22:  President Issues FCU Week Proclamation

July 18:  President signs Bill to Strengthen Insurance Fund

July 26:  NCUA 1985 Budget down 4.9%

Aug 21:  FCU Growth Surges at Midyear

Aug 31:  Two Per Credit Union Limit Placed on Las Vegas Conference

Oct  9:   Board Adopts Capitalization Rule

Oct 12:  Credit Union Membership tops 50 Million

Oct  22:  Credit Unions Most Popular Financial Institutions

Nov 15:   Board Slashed Operating Fee Scale 24%

Nov  23:  Seger, Breeden, Connell, Pratt Announced as Speakers at Las Vegas Conference

Dec 18:  American Banker Reports CU’s Growing Faster than Thrifts

Over 70 additional releases about key Agency and credit union events were issued.

All of these releases were amplified in the monthly NCUA News sent to all credit unions as shown in the samples below.

Additionally, NCUA created a Video Network in which the Agency communicated significant changes and events both internally and with credit unions.  Here is the brief opening segment of an hour long video introducing the recapitalized  NCUSIF.

 

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wsq74FkMrPQ)

Forty Years On and Context for Today

In 1984 there were over 16,000 active credit unions.  All FCU’s were examined annually overseen by six regional offices and a staff of just over 600.  The brief excerpts above of the Agency’s wide-ranging activities and reports are a tiny sample of the interactions and communications with the credit union system, Congress, the White House and the public press.

These events occurred in the third year of Ed Callahan’s chairmanship which began in October 1981. The NCUA board, Bucky Sebastian, Executive Director, and the Senior staff believed that public service is a public responsibility.  Senior employees were available, willing and eager to engage with all constituents.   And most importantly. accountable to those who entrusted their funds and members’ futures to the regulator for oversight.

A highpoint of this interaction was the December 1984 National Credit Union Conference organized and led by NCUA with the support of the credit union system.  It was a first for NCUA, and the largest conference ever held at that point in credit union history.  The event was a coming together to celebrate the cooperative system’s growing relevance and success.  And to share views about the future of the movement by all those who were dedicating their lives to their members’ well-being.

In 1984 as this year, there was a Presidential election.  Everyone remembers the outcome. NCUA’s leadership and its results in 1984 are a reminder that good government is also good politics.  An example especially relevant now, four decades later.

Lookback:  The Rest of the Story of Post Office CU’s Merger with PenFed

On December 28th, 2020 the 85-year, $35 million Post Office Credit Union (POCU) in Madison, Wisconsin ceased to be an independent charter. After voting, the 3,196 members and their savings, loans and abundant reserves (22% net worth) were transferred to the $26 billion PenFed Credit Union in Virginia.  (Source:  Seeking 25 Credit Union Faithful)

As detailed in The Problem We All Share, this merger proposal was too rich for the CEO to pass up:

“The Wisconsin credit union, chartered in 1934, has a net worth ratio of 22%, seven employees, one branch and serves all of Dane County. It is sound, well-run and lonserving. https://www.pocu.com/our-story

“In the October 15, 2020 Special Meeting Notice, the required disclosures show that the CEO will receive a five-year employment contract with an increase in annual salary to $125,000; the Vice president has a comparable gain.

“Select” employees will get a 10% retention bonus and all, a three-year employment offer. If either the CEO or Vice President terminates employment, they are eligible for one-time payments of up to $614,900.

“Each eligible member will get a one-time $200 capital distribution “if the merger is approved and consummated.” This would be from the credit union’s 22% net worth of $7.6 million and is estimated at only 8% ($640,000) of this total. (or in total less than the onetime payments to the CEO and Vice President). The remaining $7.0 million reserves transfers to PenFed as other operating income, that is free money.

“The payments are in plain sight, all contingent on a merger. The member notice provides not a single rate, fee or factual service benefit from this action. In the merger Notice the wording about the future of the single office location is vague: “PenFed intends to maintain the current POCU branch at. . .”

But now we know the rest of the story not just the branch’s status, but for the promised betterment of the 3,200 member-owners

The Rest of the Story

A week ago I received a text from a former CUNA employee and member of PenFed at their Madison branch.   He asked if I knew what had happened to the former POCU head office after finding an earlier post I had written about the merger.

He sent this picture of the branch’s status:

He had seen this sign when he visited on August 2, saying the branch would close forever on August 23, 2024 at 1:00 PM.  He had opened his account in-person and received no closure notice.  Two other members he knew who had opened their accounts online and also had no notice.

The land and building were owned by POCU/PenFed, the location right across the street from the main Post Office.  Presumably it will now be sold with PenFed booking a gain on the book value of the property.  This is the final act of what is commonly called “asset stripping” when a takeover occurs and the buyer keeps the most valluab;e assets and sells the rest.

The branch with blank signage.

Office equipment disposed, not donated.

The commitment to keep the office open, with its employees, local convenience and legacy relationships lasted three and a half years.  All the transition expenses of the merger, the payouts, the conversion costs to new systems, the termination of vendor contracts are “sunk costs.”  There is no enhancement to member value.

The merger itself ended all local governance and representation.  The closure of this local presence means no local oversight of investments or loans in the community, no further ( if there was ever any) of the promised $50,000 annual local donations , no employment and no participation in the credit union system in Wisconsin.

PenFed made no announcement of this closure.   In the quarterly call reports, it states its FOM potential is the entire population of the US.   So members in Madison now have a relationship no different from any other person who joins remotely.   And all they got from this deal was $200 to give up their extraordinarily successful 85-year charter.

The rest of the story is that PenFed acted in its self-interest to close a location that it must have deemed “unprofitable” and/or contrary to its focus on digital first members.

That is not what was promised.   But we now know, as we did then, that all the promises were nothing more than phony baloney.  Here is an excerpt from the  initial story link above:

How can one know this is not a considered, well intentioned decision to enhance members’ future? After all, the Post Office board of directors affirmed in their Notice that the merger is desirable for the following reasons:

  • Our board evaluated strategic possibilities to ensure that you our member, will continue to receive the full range of products and service you deserve.
  • We have been diligently seeking to find alternatives.
  • Only one option meets the full range of our objectives: growth of membership, expansion of product offerings, infusion of investment in IT cybersecurity, improved training and enhanced community service. . .PenFed is in the best interests of our members.

The director’s closing assurance of its considered judgment is given in these words:

“It is the recommendation of your Board that you vote “yes” to approve the merger. Please be assured that you are our valued member, and we have every confidence that you will be pleased by the level of commitment service, and value that you will receive from PenFed etc. . . “

If the financial facts were not sufficiently self-incriminating, these words  expose the dishonesty of the Board’s actions. There was no due diligence of PenFed that caused them to choose this from “ a range of options.” How do we know? Because these are exactly the same representations word for word sent to the members by Sperry Associates and Magnify, PenFed’s two most recent mergers. And the explicit “assurance” contained in the Notice, “we have every confidence that you will be pleased,” is exactly the same as in these two prior mergers.

PenFed assisted in the drafting of these notices. Since NCUA approved these wordings in the past, it will do so in the future, regardless of their veracity. NCUA endorsed Post Office Board’s assurance of due diligence even though there are no facts in the notice that would confirm this assertion. NCUA’s dereliction in ratifying these exact duplicates of alleged diligent representations of member interests, raises the question whether the agency has any clue about events.

Destroying Credit Union’s Moral Capital

So the POCU branch closing is nothing more than a continued pillaging by PenFed of the institutions whose leaders it pays to turn their members’ assets and relationships over to them.  It is a pattern repeated again and again in over two dozen PenFed mergers,  A  local, long time, financially sound credit union is merged via CEO inducements, and then closed and stripped of its best assets.

PenFed is one example, albeit a leading one, of credit unions preying on their own system.  This strategy undermines the whole cooperative advantage and model.  There is no evidence it is even a successful growth strategy for the continuing credit union.

A prior NCUA board member stated the agency’s  merger oversight responsibility as: “Our focus is on ensuring member interests are protected through the regulatory process.” That is obviously not happening.

I think a more accurate description of the situation is Mark Twain’s assessment of human motivation:

“Some men worship rank, some worship heroes, some worship power, some worship God and over these ideals they dispute and cannot unite–but they all worship money.”

 

 

 

 

Where Did Creighton FCU’s Members $13 Million Go?

On August 7 Credit Union Times reported the story of the merger, without a member vote, of the $66.9 million Creighton FCU with the $1.2 billion Cobalt FCU.   The source was not from NCUA, but rather a joint announcement by Cobalt of the NCUA approved combination.

In the twelve months ending June 2024, Creighton’s networth fell from a positive $6.3 million to a negative $7.3 million.  A total loss of $13.6 million, all of which was recorded in the June 2024 quarter’s call report.

What happened to cause this loss of over 20% of credit union members’ total assets in just 90 days?

Until this quarter, Creighton FCU had been doing business as usual.  Tom Kjar the President for 32 years had just announced his retirement. The credit union’s chair had posted a Credit Union President open position on LinkedIn with a salary range of $114-$152K.

On April 3, 2024 the credit union’s Vice President of Operations and Finance, Vorace Packer, died.  There was no public announcement of the circumstances in his obituary.  The credit union provided  no followup successor.

What the Data Shows

For a sudden financial loss this large that is not connected to asset write offs, all of the indicators point to an internal defalcation.

In the 5300 call report numbers NCUA posted at March ’24, Creighton’s shares total $61 million.  Just 90 days later that total is $74 million. The difference is almost equal to the the total loss of $13.6 million.  Of this sudden share increase, $12 million is in regular shares.

These numbers show shares were under reported a pattern often used to cover irregular transfers of funds.   Because the total amount is so large,  a single diversion of $500,000 or $1.0 million would cause attention or a cash flow problem.  It seems likely this diversion has probably taken place over many years.   For example at $1.0 million per year the cash outflow would be only $250,000 per quarter.

To accomplish this cash diversion and reducing reported member share balances, there would have to be two sets of books—the incorrect numbers for the auditors and examiners, and then the actual records so members would not see shortfalls in their account statements.  The fact that the under reported balances were totalled so quickly, suggests this second set was readily discovered.

There are other patterns in the data going back over ten years that should have raised questions.  For example the credit union would report positive net income for each quarter, but the total net worth did not change until the final call report filing for December.  The pattern of reporting “reserves” was changed in March of 2022,

Why Did the Members Lose their Credit Union?

NCUA has said nothing about its actions in this event.  Cobalt is the source of the merger announcement.  It is that credit union’s members who will cover the $7.6 million hole in Creighton’s balance sheet, subject to any valuation adjustments.

Cobalt reported, before this event, a $1.8 million loss for the first six months of 2024 along with negative loan and share growth.  NCUA said that there will be no impact on the NCUSIF from this event, so Cobalt members will be the rescuers.

Will there be bond recoveries for this loss?   What is the prospect of recoveries from where the funds were sent?  Who will pursue these and other recovery options?

The Most Important Questions Remain Unanswered

How did this apparent long-standing diversion occur?   Where did the $13 million of member funds go?

As a federal charter, when was the last NCUA exam prior to the finding of the defalcation? Was there an annual exam?  If so, were normal exam procedures followed?

The credit union reports employing the same auditor, Wipfli LLP, for at least the last five years.   Were their external CPA audits clean?  Did they or the supervisory committee do an annual  sample test verification of member share balances?   Were large disbursements of funds to third parties by the credit union reviewed?

Outside audits, supervisory committee verifications and NCUA exams are all intended to keep honest people honest.   How could these required processes have failed so hugely and over such an extended time period?

What was the CEO’s role—was there no division of duties, that is different persons authorizing transfers from those  initiating specific transactions?

NCUA’s Silence is Deafening

NCUA made no announcement of this event.   We have no idea if the board approved a conservatorship or the forced merger.   What options were presented, if any, to the board?  What was their role? Or, did they just delegate this action to staff elsewhere in the organization?

Why has there been no official explanation of NCUA’s role two months after the June 30 facts have been posted?

NCUA’s primary purpose is to prevent the loss of member funds. In this case there is a $13 million dollar shortfall between the $73 million in total shares and the purported net worth and assets to cover them.

What happened to the multiple supervisory oversight roles supposedly in place?   Until these apparent failures are understood and addressed, a much bigger problem remains.  Can the supervisory system charged with the responsibility and resources to oversee the industry’s soundness perform its basic functions?

Until there is transparency and full answers about this situation, the potential for greater difficulties is possible.  The NCUA’s silence about the members’ $13 million financial and charter loss at Creighton is a greater problem than this financial failure.

The critical question is whether the regulatory system’s processes are performing as intended?Who is willing to represent the NCUA in this episode to discuss what happened, why and any necessary changes from this event’s analysis?

 

 

 

 

Two Leadership Departures:  What They Suggest About the Future of Credit Unions

 

(Text updated in PM of August 28 from initial posting)

Last week and approximately one year ago in 2023, two leaders announced their departure from senior positions of organizational responsibility.

CEO Susan Conjurski’s merger announcement  was in the now familiar language of the required merger Member Notice. In this case there were two disclosures due to  the simultaneous combinations of her dual oversight of both credit unions.  Here is the wording from the first member Notice:

NCUA Regulations require merging credit unions to disclose certain increases in compensation that any of the Merging Credit Union’s officials. . . (who) have received or will receive in connection with the merger above a certain threshold. The following individuals are eligible to receive such compensation, which is reasonable and commonplace in the financial services industry:

Susan Conjurski, President/CEO

  • Ms. Conjurski will continue employment as the Continuing Credit Union’s Vice President of Strategic Initiatives under a five-year employment agreement and will be eligible to receive a one-time retention bonus of (gross) $14,000 (less lawful deductions) if she remains with the Continuing Credit Union for at least 6 months after critical post-merger information technology systems integration.
  • Ms. Conjurski, President/CEO of Printing Industries Credit Union, serves simultaneously as the President/CEO of both Printing Industries Credit Union and Pacific Transportation Federal Credit Union. The members of Pacific Transportation Federal Credit Union are also voting on a merger with Credit Union of Southern California. Ms. Conjurski does not have a supplemental retirement plan with either Credit Union. To reward her meritorious service and to retain her services going forward, as part of our Credit Union’s merger, Ms. Conjurski will receive a Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan (SERP) with a maximum of $300,000 after five years of employment with Credit Union of Southern California.

While not connected to this merger, Ms. Conjurski will receive a SERP in connection with the merger of Pacific Transportation Federal Credit Union and Credit Union of Southern California with a maximum of $700,000 after five years of employment with Credit Union of Southern California. Ms. Conjurski would be eligible for a reduced benefit if her employment is terminated for Total Disability and she would forfeit benefits if she voluntarily resigns or is terminated for cause before reaching the final vesting date in 2028.

  • The total maximum potential amount Ms. Conjurski will be eligible to receive in connection with this Merger is (gross) $314,000 (approximately $188,400 after taxes assuming a 40% tax rate). After taxes, this equates to approximately $885 for each month of service from Ms. Conjurski’s first day of service with Printing Industries in July 2020, to the end of the plan, thereby recognizing Ms. Conjurski’s combined 17 years of meritorious service to the combined credit unions.

Prior to these concurrent CEO roles, Conjurski had been Executive Vice at Arrowhead Credit Union from 1979 – Jan 2009, 30 years and 1 month, where she presumably participated in their retirement benefit plans.

The Second Merger Notice

Following is the parallel disclosure required in the simultaneous merger of Pacific Transportation FCU:

“Ms. Conjurski will continue employment as the Continuing Credit Union’s Vice President of Strategic Initiatives under a five-year employment agreement and will be eligible to receive a one-time retention bonus of (gross) $8,000 (less lawful deductions) if she remains with the Continuing Credit Union for at least 6 months after critical post-merger information technology systems integration.

Ms. Conjurski, President/CEO of Pacific Transportation Federal Credit Union, serves simultaneously as the President/CEO of both Pacific Transportation Federal Credit Union and Printing Industries Credit Union. The members of Printing Industries Credit Union are also voting on a merger with Credit Union of Southern California. Ms. Conjurski does not have a supplemental retirement plan with either Credit Union. To reward her meritorious service and to retain her services going forward, as part of our Credit Union’s merger, Ms. Conjurski will receive a Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan (SERP) with a maximum of $700,000 after five years of employment with Credit Union of Southern California. . .

The total maximum potential amount Ms. Conjurski will be eligible to receive in connection with this Merger is (gross) $708,000 (approximately $424,800 after taxes assuming a 40% tax rate). After taxes, this equates to approximately $3,012 for each month of service from Ms. Conjurski’s first day of service with Union Pacific Federal Credit Union in July 2016 (Union Pacific FCU merged with Pacific Transportation in December 2019), to the end of the plan, thereby recognizing Ms. Conjurski’s combined approximately 12 years of meritorious service to the combined credit unions.”

The Financial Payments and Assets Transferred

In May 2023 the merger with Printing Industries was completed. Pacific Transportation FCU’s merger was finalized in September 2023, both with the Credit Union of Southern California (CUSoCal).

If the reported start dates as CEO are accurate, I calculate she served less than 3 years as CEO of Printing, and seven years at Pacific, for a total of ten years. The combined bonuses and SERP funding are $1.022 million.  In addition she is given a guaranteed employment contract for five years at an undisclosed salary, presumably with ongoing benefits.

In return for this payment and five year salary, CuSoCal gains $97 million in assets ($67 million in loans), 11,000 members an $15.2 million in net worth.  This free capital transfer is after the Pacific members received a special dividend not to exceed $2.2 million.  The $1.022 million and five year salary are a small fraction of the real financial value transferred to the Credit Union of Southern California.

NCUA’s Western Region Director Retires After 37 Years at NCUA

In last week’s retirement announcement, NCUA summarized Regional Director Cherie Freed’s nearly four decades of service.

After serving as an examiner, Freed took the position as a problem case officer in 1991 and later became a corporate examiner. Freed then became associate regional director for the Western Region before being selected as regional director in 2016.

Chairman Harper commented:  “Cherie’s dedication to public service and the NCUA has been nothing short of exemplary. . . She excelled at building internal and external coalitions, she was passionate about meeting organizational goals and customer expectations, and she produced results at the highest level. Cherie has exhibited sustained excellence throughout her career, inspired others, and made innumerable contributions to the NCUA.”

What Unites These Two Leadership Resignations

What is left out of NCUA’s description of Freed’s 37-year career is any specific involvements with credit union events or contributions as she progressed up  the listing of increased responsibilities.

There were significant industry and financial events during her regulatory roles.  When she joined the  agency in 1987, NCUA insured 14,520 natural person credit unions. The corporate network numbered 39 federally insured corporate credit unions.

Today there are just over 4,600 credit unions a decline of over 10,000.  NCUA’s liquidity lender, the CLF, is dormant.  New charters are as scarce as hen’s teeth.

In that first year when Freed joined NCUA, the S&L industry still had its own insurance fund, the FSLIC, overseen by its own federal regulator, the Office of Thrift Supervision.  The system’s liquidity lender, the FHLB, predominantly served the S&L’s, even though it had been expanded to include other financial real estate lenders.

Today the separate S&L system no longer exists.  All of the remaining 556 “Savings Institutions” with total assets of $1.2 trillion are FDIC insured.  Their regulation is divided between the FDIC, the OCC and the Federal Reserve.

Both persons in the NCUA announcements above began their final leadership roles in California about the same time 2016-17.   By rule, Freed oversaw the two mergers and payouts described in the Member Notices above.

In both Member Notices there is misinformation, disinformation, irrelevant data and omission of vital facts–eg. the total dollar value of Conjurski’s new five year employment contract.  The credit unions’ member-owners were ill-served by this required regulatory review and approval.

Losing the Cooperative Future

The coop industry, unlike the thrift sector is not consolidating because of safety and soundness concerns.  Rather many of these mergers are driven by personal greed and ambition.  Pacific Transportation FCU reported 21% capital at December 2022 prior to announcing its merger. Printing Industries’ net worth was 11%.

Conjurski’s windfall was not an isolated event under Freed’s administration.  Another CEO negotiated a $1.0 million merger bonus.  In a separate situation the Board Chair and CEO diverted $12 million of member equity to their recently established nonprofit.  The intent was to use these members reserves to continue their veneer of public philanthropy even though they had given up all leadership positions.

The merger examples show that credit union leaders are not immune from the “animal spirits” at the heart of market capitalism.  Cooperatives were supposed to be an alternative to the self-interest that drives “free enterprise.”

This disease of self-enrichment now infects the cooperative body.  The regulators have failed to enforce their own merger rule.   The NCUA board and senior staff board appear to lack either conviction and/or the courage to speak to this usurpation of the members’ collective wealth.

And the money being transferred has created a whole sponsoring eco-system of enablers including consultants, compensation advisors, former NCUA employees, accountants and lawyers who grease the paths and fill their own pockets.

The Increase in System Risk

The NCUA board and the regional administrators signing off on these events are mute about these examples of blatant self dealing.  They pretend not to notice as these privately arranged deals are announced followed by the asset stripping of long- standing sound credit unions after the combinations are complete.

To see the increased risk, one need only ask whether the future of the cooperative system is likely to be more sound with ten credit unions in the $500 million to $1.5 billion asset range or one $10 billion credit union with a generic brand operating over multiple states and markets?

The answer I believe is obvious.   If one doubts this, just revisit how the S&L system totally collapsed.  It was not because of small institution failures.  And the largest failures were all sold to banks.

Ultimately this pattern of corporate ambition could end up in the full conversion of the cooperative system to their exact opposite–for-profit banks.   Why should credit union leaders  buy banks at a premium when they can convert all this free reserves to private gain?

Freed oversaw and approved these self-dealing events firsthand.   The irony of her 37 years of service is that in all likelihood her professional opportunity no longer exists for someone entering the agency today.

For in the next four decades, the trends are clear—there will not be an independent NCUA.   Credit unions will have become too powerful, consolidated and independent in purpose for a separate  agency to oversee what was intended to be a cooperative, member-focused tax-exempt system.

If a system can’t learn from its past and that of its financial brethren, it has no future.

Transparency: An Advantage When Properly Understood

Spent time earlier this week talking with people who work with a DC non-profit 501 C 3.  It is called Everyone Home DC.

It was incorporated in 1967 by an interdenominational group of religious leaders called the Capital Hill Group Ministry.  For almost six decades the organization has focused on the housing needs of those at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder.

Its Vision:  We support the holistic needs of individuals and families at risk of, or experiencing homelessness.  Housing is our starting point

The group’s website has five components, similar to many credit unions’ content, in an About Us section:  Our Story, Board, Staff, Careers and Funding and Reports.

I clicked on the Funding and Reports tab and found links to the latest five years of Annual Reports, complete external CPA audits, and the IRS 990 filings for nonprofits.  These reports provided an open and full picture of the group’s financial status, trends, how they are funded, and objective measures of their  community impact.

Overcoming shortages of shelter for low income individuals is one of the most intractable problems for every major city in America. The group’s reporting and disclosures give the reader confidence that the leaders know what they are doing and are accountable for their outcomes and responsibilities.

That confidence is vital.  For this nonprofit’s modest budget relies on government grants and private donations.  It is vetted by its funders. In 2023, the organization announced that the Bezos Day 1 Families Fund had granted them their first-ever multi-year, multi-million dollar funding.

Trust from Transparency

Transparency is critical to Everyone Home’s credibility.  it is a non-profit, totally dependent on external funding and engaged in an area of social need where work is never finished and endgame always distant.

It is an example credit unions who are dependent on member and community support might learn from.  Especially the posting of the latest five years of IRS filings, CPA audits and Annual Reports.

A  long-term practice of open and full communication with a group’s supporters is vital when hard times or unexpected challenges arise.  A foundation of trust is built through transparency.  It becomes the intangible capital (goodwill) that can be the difference between a successful recovery or a demise.

Sweeping a Problem Under a Cobalt Rug

Contrast this expectation with the events in an August 7th  Credit Union Times story of the recent merger, without a member vote, of the $67 million Creighton FCU (Omaha) with the $1.2 billion Cobalt Federal Credit Union in Papillion, Neb.

The Times’ story reports the credit union’s net worth ratio went from 9.09% at March 2024 to a negative 10.95% three months later at June’s quarter end.

In announcing the merger Cobalt’s explanation for the consolidation, per the Times, was the July 31 retirement of Creighton’s President/CEO Thomas C. Kjar.

One does not have to be a financial analyst or even a credit union member to know there is something dreadfully wrong for a deterioration of almost 20% of a credit unions assets in just 90 days.

Creighton was a federal charter, filing four quarterly reports per year and presumably subject to NCUA’s annual exam oversight.  It was organized in 1951 and operated five branches with 20 employees.

At June 30, 2024 its balance sheet of $43 million in loans and $23 million of investments appears normal, and not much different from a year earlier.  The allowance for loan losses is just $277K.

The one unusual item is a $12.5 million under miscellaneous expense (compared to $15K a year earlier).  This one time significant amount suggests a newly discovered financial hole due to misappropriation or other sudden loss event. That one entry accounts for most of the $13.5 million YTD loss, which eliminated all of Creighton’s net worth.

How can such a catastrophic loss occur under the agency’s supervisory nose?   I can find no NCUA announcement of this forced merger.  Silence undermines confidence in the NCUA’s examination and supervision competency.  It suggests there is something to hide.

When problems of any kind are swept under the rug, there is no learning by either credit unions or the agency from whatever went wrong.  This forced merger transaction deserves more explanation  than the FAQ’s of Cobalt FCU, the rescuing party.  An accounting is due for Creighton FCU’s members and to the credit union community about what happened and NCUA’s role.

Now Creighton’s 10,000 member-owners are left in the dark about their institution’s oversight and why NCUA  ended its existence.  Such an abrupt, unilateral and forced action can only increase  skepticism of a government agency about  its openness and responsibility to the public.

In the example of Everyone Home, transparency is critical to carrying out its mission.   At NCUA the opposite seems to be the norm.

NCUA has an obligation in  its supervisory role to provide its funding constituents the circumstances about any major failure.  This is the kind of event the agency is supposed to prevent.

The published call reports are the only “facts” available on this $67 million credit union’s closing. They scream for an explanation of this sudden 90-day catastrophic loss.

The agency’s failure to address its actions at this most critical junction in a credit union’s life, poses basic questions about its competence, not just its transparency.

NCUA’s Spreadsheet Merger FORM: What the Agency Gets and Member-Owners Don’t

NCUA has published a dynamic excel spreadsheet to be used with merger applications. It is titled Merger Related Financial Comparison.

Its purpose as stated in the first sentence: This comparison form can assist you in determining if you are required to disclose any increases in compensation due to the merger in the member notice. You are not required to submit this form in your merger application; however, you are encouraged to do so. The information you provide may help NCUA process your request more efficiently(underlining added)

Here is a copy of the form.  If it is too small to read, this is a link to a PDF.  There is no NCUA number on the form or other information, such as when issued.

What the Form Says

The instructions about  what compensation must be disclosed in the Notice of merger is answered with a question: Would the payment have occurred if the credit union were not merged?

The Form’s directions and simple examples plus the Agency’s encouragement to submit illustrate its intended use.  The spreadsheet is a tool to help credit unions game the system to conform with NCUA’s requirement that only increases of 15% and greater from all compensation need be disclosed to members in the official meeting Notice.

This limitation is completely contrary to the intent of Chairman McWatters’ when proposing the rule in 2017:

“the agency should require all merger solicitation documents to provide, without limitation, a discussion of any change-in-control payments and other management compensation awards and agreements, and that such disclosures are written in plain language and delivered to voting members in a reasonable time prior to the scheduled merger vote”  (Source:  Time to Talk about an Ugly Truth in Mergers.)

In virtually all mergers when  the institutional’s legal charter ends, all existing employment contracts, benefits, retirement plans will cease to exist.  Change of control clauses or immediate vesting options may occur in benefit plans.  The continuing credit union will rewrite employment contracts and conditions, including bonuses, responsibilities, incentives and benefit packages.

To fulfill McWatters’ intent, all of these renegotiated terms should be provided to owners whose approval is required for the changes to be effective.  The logic is simple.  NCUA requires this information for its due diligence and approval, shouldn’t the persons who own the assets and must vote on their future  management, also have this same data?

The Data NCUA Receives

The form requires that all current compensation  indirect compensation, leave, deferred compensation and early payment of retirement benefits and other financial rewards be entered on the form for the CEO and four highest paid managers.

Member owners receive none of this data.

NCUA requires that all these same areas be reported post merger.  The Member-owners receive none of this detail.  The only required disclosure per this Form is a single dollar amount if all these post-merger payments exceed 15% of the executive’s total prior to the merger.

Take the example of CEO compensation already entered on the form.  The CEO’s salary increases from $760K to $850K after the merger.  (A typical CEO merger salary?!) Adding more leave, this total increase of $92,500 (12.17%) does not have to be disclosed to members.  It is below the 15% threshold.  The member-owners receive none of this calculation or data.

Another completed example is directors’ and supervisory members’ compensation .  In this case the directors received $1 before the merger and $10,000 post.  But this change does not have to be reported. It falls below the minimum change of $10,000.  Another executive example shows a 400% change that is not given members,  but a 21% increase that must be.

In all these examples, the member-owners receive none of these calculations.

The form states clearly what is required and highly recommended  to be sent NCUA:   

Required per Part 708b of the NCUA Rules and Regulations: Board minutes for the merging and continuing credit union that reference the merger for the 24 months before the date the boards of directors of both credit unions approve the merger plan.“

“Highly Recommended: This comparison form and any employment contracts, retirement contracts or documents, executive session minutes, presentations, or any other documentation supporting the compensation amounts entered in the form.

The member-owners receive none of these required and highly recommended submissions of compensation and board minute details.

Why There Was a Merger Rule

When proposing the rule in 2017, NCUA staff analyzed many recent mergers and concluded that a significant portion were influenced by incentives paid to executives.

It is a human reality that those in charge of managing money can be tempted by self-dealing.  In the early years of state charters, prior to passage of the FCU act, some state laws prohibited managers and boards from borrowing from their own credit union.  Instead “central credit unions” were organized to meet those needs.

The NCUA call report today collects the aggregate number and amount of  Loans outstanding to credit union officials and senior executive staff (Account 956).  Section 4 Investments paragraph 11 shows the total of the credit union’s securities to fund employment benefit and deferred compensation plans including SERPS and other insurance.

Finally all state chartered credit unions are required to file IRs form 990 annually which details all executive and board compensation.  Federal charters have no such requirement-yet.

These disclosures are all  efforts for transparency about the compensation executives receive as stewards of others’ financial assets.

Smoothing the Paths to Temptation

Transparency in total compensation is critical to preventing the ever-present danger of acting in one’s self interest versus that of the member-owners

NCUA now withholds from member-owners, who must approve the life or death their chater, the most critical information NCUA requires for its approval in the first place.

Denying Members The Rights of Ownership

NCUA has taken over the role of the member owners.  Members are left totally in the dark about the scale of compensation commitments being entered into.  Instead of providing members with this same vital information, NCUA offers a spreadsheet to enable  credit unions to manipulate the very minimal disclosures now required.

NCUA is explicit about the facts it requires to allow the transaction to proceed.  But the members receive none of this vital information.

NCUA has preempted members’ right to make an informed choice.  The merging credit union does not have to “sell” its compensation plan outcomes to the members.  It just has to “sell” the terms to NCUA in private.

The credit union self-dealing that brought about the 2017/2018 merger rule update has not ended.  It has just been totally obscured and more critically, facilitated by NCUA.  The Agency seems powerless to understand and correct its supervision deficit over what is taking place.

But the credit union industry sees clearly.   When nothing meaningful is required to be disclosed, nothing is forbidden.  The members are kept in the dark. The ever-present temptations to cash out will only grow.

In case after case the member-owners lose control over their enormous financial legacies; they also have lost all their future choices.

These combinations will inevitably short change the credit union system’s options going forward.  They are wounds on the soul for why credit unions were created in the first place.

Ugly Truths: Mergers, Kickbacks and Apostates

The Ongoing Corruption of the Cooperative Credit Union System’s Ideals in America”  (with edit updates on August 9)

I have previously observed that  it doesn’t take an illegal activity to destroy a firm, an industry, or even bring harm to the broader economy.

I believe the credit union system is at a turning point.   Since the passing of NCUA’s merger rule in 2017/18, the amount of asset takeovers (AKA voluntary mergers) has only accelerated.  Some think this is a good thing.  I believe numerous examples prove otherwise.

According to Credit Union Times the numbers are increasing. The majority of second quarter 2024 merged assets in this latest update have nothing to do with safety and soundness issues:  The NCUA approved 46 mergers during the second quarter of 2024, up from the 26 consolidations that received the green light to consolidate during the first quarter and the 36 approved mergers during last year’s second quarter.

As discussed below some credit union CEO’s are “gaming” regulatory disclosure requirements to hide their significant personal benefits. Credit unions acquire sound, longstanding healthy credit unions through private deals which benefit and enrich the selling executive team.  The members are given nothing but future promises and empty rhetoric, most frequently, “bigger is better.”

The transactions increasingly contradict  any common sense understanding of financial equity or fairness for members.  The information provided members and approved by NCUA is meaningless for any considered owner decision.

The cooperative system’s unique purpose and public reputation are at risk.  These deals will be  seen as just more of the same wheeling and dealing as for-profit banks.   At some point these ongoing patterns of self-dealing will become the object of a business media story, a congressional inquiry or even consumer group action.

The good will and good works of the truly credit union spirited will be overwhelmed by the depredations of an ambitious few. The system may never recover from the consequences of these blatant examples of betrayal of the trust members placed in their “elected” board leaders and regulatory oversight.

In previous posts I have detailed cases from Exceed, Infinity, 121 Financial, Finance Center, and Vermont State Employees in which my analysis of the transactions made little or no economic or business sense-except for insiders. Members, who must vote any merger, have little or no power to object or even inquire. The process gives all the resources and media power to the incumbents initiating the deals.  Member participation is presented as a purely administrative step because the regulators have “already approved the merger subject to the member vote.”

A current Example: Member One FCU transferred to Virginia Credit Union

In last week’s post, I describe the members’ “rebellion” against management’s proposal to transfer all the assets of the $1.7 billion Member One FCU to VCU.  The opposition’s blog site was filled with multiple member voices against the change.

On July 30 after the vote closed,  Member One announced the result: 3,479 voted to approve and 1,404 against.  In the same release, the credit union stated it had become a division of VCU on August 1, or 24 hours after the vote.

Case closed or not?  Certainly, the two credit unions want to give that impression. However It is important to seek the truth apart from these two “facts.”  What other context is available about this event?  Were the members’ best interests truly served?

My first observation: the voting participation seems extremely low for this controversial action.  The  number in favor of the merger, 3,479 is just 2.3% of the credit union’s 155,000 members.   The total voters, 4,883, are only  3.2% of all eligible to participate.

This result means each Yes vote supported the transferred $474,000 of total assets and $44,560 of net worth to VCU.  That outcome would itself suggest the need for greater scrutiny.

Why was the turnout so low?   Were ballots sent to every member?  How was the process managed? By whom? How does this member participation compare with other similar sized or contested mergers?

The Opponents’ Efforts

There was spirited public opposition including a news radio interview.   The website Member One Vote No recorded over 80 member comments before being taken down.   These concerns  universally questioned the merger proposal.  A  Reddit link Member One Merger Cookies, is still active and provides a sample of the  many comments in opposition.

Members posed multiple questions about the $570,000 bonuses being paid to the the credit union’s five senior executives.  The members received nothing from their collective $155 million net worth and eight decades of loyalty.

The opponent’s Vote No site also included links to nine different VCU social media with postings by VCU members sharing multiple complaints about the acquiring credit union’s service, mobile banking, culture etc.  Did Member One’s Board do any due diligence prior to announcing the merger in January 2024?   If so, why was there no information about VCU’s business model or priorities, for example the reason for its recent decision to convert to a federal charter.

Twenty-Four Hours to End Member One’s Independence

My second question: why the rush to complete the merger in 24 hours after the vote ended, that is, by August 1?  The Notice and FAQs clearly state “There are no anticipated changes to core services and member benefits.  And, it will be 2026 before there will be operational integration.  In the meantime, there will be two operational centers.  No branches will be closed .

There are least two forms that must be sent to NCUA (6308A and 6309) both of which would take more than 24 hours, especially the combined financial statements, before a merger is finalized.

Why the speed to make this a done deal? The only effect is to remove Member One’s board and to give VCU immediate access to and full control of the credit union’s financial resources.  Is VCU that much in need?

The very low vote participation and the rush to close the deal points to the need for more information about what is really going on.

The Responsibility of Credit Union Directors

There are two sets of board members who oversee each merger event.  Member One’s board is very accomplished per their public resumes.   From the June 2022 announcement of new board officers, the leadership team presents extensive professional and Roanoke community experience.

The Chair, Joseph Hopkins, signed the Member Notice of the merger’s required meeting. He retired from a long career at Norfolk and Southern, has been on the Member One board for over 30 years and is a 50-year credit union member.

Penny Hodge, Vice Chair, retired in December 2018 as Assistant Superintendent of Roanoke Country schools after 31 years.  She is a CPA and became a Member One director in 2019.

A  new board member in 2022 was Tyler Caveness who graduated from Harvard in 2014  with an economics degree.   He is “founder and principal advisor at Caveness Investment Advisory, LLC, a boutique wealth management practice providing investment, income-tax minimization, and alternative financing strategies for the self-employed.”

Member One also appoints associate Board members. On May 23, 2023 the board announced three new associate members, all with excellent professional  and local credentials. These are brief biographical excerpts in the announcement:

Armistead Lemon has an 18 year career in leading independent  school education.

Mary Beth Nash is a local government attorney with 28 years experience representing private and public sector entities.

Rebecca Owens is Roanoke County Deputy Administrator, responsible for county’s financial administration and has 30 years in local government.

Why did these three experienced, Roanoke-based professionals support the ending of their local charter in a few short months after taking office?  The merger announcement was on January  11, 2024.  One presumes there was some preliminary discussion and due diligence by the board before this public decision.

It seems highly unusual these three experienced professionals would join an organization and then quickly turn around and support an end to their leadership role within just a few short months.  What role did they play?  What information were they given?

NCUA is very clear in its statements on the fiduciary role of directors.  From two 2011 letters by NCUA’s General Counsel:

“we (NCUA)also believe that fiduciary duties are properly owed to people, and not to entities. FCU directors must understand the people who are affected by the directors’ decisions and identify which people the directors are serving.

“The danger is that, if the directors are allowed to focus only on the credit union when making a decision – without regard to how the members are affected – the directors can justify making self- serving decisions, or decisions that serve primarily the FCU’s insiders, under the guise that the directors are simply doing what is best for the credit union.”  (emphasis added)

Failing the Members

There are no factual details or future commitments in the Member Notice that would meet this fiduciary standard for this merger.  Let alone Directors’ duties of care and of loyalty.  The only specific financial details are the bonus payments totaling $570,000 to five senior executives.  Of this amount, $250,000 is due the CEO, Frank Carter,  as of the effective merger date—which we now know was 24 hours after the vote closed.

Why did members receive nothing from their $155 million collective savings?  In any other institutional sale in the open market, owners would have received 125% to 200% of their book value net worth.  We know this because these are the routine multiples credit unions pay when buying banks.  Should not credit union owners be treated as well as bank owners?

From the very general information in the four-page Member Notice, the widespread member opposition published in social media, and the explicit, immediate benefits going to the CEO and senior team, this merger seems contrary to any reasonable understanding of fiduciary responsibility by the board and executives of Member One.

They not only failed the 155,000 member owners but also the greater Roanoke community and the eighty-four year legacy of prior generations that contributed to creating this $1.7 billion local institution.

The Other Board of Directors: NCUA

NCUA’s rule 708b provides the process for the Agency’s monitoring and approval of  every step of the merger process.  The agency’s merger checklist has 21 areas for potential submission and seven required forms.

The update of the rule was announced during the GAC conference in February of 2017 in response to published examples of merger self dealing and outright solicitations.  Chairman McWatters’ intent is quoted in this report of the merger landscape by Frank Diekmann in his CUToday analysis, Time to Talk About an Ugly Truth in Mergers:

McWatters: “The agency should diligently work to preserve small credit unions, as well as minority- and women-operated credit unions.  

“In addition, the agency should require all merger solicitation documents to provide, without limitation, a discussion of any change-in-control payments and other management compensation awards and agreements, and that such disclosures are written in plain language and delivered to voting members in a reasonable time prior to the scheduled merger vote.”

Since that speech, and the passage of the rule  Diekmann’s Ugly Truths have only gotten worse and disclosures minimized.

Member One’s merger is just the most recent example. No member owner, let alone an NCUA examiner,  RD or board member could make an informed judgment about this merger proposal with the information in the four-page Member Notice.

If any credit union had provided this level of detail to purchase a bank or by organizers to start a credit union, the request would have been summarily rejected.  Yet that is all the information credit union owners were given.

NCUA’s In Loco Parentis Merger Oversight

The impact of NCUA’s rule has been to put the agency’s judgement and fact review in the place of the members’ ability to make an informed decision.  Most of the information required by NCUA in its 21 point checklist is not shared with members.  For example, its review of the prior 24 months of board minutes are not disclosed along with multiple other filings.

NCUA then sends its approval of the Member Notice with its limited information which includes the date of the special meeting and ballots to vote.  Absent are any of the details NCUA used to approve the application and Notice.

Moreover, the Agency has provided an easy work-around spreadsheet to help determine what must be disclosed, if anything, about compensation commitments.  This is completely contrary to former Chairman McWatters’ statement of “without limitation” disclosures.  In essence, NCUA shows credit unions how to “game” its own disclosure rule.

Self-dealing by those who lead the organization, oversee the entire process and control all resources to communicate with members was the number one priority addressed in the 2018 rule.  Unlike state charters which must file IRS form 990 detailing board and executive compensation annually, FCU’s are not required to file or disclose any compensation data to anyone at any time.

The agency’s excel spreadsheet with sample entries helps to determine what portion, if any, of future compensation must be disclosed. Here is the form that credit unions can submit to show compliance or not, along with a required certification of No Non-Disclosed Merger-Related Financial Arrangements.

Future compensation is what the whole rule was intended to address, including conversions of previously funded SERPS and other benefit plans.

Why should NCUA be able to review this form, but not members?   In the Member One Notice only merger related bonuses of $570,000 were revealed.  However the credit union reported over $32 million in SERP and Employee Insurance Benefits in its June 2024 call report balance sheet that will either vest or be distributed under change of control clauses—but there was no disclosure of where those funds now go.

Reporting only merger related bonuses does not begin to reveal the compensation related commitments to senior employees in the merging credit union.  Most will enter into new employment contracts with the continuing credit union that are guaranteed years into the future versus being at-will positions.

To illustrate this under reporting, NCUA recently approved a merger that disclosed to members only $900,000 of bonus or salary increases for the five senior employees.  However, because the credit union was a state charter and the lengths of the new contracts were disclosed, the actual guaranteed payments were closer to $9.4 million for the  highest compensated employees.

This is how the disclosures of self-dealing are “gamed.”  NCUA has inserted its review in place of providing  essential information to the members for their decision making.  Members receive no facts, only rhetorical promises or future assurances.  In Member One’s case, this motto was “Bigger is Better” an assertion easily  contradicted by the diverse loan growth and ROA performances as of June 2024 reported by the top ten credit unions.

The Shortcomings Of the Merger Rule and an Easy Solution

There are two other serious information shortcomings in the merger disclosures.  Nothing is required to be shown about the continuing credit union’s business model, priorities, plans or culture.  In this case VCU’s social media posts suggest some potential cultural and operational issues.

If members are transferring the future management of all their assets to another organization, shouldn’t that organization’s plans and leadership intentions be part of the disclosures, even including the compensation of the continuing executives.

Voting by members in a merger is not about protecting their individual savings and loans.  If members don’t like the outcome, they can withdraw and go to another institutions.

Rather the voting is about the transfer and full control of all the assets, tangible and intangible created in a credit union’s long history, to a third party.   Now there is nothing required to be disclosed about the new organization’s taking over these accumulated resources except a summary balance sheet and income statement that is already available from call reports.

A second problem is that the voting process is deeply flawed.  It has the appearance of democracy and one person one vote.  In this case 97% of members did not vote on the future of their own credit union?  Why?

Moreover, the entire voting process and institutional resources are in the hands of one party which has a vested interest in the outcome.  Members who oppose have no way to easily contact other members, there are no resources for marketing or outreach. The credit union executives control all the messaging with its FAQ’s and in this case, free Oreo cookies.

This is not a democratic election process.  It is a monopoly managed by those in power who control all the variables in the very short time frame in which the messaging and balloting is done.  To end a charter should require a minimum number of members to vote, at least 20%, and provide a process for opponents to have access to members.

And the easy solution:  Require every voluntary merger where the dissolving credit union has 7% net worth, to issue a public RFP for bidders and that there be a minimum of two proposals received.

RFP’s are a routine process in virtually every consequential credit union decision including technology choices and even the hiring of consultants who submit proposals in response.

NCUA should lay out the minimum RFP contents and then review the numerous responses.  The credit union board has the data for why one option was chosen over another to recommend to members.  Here is how the process works in a good merger.

The Apostates

The word apostates refers to someone whose actions or inactions, suggest they have totally abandoned or rejected their core beliefs or principles.  Or maybe have no settled ones at all.

In this example of Member One’s executive suite and board’s professional credentials, the public record of merger disclosures versus  the aspirations presented on the credit union’s website, all combine to give the impression these leaders abandoned whatever belief they had in their 84-year old credit union. Rather it was the members whose voices spoke up for the credit union while those in leadership sold out. (See one example at end.)

The role of NCUA’s three person board is also critical.  What is their understanding of the  cooperative charter?  How is it different from banks, other than the tax exemption?  What are the role and rights of member-owners?   What does democratic governance, one person one vote entail, when board elections are rarely held?  When only 3% to 4% of owners vote on the continuance of their independent charter, how meaningful is this process for mergers?

If the board believes the proper policy is letting the free market work its will versus setting regulatory boundaries, why is there no support for actual transparent market solutions?   Why do bank owners reap rewards when bought by credit unions, but credit union owners receive nothing when control is transferred to a credit union third party?

Chair Harper, Vice Chair Hauptman and newcomer Otsuka have either turned a blind eye or have no problem with senior executives capitalizing on their positions for self-enrichment-and the members left holding an empty bag.

NCUA’s current board has taken no action on the growing number of examples where the fiduciary duties of all decision makers to protect members’ best interests have clearly fallen short of the clear standard presented by its General Counsel.

In the end this benign neglect will erode the financial and reputational foundations of the cooperative model.

Creating An Unsound Cooperative System

Ultimately this intentional or unintentional fiduciary  abandonment by all parties will only spawn greater and greater incidents of insider sell outs in the pursuit of growth and greed.  The result is  more and more risk put into fewer and fewer baskets.

This increasing concentration decreases the traditional advantages of local relationships and stability and reduces overall financial and business diversity within the credit union system.  The soundness of the system is narrowed; the variety of business models is reduced; and the traditional credit union advantages of local knowledge, control and earned loyalty are lost.

The unique design of democratic member-owned financial alternatives serving their communities faithfully over generations is sacrificed on the altar of bigness.

The cooperative model has been turned upside down.  It no longer serves members interests first, but rather the personal ambitions of the institution’s leaders.

One Member’s Voice

When those in governmental or private positions of authority forget where their accountability is owed, the prospect of member rebellion grows.  Who can forget the taxi drivers attending NCUA board meetings to lobby for member-focused solutions?

In the case of Member One, a person who served the credit union in leadership posted his logic for why this merger was not in the members’ interest on NCUA’s website.  When posting comments NCUA “will review, redact and post submitted comments” and “also reserve(s) the right not to post a comment that we believe is false, egregious, or unrelated to the proposed merger.”

Sometimes we call these critics prophetic.  When current leaders forget to whom their duties of care and loyalty are due, this comment presents a well reasoned, informed appeal for a return to core credit union principles.

The following is what this member “sees” versus what those in positions of authority  choose to ignore:

I, Dwight Holland, MD, PhD STRONGLY OPPOSE THIS MERGER AT THIS TIME as a former 7 year Supervisory Committee Member of M1FCU, and 2 years as a successful Chair of that Committee. My background:

I was on the Supervisory Committee of M1FCU from 1996 to 2003, with the last 2 years as the Chair. So, I know what I am talking about regarding Credit Union matters.

I was also the guy that pushed hard in 1996 to get on-line banking into the Credit Union when some of our Board Members weren’t sure what a domain name was, or why we should do this. So, I AM NOT opposed to change and adapting when necessary or it makes sense for our members.

The reasons I am opposed:

1. We lose LOCAL CONTROL and influence in the governance of the Credit Union because we are being swallowed by a bigger fish. The smaller fish in the pond of merger always loses its identity, culture and influence with time, despite promises by the Board and CEO of both Credit Unions.

2. We are a HEALTHY, overall well-managed credit union that has grown to around 1.6 Billion dollars. Why surrender this LOCAL achievement and control to a financial entity in Richmond?

3. MemberOne started out as the N&W Credit Union, and grew with our own economy, mergers and healthy acquisitions of struggling credit unions in a non-predatory way. That rich history and legacy will disappear with this merger into the mists. As member number 4404 that started as a 6 year old, I personally don’t like that notion. I can see people in leadership, and talk to them directly, and they will listen. Having control going to Richmond will dilute that “personal touch” dramatically.

4. I am the Treasurer of a state-wide Military Organization that uses a national credit union (over 10 Billion in size) for its banking purposes. Trying to get help with such a large organization is just like dealing with a large bank. It is tedious to get anything done, when something doesn’t go well, it took me and national level leaders in our organization over 1.5 years to get a very simple, but critical thing settled. The larger an organization is, the harder it is to get through the layers of bureaucracy. Staff sometimes in large orgs just doesn’t “need” to care about you for their performance reviews. That’s not true for more locally controlled orgs.

5. As M1FCU member, we often give forbearance to our friends and neighbors regarding loans and the like if they as for it, and work with them to help. Larger, more distant Credit Unions, cannot, and generally will not do this to the extent that a well-run locally controlled one will.

6. There are more reasons not to merge that relate to insurances, benefits, control of wages locally, etc, but I’ll let others deal with those.

The “incentives (for executives) to stay” at the end of the meeting notice seem extraordinary – why is such an incentive needed? There would certainly be others available to hire who are well qualified should these people choose not to stay.

Well more than a half million dollars is being promised to these five individuals! That amount would best serve members in so many other ways: beefing up certificate and savings rates or assisting those who need loans, for example, would certainly serve the members better than this huge amount flowing into individual pockets.

I do not see numbers that benefit members of the credit union except those receiving incentives to stay. Respectfully, there is no way those employees are worth that much to stay. How much would the rest of the members receive to stay rather than to take our business elsewhere? I see no way this merger benefits the members except the 3 or 4 mentioned in the letter we received.