May 1: Time for a MayDay Call for Rule of Law and a Popular Uprising

America is not living in a normal period of federal governmental conduct.  Trump’s largest campaign donor ($275  million) Elon Musk was given a non-legislative, non-elected temporary position. Thus informally  empowered,  his DOGE teams have gone into every federal government and some non-governmental organizations to mandate staff and program cuts.

These cuts and program closures are of Congressionally authorized programs and spending.  This is a pure power play with no oversight, accountability or  any formal authority.

It is total power without limits. In a democracy those who are appointed or elected to positions of power are called leaders.  In an authoritarian government, these individuals are called rulers.

A Fight for the Cooperative System’s Integrity

On April 16 President Trump removed the two Senate confirmed democratic members of the NCUA board. Only Chairman Hauptman, a republican whose term ends this August, remains.  There was no reason given in the firing email. Sue me if you don’t like it.  And both fired members have filed suit in federal court.

The power of both law and precedent suggest this action is illegal.  It raises substantive questions about NCUA’s authority and future.  The bottom line is credit unions are in a fight for the financial and legal integrity of their system.

Some credit unions will want to wait and see what happens before acting.  Others will delegate the burden and pay someone else to chart the way forward.  Many will just go on with business as usual.  With all the uncertainties in DC the assumption is that NCUA is at best pre-occupied, or at worst NCUA won’t dare buck Trump’s deregulation stance and stand up to credit unions.

One long-time reader suggested another approach: There is no reason to stand by this board, or jeopardize your voice by association.  They were neither effective as administrators nor wise enough to see the fog of the last administration. .  .

Why not push for the quick organization of a new board and the forward progress it might bring.  In the very least be ready to work with this administration and keep the CU agenda clear of the fall out that will follow.

That presumes a democratic, participatory system.  That is not what we have as illustrataed by yesterday’s announcement of the larest credit union liquidation in at least six years.

The Unilever FCU  Liquidation

Here are the facts last published by NCUA about this sudden $47 million credit union liquidation announced by NCUA on April 30.

At December 30, 2024, Unilever’s total assets were $ 46.7 million; net worth, $4.1 million (8.95%), virtually no delinquency on a portfolio of which 90% is real estate loans.  There are five employees, a single office, and very high average share balances ($29,400) and loans ($58,502), while serving just 1,448 members.

No conservatorship was announced. Instead an immediate takeover with no announced effort to find a merger solution.  No facts or explanation for the los was provided except to say the credit union was insolvent. What caused this sudden loss discovery? Why the instant liquidation?

The absence of any facts or reasons for acting suggests another regulatory-supervisory failure that is just being expensed away with insurance funds.

It reminds one of the situation last July when NCUA suddenly discovered that Creighton FCU had lost 20% of its value in the days right after filing its March 2024 call report.  The newly discovered loss was approximately $13 million in a $67 million FCU.  The credit union was merged with Cobalt FCU. There was no NCUSIF expense.  And no explanation of where the money went.

In the Unilever case, Hauptman, a one-person NCUA board, approved the outcome.  There is no evidence in support of this action.  Zero transparency for the members and the public.  This is what one person rule creates.  Is Unilever just the first of a series of unilateral decisions by Hauptman?

NCUA’s Defense of a One Person Board

On April 18, 2025 two days after the two board firings, the agency published an internal staff memo on the current state of the NCUA Board.  The memo was unattributed and contained no statements by any NCUA person.  It was just an anonymous assertion with these points:

Please be assured that the NCUA has precedent and standing delegations of authority in place to continue performing all operational and statutory requirements under the authority of a single Board Member. No statutory authority, internal legal opinion or other objective fact was provided to support this “assurance.”

In support of this undocumented position, the agency referenced a purported past event:

“During the Bush Administration (2001–2002), Chairman Dennis Dollar acted as a sole Board Member. He held a Board meeting, voted, and took several actions, both administrative and operational. Chairman Dollar recently stated in an article  in CU Today, “The records are in place at NCUA from 2002 that clearly establish the precedent that the Chairman can act as the Board.”

This statement is the most problematic of all.  Immediately after the board firings, Dennis Dollar called them “unprecedented.”  But a day later he claims that his prior tenure is now the precedent to follow this unprecedented event (see same article).

However NCUA presents none of the “records” that Dollar says are in place and certainly references no legal opinion.

What is even more curious is that the official NCUA 2002 Annual Report page 13 states:

Board members confirmed

The highlight of NCUA’s legislative year occurred March 22, 2002, when the U.S. Senate confirmed JoAnn Johnson and Deborah Matz, both serving as interim appointees, to join Chairman Dennis Dollar to complete the three-member NCUA Board.  

According to NCUA’s public account, Dollar’s two colleagues were indeed present, serving as interim appointees. There is no mention of his taking any action to set a precedent for one person rule to be followed in the future.

Following NCUA’s circular reasoning in citing a former board member and then that person confirming it is OK to do so, NCUA closes its staff update saying:

“It is the NCUA’s long-held view that a single Board Member constitutes a quorum when there are no other Board Members. Chairman Hauptman and NCUA’s leadership are equipped with the required authorities to continue implementing the Administration’s priorities. . . 

The memo asserts an  anonymous long-held view with zero factual, no legal reference nor any public prior event where this opinion was expressed.  The long held view is  an argument made of whole cloth.

One could just have easily asserted that in any organization’s bylaws or chartering authority where a  quorum is required, the term presumes more than a single board member is necessary to conduct business.  That is a more reasonable understanding of the quorum requirement.

So instead of clarifying Hauptman’s authority as Chairman, Vice Chairman and board member, the three-in-one board situation now, the agency presents a shallow, undocumented explanation to the staff and the public.

What’s at Stake this May Day

The rule of law is at stake.  NCUA has become a basterdized agency with no apparent legal grounding.  Fire the board and turn the agency into  one person rule,

This is the reason for the Unilever FCU unexplained liquidation is so important.  For the most consequential action the regulator can take versus a credit union is to put it out of business with no due process or public accountability.

The action was intended to demonstrate we’re really in charge now.  It is the largest liquidation in six years or longer.  A first example of how  the agency now “will ensure America’s credit unions are safe and sound.”   And if this arbitrary assertion of power can happen to Unilever FCU, it can happen to any credit union.

Credit unions today are confronting a situation where the entity charged with overseeing the legislation and regulation protecting the system, is itself acting extra-legal, unable or unwilling to even defend its current board status.   In other words the agency which enforces the law cannot defend its own legal standing.

Where are the agency’s lawyers so quick to explain the agency’s legislative interpretations?  Did they challenge the firings?  Brief Hauptman?  Were there resignations on principle if there was an obection?

Every NCUA employee took an oath to support the constitution, not a specific person in power.  Where are those individuals of courage and character in the agency?  Silence is consent.  Consent is capitulation.  That is the end of the credit union democratic experiment, unless there is a MayDay uprising starting now.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

“Take Action Now”

That was the request of O Bee Credit Union President Andrew Downin’s recent letter to his members.

Dated April 18, two days after the Trump administration fired the two democratic board members at NCUA, I thought this was fast action.

The immediacy of the situation was different however:

We need your help. 

A proposed change in Olympia (WA) could directly impact O Bee Credit Union and the services we provide to you and our community. A last-minute amendment was added to Senate Bill 5794 that would impose a new tax on not-for-profit, Member-owned credit unions like O Bee. This amendment was introduced without any public input and ignores the real value credit unions provide. 

This new tax would reduce our ability to offer affordable loans, low fees, and financial support to our Members. It’s not just a tax on O Bee – it’s a tax on you, our Member-owners.

The email closes with this request:

TAKE ACTION NOW*
* This link takes you to a trusted website from our partners at GoWest Credit Union Association.

The letter ends with: Thank you for being a part of O Bee Credit Union. Together, let’s stand up for what makes credit unions special.

What Makes Credit Unions Special?

In this event, the credit union threat is from a change in the state’s tax exempt status. There is direct parallel at the federal level.

But threats to credit unions are more than taxation. Last week the Trump administration took over NCUA.  With a single board member whose term expires in four months, the agency will either bow to Caesar or navigate to keep member-owners’ interest first.

If the latter course is followed, it will need the support and engagement of the members. This existential threat may be harder to rally for member action versus opposing taxation,  No one is for taxes.

But it is critical to point out the NCUSIF logo on the credit union’s marketing materials represents a uniquely credit union designed and dedicated cooperative fund.  Even this email includes the words:  Federally Insured by NCUA.

During the Silver State banking crisis in 2023, the credit union community promoted their separate insurance fund as well as the differences in institutional structure and risk versus banks.

Many factors make credit unions special.   For me the most important takeaway from this communication is not the issue of a tax change or  the current Agency takeover in DC, but rather the request for members to act.

It is member involvement that will separate the credit union issues from the transactional lobbying circus in Washington.   O Bee does an excellent job communicating their credit union’s uniqueness in their monthly messages.

This corporate discipline to stay connected with members is a potent power.  This was the first but not the last time members will be asked to take action in the months ahead.

 

 

 

When Silence is NOT Golden

Learning when to speak up is an art in both personal interactions and leadership of a public agency.

Words are critical in times of crisis and uncertainty.  But the three NCUA board members  have embraced silence as their preferred form of leadership.

Emptying Out the Federal Government

Entire agencies in Washington and across the country are being dismantled and staff arbitrarily let go.  Every agency  including the FDIC, the FTC board  (an independent agency) and all those on which the public relies from the CDC/NIH, to the VA and Social Security are being taken apart.

These radical reductions are not about fraud or efficiency.  It is to break these agencies’ ability to deliver their basic services to the public.  Services approved and funded by Congress.   It is an attack on the core responsibilities of government and the citizens which depend on these services.

Where is the NCUA Board?

For at least the past year, the NCUA board members have been literally missing in action.  There have been extended member  absences due to medical or family leave.

Borad meetings have been routinely cancelled.  Scheduled meetings have had micro agendas such as updates on internal programs while the difficult challenges of credit union direction are ignored.  These chalenges include the growing spree of bank acquisitions and the pillaging of credit union member reserves by CEO’s in mergers,

Their inaction has been bipartisan.

The Current Uncertainty

This month the press reports NCUA has held two closed board meetings to discuss “personnel matters.”  It is obvious the agency must respond to the administration’s imperative for drastic staffing cuts.

This is an issue that affects every credit union and its members.  This is not about policy, but the abillity of the regulator to do its core job of examination and supervision.

In a democratic system, the ultimate arbiter of power are the people.  In town and city across the country individuals are rising up to protect their interests responding to the disabling of key government functions.

But no one is standing up for NCUA because there is nothing to stand up for.  No plan, no pending organization redesigns.  Total silence.

When the time comes for action to protect credit union interests, there will be no platform to defend.  The troops will have been off fighting for CDFI funds, or to modify the CFPB’s structure or a myriad of other potential changes sorted out in every other part of government.

Moreover all this time the industry will reserve its biggest efforts and in conversations with top leadership in government, protecting credit union’s federal tax exemption.

No federal government agency can save itself from a targetted effort by political leadership to tear it down.  Only the public who rely on these services can do so.   And it is happening.   Because the press and agency employees and former employees are speaking up in other purges to inform the public about what is happening.

But not so at NCUA.   This is not the time for board silence.  Rather united efforts balancing new realities with ongoing responsibilities should be presented as in everyone’s interest.

Where is that plan and the basis for credit unions and their membersto support it?

 

 

 

 

The Critical Role of Credit Union History Right Now

Recently I contacted the Library of Congress (LOC) to see if they had copies of Report on Credit Unions.  This monthly printed publication was begun in January 1957 and continued through the mid 1980’s.

Here is what the librarian found in the search of their records:

I am sending you the title page of the Report on Credit Unions published in January 1957–the only issue we have in the collection. I also noticed that it was cataloged as a monograph, not a serial. 

I ran another search in the Ulrich’s Periodicals Index using the ISSN number–I have attached the record from Ulrich’s as well. Ulrich’s shows a different publisher, but the original publication might have been bought at some point by CoVest Reports, Inc. listed in Ulrich’s. The serial appears to have been a bi-weekly newsletter which might be the reason it wasn’t collected by the Library.

I searched Google books and found the title mentioned in several publications:
Congressional hearing from 1963 which refers to volume 5, issue no.3, dated March 15, 1963 published by Reports, Inc., Kent, Conn.


In-plant Thrift and Loan Services by Banks and Credit Unions (1959) by Rudolf Modley – the name on the 1957 issue–cites several articles from Report on Credit Unions. 
 

That is the extend of the governmental records of the Report’s  “first draft of credit union history” published during  this consequential time of credit union expansion including the era of deregulation.

The Report was cited in Congressional testimony, linked above, as part of the debate during the President’s tax message in 1963.   The reference to the Report was not about taxation but rather the necessity for supporting quality supervision of credit unions citing an Illinois example.

The Absence of Historical Records

When attempting to write a brief account of Ed Callahan’s years as Chair of NCUA I learned there was no repository for trade association publications or the numerous private newsletters that tracked the industry prior to the era of online media.

CUNA Mutual had sent their records to the Credit Union Museum.   NAFCU when it closed down in 2024 apparently had no repository of their numerous magazines and weekly newsletters to chronical their founding in 1969.  Similarly I could not locate a source for CUNA’s weekly and monthly printed publications.  State league newsletters were similarly not kept.

I contacted NCUA to see if the 21 NCUA Video Network VHS tapes created in the Callahan era had been saved.  No copies could be found of these special reports which, among other recordings, included live excerpts of the first, and only, national examiner’s conference.  There were two hour long live recordings of sessions with examiners led by Rex Johnson and a Harvard Business School professor to enhance examiner analysis and supervision skills.

Why the Past Matters Now

History may not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.   At the moment NCUA leaders are confronting the challenge of becoming more focused and efficient following policy guidance of the Trump Administration.

In 1981/2 the Agency faced a similar challenge but for very different reasons.   The credit union system was in crisis.  “Survival” was the priority according to CUNA President Jim Williams when introducing new Chair Ed Callahan at the February 1982 GAC convention.

The broad policy agenda was for credit unions and NCUA to respond to the new era of deregulation.   For NCUA this meant a complete reorganization of the agency to prioritize field examinations and supervision led by the six regional directions.   The DC head office reduced the number of staff departments from 16 to 2, an Office of Programs and an Office of Administration.  The Executive Director, Bucky Sebastian, was also the General Counsel.

The recently created DC consumer examination team which planned to employ as many as 50 personnel was in turn transferred to the RD’s. Every examiner had responsibility for completing an annual safety and soundness and compliance exam for every FCU,

The result of this reorganization placed operational responsibility on the RD’s, not central office staff. It led to a reduction in agency budgets for three consecutive years along with the lowering of FCU operating fees annually.  The agency including the CLF and NCUSIF had been designed for the open competition in which the credit union system completely outpaced their banking and S&L counterparts for the decades to come.

The Relevance for Today

Instead of trauma and closed door board discussions, these 1982  changes were done openly and with clearly stated administration and policy goals.  The messages were delivered via the video network with the first tape a credit union panel discussing the challenges of deregulation.

Public board meetings were taken “on the road” with the first held in historic Faneuil Hall In Boston MA in 1982.  Weekly press releases covered both agency initiatives and credit union progress.

But finding the contemporary public record of these events is very difficult.  When the past is lost, or worse ignored, then the present is left adrift.  When there is no understanding of how past events, there is a tendency to believe that only the present matters.

When disruptions occur whether from market or economic forces or changes of administration, the tendency is to protect the status quo, the known.  This is the result of bureaucratic incumbency.   It is only human nature for those at the top of an organization or career to protect their legacy.

The best way to understand the need and inevitability of change is to know the past.  This is particularly critical if those with ultimate responsibility are not familar with credit union, let alone NCUA, history. That familiarity can not only provide lessons but olso hope that change is necessary for an even better future.

That was the outcome of NCUA’s 1981-1985 makeover.   One would hope it would be the result  in today’s NCUA leadership deliberations.

 

 

The Most Consequential GAC Speech in Credit Union History

NCUA Chairman Ed Callahan  spoke to CUNA’s GAC conference in Washington DC on February 8, 1984.

He urged his listeners to support the most vital change in the system since the passage of the FCU Act in 1934.

His title was Finish the Job.  He challenged credit unions to strengthen their NCUSIF insurance fund by backing legislation redesigning it using cooperative principles.

The talk is  11 minutes.  Ed provides an update on the state of the credit union system in one word, “fantastic.” He puts the current situation in the context of 75 years of credit union history.  He describes how deregulation is meeting the needs of the country’s changing economy.

An Advocate for Credit Unions

His closing is a call to support a Better Way for  the NCUSIF.  He asks credit unions to compare the cost savings under the 1% solution to the current two premium model.  And then to champion the change in a bill introduced by Senator Jake Garn.

The recording is from a cassette of the live speech with the video overlays added later.

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UcXPyUMtic)

This is an example of the profound change possible for credit unions when all parties work together to benefit members.

Tomorrow’s Critical NCUA Board Meeting:  An Opportunity to Demonstrate the Strength of an Independent Cooperative System

The prime agenda item for Thursday’s NCUA board is the NCUSIF’s year end audit and setting the NOL cap for December 2025.  The political context in Washington at this moment makes this  meeting critically important.

Will the public discussion reinforce the understanding of the Fund’s  extraordinary performance and its unique  cooperative design?   Will its decade long performance of insured losses below a basis point, confirm its critical role in credit union’s unique purpose in America’s financial system?

The Political Context

The 2024 external CPA  audit was released last week.   It continues to show the financial stability of the cooperative system and the strength of its unique deposit insurance model.

This track record  is especially vital in this time of an administration challenging all aspects of federal agency performance.  This includes the federal regulatory structures, including FDIC’s oversight. For some the NCUSIF’s functions appear quite similar.  Could its future also hang in the balance?

It will be vital that the Fund’s uniqueness be affirmed during this update.  Especially these three characteristics:

  • A unique funding model; Every credit union member contributes directly 1 cent of their insured savings dollars to the NCUSIF’s 1% deposit base.  This member-centric capitalization is a direct copy of cooperative business design.
  • Explicit statutory guardrails on fund performance: There is complete and timely transparent reporting marked by the annual  independent CPA audit and monthly public financial postings.   Statutory limits are provided on total balances and a dividend paid to the owners, when this CAP is exceeded. Premium assessments in the event of catastrophic events, are clearly defined.  Premiums have been used only three times in the fund’s 40 year history.
  • The right to withdraw. If a credit union changes its charter or insurer their accumulated 1% deposit is returned. All 1%  deposits are returned if NCUA ceases to manage the fund.

How Board members present the NCUSIF’s demonstrated financial success may be crucial to its continued independence, not to mention NCUA’s.  If credit unions lose their fund in a regulatory realignment, would the singular credit union system be far behind?

Key Performance Issues

We knew yearend 2024 financial outcomes would be superb based on the November 21, 2024 NCUSIF board update as of September 30.  The yearend equity ratio is above .302%  showing the importance of the NOL cap. If it had been at its longtime cap of 1.3%, credit unions could have received a small dividend for 2024.

Will the Board’s discussion of this and other topics be anchored by full transparency, supported by real facts and the historical record versus hypothetical conjecturing?

The fund’s effectiveness is not based on its total assets, but rather, as in all insurance underwriting,  its size to relative to insured risk.  For example, the allowance account at $237 million is set aside from retained earnings.  It equals 1.3 basis points of insured savings at yearend.  Only once in the past ten years have total cash insured expense losses exceeded reserve level.

Specific areas of importance for board oversight include:

  1. How will the NOL cap for December 2025 be set? This limit triggers a dividend when earnings raise the yearend ratio above this number. There was no data provided when the Board set the NOL for 2024.  It simply extended the prior year’s limit,  no analysis provided. Even the detailed assumptions used by staff in the prior two years did not support their 1.33% recommendation. Will  real numbers be provided with full details of any hypothetical assumptions? Or, might the board simply endorse the historical 1.3% cap used in the first 33 years following its redesign?
  2. The greatest internal risk to the Fund’s effectiveness is the management of its $23 billion investment portfolio. Since December 2022, the portfolio’s maket value  has been less than its book, that is underwater.   The portfolio’s 2024 full year return is 2.5%. The overnight cash portion yields  approximately 4.5%.  The below book term portfolio earned just 1.92%.

Yet the fund continues to invest long in November, extending its duration risk, at a time of a reset in what a normal yield environemnt may be.  To sustain the Fund’s equity ratio a yield between 2.5-3.0% is necessary based on 40 years of actual operating results. The critical topic is what will the board require to improve the Fund’s interest rate risk management and turn around this continuing portfolio underperformance?

  1. The fund’s transparency is critical to its public credibility and trust. The allowance account is determined using an “internal econometric model.”   The model’s details and assumptions should be included in the staff’s presentation.

The continued use of Federal, not private GAP accounting misleads, mischaracterizes and  distorts the fund’s actual financial standing.  The terminology and schedules used with the Fund’s accounts are totally irrelevant since the NCUSIF is not an appropriated entity.

Federal GAAP removes specific information accounts from the NCUSIF’s financial statements.  For example is the portfolio’s actual value $22 or $23 billion?  Where is the net income total?  Or  retained earnings?  These traditional GAP terms do not appear.

The federal terms and schedules used are not relevant for the NCUSIF and convey an incorrect impression that the NCUSIF is somehow a federally appropriated fund. Or red meat for an uninformed DOGE analyst.

At a minimum private GAP financial statements presentation should be presented alongside the Federal GAP.  For private GAP is how all three of NCUA’s other managed funds are presented.

I am looking forward to the meeting.   Every credit union should as well.

Uncertainty in Washington-What are the Options?

When I was a member of Ed Callahan’s team, he would offer two thoughts when evaluating uncertain situations:  The first was “Never say never, when talking about future possibilities.  The second was “What are the options” when working through a challenge.

Each day brings more Washington rumors, supposed plans, new faces and real events that have led to increased uncertainty for NCUA and credit unions under the Trump overhaul of the federal government.

Those who see changes as a threat to the independent co-op system are urging credit unions to prepare for battle, increase lobbying efforts and deploy new member engagement tools.  Others will go with the flow assuming they will be OK if they stay invisible as part of a herd of 4,500 institutions.

If a never-say-never event unfolds, how does one prepare for it? Are there options that should be ready to go beyond the standard lobbying or “fight back” efforts?

A Short Credit Union History

The most important means of acting as a check to an overreach or an unresponsive federal regulatory environment is the dual chartering system.

Credit unions were birthed and spread first in the state legislatures.  From 1909 until the Federal Credit Union Act passed in 1934, over 25 states authorized local and varied credit union charters.  These multiple state examples were the “proof of concept” that gave Congress the example to extend this unique member-owned design to all states via a federal chartering option.

But state innovation did not end with this beginning. Senator Proxmire in a 1984 hearing stated he received his first  real estate loan in the 1940’s from a credit union.  FCU’s did not have real estate lending power until 1978.  State systems pioneered the introduction of NOW (checking accounts) in Rhode Island and share drafts in other states before this transaction authority was given all financial institutions in the Monetary Control Act of 1980.

State charters led the way in deregulating rates and terms on savings years ahead of the DIDC and NCUA action in 1982. State options have had much more flexible fields of membership, CUSO investments and other varied business options.

State credit unions lead federals in transparency with their required annual IRS 990 reports.  These filings disclose director and senior executive compensation as well as listing all 501 C3 contributions and political donations, if any.

Dual chartering has been a source of diversity, change and responsiveness to local conditions.  The NCUSIF’s regulations, including the risk based capital requirement, impose a one size fits all accounting and capital model on a very diverse industry.

The Critical State Advantage

However, there is one option that keeps the independent role of the state system intact.  That is the opportunity, currently in ten states, for their credit unions to choose private versus NCUSIF deposit insurance.

At yearend ASI, the Ohio based deposit insurance company, covered the shares of approximately 100 credit unions with $23.4 billion in assets serving 1.4 million members.  Six of these insured firms have over $1 billion in assets; seven have less than $1.0 million.  The average asset size is $240 million.

Expanding CU Choice Across the System

Recently ASI presented a webinar as part of a campaign called CUChoice.  The focus was on Michigan credit unions to encourage their support for a legislative change to give  state charters a choice in their insurance coverage.

The full recording of the webinar is here.

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hP-QN8HazKA)

The slides present the advantages of ASI vs NCUSIF.  Points covered include credit union ownership, a member-elected board of directors, and the specific role of an insurer that is not a regulator.  ASI’s focus is on being a business partner with its credit unions in which interests are aligned.

Slides 13-29 are a presentation by CUNA’s long time chief economist Bill Hampel, now retired.  In his talk he discusses the advantage of a Michigan state charter and compares the performance history of NCUSIF and ASI from 2007 though 2013.  He directly answers the vital question referred to as the tall tree issue by showing how the two insurers compare in size to their single largest credit union. (slide 22)

Slide 29 is a detailed comparison of ASI’s equity to insured coverage ratio of 1.75%. to the NCUSIF’s 1.31%

More Than a State Charter Option

The choice of deposit insurance has benefits far beyond state charters.  The option enhances the vitality of the entire dual chartering cooperative model.  In those states with an option, Hampel presents data suggesting those states have stronger performance.

Having an option prevents NCUA from being a total monopoly and provides real time performance comparisons. For example, ASI financial audits and reports follow private GAAP accounting, whereas the NCUSIF in 2010 adopted federal GAAP.  This federal standard mischaracterizes the NCUSIF’s operations and distorts the NCUSIF’s year end financial position. Also ASI must comply with reserving requirements under both GAAP and state insurance regulations.

ASI’s most critical difference is You Do Own It.  The credit union elects the board and there is an appointed advisory group. The users have a direct say and responsibility for the management of their collaborative fund.

ASI has a performance track record as long as the NCUSIF.  That history had a direct impact when the NCUSIF’s financial model was redesigned by Congressional legislation in 1984.  The 1% deposit model, which provides the earnings and equity foundation for the fund’s financial stability, was a direct borrowing from ASI’s structure and experience.

By offering choice, ASI provides all credit unions a check and balance on the unilateral power of a monopoly insurer/regulator.  The choice follows the unique constitutional system of state and federal powers.  It rests on the cooperative values of self-help and collaboration.

No one knows what the future of federal regulatory and insurance systems will be under Trump’s administration.  Credit unions should further enhance their options now building on their unique dual chartering roots.

In all other areas of Americans’ insurance coverage-life, auto, health and many more,  the licensing and regulation responsibility rests solely at the state level.  There is no federal option-except for deposit insurance.  ASI is an example of this responsibility and choice that makes the credit union system more resilient and viable than any other model yet created.

Uncertain about outcomes at the federal level?  Act now because no one knows today what you might need tomorrow.

A Lesson from the Past: Could NCUA Be Reorganized Away?

While credit unions focus on the threat of federal taxation, there is another event that could end the independent cooperative system.  To understand how governmental agencies are reorganized, it is useful to review what happened to the separate S&L industry after a decade long series of industry and regulatory failings.

From an Inspector General Report dated March 2012: Title III of the Dodd-Frank Act sets forth provisions to address problems and concerns in the multiple agency financial regulatory system by abolishing OTS and transferring its powers and authorities to the FRB, FDIC, and OCC as of July 21, 2011 .

All OTS functions relating to federal savings associations, all OTS rulemaking authority for federal and state savings associations, and the majority of OTS employees transferred to OCC; OTS’s supervisory responsibility for state-chartered savings associations and OTS employees to support these responsibilities transferred to FDIC; and OTS’s authority for consolidated supervision of savings and loan holding companies and their non-depository subsidiaries transferred to FRB.

Prior to this 2011 transfer of supervision, chartering and examination, the separate FSLIC insurance fund had been merged into the FDIC in two steps.  The FSLIC was abolished in August 1989 and replaced by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). On December 31, 1995, the RTC was merged into the FDIC which became the sole deposit insurer for all thrift institutions.

The Presidential Transition Center describes one surviving regulator’s situation today: “The OCC is one of eight Treasury bureaus and has approximately 3,850 total employees. Headquartered in Washington, D.C. It has four district offices and a London office that supervises international activities of national banks. Operations are funded primarily by assessments on national banks and federal savings associations.”

Current numbers under OCC responsibility are  approximately 1.500  national banks and federal savings associations and 50 federal branches and agencies of foreign banks.

The administrative head, the Comptroller, is nominated  by the President to a five year term and confirmed by the Senate.

As of mid-2024 there were 556 surviving savings institutions.  There was no single regulator however. Supervisory oversight of their $1.2 trillion total assets was divided among the OCC-242, the FDIC- 278 and the Federal Reserve-36.

An  independent consolidated thrift industry does not exist today.  Depending on each institution’s charter history and scope of operations, regulatory oversight is divided among the three federal banking agencies.

The Relevance of History

A goal of the Trump administration is greater governmental efficiency. Combining regulatory agencies is not a new idea. Merging the cooperatively designed NCUSIF into the FDIC, closing the unused  CLF and transferring  chartering and supervision to a new Treasury bureau would seem a reasonable proposal-for some.

A New North Star: Faster Alone, Farther Together

How might a single OCC administrator view this possibility?  The following is from an exit interview with the acting OCC head during the Biden administration:

Michael Hsu, a longtime bank supervisor and former top Fed staffer, threw himself into what he describes as a dream job: running an agency full of examiners. The OCC chief was at the table as officials managed through a regional banking crisis and a crypto crash.

MH: I made safeguarding trust the North Star for all that we were doing…I feel good about what we’ve done.

I’m most interested in long-term, durable wins. I’ve been in government for 20 years, over 20 years doing this stuff. There’s nothing more frustrating than this kind of fleeting, pendulum-swing of announcements. . .

There’s a saying: Faster alone, farther together. I say it to my staff all the time, which is frustrating, because sometimes we have to slow down…But if you just do it alone, you can get the quick win, but then the next guy is just going to undo the quick win.

Responding to a Reorganization Review

To counter the inevitable suggestions for more coordinated financial regulation, the so-called level playing field, requires rethinking what is being communicated at every level about credit unions today.

Some areas for messaging might include:

  • An NCUA led by informed and articulate leaders presenting the contributions and role of credit unions and cooperative design to the pubic and Congress;
  • An industry performing with stable and successful financials capable of responding to ever-changing markets;
  • Meeting public and individual interest in and demand for cooperative charters to lift up local groups and communities;
  • Daily examples of member-owner benefit that rises above traditional service and product options from for-profit providers;
  • Leadership at all levels communicating the advantages of cooperative design. A former NCUA executive director once summarized credit union’s purpose with the phrase:  “it’s the member, stupid.”

Much of today’s credit union commentary reads and sounds like all the other lobbying and jockeying with a new administration.  Protect the status quo.  Align one’s vision and “asks” with the incoming administration’s priorities.

That apprach may be smart politics.  But credit unions did not succeed by preserving the status quo.   What will their role be in responding to the numerous areas of unmet member needs and expectations?  That response will position NCUA and credit unions as leaders for greater contribtions or, if not, as a part of  governmental policy that needs rethinking.

 

 

How Will Trump Administration Policies Affect NCUA?

In a full first day of pomp, circumstance and executive orders, a new regime took over the leadership of the U.S. government.  Among the new President’s many actions was appointing Kyle Hauptman as Chairman of NCUA.  What will this mean for the agency and credit unions?

Among the blizzard of Trump’s first day executive orders were a number directed at the administration of federal agency management.   These orders included:

  • The requirement for all employees to return to office five days per week;
  • A freeze on hiring;
  • The removal of civil service protection on senior positions.
  • Ending all DEI training and policy implementation.

There were also multiple references to eliminating regulations and sending the people’s money back to them via reduced spending, and maybe lower taxes.

Chairman Hauptman’s term expires in August of this year.  Will he follow these priorities of the new administration or assert independent agency status, and therefore not bound by these initiatives?

Hauptman has a number of initial decisions that will indicate what his governing practice will be including:

  • Who does he add to his team as appointees and what is their professional experience–credit unions or government employment? Or, purely political patronage?
  • What is his governing philosophy? Is the job a full-time leadership responsibility for the agency, or merely a policy setting role delegating to staff all interpretation and implementation?
  • What is his view of the role of the cooperative credit union system? Is the coop design unique, or just another form of financial choice in the marketplace?  How does he assess the major trends in the industry including merger-acquisitions, the buying of profitable banks and the suggestion that credit unions be taxed?

Preparing for the Role

Hauptman announced his intent to become chair posting “openings” on LinkedIn several weeks ago.   His view of credit unions and a governing agenda have never been spelled out.  His statements on policy have been in response to Harper proposals, which he has largely supported including the longest, most intrusive rule NCUA ever added to the books, Risk Based Capital.

What will be his leadership style as Chair?   How accessible will he be to the public, the press and to the credit union community?   Will he listen in conversations or deliver scripted positions?  Will he present objective and fact-based priorities or rely on general cliches about government’s role?

Can he articulate common purpose with the cooperative system founded on collaboration, or will he assert NCUA’s independence from credit union’s destiny or fate?

When problem events occur, will he respond with factual answers, send out staff to reply, or worse, just stay silent and avoid any comment as the press reports on credit union shortcomings?

People, especially those working in credit unions serving members, want to hear from their regulators.   The coop democratic structure is intended to give responsibility to the members and their chosen leaders.  Openness builds trust and confidence.  Distance undermines the collaborative advantage which is the foundation of two vital NCUA facilities: the CLF and the NCUSIF.

The Learning Challenge

For both individuals and organizations to succeed they must become learning entities.  Responding to change is more than just adding new technology or professional expertise.  It means sharing  a vision while responding to the constant changes which we all face.

The Shakespearean actor Patrick Page stated that it takes at least 30 years to become an effective performer.  Acting first requires knowing thyself, the motivations and awareness that comes from life’s experiences, relationships and multiple roles.  But just as important is understanding the same characteristics in others-especially if you intend to present their character to the public in plays.

Leaders are formed in the same way.   Leadership is not conferred by appointment to a role—no matter how deserving the individual interprets his or her selection.  It is formed in the challenges of life—the wins, the disappointments and the strivings.

Now Hauptman has the chance to show how he will learn and lead.   The fate of an industry may depend on how successful his growth can be.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

One More Time: How Does $13.6 Million Vanish without a Trace?

The Creighton FCU insolvency resulted from the sudden discovery of a $13.6 million hole in this reportedly $67 million asset credit union.  The failure, NCUA’s largest in 2024, is apparently an unsolvable mystery.  One in which the only suspect has  died.  As I first posted, NCUA has provided not a single fact about where any of the money went.  Just speculation.

More incredible is the IG suggestion that there is no money missing, just a bunch of accounting errors. Moreover, no one seems very curious about finding out where money went. In the IG response to the Congressional inquiry he opens with the statement:  “my office was not required to perform a material loss review. Additionally, NCUA informed us that the agency was not required to conduct a post-mortem review.”  In other words, don’t look for any answers from us.

The one IG explanation is that the CFO, who died in April 2024 leading to the shortfall’s discovery. was covering up actual operating losses for up to 26 years. We’ll examine this idea later.  In the IG’s summary review, no one within the credit union or NCUA  examiners and external  CPA auditors apparently saw any indications of irregularity during  three decades.

The IG further assures Congress that an over “20 year review” of the CFO’s family records reveals no unusual credit union cash diversions. Yet this is still the person who carried out this cover up apparently alone, fooling every check and balance and division of duties for such an extended scheme.

Blaming a person no longer around, and who apparently took no funds, feels too convenient.  Let’s look at the plausibility of the IG’s theory and facts we do know.

The Cash Came In

We know the members deposited the cash and the funds which went missing.   When the $13.6 million shortfall was discovered, this hole was covered by underreporting shares by an almost equal amount.  Shares balances in the March 30, 2024 call report were $61 million.  Ninety days later the total reported by NCUA in their exam and the June call report  was $74 million.  This is the exact total change in net worth. And the same order of magnitude ($74 million) for Creighton members’ share liability when merged with Cobalt.

But where did the cash go?   Here is the IG’s “official explanation” after reviewing all the information he reviewed:

NCUA officials believe the credit union failed due to bad accounting and financial statement fraud. The large deficit was hidden by the former CFO who exploited Creighton’s weak accounting system that allowed back posting, forward posting, deleting transactions, and hiding general ledger accounts when generating reports. Because no money was found to have left the credit union through this, NCUA officials believe the former CFO committed the fraud not for personal financial gain, but to make the credit union appear to be thriving in the eyes of its Board and membership.  

The IG’s “Thriving by Hiding” CFO Motivation

Reread what the IG just asserted.  Although we know the $13 million member deposits came in, “no money was found to have left the credit union.”   This CFO was cooking the books just to hide operating losses for 26 years.  This is what the IG wants us to believe?

Cash shortfalls creating a cumulative deficit can only occur if the credit union pays out that cash in some form (hidden operating expenses, fraudulent loans, fake withdrawals, phoney investments etc) What were those payouts? Some entity or person received these cash diversions hidden by accounting coverups for decades.

A brief IG reference is made to the management of the credit union’s 150 ATM’s for which the accounting was difficult to reconcile.  This should have prompted questions such as, what accounts were used to fund the ATM operations?  Who managed the cash deliveries and cash drawer balancing when machines were serviced?  Was there an external servicing contract or were cu personnel responsible? The IG letter states:  Fraud auditors reviewed ATM and lease payment accounting transactions. The regional director stated that the ATM accounting was extremely complicated due to Creighton having over 150 ATMs and the multiple ways in which income and expenses could be divided.”    

The IG statement is an NCUA and auditor admission they could not figure out what was going on. Managing 150 cash receiving and paying ATM’s is similar to having to reconcile 150 teller cash drawers periodically.  Cash comes from deposits and checks, and cash is with withdrawn by members from their share accounts.

NCUA’s Regional Director is reported to find that “ATM accounting was extremely complicated.”   This is what should be expected from covering up a missing $13 million.  But not a single instance of imbalance or shortfall is cited.   Or even a reference to how the machines were managed.

And the closest we get to the smell of a smoking gun is not from NCUA or outside auditors, but from Cobalt which is quoted in the IG report:

“NCUA officials advised (note the passive voice) that in early October 2024, they learned from Cobalt that after the merger, Cobalt determined that the former CFO understated expenses related to the ATM network to artificially boost Creighton’s income statement to appear to achieve a steady net income.  The IG continues:

“Cobalt surmised that the former CFO was either not booking the monthly ATM expenses at all or was severely understating the expenses. Cobalt indicated the ATM costs alone should have been $255,000 each quarter. They determined the CFO booked around $120,000 per quarter to the office Operations account. Cobalt officials explained to NCUA officials that this would account for an approximate $500,000 to $550,000 reduction in net income per year if no other expenses were booked to the Office Operations account. 

Cobalt officials explained that over more than 26 years, such an understatement would easily account for the $12.5 million deficit.”

One can only say Wow! to this explanation from Cobalt.  NCUA did not make this finding. ATM expenses are for cash outlays for withdrawals and network operations.  The bottom line is that someone or some entity was paid the money.  Who wrote and signed the checks for these underreported expenses? The IG report makes it appear it was all just confusing bookkeeping.

Putting the Blame on a Fall Guy

Cash from members shares came in and $13 million cash ended up missing.  For 26 years it was all the “fault” of a person no longer living.   Which means that all of those who were simultaneously responsible for the safe and sound operation are let off the hook.

Among these listed in the IG letter are the CEO of 32 years, a senior accountant, the board, the supervisory committee, the outside auditor, special auditors and multiple NCUA officials from the supervisory examiner, problem case officers up to the RD’s office.

These were not just persons called in to observe a financial autopsy. They were directly responsible for this institution’s safe and sound operation  in their various  capacities in the many years before this failure came to light.   Yet we read not a word about their roles including the person who oversaw the CFO and his senior accountant staff this entire time.

The Reported and Reconstructed Net Income

Here is what we know from the most recent eleven yearend call reports prior to June 2024.

Creighton FCU’s Reported Financial Performance

OK performance, but certainly not world beating.  If one believes the IG’s theory, then the real result in this most recent eleven years was an operating loss of $5.5 million from ATM “expenses” plus false net income of $2.0 million. A $7.5 million difference somehow  hidden by creative accounting.

However if one presumes a steady cash diversion as the problem, then adding back the estimated $500,000 or more per year means the credit union actually made $7.5 million—most of which was “expensed away.”  This earnings  would equate to an average ROA of 1.2% or four times the net in the call report.  And a reasonable possibility.

The cash from member share growth came in. The cash went out the door as an “operating expense” somehow, somewhere.

A diversion of this magnitude for this long would seem to require several participants.  Presumably the ATM’s were not deployed all at once.  A system of diverting cash was initially set up and expanded as the network grew. Was some entity or person(s) servicing the machines somehow involved?  Other credit union employees had to balance the ATM total cash receipts and disbursements to the general ledger.  There had to be a system for quickly producing expense and suspense entries to cover up the missing cash for exams and auditors.  No one person could fill all these roles.

Since the share shortfall was quickly found suggesting a second set of books, there is probably a similar recurring system for diverting cash to sustain this activity for decades.

All the people listed in the IG reports were in the room when this happened.  But none of them was apparently asked for an explanation of how this could have occurred on their watch. For example how could the CFO have “managed” the expected net income without first talking to the CEO about the results?

After reviewing 20 years of the deceased CEO’s family records, and finding  “no improper transfer of credit union funds”, the IG’s simple explanation is that “that the CFO hid this $12 million deficit by exploiting the credit union’s weak accounting system.”   But how long had this “weak accounting system” been in place?

The lack of any IG mention of NCUA exam and CPA  responsibility for “weak accounting” suggests a reluctance to learn who is accountable for what in this failure.  Instead put the blame on the person no longer available, and who took nothing.

Questions the IG should have asked include: What were the examiners’ CAMEL ratings in the most recent years?   What did the supervisory committee do?   How did examiners record the problems of” back posting, forward posting, deleting transactions, and hiding general ledger accounts”  now offered to explain the inability to find the shortfall?  Did the CPA firm give a clean audit opinion?

The NCUA and IG’s failure to look at the standard processes for oversight and accountability reflects a flaw in the agency’s own structure. Handing problems over to another credit union to cover up NCUA’s supervisory failures, will only lead to more such failures.

Throwing a Credit Union Under the Bus

Cobalt FCU and their members are taking the hit for Creighton’s financial and supervisory failures. The immediate results of the Creighton merger in the September 2024 quarter include a share inflow of over $73 million; a reduction in undivided earnings of almost $7.0 million (from $115.6  to $106.5–( i.e. Creighton’s negative net worth); and an increase of 6,700 members versus declines in the immediate prior quarters.

Additionally, Cobalt’s net income from ongoing operations reported a $400,000 third quarter loss. The year to date net income is a negative $2.2 million. These combined changes resulted in Cobalt’s net worth falling to 8.1% from 9.2% at the September 2023 quarter end.

A Case Study of Failure-at All Levels

In the IG’s reply to Congress, he states one of the objectives was to report on:

the effectiveness of the National Credit Union Administration’s (NCUA) examination and oversight processes in detecting and preventing financial irregularities, and the role and performance of external auditors in this case.  The letter covers none of these issues. 

At this time no one yet knows where the missing cash has gone.  NCUA has not worked very hard to get critical information on the event. The IG mentions a possible explanation suggesting there is no missing money-just accounting confusion.   But the $13 million of member funds is gone.

NCUA seems to have distanced themselves from any further explanations, even citing Cobalt for the latest accounting examples.  Yet overseeing the safe and sound operations of credit unions is NCUA’s number one priority.   NCUA failed totally and quickly moved on  in this case.  They have literally closed the books, fended off queries and  said there is nothing more to see here.

If this sudden $13 million failure is not a wakeup call, when will the senior leaders of the agency step up to the mike and take responsibility?  The NCUA board is responsible for governing the agency, not staff.

The Board’s silence and turning over responses to the IG for a Congressional inquiry for its largest cu failure in 2024 is a leadership failing.  The agency’s no comment and the IG’s second and third hand reporting,  undermines pubic trust and confidence in NCUA’s administration.  Congress, credit unions  and the public want to hear from their leaders in a crisis, not the bureaucracy.

Perhaps it is time for a real change at the NCUA board.