Category: NCUSIF

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The Most Consequential GAC Speech in Credit Union History

NCUA Chairman Ed Callahan  spoke to CUNA’s GAC conference in Washington DC on February 8, 1984.

He urged his listeners to support the most vital change in the system since the passage of the FCU Act in 1934.

His title was Finish the Job.  He challenged credit unions to strengthen their NCUSIF insurance fund by backing legislation redesigning it using cooperative principles.

The talk is  11 minutes.  Ed provides an update on the state of the credit union system in one word, “fantastic.” He puts the current situation in the context of 75 years of credit union history.  He describes how deregulation is meeting the needs of the country’s changing economy.

An Advocate for Credit Unions

His closing is a call to support a Better Way for  the NCUSIF.  He asks credit unions to compare the cost savings under the 1% solution to the current two premium model.  And then to champion the change in a bill introduced by Senator Jake Garn.

The recording is from a cassette of the live speech with the video overlays added later.

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UcXPyUMtic)

This is an example of the profound change possible for credit unions when all parties work together to benefit members.

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Tomorrow’s Critical NCUA Board Meeting:  An Opportunity to Demonstrate the Strength of an Independent Cooperative System

The prime agenda item for Thursday’s NCUA board is the NCUSIF’s year end audit and setting the NOL cap for December 2025.  The political context in Washington at this moment makes this  meeting critically important.

Will the public discussion reinforce the understanding of the Fund’s  extraordinary performance and its unique  cooperative design?   Will its decade long performance of insured losses below a basis point, confirm its critical role in credit union’s unique purpose in America’s financial system?

The Political Context

The 2024 external CPA  audit was released last week.   It continues to show the financial stability of the cooperative system and the strength of its unique deposit insurance model.

This track record  is especially vital in this time of an administration challenging all aspects of federal agency performance.  This includes the federal regulatory structures, including FDIC’s oversight. For some the NCUSIF’s functions appear quite similar.  Could its future also hang in the balance?

It will be vital that the Fund’s uniqueness be affirmed during this update.  Especially these three characteristics:

  • A unique funding model; Every credit union member contributes directly 1 cent of their insured savings dollars to the NCUSIF’s 1% deposit base.  This member-centric capitalization is a direct copy of cooperative business design.
  • Explicit statutory guardrails on fund performance: There is complete and timely transparent reporting marked by the annual  independent CPA audit and monthly public financial postings.   Statutory limits are provided on total balances and a dividend paid to the owners, when this CAP is exceeded. Premium assessments in the event of catastrophic events, are clearly defined.  Premiums have been used only three times in the fund’s 40 year history.
  • The right to withdraw. If a credit union changes its charter or insurer their accumulated 1% deposit is returned. All 1%  deposits are returned if NCUA ceases to manage the fund.

How Board members present the NCUSIF’s demonstrated financial success may be crucial to its continued independence, not to mention NCUA’s.  If credit unions lose their fund in a regulatory realignment, would the singular credit union system be far behind?

Key Performance Issues

We knew yearend 2024 financial outcomes would be superb based on the November 21, 2024 NCUSIF board update as of September 30.  The yearend equity ratio is above .302%  showing the importance of the NOL cap. If it had been at its longtime cap of 1.3%, credit unions could have received a small dividend for 2024.

Will the Board’s discussion of this and other topics be anchored by full transparency, supported by real facts and the historical record versus hypothetical conjecturing?

The fund’s effectiveness is not based on its total assets, but rather, as in all insurance underwriting,  its size to relative to insured risk.  For example, the allowance account at $237 million is set aside from retained earnings.  It equals 1.3 basis points of insured savings at yearend.  Only once in the past ten years have total cash insured expense losses exceeded reserve level.

Specific areas of importance for board oversight include:

  1. How will the NOL cap for December 2025 be set? This limit triggers a dividend when earnings raise the yearend ratio above this number. There was no data provided when the Board set the NOL for 2024.  It simply extended the prior year’s limit,  no analysis provided. Even the detailed assumptions used by staff in the prior two years did not support their 1.33% recommendation. Will  real numbers be provided with full details of any hypothetical assumptions? Or, might the board simply endorse the historical 1.3% cap used in the first 33 years following its redesign?
  2. The greatest internal risk to the Fund’s effectiveness is the management of its $23 billion investment portfolio. Since December 2022, the portfolio’s maket value  has been less than its book, that is underwater.   The portfolio’s 2024 full year return is 2.5%. The overnight cash portion yields  approximately 4.5%.  The below book term portfolio earned just 1.92%.

Yet the fund continues to invest long in November, extending its duration risk, at a time of a reset in what a normal yield environemnt may be.  To sustain the Fund’s equity ratio a yield between 2.5-3.0% is necessary based on 40 years of actual operating results. The critical topic is what will the board require to improve the Fund’s interest rate risk management and turn around this continuing portfolio underperformance?

  1. The fund’s transparency is critical to its public credibility and trust. The allowance account is determined using an “internal econometric model.”   The model’s details and assumptions should be included in the staff’s presentation.

The continued use of Federal, not private GAP accounting misleads, mischaracterizes and  distorts the fund’s actual financial standing.  The terminology and schedules used with the Fund’s accounts are totally irrelevant since the NCUSIF is not an appropriated entity.

Federal GAAP removes specific information accounts from the NCUSIF’s financial statements.  For example is the portfolio’s actual value $22 or $23 billion?  Where is the net income total?  Or  retained earnings?  These traditional GAP terms do not appear.

The federal terms and schedules used are not relevant for the NCUSIF and convey an incorrect impression that the NCUSIF is somehow a federally appropriated fund. Or red meat for an uninformed DOGE analyst.

At a minimum private GAP financial statements presentation should be presented alongside the Federal GAP.  For private GAP is how all three of NCUA’s other managed funds are presented.

I am looking forward to the meeting.   Every credit union should as well.

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Uncertainty in Washington-What are the Options?

When I was a member of Ed Callahan’s team, he would offer two thoughts when evaluating uncertain situations:  The first was “Never say never,” when talking about future possibilities.  The second was “What are the options” when working through a challenge.

Each day brings more Washington rumors, supposed plans, new faces and real events that have led to increased uncertainty for NCUA and credit unions under the Trump overhaul of the federal government.

Those who see changes as a threat to the independent co-op system are urging credit unions to prepare for battle, increase lobbying efforts and deploy new member engagement tools.  Others will go with the flow assuming they will be OK if they stay invisible as part of a herd of 4,500 institutions.

If a never-say-never event unfolds, how does one prepare for it? Are there options that should be ready to go beyond the standard lobbying or “fight back” efforts?

A Short Credit Union History

The most important means of acting as a check to an overreach or an unresponsive federal regulatory environment is the dual chartering system.

Credit unions were birthed and spread first in the state legislatures.  From 1909 until the Federal Credit Union Act passed in 1934, over 25 states authorized local and varied credit union charters.  These multiple state examples were the “proof of concept” that gave Congress the example to extend this unique member-owned design to all states via a federal chartering option.

But state innovation did not end with this beginning. Senator Proxmire in a 1984 hearing stated he received his first  real estate loan in the 1940’s from a credit union.  FCU’s did not have real estate lending power until 1978.  State systems pioneered the introduction of NOW (checking accounts) in Rhode Island and share drafts in other states before this transaction authority was given all financial institutions in the Monetary Control Act of 1980.

State charters led the way in deregulating rates and terms on savings years ahead of the DIDC and NCUA action in 1982. State options have had much more flexible fields of membership, CUSO investments and other varied business options.

State credit unions lead federals in transparency with their required annual IRS 990 reports.  These filings disclose director and senior executive compensation as well as listing all 501 C3 contributions and political donations, if any.

Dual chartering has been a source of diversity, change and responsiveness to local conditions.  The NCUSIF’s regulations, including the risk based capital requirement, impose a one size fits all accounting and capital model on a very diverse industry.

The Critical State Advantage

However, there is one option that keeps the independent role of the state system intact.  That is the opportunity, currently in ten states, for their credit unions to choose private versus NCUSIF deposit insurance.

At yearend ASI, the Ohio based deposit insurance company, covered the shares of approximately 100 credit unions with $23.4 billion in assets serving 1.4 million members.  Six of these insured firms have over $1 billion in assets; seven have less than $1.0 million.  The average asset size is $240 million.

Expanding CU Choice Across the System

Recently ASI presented a webinar as part of a campaign called CUChoice.  The focus was on Michigan credit unions to encourage their support for a legislative change to give  state charters a choice in their insurance coverage.

The full recording of the webinar is here.

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hP-QN8HazKA)

The slides present the advantages of ASI vs NCUSIF.  Points covered include credit union ownership, a member-elected board of directors, and the specific role of an insurer that is not a regulator.  ASI’s focus is on being a business partner with its credit unions in which interests are aligned.

Slides 13-29 are a presentation by CUNA’s long time chief economist Bill Hampel, now retired.  In his talk he discusses the advantage of a Michigan state charter and compares the performance history of NCUSIF and ASI from 2007 though 2013.  He directly answers the vital question referred to as the tall tree issue by showing how the two insurers compare in size to their single largest credit union. (slide 22)

Slide 29 is a detailed comparison of ASI’s equity to insured coverage ratio of 1.75%. to the NCUSIF’s 1.31%

More Than a State Charter Option

The choice of deposit insurance has benefits far beyond state charters.  The option enhances the vitality of the entire dual chartering cooperative model.  In those states with an option, Hampel presents data suggesting those states have stronger performance.

Having an option prevents NCUA from being a total monopoly and provides real time performance comparisons. For example, ASI financial audits and reports follow private GAAP accounting, whereas the NCUSIF in 2010 adopted federal GAAP.  This federal standard mischaracterizes the NCUSIF’s operations and distorts the NCUSIF’s year end financial position. Also ASI must comply with reserving requirements under both GAAP and state insurance regulations.

ASI’s most critical difference is You Do Own It.  The credit union elects the board and there is an appointed advisory group. The users have a direct say and responsibility for the management of their collaborative fund.

ASI has a performance track record as long as the NCUSIF.  That history had a direct impact when the NCUSIF’s financial model was redesigned by Congressional legislation in 1984.  The 1% deposit model, which provides the earnings and equity foundation for the fund’s financial stability, was a direct borrowing from ASI’s structure and experience.

By offering choice, ASI provides all credit unions a check and balance on the unilateral power of a monopoly insurer/regulator.  The choice follows the unique constitutional system of state and federal powers.  It rests on the cooperative values of self-help and collaboration.

No one knows what the future of federal regulatory and insurance systems will be under Trump’s administration.  Credit unions should further enhance their options now building on their unique dual chartering roots.

In all other areas of Americans’ insurance coverage-life, auto, health and many more,  the licensing and regulation responsibility rests solely at the state level.  There is no federal option-except for deposit insurance.  ASI is an example of this responsibility and choice that makes the credit union system more resilient and viable than any other model yet created.

Uncertain about outcomes at the federal level?  Act now because no one knows today what you might need tomorrow.

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A Lesson from the Past: Could NCUA Be Reorganized Away?

While credit unions focus on the threat of federal taxation, there is another event that could end the independent cooperative system.  To understand how governmental agencies are reorganized, it is useful to review what happened to the separate S&L industry after a decade long series of industry and regulatory failings.

From an Inspector General Report dated March 2012: Title III of the Dodd-Frank Act sets forth provisions to address problems and concerns in the multiple agency financial regulatory system by abolishing OTS and transferring its powers and authorities to the FRB, FDIC, and OCC as of July 21, 2011 .

All OTS functions relating to federal savings associations, all OTS rulemaking authority for federal and state savings associations, and the majority of OTS employees transferred to OCC; OTS’s supervisory responsibility for state-chartered savings associations and OTS employees to support these responsibilities transferred to FDIC; and OTS’s authority for consolidated supervision of savings and loan holding companies and their non-depository subsidiaries transferred to FRB.

Prior to this 2011 transfer of supervision, chartering and examination, the separate FSLIC insurance fund had been merged into the FDIC in two steps.  The FSLIC was abolished in August 1989 and replaced by the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). On December 31, 1995, the RTC was merged into the FDIC which became the sole deposit insurer for all thrift institutions.

The Presidential Transition Center describes one surviving regulator’s situation today: “The OCC is one of eight Treasury bureaus and has approximately 3,850 total employees. Headquartered in Washington, D.C. It has four district offices and a London office that supervises international activities of national banks. Operations are funded primarily by assessments on national banks and federal savings associations.”

Current numbers under OCC responsibility are  approximately 1.500  national banks and federal savings associations and 50 federal branches and agencies of foreign banks.

The administrative head, the Comptroller, is nominated  by the President to a five year term and confirmed by the Senate.

As of mid-2024 there were 556 surviving savings institutions.  There was no single regulator however. Supervisory oversight of their $1.2 trillion total assets was divided among the OCC-242, the FDIC- 278 and the Federal Reserve-36.

An  independent consolidated thrift industry does not exist today.  Depending on each institution’s charter history and scope of operations, regulatory oversight is divided among the three federal banking agencies.

The Relevance of History

A goal of the Trump administration is greater governmental efficiency. Combining regulatory agencies is not a new idea. Merging the cooperatively designed NCUSIF into the FDIC, closing the unused  CLF and transferring  chartering and supervision to a new Treasury bureau would seem a reasonable proposal-for some.

A New North Star: Faster Alone, Farther Together

How might a single OCC administrator view this possibility?  The following is from an exit interview with the acting OCC head during the Biden administration:

Michael Hsu, a longtime bank supervisor and former top Fed staffer, threw himself into what he describes as a dream job: running an agency full of examiners. The OCC chief was at the table as officials managed through a regional banking crisis and a crypto crash.

MH: I made safeguarding trust the North Star for all that we were doing…I feel good about what we’ve done.

I’m most interested in long-term, durable wins. I’ve been in government for 20 years, over 20 years doing this stuff. There’s nothing more frustrating than this kind of fleeting, pendulum-swing of announcements. . .

There’s a saying: Faster alone, farther together. I say it to my staff all the time, which is frustrating, because sometimes we have to slow down…But if you just do it alone, you can get the quick win, but then the next guy is just going to undo the quick win.

Responding to a Reorganization Review

To counter the inevitable suggestions for more coordinated financial regulation, the so-called level playing field, requires rethinking what is being communicated at every level about credit unions today.

Some areas for messaging might include:

  • An NCUA led by informed and articulate leaders presenting the contributions and role of credit unions and cooperative design to the pubic and Congress;
  • An industry performing with stable and successful financials capable of responding to ever-changing markets;
  • Meeting public and individual interest in and demand for cooperative charters to lift up local groups and communities;
  • Daily examples of member-owner benefit that rises above traditional service and product options from for-profit providers;
  • Leadership at all levels communicating the advantages of cooperative design. A former NCUA executive director once summarized credit union’s purpose with the phrase:  “it’s the member, stupid.”

Much of today’s credit union commentary reads and sounds like all the other lobbying and jockeying with a new administration.  Protect the status quo.  Align one’s vision and “asks” with the incoming administration’s priorities.

That apprach may be smart politics.  But credit unions did not succeed by preserving the status quo.   What will their role be in responding to the numerous areas of unmet member needs and expectations?  That response will position NCUA and credit unions as leaders for greater contribtions or, if not, as a part of  governmental policy that needs rethinking.

 

 

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How Will Trump Administration Policies Affect NCUA?

In a full first day of pomp, circumstance and executive orders, a new regime took over the leadership of the U.S. government.  Among the new President’s many actions was appointing Kyle Hauptman as Chairman of NCUA.  What will this mean for the agency and credit unions?

Among the blizzard of Trump’s first day executive orders were a number directed at the administration of federal agency management.   These orders included:

  • The requirement for all employees to return to office five days per week;
  • A freeze on hiring;
  • The removal of civil service protection on senior positions.
  • Ending all DEI training and policy implementation.

There were also multiple references to eliminating regulations and sending the people’s money back to them via reduced spending, and maybe lower taxes.

Chairman Hauptman’s term expires in August of this year.  Will he follow these priorities of the new administration or assert independent agency status, and therefore not bound by these initiatives?

Hauptman has a number of initial decisions that will indicate what his governing practice will be including:

  • Who does he add to his team as appointees and what is their professional experience–credit unions or government employment? Or, purely political patronage?
  • What is his governing philosophy? Is the job a full-time leadership responsibility for the agency, or merely a policy setting role delegating to staff all interpretation and implementation?
  • What is his view of the role of the cooperative credit union system? Is the coop design unique, or just another form of financial choice in the marketplace?  How does he assess the major trends in the industry including merger-acquisitions, the buying of profitable banks and the suggestion that credit unions be taxed?

Preparing for the Role

Hauptman announced his intent to become chair posting “openings” on LinkedIn several weeks ago.   His view of credit unions and a governing agenda have never been spelled out.  His statements on policy have been in response to Harper proposals, which he has largely supported including the longest, most intrusive rule NCUA ever added to the books, Risk Based Capital.

What will be his leadership style as Chair?   How accessible will he be to the public, the press and to the credit union community?   Will he listen in conversations or deliver scripted positions?  Will he present objective and fact-based priorities or rely on general cliches about government’s role?

Can he articulate common purpose with the cooperative system founded on collaboration, or will he assert NCUA’s independence from credit union’s destiny or fate?

When problem events occur, will he respond with factual answers, send out staff to reply, or worse, just stay silent and avoid any comment as the press reports on credit union shortcomings?

People, especially those working in credit unions serving members, want to hear from their regulators.   The coop democratic structure is intended to give responsibility to the members and their chosen leaders.  Openness builds trust and confidence.  Distance undermines the collaborative advantage which is the foundation of two vital NCUA facilities: the CLF and the NCUSIF.

The Learning Challenge

For both individuals and organizations to succeed they must become learning entities.  Responding to change is more than just adding new technology or professional expertise.  It means sharing  a vision while responding to the constant changes which we all face.

The Shakespearean actor Patrick Page stated that it takes at least 30 years to become an effective performer.  Acting first requires knowing thyself, the motivations and awareness that comes from life’s experiences, relationships and multiple roles.  But just as important is understanding the same characteristics in others-especially if you intend to present their character to the public in plays.

Leaders are formed in the same way.   Leadership is not conferred by appointment to a role—no matter how deserving the individual interprets his or her selection.  It is formed in the challenges of life—the wins, the disappointments and the strivings.

Now Hauptman has the chance to show how he will learn and lead.   The fate of an industry may depend on how successful his growth can be.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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One More Time: How Does $13.6 Million Vanish without a Trace?

The Creighton FCU insolvency resulted from the sudden discovery of a $13.6 million hole in this reportedly $67 million asset credit union.  The failure, NCUA’s largest in 2024, is apparently an unsolvable mystery.  One in which the only suspect has  died.  As I first posted, NCUA has provided not a single fact about where any of the money went.  Just speculation.

More incredible is the IG suggestion that there is no money missing, just a bunch of accounting errors. Moreover, no one seems very curious about finding out where money went. In the IG response to the Congressional inquiry he opens with the statement:  “my office was not required to perform a material loss review. Additionally, NCUA informed us that the agency was not required to conduct a post-mortem review.”  In other words, don’t look for any answers from us.

The one IG explanation is that the CFO, who died in April 2024 leading to the shortfall’s discovery. was covering up actual operating losses for up to 26 years. We’ll examine this idea later.  In the IG’s summary review, no one within the credit union or NCUA  examiners and external  CPA auditors apparently saw any indications of irregularity during  three decades.

The IG further assures Congress that an over “20 year review” of the CFO’s family records reveals no unusual credit union cash diversions. Yet this is still the person who carried out this cover up apparently alone, fooling every check and balance and division of duties for such an extended scheme.

Blaming a person no longer around, and who apparently took no funds, feels too convenient.  Let’s look at the plausibility of the IG’s theory and facts we do know.

The Cash Came In

We know the members deposited the cash and the funds which went missing.   When the $13.6 million shortfall was discovered, this hole was covered by underreporting shares by an almost equal amount.  Shares balances in the March 30, 2024 call report were $61 million.  Ninety days later the total reported by NCUA in their exam and the June call report  was $74 million.  This is the exact total change in net worth. And the same order of magnitude ($74 million) for Creighton members’ share liability when merged with Cobalt.

But where did the cash go?   Here is the IG’s “official explanation” after reviewing all the information he reviewed:

NCUA officials believe the credit union failed due to bad accounting and financial statement fraud. The large deficit was hidden by the former CFO who exploited Creighton’s weak accounting system that allowed back posting, forward posting, deleting transactions, and hiding general ledger accounts when generating reports. Because no money was found to have left the credit union through this, NCUA officials believe the former CFO committed the fraud not for personal financial gain, but to make the credit union appear to be thriving in the eyes of its Board and membership.  

The IG’s “Thriving by Hiding” CFO Motivation

Reread what the IG just asserted.  Although we know the $13 million member deposits came in, “no money was found to have left the credit union.”   This CFO was cooking the books just to hide operating losses for 26 years.  This is what the IG wants us to believe?

Cash shortfalls creating a cumulative deficit can only occur if the credit union pays out that cash in some form (hidden operating expenses, fraudulent loans, fake withdrawals, phoney investments etc) What were those payouts? Some entity or person received these cash diversions hidden by accounting coverups for decades.

A brief IG reference is made to the management of the credit union’s 150 ATM’s for which the accounting was difficult to reconcile.  This should have prompted questions such as, what accounts were used to fund the ATM operations?  Who managed the cash deliveries and cash drawer balancing when machines were serviced?  Was there an external servicing contract or were cu personnel responsible? The IG letter states:  Fraud auditors reviewed ATM and lease payment accounting transactions. The regional director stated that the ATM accounting was extremely complicated due to Creighton having over 150 ATMs and the multiple ways in which income and expenses could be divided.”    

The IG statement is an NCUA and auditor admission they could not figure out what was going on. Managing 150 cash receiving and paying ATM’s is similar to having to reconcile 150 teller cash drawers periodically.  Cash comes from deposits and checks, and cash is with withdrawn by members from their share accounts.

NCUA’s Regional Director is reported to find that “ATM accounting was extremely complicated.”   This is what should be expected from covering up a missing $13 million.  But not a single instance of imbalance or shortfall is cited.   Or even a reference to how the machines were managed.

And the closest we get to the smell of a smoking gun is not from NCUA or outside auditors, but from Cobalt which is quoted in the IG report:

“NCUA officials advised (note the passive voice) that in early October 2024, they learned from Cobalt that after the merger, Cobalt determined that the former CFO understated expenses related to the ATM network to artificially boost Creighton’s income statement to appear to achieve a steady net income.  The IG continues:

“Cobalt surmised that the former CFO was either not booking the monthly ATM expenses at all or was severely understating the expenses. Cobalt indicated the ATM costs alone should have been $255,000 each quarter. They determined the CFO booked around $120,000 per quarter to the office Operations account. Cobalt officials explained to NCUA officials that this would account for an approximate $500,000 to $550,000 reduction in net income per year if no other expenses were booked to the Office Operations account. 

Cobalt officials explained that over more than 26 years, such an understatement would easily account for the $12.5 million deficit.”

One can only say Wow! to this explanation from Cobalt.  NCUA did not make this finding. ATM expenses are for cash outlays for withdrawals and network operations.  The bottom line is that someone or some entity was paid the money.  Who wrote and signed the checks for these underreported expenses? The IG report makes it appear it was all just confusing bookkeeping.

Putting the Blame on a Fall Guy

Cash from members shares came in and $13 million cash ended up missing.  For 26 years it was all the “fault” of a person no longer living.   Which means that all of those who were simultaneously responsible for the safe and sound operation are let off the hook.

Among these listed in the IG letter are the CEO of 32 years, a senior accountant, the board, the supervisory committee, the outside auditor, special auditors and multiple NCUA officials from the supervisory examiner, problem case officers up to the RD’s office.

These were not just persons called in to observe a financial autopsy. They were directly responsible for this institution’s safe and sound operation  in their various  capacities in the many years before this failure came to light.   Yet we read not a word about their roles including the person who oversaw the CFO and his senior accountant staff this entire time.

The Reported and Reconstructed Net Income

Here is what we know from the most recent eleven yearend call reports prior to June 2024.

Creighton FCU’s Reported Financial Performance

OK performance, but certainly not world beating.  If one believes the IG’s theory, then the real result in this most recent eleven years was an operating loss of $5.5 million from ATM “expenses” plus false net income of $2.0 million. A $7.5 million difference somehow  hidden by creative accounting.

However if one presumes a steady cash diversion as the problem, then adding back the estimated $500,000 or more per year means the credit union actually made $7.5 million—most of which was “expensed away.”  This earnings  would equate to an average ROA of 1.2% or four times the net in the call report.  And a reasonable possibility.

The cash from member share growth came in. The cash went out the door as an “operating expense” somehow, somewhere.

A diversion of this magnitude for this long would seem to require several participants.  Presumably the ATM’s were not deployed all at once.  A system of diverting cash was initially set up and expanded as the network grew. Was some entity or person(s) servicing the machines somehow involved?  Other credit union employees had to balance the ATM total cash receipts and disbursements to the general ledger.  There had to be a system for quickly producing expense and suspense entries to cover up the missing cash for exams and auditors.  No one person could fill all these roles.

Since the share shortfall was quickly found suggesting a second set of books, there is probably a similar recurring system for diverting cash to sustain this activity for decades.

All the people listed in the IG reports were in the room when this happened.  But none of them was apparently asked for an explanation of how this could have occurred on their watch. For example how could the CFO have “managed” the expected net income without first talking to the CEO about the results?

After reviewing 20 years of the deceased CEO’s family records, and finding  “no improper transfer of credit union funds”, the IG’s simple explanation is that “that the CFO hid this $12 million deficit by exploiting the credit union’s weak accounting system.”   But how long had this “weak accounting system” been in place?

The lack of any IG mention of NCUA exam and CPA  responsibility for “weak accounting” suggests a reluctance to learn who is accountable for what in this failure.  Instead put the blame on the person no longer available, and who took nothing.

Questions the IG should have asked include: What were the examiners’ CAMEL ratings in the most recent years?   What did the supervisory committee do?   How did examiners record the problems of” back posting, forward posting, deleting transactions, and hiding general ledger accounts”  now offered to explain the inability to find the shortfall?  Did the CPA firm give a clean audit opinion?

The NCUA and IG’s failure to look at the standard processes for oversight and accountability reflects a flaw in the agency’s own structure. Handing problems over to another credit union to cover up NCUA’s supervisory failures, will only lead to more such failures.

Throwing a Credit Union Under the Bus

Cobalt FCU and their members are taking the hit for Creighton’s financial and supervisory failures. The immediate results of the Creighton merger in the September 2024 quarter include a share inflow of over $73 million; a reduction in undivided earnings of almost $7.0 million (from $115.6  to $106.5–( i.e. Creighton’s negative net worth); and an increase of 6,700 members versus declines in the immediate prior quarters.

Additionally, Cobalt’s net income from ongoing operations reported a $400,000 third quarter loss. The year to date net income is a negative $2.2 million. These combined changes resulted in Cobalt’s net worth falling to 8.1% from 9.2% at the September 2023 quarter end.

A Case Study of Failure-at All Levels

In the IG’s reply to Congress, he states one of the objectives was to report on:

the effectiveness of the National Credit Union Administration’s (NCUA) examination and oversight processes in detecting and preventing financial irregularities, and the role and performance of external auditors in this case.  The letter covers none of these issues. 

At this time no one yet knows where the missing cash has gone.  NCUA has not worked very hard to get critical information on the event. The IG mentions a possible explanation suggesting there is no missing money-just accounting confusion.   But the $13 million of member funds is gone.

NCUA seems to have distanced themselves from any further explanations, even citing Cobalt for the latest accounting examples.  Yet overseeing the safe and sound operations of credit unions is NCUA’s number one priority.   NCUA failed totally and quickly moved on  in this case.  They have literally closed the books, fended off queries and  said there is nothing more to see here.

If this sudden $13 million failure is not a wakeup call, when will the senior leaders of the agency step up to the mike and take responsibility?  The NCUA board is responsible for governing the agency, not staff.

The Board’s silence and turning over responses to the IG for a Congressional inquiry for its largest cu failure in 2024 is a leadership failing.  The agency’s no comment and the IG’s second and third hand reporting,  undermines pubic trust and confidence in NCUA’s administration.  Congress, credit unions  and the public want to hear from their leaders in a crisis, not the bureaucracy.

Perhaps it is time for a real change at the NCUA board.

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Congress Queries NCUA On the Largest Credit Union Failure of 2024

During the January 6 WOWT’s First Alert news program, the station presented  a report titled Watchdogs Say $13.6 million is missing from recently-absorbed Omaha-based credit union.   The TV Reporter, Michael McKnight, had contacted me for comments on the case.

The TV story told of the $13.6 million dollar loss at Creighton FCU leading to its subsequent merger with Cobalt FCU in August 2024.  Cobalt said this was the result of the “CEO’s retirement.”  Both Peter Strozniak’s Credit Union Times article and I had written about this forced merger and the loss in its final June 2024 quarter of operations.

The merger was caused by an enormous deficit equal to 20% of assets uncovered following the CFO’s death in April.  NCUA gave no explanation of what happened, where the money went or who was responsible for the follow-up.  NCUA and Cobalt refused to answer any questions about the event.  Problem resolved, no questions please. 

But the TV news triggered immediate additional facts that NCUA has refused to provide the press and public about its actions. The TV reporter received a letter NCUA’s Inspector General (IG) sent to Omaha Congressman Mike Flood responding to his inquiry about the circumstances of the loss in November.

The IG response is linked here.  The letter opens with an unusual disclaimer of direct responsibility as the IG and NCUA are not required to investigate this situation any further:

Because there was no loss to the Share Insurance Fund, my office was not required to perform a material loss review. Additionally, NCUA informed us that the agency was not required to conduct a post-mortem review for the same reason.

But the IG then proceeds to state facts from the public 5300 call report and details of all the external resources and NCUA officials who became involved when the CFO died in April. Those listed include a local CPA firm, the NCUA’s supervisory examiner, the regional director, associate regional director, the director of special actions and a problem case officer.   NCUA requested the credit union hire a bond attorney, fraud auditor and an interim CFO to work with its problem case officer.  On May 3 the case was transferred to the Western Region’s Special Case office on May 3.

The only NCUA offices not listed are those ultimately responsible for the oversight of NCUA’s federal credit unions:  the Executive Director, the Director of Examination and Insurance and the NCUA board.  By omitting any mention of their role, they are apparently excused from any accountability.

In October 2024 Cobalt reported to NCUA that the “former CFO understated expenses related to the ATM network to artificially boost Creighton’s income statement to appear to achieve a steady net income.” The IG’s explanation also includes this assertion of agency’s due diligence:

When reviewing the deceased CFO’s family financial records and computers that:The regional director also said the fraud auditors looked for all ways cash could have left the credit union and found no instances of cash removal.

The IG’s concluding paragraph provide NCUA’s theory of the case:

In summary, NCUA officials believe the credit union failed due to bad accounting and financial statement fraud. The large deficit was hidden by the former CFO who exploited Creighton’s weak accounting system that allowed back posting, forward posting, deleting transactions, and hiding general ledger accounts when generating reports. Because no money was found to have left the credit union through this, NCUA officials believe the former CFO committed the fraud not for personal financial gain, but to make the credit union appear to be thriving in the eyes of its Board and membership. 

The IG’s Theory of the Case

Several observations from the IG’s summary.  First all the information is second and third hand.  The IG did not complete any direct review, but solely reported what others have said and done.

If this preliminary description is accurate, one has to believe this accounting coverup occurred over at least 26 years with an average operating shortfall of $500,000 per year between reported and actual net income.

To accomplish this alleged coverup, the CFO would have to keep two complete sets of books. As the deficits were recorded from share balances this would require hundreds of individual entries each quarter to balance out the shortfall but keep member statements accurate.  Then these two sets of books would need to be updated quickly whenever external NCUA examiners and auditors arrived on site.  Or whenever there was any external loan and share verifications.

A person capable of this legerdemain bookkeeping effort for over 26 years was however not capable of managing the credit union’s financial performance with positive net income?

There is no explanation of how such a consequential scheme could have gone undetected from annual CPA audits, NCUA examinations. supervisory committee share and loan verifications and traditional separation of duties in the accounting shop.  It was not discovered until the CFO’s death in April.  New people quickly found the out of balance situation and the $13 million shortfall. The fact that the share shortfalls were recovered so rapidly and then transferred in full to Cobalt, suggests these two sets were readily available.  An internal defalcation involving member share balances over three decades would normally be an auditing and forensic nightmare to reconstruct.  But in this case resolved quickly.

Just Country Bumkins Fooling Experts

Finally, it strains credulity to believe there was no shortfall of funds. The cash had been received from the incoming share deposits.  But the IG’s letter presents the assumption that the CFO just used “suspense accounts” to cover unrecorded continuing operating losses—that would average at least $500,000 per year.   Why would a person go to this much trouble to just cover operating losses for which he was not directly responsible?  If in fact it was failure to balance out ATM deposits and withdrawals—one suggestion—how could such a continuing imbalance go unnoticed for over three decades?

The IG report describes the accounting coverup: Specifically, the CFO had understated expenses related to the credit union’s ATM network to artificially boost Creighton’s income statement.  And, The regional director stated that the ATM accounting was extremely complicated due to Creighton having over 150 ATMs and the multiple ways in which income and expenses could be divided.   

A credit union of this asset and member size managing a 150 ATM network seems highly unusual.  What happened to this system after the merger?  Why were examiners and auditors unable to balance out this system for decades?

Assuming the CFO’s only rationale was to hide a continuing operating loss and that he received no benefit from his actions, one must ask who also might benefit from such a coverup?  Who supervised the CFO?  Is this just a situation of two country bumkins fooling all exam and auditing experts for decades?

NCUA’s Silence on This Failure

Until the IG’s December response to Congressman Flood’s inquiry, all responsible parties have said nothing about the situation.  Press queries are referred to call reports and  to Cobalt’s press release saying the merger was due to the CEO’s retirement, a completely false account.  Why would the NCUA and Cobalt put out such a blatantly false and easily contradicted explanation?   Was it to avoid addressing the $7 million or greater shortfall that Cobalt members will now cover?

One fact is clear, everyone, including the IG is distancing themselves from any responsibility for getting to the bottom of this $13 million loss.  The IG presents second hand information and lists multiple NCUA involvements with everyone handing off the ball to someone else-either internally or externally.  Cobalt does the cleanup.  The IG quotes Cobalt’s theory of the loss from October, not NCUA findings, for the missing funds. The IG washes his hand because no “material loss” review is required, but he will consider adding a review to his 2025 “to-do” list.

When people in positions of responsibility have nothing to hide, they will speak up with their understanding of events and what more needs to be done.  In this case there is silence for all parties, but most especially the highest levels of NCUA. The initial explanation of multiple decades of accounting coverups  creating a  $13 million shortfall seems unlikely and inconsistent with some of the data reported.  It feels like there must be more to the story.

The True Shortcomings

NCUA’s lack of public candor is the real problem. No one at NCUA wants to take responsibility for the agency’s  most fundamental  role of overseeing a credit union’s safe and sound operation.  Noticeably absent from IG’s account is the role of the three-member board, the information they received and the actions they did, or did not, take.

Did the Board approve the forced merger without member vote?  If so, what was in the Board Action Memorandum about the situation and alternatives?   Why was Cobalt FCU willing to absorb this accounting and operational mess with a $7.0 million loss which their members must now cover?  Where is their upside, if any?

Why weren’t the previous NCUA annual (?) exam papers reviewed for how so-called unrecorded expenses could be disguised in other accounts (suspense and office expenses)?  The three quarterly call reports clearly show the credit union reporting positive net income, but no increase in net worth until the yearend.  Don’t examiners first review the accuracy of call reports as one of their first verifications?  Etc. etc.

The Largest Credit Union Failure in 2024

The Creighton case is an example of institutional failures.  The most serious is not the $13 million unexplained loss shutting down a federal credit union. But the total lack of responsiveness to the members and the public by NCUA’s leadership. In a crisis, leadership should come from the NCUA board members, not the professional staff.  They are merely foot soldiers.  The leaders are missing in action.

Is the best explanation NCUA can provide Congress and the public an IG summary of second-hand agency actions, a listing of all the professional resources sent and offering a third party’s partial explanations of what may have happened?

The buck should stop at the Board’s three desks.  The board members are nowhere to be found or heard on the most significant failure in 2024.  A long standing, apparently successful federal credit union collapses overnight and costs its members their institution and $13 million in combined resources.

More Precious than Dollars: Trust and Confidence

The NCUA board member’s inaction and silence when facing real problems in an open, prompt and responsible manner is a failure of leadership.  Hiding from issues and accountability leads to internal coverups.  It creates a lack of public confidence in the agency’s oversight.  The perception that board members are not up to the agency’s most basic responsibility raises  questions about their competency supervising other areas of credit union activity in which members good faith and trust (e.g.merger payouts)  are routinely compromised.

After the TV investigation was reported on Monday, I received the following from a former Creighton member.  It read :

Hi Chip – I ran across your coverage (in November) of Creighton Federal’s large shortfall. I am a customer there and had followed their directives to switch to Cobalt. Now I’m wondering if my money is safe at Cobalt! I liked some of Cobalt’s products (a money market savings account with high interest, for instance) and have been happy with their service so far. Still, your coverage of the slap-dash management at Creighton Federal, and its rescue by Cobalt has me wondering if I should move my money to another credit union in town that doesn’t have any problems (that I know of). Thanks!

Hopefully this case is at its beginning and the three members of Congress on the IG’s response will continue to press for actual facts, updated numbers and direct explanations for what happened.  NCUA seems incapable of self-assessments.   Credit unions should not expect perfection from their regulator, but they should have honest accountability.

Editorial update at 5:00 PM January 8.

Yesterday the WOWT station published this follow up report incorporating some of the IG’s December letters comments to Representative Hood.

Follow on January 7 report here.  

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NCUSIF 3Q Public Update:  How to Enhance the Board’s Stewardship (Part 2 of 2)

My earlier analysis, part 1,  of the NCUSIF’s financial performance in 2024’s first three quarters, highlighted the fund’s soundness.  It concluded with Board member Otsuka’s statement about the board’s role to be good “stewards” of the fund.  This post shows how that oversight role could be improved.

The Benefit of Public Board Meetings

The board’s quarterly discussion of the fund’s performance is an important responsibility.  It demonstrates each board member’s “grasp” of the subject matter, their preparation and their reasoning for any conclusions.  Just like a credit union board’s role, their judgment is critical in overseeing staff’s recommendation.

It is in the board’s particular roles in this quarterly review, that the public learns each member’s understanding of general policy, especially the role of America’s cooperative financial alternative.

Additionally, NCUA’s monthly publication of the NCUSIF’s performance provides the fund’s cooperative owners the opportunity to monitor how their 1% deposits are managed by following critical financial indicators.  This monthly update was a condition for the open-ended funding model of the 1% deposit by credit unions.  If the trends are in the wrong direction, then credit unions have the facts to speak up.

Critical NCUSIF Financial Issues

The fund’s finances have one primary revenue driver, the yield on the investment portfolio.  This was by design.  It was a dramatic change from the premium based approach of the FSLIC and the FDIC which was also followed for the first 15 years of the NCUSIF’s operations.  That premium model proved fundamentally flawed. That history is described at the end of this post.

The NCUSIF’s Investment Underperformance

Slides from the September financials in November meeting clearly demonstrates the agency’s continuing shortcomings  in managing the Fund’s interest rate risk.

The first tracks how the fund’s yield (blue line) began trailing its market indicators as of mid-2021.

The next shows that the NCUSIF portfolio has been “underwater,” that is below market in value and return, since December 2021.

The first consequence of this portfolio strategy is that the fund’s primary revenue source is  shortchanging the fund and credit unions. The second is that the majority of the fund’s investments are not readily liquid in the event needed without either borrowing or selling investments at a loss.

Below is the latest investment report provided to the board in the quarterly review.

It shows an overnight yield of 4.79% on 24% of the portfolio; 1.74% on the remaining 76%; and a weighted average YTD yield of only 2.48%.  This below market return is  due to the fixed rate bonds purchased following a robotic investment ladder out to over seven years independent of any ongoing IRR assessments.

At September 2024, every investment maturity bucket except overnights, and recent investments for seven years, are below market value.

This update shows one investment action during the third quarter: $1.1 billion of bonds purchased on August 15, 2024  at “various” yields of 3.5% to 3.85%.  Following are the other yield-investment  options that same day from the Department of the Treasury.

Date 8/15/2024
1 Mo 5.53
2 Mo 5.4
3 Mo 5.34
4 Mo 5.22
6 Mo 5.04
1 Yr 4.52
2 Yr 4.08
3 Yr 3.9
5 Yr 3.79
7 Yr 3.83
10 Yr 3.92
20 Yr 4.28
30 Yr 4.18

This August investment decision  yields less than all other Treasury options with maturities less than three years-shown in blue.  It extends the interest rate risk as measured by the fund’s weighted average life (WAL). It follows the same pattern of activity that resulted in the fund’s past three plus years of underperformance. 

With the portfolio’s current WAL, this revenue-yield shortfall could extend for another 2.5 years.  Have no lessons been learned from this latest interest rate cycle?

Since 2008, the fund’s data shows that a portfolio return between 2.5% and 3.0%  is more than sufficient to maintain an NOL of 1.3%.  Returns above that breakeven range would give credit unions a dividend to recognize their open-ended underwriting commitment. More importantly, it rewards their collective risk management.

The Fund does not need more assets relative to risk, as some board members have stated.  It needs more effective management of the portfolio investments it already receives.

The Chairman of the investment committee and two of its four members were at November board table responding to questions.   This would have been the perfect time for a dialogue about whether alternative investment options were considered.  This one day’s investments in August increased IRR risk, reduced liquidity  and returned a lower yield than multiple other options.

Instead of explaining this decision, the board continues to put its head in the sand.  It glosses over performance charts that would not get past questioning by the newest examiner should a credit union report this outcome and unexamined policy.

In the meantime, credit unions are on the hook for NCUA’s mismanagement of the fund’s return, not just the industry’s potential insurance risks.

The Lack of Transparency

There are a several calculations used in the final numbers that are vital to understanding their reliability.  At times in the past these assumptions and data are shown in detail at briefings. This time only a final number is given so that it is impossible to validate the results presented.

The classic example of a lack of transparency was that until February of 2024, the staff had provided its calculation of the modeling data used for recommending the normal operating level (NOL) for the fund’s coming year. This cap determines when a dividend must be paid from net income.   In February however, the board continued the 1.33% with no underlying data or assumptions presented to justify a cap higher than the long time, traditional 1.30%.

That 1.30 was exactly the actual NOL reported for December 2023.  The financial model was working exactly as designed, yet the staff and board just rolled over the old higher level with no factual justification.  The fund’s own performance belied the need for an NOL above the historic cap.

In the prior two years of staff’s 1.33% NOL recommendation, the underlying data were provided.  But when modeled out this information did not support their recommendation.  Rather it showed that the historic 1.3% cap would have covered all the forecasted model’s contingencies in the next five years.  Is that why no details were given for 2024’s NOL setting?

One board member commented in the Q&A for 2024’s NOL that he did not know what the right number should be.  Moreover he didn’t think it would make a difference for credit unions whether the cap was 1.3% of 1.33%.  As of September 30, the fund’s equity ratio was .303% and headed higher by year end.  Should the December 2024 exceed 1.3% that decision will matter greatly, causing credit unions to forego tens of millions in NCUSIF dividends.

The question is not, what is the right cap on the NOL;  rather, it is what is the appropriate range for the fund’s equity so that credit unions can share in the success when all goes well.  That judgment is no different from managing a credit union’s capital ratio, a decision and responsibility familiar to every credit union board member and CEO.

Other Missing Details

Another disclosure shortcoming was the  investment report.  Instead of listing the individual investment purchases as in past reports,  “various” maturities and a range of yields  (3.8 to 3.85%) were given.  This suggests the individual securities were for at least 7 years.  This investment choice was at a time when the yield curve offered multiple higher returns on all options with maturities less than three years.

These shorter investments would reduce liquidity risk, improve yield immediately and enhance portfolio flexibility—but no board member questioned these August 15 investment decisions.

Undocumented Projections

The 2024 year end NOL projection by staff was given in a footnote as 1.28% in the last slide.  In  previous  December year end forecasts, the staff has presented a full NOL calculation in a single slide. The data included projected retained earnings,  insured share totals  and the resulting NOL outcome.

Insured shares grew only .46%  in  the third quarter.  If that growth pattern continues in Q4, then the NOL could be much higher than the 1.303 at September. Why present such an important forecast result (1.28%), which is below the current actual level with no substantiating numbers or assumptions?

Yet no board member commented on this lack of disclosure—and its implications for credit unions.

An Increase in Allowance Account and No Losses

Another critical number is the loss expense which is used to increase, or sometimes lower, the total dollars in the reserve account.   For the quarter the additional expanse was $21.7 million raising the total allowance to $232 million or 1.32 basis points of September 2024 insured shares.  So far in 2024 the total actual insured losses are near zero.

Th allowance ratio is greater than the NCUSIF’s average annual loss experience since 2008. In the most recent five years there have been no major losses.  Yet the reserve continues to grow in both dollars and relative to insured risk.

The formula being used for this reserving should be disclosed.  This expense comes right out of retained earnings and thus reduces the NOL number. Just as when presenting an NOL forecast, the underlying assumptions and data should be open for board, public, and credit union scrutiny.

The State of the Board’s Stewardship

As for Otsuka’s call out of the board’s stewardship of the NCUSIF, the examples above are some of the specific opportunities to enhance this responsibility. And we haven’t even gotten to the backward looking calculation of the NOL, but that issue is for another day.

Endnote: Brief History of NCUSIF Redesign

The new NCUSIF financial design in 1984 was based on a study of insurance alternatives and the fund’s initial 15 year trends.  The traditional premium approach in the first years of the 1980’s required double premiums assessed by NCUA.  But even then, the fund made no headway toward the statutory goal of 1% of insured shares.

There were two major reports of this in-depth reassessment.   One was a 100 page study sent to Congress on April 15, 1983 by Chairman Callahan.   The report addressed specific congressional questions, provided a history of cooperative stabilization and share insurance funds, and gave recommendations for change.  It also included extensive comments from credit union leaders.

When the new design, A Better Way, was established by Congress in 1984 the background analysis for a new model was explained in the video below.  It was sent to all credit unions outlining this unique collaborative effort and its benefits for credit unions. For without the credit union support, there would have been no congressional action to authorize this unique cooperative approach to NCUA’s share insurance model.

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IlqxLeFkuLY)

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Great Third Quarter NCUSIF Report! (part 1 of 2)

I missed the November 21 NCUA board’s NCUSIF update so went back and listened to the 30 minute discussion via video.  The report was incredibly positive.  About both the financial performance of the fund and credit union industry trends.

There were several data “blanks” and areas that were not covered that I will discuss tomorrow.

The slides used to update the NCUSIF can be found here.  YTD net is over $226 million which raised the Fund’s total retained earnings to $5.4 billion.  This is .3033% of total insured shares ($1.767 trillion) at September 30, thus exceeding the .30% historical NOL cap.

Total insured losses for the year are negative, that is, recoveries of $2.0 million on prior losses have offset current writedowns of just $1.1 million.  Nonetheless, NCUA has increased the loss allowance reserve to $232 million, or 1.3 basis points of insured shares in addition to the .3033 in retained earnings.

Since 2014 the NCUSIF has recorded actual net cash losses that exceeded 1 basis point of insured shares in only one year, 2018.  That year the Fund wrote down the value of its portfolio of taxi medallion loans.  In 2020 it sold this portfolio  to a New York distressed asset fund manager (Marblegate) which benefitted from the full recovery in portfolio value as credit unions took all the write downs via the NCUSIF.

The CAMEL Trends

Even the CAMEL trends are positive.  Kelly Lay Director of Examination  and Supervision was at the table.  The % of credit union assets classified as Code 4 & 5 declined from the June quarter.   When asked about the change, Lay said it was because of improvements in specific credit union’s liquidity positions-a trend validated in Callahan’s third quarter TrendWatch analysis presented on November 12, 2024, nine days prior to the board meeting.

These two slides from that presentation show these changes in system liquidity:

She further stated that any large credit union that is downgraded in rating or with a 4/5 CAMEL ratings is examined at least annually.   When pressed by a board member about potential exposure in commercial real estate loans, she replied that “there was nothing very concerning.”

External Third Quarter Data Analysis Positive

Several times board members referred to second quarter data, one citing an increase in delinquency and lower ROA at June 2024.

However both the macro-analysis in Callahan’s 3Q Trend Watch Video and the large, individual credit union performance comparisons by Jim DuPlessis of Credit Union Times all show marked improvement in the third quarter.

Two excellent data analysis by Jim DuPlessis include graphs that do not support this observation from older data:

Analysis of five most recent quarters through Q3 ’24 of industry loan production, published on November 4.

Top Ten Credit Union’s Earnings Still Improving on November 1,  using the most recent five quarters through Q 3, 2024.

Two of TrendWatch slides:

And if the macro trends  in credit unions was not convincing by itself, the final TrendWatch slide showed this perfpr,amce comparison with competitors thru June as later data is not yet released:

Stewards of the NCUSIF

In her opening statement board member Otsuka commented:  Being stewards of the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund is one of NCUA’s primary jobs—a critical component of our duty to protect members’ shares at credit unions. Thus, I continue to be encouraged by the strong performance of the Share Insurance Fund.

Tomorrow I will cover areas where the data was lacking compared to prior updates and the one primary performance topic that the board failed to address.

In future updates, the presentations could be improved if more timely data were used, so the board members have the benefit of the latest information when asking questions or making comments.  Or even when testifying before Congressional committees.

 

 

 

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Celebrating a Year of Extraordinary Credit Union Accomplishment

There have been pivotal years in credit union history, none more so than 1984.

NCUA and credit unions celebrated unprecedented market place, legislative and industry financial success.  NCUA issued over 100 press releases over the 12 months.  These announcements covered credit union performance, agency initiatives, and multiple press and political comments on the cooperative system.  Here is a very small sample, in date order, of these Agency communications:

Jan  4:   American Banker reports credit unions grow faster.

Jan 11:  CLF pays quarterly dividend of 9.0%.

Jan 16:   NCUA Acts to recover Penn Square losses

Feb 15:  Credit Union Stamp Released in Massachusetts

Feb 29:  Symposium on College Student Credit Unions

Mar  6:   Financial Performance Reports a Hit

Mar  9:   NCUA Board to Meet in Tucson

Mar 14:  Credit Unions Fastest Growing Financial Institutions

Mar 21:  Callahan Testifies Before Senate Banking Committee on Insurance Fund Capital

Mar 24:  NCUA to hold First Conference of Federal and State Examiners

Apr   4:   Banking Committee Approves Capitalization Bill

Aor  18:  NCUA Names Koppin Supervisory Examiner of the Year

Apr  30:  Credit union Statistics for March

May 15:  NCUA Central and Regional Office Realignment

May 24:  NCUA Investment Hotline Unveiled

May 30: Credit Union chartered for Cannon Hills Employees

June 19:  50th Anniversary Celebration

June 22:  President Issues FCU Week Proclamation

July 18:  President signs Bill to Strengthen Insurance Fund

July 26:  NCUA 1985 Budget down 4.9%

Aug 21:  FCU Growth Surges at Midyear

Aug 31:  Two Per Credit Union Limit Placed on Las Vegas Conference

Oct  9:   Board Adopts Capitalization Rule

Oct 12:  Credit Union Membership tops 50 Million

Oct  22:  Credit Unions Most Popular Financial Institutions

Nov 15:   Board Slashed Operating Fee Scale 24%

Nov  23:  Seger, Breeden, Connell, Pratt Announced as Speakers at Las Vegas Conference

Dec 18:  American Banker Reports CU’s Growing Faster than Thrifts

Over 70 additional releases about key Agency and credit union events were issued.

All of these releases were amplified in the monthly NCUA News sent to all credit unions as shown in the samples below.

Additionally, NCUA created a Video Network in which the Agency communicated significant changes and events both internally and with credit unions.  Here is the brief opening segment of an hour long video introducing the recapitalized  NCUSIF.

 

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wsq74FkMrPQ)

Forty Years On and Context for Today

In 1984 there were over 16,000 active credit unions.  All FCU’s were examined annually overseen by six regional offices and a staff of just over 600.  The brief excerpts above of the Agency’s wide-ranging activities and reports are a tiny sample of the interactions and communications with the credit union system, Congress, the White House and the public press.

These events occurred in the third year of Ed Callahan’s chairmanship which began in October 1981. The NCUA board, Bucky Sebastian, Executive Director, and the Senior staff believed that public service is a public responsibility.  Senior employees were available, willing and eager to engage with all constituents.   And most importantly. accountable to those who entrusted their funds and members’ futures to the regulator for oversight.

A highpoint of this interaction was the December 1984 National Credit Union Conference organized and led by NCUA with the support of the credit union system.  It was a first for NCUA, and the largest conference ever held at that point in credit union history.  The event was a coming together to celebrate the cooperative system’s growing relevance and success.  And to share views about the future of the movement by all those who were dedicating their lives to their members’ well-being.

In 1984 as this year, there was a Presidential election.  Everyone remembers the outcome. NCUA’s leadership and its results in 1984 are a reminder that good government is also good politics.  An example especially relevant now, four decades later.