Category: NCUA

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Ugly Truths: Mergers, Kickbacks and Apostates

“The Ongoing Corruption of the Cooperative Credit Union System’s Ideals in America”  (with edit updates on August 9)

I have previously observed that  it doesn’t take an illegal activity to destroy a firm, an industry, or even bring harm to the broader economy.

I believe the credit union system is at a turning point.   Since the passing of NCUA’s merger rule in 2017/18, the amount of asset takeovers (AKA voluntary mergers) has only accelerated.  Some think this is a good thing.  I believe numerous examples prove otherwise.

According to Credit Union Times the numbers are increasing. The majority of second quarter 2024 merged assets in this latest update have nothing to do with safety and soundness issues:  The NCUA approved 46 mergers during the second quarter of 2024, up from the 26 consolidations that received the green light to consolidate during the first quarter and the 36 approved mergers during last year’s second quarter.

As discussed below some credit union CEO’s are “gaming” regulatory disclosure requirements to hide their significant personal benefits. Credit unions acquire sound, longstanding healthy credit unions through private deals which benefit and enrich the selling executive team.  The members are given nothing but future promises and empty rhetoric, most frequently, “bigger is better.”

The transactions increasingly contradict  any common sense understanding of financial equity or fairness for members.  The information provided members and approved by NCUA is meaningless for any considered owner decision.

The cooperative system’s unique purpose and public reputation are at risk.  These deals will be  seen as just more of the same wheeling and dealing as for-profit banks.   At some point these ongoing patterns of self-dealing will become the object of a business media story, a congressional inquiry or even consumer group action.

The good will and good works of the truly credit union spirited will be overwhelmed by the depredations of an ambitious few. The system may never recover from the consequences of these blatant examples of betrayal of the trust members placed in their “elected” board leaders and regulatory oversight.

In previous posts I have detailed cases from Exceed, Infinity, 121 Financial, Finance Center, and Vermont State Employees in which my analysis of the transactions made little or no economic or business sense-except for insiders. Members, who must vote any merger, have little or no power to object or even inquire. The process gives all the resources and media power to the incumbents initiating the deals.  Member participation is presented as a purely administrative step because the regulators have “already approved the merger subject to the member vote.”

A current Example: Member One FCU transferred to Virginia Credit Union

In last week’s post, I describe the members’ “rebellion” against management’s proposal to transfer all the assets of the $1.7 billion Member One FCU to VCU.  The opposition’s blog site was filled with multiple member voices against the change.

On July 30 after the vote closed,  Member One announced the result: 3,479 voted to approve and 1,404 against.  In the same release, the credit union stated it had become a division of VCU on August 1, or 24 hours after the vote.

Case closed or not?  Certainly, the two credit unions want to give that impression. However It is important to seek the truth apart from these two “facts.”  What other context is available about this event?  Were the members’ best interests truly served?

My first observation: the voting participation seems extremely low for this controversial action.  The  number in favor of the merger, 3,479 is just 2.3% of the credit union’s 155,000 members.   The total voters, 4,883, are only  3.2% of all eligible to participate.

This result means each Yes vote supported the transferred $474,000 of total assets and $44,560 of net worth to VCU.  That outcome would itself suggest the need for greater scrutiny.

Why was the turnout so low?   Were ballots sent to every member?  How was the process managed? By whom? How does this member participation compare with other similar sized or contested mergers?

The Opponents’ Efforts

There was spirited public opposition including a news radio interview.   The website Member One Vote No recorded over 80 member comments before being taken down.   These concerns  universally questioned the merger proposal.  A  Reddit link Member One Merger Cookies, is still active and provides a sample of the  many comments in opposition.

Members posed multiple questions about the $570,000 bonuses being paid to the the credit union’s five senior executives.  The members received nothing from their collective $155 million net worth and eight decades of loyalty.

The opponent’s Vote No site also included links to nine different VCU social media with postings by VCU members sharing multiple complaints about the acquiring credit union’s service, mobile banking, culture etc.  Did Member One’s Board do any due diligence prior to announcing the merger in January 2024?   If so, why was there no information about VCU’s business model or priorities, for example the reason for its recent decision to convert to a federal charter.

Twenty-Four Hours to End Member One’s Independence

My second question: why the rush to complete the merger in 24 hours after the vote ended, that is, by August 1?  The Notice and FAQs clearly state “There are no anticipated changes to core services and member benefits.  And, it will be 2026 before there will be operational integration.  In the meantime, there will be two operational centers.  No branches will be closed .

There are least two forms that must be sent to NCUA (6308A and 6309) both of which would take more than 24 hours, especially the combined financial statements, before a merger is finalized.

Why the speed to make this a done deal? The only effect is to remove Member One’s board and to give VCU immediate access to and full control of the credit union’s financial resources.  Is VCU that much in need?

The very low vote participation and the rush to close the deal points to the need for more information about what is really going on.

The Responsibility of Credit Union Directors

There are two sets of board members who oversee each merger event.  Member One’s board is very accomplished per their public resumes.   From the June 2022 announcement of new board officers, the leadership team presents extensive professional and Roanoke community experience.

The Chair, Joseph Hopkins, signed the Member Notice of the merger’s required meeting. He retired from a long career at Norfolk and Southern, has been on the Member One board for over 30 years and is a 50-year credit union member.

Penny Hodge, Vice Chair, retired in December 2018 as Assistant Superintendent of Roanoke Country schools after 31 years.  She is a CPA and became a Member One director in 2019.

A  new board member in 2022 was Tyler Caveness who graduated from Harvard in 2014  with an economics degree.   He is “founder and principal advisor at Caveness Investment Advisory, LLC, a boutique wealth management practice providing investment, income-tax minimization, and alternative financing strategies for the self-employed.”

Member One also appoints associate Board members. On May 23, 2023 the board announced three new associate members, all with excellent professional  and local credentials. These are brief biographical excerpts in the announcement:

Armistead Lemon has an 18 year career in leading independent  school education.

Mary Beth Nash is a local government attorney with 28 years experience representing private and public sector entities.

Rebecca Owens is Roanoke County Deputy Administrator, responsible for county’s financial administration and has 30 years in local government.

Why did these three experienced, Roanoke-based professionals support the ending of their local charter in a few short months after taking office?  The merger announcement was on January  11, 2024.  One presumes there was some preliminary discussion and due diligence by the board before this public decision.

It seems highly unusual these three experienced professionals would join an organization and then quickly turn around and support an end to their leadership role within just a few short months.  What role did they play?  What information were they given?

NCUA is very clear in its statements on the fiduciary role of directors.  From two 2011 letters by NCUA’s General Counsel:

“we (NCUA)also believe that fiduciary duties are properly owed to people, and not to entities. FCU directors must understand the people who are affected by the directors’ decisions and identify which people the directors are serving.

“The danger is that, if the directors are allowed to focus only on the credit union when making a decision – without regard to how the members are affected – the directors can justify making self- serving decisions, or decisions that serve primarily the FCU’s insiders, under the guise that the directors are simply doing what is best for the credit union.”  (emphasis added)

Failing the Members

There are no factual details or future commitments in the Member Notice that would meet this fiduciary standard for this merger.  Let alone Directors’ duties of care and of loyalty.  The only specific financial details are the bonus payments totaling $570,000 to five senior executives.  Of this amount, $250,000 is due the CEO, Frank Carter,  as of the effective merger date—which we now know was 24 hours after the vote closed.

Why did members receive nothing from their $155 million collective savings?  In any other institutional sale in the open market, owners would have received 125% to 200% of their book value net worth.  We know this because these are the routine multiples credit unions pay when buying banks.  Should not credit union owners be treated as well as bank owners?

From the very general information in the four-page Member Notice, the widespread member opposition published in social media, and the explicit, immediate benefits going to the CEO and senior team, this merger seems contrary to any reasonable understanding of fiduciary responsibility by the board and executives of Member One.

They not only failed the 155,000 member owners but also the greater Roanoke community and the eighty-four year legacy of prior generations that contributed to creating this $1.7 billion local institution.

The Other Board of Directors: NCUA

NCUA’s rule 708b provides the process for the Agency’s monitoring and approval of  every step of the merger process.  The agency’s merger checklist has 21 areas for potential submission and seven required forms.

The update of the rule was announced during the GAC conference in February of 2017 in response to published examples of merger self dealing and outright solicitations.  Chairman McWatters’ intent is quoted in this report of the merger landscape by Frank Diekmann in his CUToday analysis, Time to Talk About an Ugly Truth in Mergers:

McWatters: “The agency should diligently work to preserve small credit unions, as well as minority- and women-operated credit unions.  

“In addition, the agency should require all merger solicitation documents to provide, without limitation, a discussion of any change-in-control payments and other management compensation awards and agreements, and that such disclosures are written in plain language and delivered to voting members in a reasonable time prior to the scheduled merger vote.”

Since that speech, and the passage of the rule  Diekmann’s Ugly Truths have only gotten worse and disclosures minimized.

Member One’s merger is just the most recent example. No member owner, let alone an NCUA examiner,  RD or board member could make an informed judgment about this merger proposal with the information in the four-page Member Notice.

If any credit union had provided this level of detail to purchase a bank or by organizers to start a credit union, the request would have been summarily rejected.  Yet that is all the information credit union owners were given.

NCUA’s In Loco Parentis Merger Oversight

The impact of NCUA’s rule has been to put the agency’s judgement and fact review in the place of the members’ ability to make an informed decision.  Most of the information required by NCUA in its 21 point checklist is not shared with members.  For example, its review of the prior 24 months of board minutes are not disclosed along with multiple other filings.

NCUA then sends its approval of the Member Notice with its limited information which includes the date of the special meeting and ballots to vote.  Absent are any of the details NCUA used to approve the application and Notice.

Moreover, the Agency has provided an easy work-around spreadsheet to help determine what must be disclosed, if anything, about compensation commitments.  This is completely contrary to former Chairman McWatters’ statement of “without limitation” disclosures.  In essence, NCUA shows credit unions how to “game” its own disclosure rule.

Self-dealing by those who lead the organization, oversee the entire process and control all resources to communicate with members was the number one priority addressed in the 2018 rule.  Unlike state charters which must file IRS form 990 detailing board and executive compensation annually, FCU’s are not required to file or disclose any compensation data to anyone at any time.

The agency’s excel spreadsheet with sample entries helps to determine what portion, if any, of future compensation must be disclosed. Here is the form that credit unions can submit to show compliance or not, along with a required certification of No Non-Disclosed Merger-Related Financial Arrangements.

Future compensation is what the whole rule was intended to address, including conversions of previously funded SERPS and other benefit plans.

Why should NCUA be able to review this form, but not members?   In the Member One Notice only merger related bonuses of $570,000 were revealed.  However the credit union reported over $32 million in SERP and Employee Insurance Benefits in its June 2024 call report balance sheet that will either vest or be distributed under change of control clauses—but there was no disclosure of where those funds now go.

Reporting only merger related bonuses does not begin to reveal the compensation related commitments to senior employees in the merging credit union.  Most will enter into new employment contracts with the continuing credit union that are guaranteed years into the future versus being at-will positions.

To illustrate this under reporting, NCUA recently approved a merger that disclosed to members only $900,000 of bonus or salary increases for the five senior employees.  However, because the credit union was a state charter and the lengths of the new contracts were disclosed, the actual guaranteed payments were closer to $9.4 million for the  highest compensated employees.

This is how the disclosures of self-dealing are “gamed.”  NCUA has inserted its review in place of providing  essential information to the members for their decision making.  Members receive no facts, only rhetorical promises or future assurances.  In Member One’s case, this motto was “Bigger is Better” an assertion easily  contradicted by the diverse loan growth and ROA performances as of June 2024 reported by the top ten credit unions.

The Shortcomings Of the Merger Rule and an Easy Solution

There are two other serious information shortcomings in the merger disclosures.  Nothing is required to be shown about the continuing credit union’s business model, priorities, plans or culture.  In this case VCU’s social media posts suggest some potential cultural and operational issues.

If members are transferring the future management of all their assets to another organization, shouldn’t that organization’s plans and leadership intentions be part of the disclosures, even including the compensation of the continuing executives.

Voting by members in a merger is not about protecting their individual savings and loans.  If members don’t like the outcome, they can withdraw and go to another institutions.

Rather the voting is about the transfer and full control of all the assets, tangible and intangible created in a credit union’s long history, to a third party.   Now there is nothing required to be disclosed about the new organization’s taking over these accumulated resources except a summary balance sheet and income statement that is already available from call reports.

A second problem is that the voting process is deeply flawed.  It has the appearance of democracy and one person one vote.  In this case 97% of members did not vote on the future of their own credit union?  Why?

Moreover, the entire voting process and institutional resources are in the hands of one party which has a vested interest in the outcome.  Members who oppose have no way to easily contact other members, there are no resources for marketing or outreach. The credit union executives control all the messaging with its FAQ’s and in this case, free Oreo cookies.

This is not a democratic election process.  It is a monopoly managed by those in power who control all the variables in the very short time frame in which the messaging and balloting is done.  To end a charter should require a minimum number of members to vote, at least 20%, and provide a process for opponents to have access to members.

And the easy solution:  Require every voluntary merger where the dissolving credit union has 7% net worth, to issue a public RFP for bidders and that there be a minimum of two proposals received.

RFP’s are a routine process in virtually every consequential credit union decision including technology choices and even the hiring of consultants who submit proposals in response.

NCUA should lay out the minimum RFP contents and then review the numerous responses.  The credit union board has the data for why one option was chosen over another to recommend to members.  Here is how the process works in a good merger.

The Apostates

The word apostates refers to someone whose actions or inactions, suggest they have totally abandoned or rejected their core beliefs or principles.  Or maybe have no settled ones at all.

In this example of Member One’s executive suite and board’s professional credentials, the public record of merger disclosures versus  the aspirations presented on the credit union’s website, all combine to give the impression these leaders abandoned whatever belief they had in their 84-year old credit union. Rather it was the members whose voices spoke up for the credit union while those in leadership sold out. (See one example at end.)

The role of NCUA’s three person board is also critical.  What is their understanding of the  cooperative charter?  How is it different from banks, other than the tax exemption?  What are the role and rights of member-owners?   What does democratic governance, one person one vote entail, when board elections are rarely held?  When only 3% to 4% of owners vote on the continuance of their independent charter, how meaningful is this process for mergers?

If the board believes the proper policy is letting the free market work its will versus setting regulatory boundaries, why is there no support for actual transparent market solutions?   Why do bank owners reap rewards when bought by credit unions, but credit union owners receive nothing when control is transferred to a credit union third party?

Chair Harper, Vice Chair Hauptman and newcomer Otsuka have either turned a blind eye or have no problem with senior executives capitalizing on their positions for self-enrichment-and the members left holding an empty bag.

NCUA’s current board has taken no action on the growing number of examples where the fiduciary duties of all decision makers to protect members’ best interests have clearly fallen short of the clear standard presented by its General Counsel.

In the end this benign neglect will erode the financial and reputational foundations of the cooperative model.

Creating An Unsound Cooperative System

Ultimately this intentional or unintentional fiduciary  abandonment by all parties will only spawn greater and greater incidents of insider sell outs in the pursuit of growth and greed.  The result is  more and more risk put into fewer and fewer baskets.

This increasing concentration decreases the traditional advantages of local relationships and stability and reduces overall financial and business diversity within the credit union system.  The soundness of the system is narrowed; the variety of business models is reduced; and the traditional credit union advantages of local knowledge, control and earned loyalty are lost.

The unique design of democratic member-owned financial alternatives serving their communities faithfully over generations is sacrificed on the altar of bigness.

The cooperative model has been turned upside down.  It no longer serves members interests first, but rather the personal ambitions of the institution’s leaders.

One Member’s Voice

When those in governmental or private positions of authority forget where their accountability is owed, the prospect of member rebellion grows.  Who can forget the taxi drivers attending NCUA board meetings to lobby for member-focused solutions?

In the case of Member One, a person who served the credit union in leadership posted his logic for why this merger was not in the members’ interest on NCUA’s website.  When posting comments NCUA “will review, redact and post submitted comments” and “also reserve(s) the right not to post a comment that we believe is false, egregious, or unrelated to the proposed merger.”

Sometimes we call these critics prophetic.  When current leaders forget to whom their duties of care and loyalty are due, this comment presents a well reasoned, informed appeal for a return to core credit union principles.

The following is what this member “sees” versus what those in positions of authority  choose to ignore:

I, Dwight Holland, MD, PhD STRONGLY OPPOSE THIS MERGER AT THIS TIME as a former 7 year Supervisory Committee Member of M1FCU, and 2 years as a successful Chair of that Committee. My background:

I was on the Supervisory Committee of M1FCU from 1996 to 2003, with the last 2 years as the Chair. So, I know what I am talking about regarding Credit Union matters.

I was also the guy that pushed hard in 1996 to get on-line banking into the Credit Union when some of our Board Members weren’t sure what a domain name was, or why we should do this. So, I AM NOT opposed to change and adapting when necessary or it makes sense for our members.

The reasons I am opposed:

1. We lose LOCAL CONTROL and influence in the governance of the Credit Union because we are being swallowed by a bigger fish. The smaller fish in the pond of merger always loses its identity, culture and influence with time, despite promises by the Board and CEO of both Credit Unions.

2. We are a HEALTHY, overall well-managed credit union that has grown to around 1.6 Billion dollars. Why surrender this LOCAL achievement and control to a financial entity in Richmond?

3. MemberOne started out as the N&W Credit Union, and grew with our own economy, mergers and healthy acquisitions of struggling credit unions in a non-predatory way. That rich history and legacy will disappear with this merger into the mists. As member number 4404 that started as a 6 year old, I personally don’t like that notion. I can see people in leadership, and talk to them directly, and they will listen. Having control going to Richmond will dilute that “personal touch” dramatically.

4. I am the Treasurer of a state-wide Military Organization that uses a national credit union (over 10 Billion in size) for its banking purposes. Trying to get help with such a large organization is just like dealing with a large bank. It is tedious to get anything done, when something doesn’t go well, it took me and national level leaders in our organization over 1.5 years to get a very simple, but critical thing settled. The larger an organization is, the harder it is to get through the layers of bureaucracy. Staff sometimes in large orgs just doesn’t “need” to care about you for their performance reviews. That’s not true for more locally controlled orgs.

5. As M1FCU member, we often give forbearance to our friends and neighbors regarding loans and the like if they as for it, and work with them to help. Larger, more distant Credit Unions, cannot, and generally will not do this to the extent that a well-run locally controlled one will.

6. There are more reasons not to merge that relate to insurances, benefits, control of wages locally, etc, but I’ll let others deal with those.

The “incentives (for executives) to stay” at the end of the meeting notice seem extraordinary – why is such an incentive needed? There would certainly be others available to hire who are well qualified should these people choose not to stay.

Well more than a half million dollars is being promised to these five individuals! That amount would best serve members in so many other ways: beefing up certificate and savings rates or assisting those who need loans, for example, would certainly serve the members better than this huge amount flowing into individual pockets.

I do not see numbers that benefit members of the credit union except those receiving incentives to stay. Respectfully, there is no way those employees are worth that much to stay. How much would the rest of the members receive to stay rather than to take our business elsewhere? I see no way this merger benefits the members except the 3 or 4 mentioned in the letter we received.

 

 

 

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Whistleblowers’ Elegies

Yesterday I attended a session from the Whistleblowers’ Summit in Washington DC at the Busboys and Poets restaurant.

The Summit describes itself as “a non-partisan educational and charitable conference. Whistle Blowing is apolitical; it is not about “Left” vs. “Right”— it is about Right vs. Wrong. The Summit is “trans-partisan” in nature because not only do we honor Democrats and Republicans; we also host everyone from Libertarians and Conservatives—to Liberals and Progressives.”

I was invited by Cliff Rosenthal, who with Michael McCray, published their book Community Capital– Race, Equity, and the Credit Union Movement.  It is partly Cliff’s telling of his 35+ years working with community development credit unions and the CDFI movement.

The second part is Michael McCray’s recounting of NCUA’s liquidation of Alpha Kappa Psi FCU in 2010.  His inside story includes documents from NCUA, first hand conversations from the participants, and the transcript of the court hearing appealing NCUA’s action in late 2010.

I have previously published multiple brief excerpts from McCray’s account.  It is at a minimum a story of personal conflict and a regulatory “set up,” that in Cliff’s view would not occur today.

These two credit union authors were among several book presentations by insiders, whistleblowers who go public, about the abuses of private and governmental organizations.   One author described the overreach of the guardianship authority in the US.  The second, a former State Department Human Rights Employee, detailed the coverup of the CIA’s systematic use of torture at black sites around the world.

Press and Whistleblowers

The theme of this year’s conference is “is “Media Matters—Whistleblowers, Investigative Journalists & Enterprise Reporting.”  One speaker, a former journalist at the Hartford Courant, said that a senior editor had counseled him in his initial visit to the federal courthouse beat about the importance of his role.

He was told that in many instances his account of the hearings  would be the last, best hope for the persons who have been wronged, whether in civil or criminal matters.  If their side of the story is not covered publicly, the chances that equal justice prevails is diminished.

Being a whistleblower, or even in opposition to any  organization’s public activity, is an act of courage.   For example, when I talk to persons opposing their credit union’s takeover via merger, they tell stories of threats to their jobs or even  businesses.  These accounts reference the advertising power of the continuing credit union and local media’s reluctance to cover controversy.

This was a theme of opponents in 121 Financial Credit union’s merger with VyStar Credit union.  The comments posted currently on the website of the opponents to Member One’s combination with Virginia Credit Union mention this factor.

This former Courant reporter’s observation reminded me of the work that the Credit Union Times reporter, Peter Strozniak, who routinely searches out court filings in cases involving credit unions such as the CBS FCU embezzlement.  He presents facts of institutional shortcomings at NCUA and in credit unions that reveal failings understandably absent from the official accounts.

Without credit union reporters willing to cover controversy, the fourth estate’s critical role in holding credit union leaders to account is missing.  One has to applaud the ongoing detailed coverage of the merger games being played presented in CUToday’s details from NCUA summary of merger disclosures. These include  straightforward examples of self-serving actions and no member benefits, driving combinations of large, sound institutions.

CUToday’s Cooperator-in-Chief Frank Diekmann has had the courage to editorialize as far back as 2017 on the harm these actions are doing to the system.

Sooner or later, such reporting will inspire insiders and others to come forward.  For example, this is a post by a senior employee to yesterday’s analysis of the proposed Member One combination with Virginia Credit Union:

Great article here, I’m at the csuite level at Member One and can tell you everything you stated in the article is 100% fact. Over the last year, there has been no transparency with people below the csuite level, even hearing rumors of issues with the voting as tallies have been changed.

A lot of sneaky stuff going on here and most employees know that this spells devastation for their careers as they will be let go in some form or fashion later down the road. Sadly, too late for Members to know the truth.

Doing the Right Thing

Another participant from yesterday’s session  commented that she was grateful for hearing these stories and public airings by individuals trying to do the right thing.

Their actions are often at personal risk and cost.   The disclosures may end careers in a chosen area, profession, or organization to which they have devoted much time and commitment.

But she drew hope from these examples. They are not intended as disparaging tear downs. These individuals are trying to make their company, their institution or the society a better place for tomorrow, she said.

Credit Union Karma?

To illustrate her point, I close with an observation from the abrupt, unnecessary liquidation of the Kappa Alpha Psi fraternity in 2010.   Its sponsor was one of the Divine Nine sororities and fraternities formed by black students shut out of white Greek organizations on the 20th century American college campus.

In 2023, their sister organization, Alpha Kappa Alpha (AKA) formed a credit union, For Members Only FCU.  One year later that new charter holds over $4.2 million in assets for 7,500members.   One of that sorority’s members is now the Democratic nominee for President.

 

 

 

 

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Credit Union Member-Owners Rebel Against Proposed Merger of their $1.7 Billion Credit Union    

Synopsis:  Due to the length of this post, the following is a quick summary of this merger proposal.  The five highest paid executives of Member One FCU will receive $570,000 in bonuses; the continuing, Virginia Credit Union, takes over a very sound $1.7 billion balance sheet and adds $155 million new capital to its net worth, and the members receive only free cookies for their 84 year old successful credit union.

Tomorrow, July 30, 2024, member voting will end on the proposed merger of Member One FCU in Roanoke, VA with Virginia Credit Union (VACU), in Richmond.

Member One was founded 84 years earlier to serve the employees of the  N&W railway headquartered in Roanoke.  Today it is a multi-seg charter with $1.65 billion in assets, $1.5 billion in loans, 159,000 members served by 335 FTE’s in fifteen branches.  (data as of June 30, 2024)

The members will receive nothing from their $155 million of collective capital (9.57% net worth) and four generations of loyal support.

The Member Notice dated June 13, 2024 confirms that this merger is not about change but rather continuation of the business status quo:

“Same knowledgeable, Friendly Employees”

“ the credit union’s main office and branches will remain open, subject to good practices and safety and soundness.”

“Changes to services and benefits:  There are no anticipated changes to core services and member benefits.”

The only advantages referenced in the Notice are general assertions about potential future capabilities which are completely undefined either in time or factually.  An example: “we would ultimately gain economies of scale.”

This decision facing members is simply stated by member Carrie Adams on the opposition members’ website:

“Saying “no” to a merger is saying “yes” to the future you believe in.”

The Opposition’s Campaign and Web Site

The member-owners opposing this sale have established a website VoteNoMemberone.org that documents the reasons for their opposition.  It includes a countdown clock clicking to the voting deadline tomorrow, Tuesday.  It urges members to vote No.

The basis for their opposition is summarized in six points:

  • There is No Real Benefit for Members
  • This is Bad for the Roanoke Valley
  • VACU is only after the numbers
  • Different Culture, Different Fees
  • You will become a number, not a Member
  • You are NOT being communicated with

In the Your Voice Heard portion of the site, members’ comments document these statements. In the almost 100 posts one quickly senses there is nothing to be gained and much to be lost in this betrayal of members’ trust.  Here are some examples of members and the community “being left in the dark:”

I had no idea! Thanks for the information about the credit union, brings a light to us members being left out in the dark.

I sent Member One some feedback through their website and had asked some questions, expecting to hopefully get a response. I did. I got a canned response asking for my information to contact me rather than just answering my questions through their email response. . .

We can say goodbye to the hometown feeling of being a valued member to becoming just a number.  

Yet another local business being bought out by a BIG City Business. The only notice we got about the merger was a tv news report, so if you didn’t see the news or a friend tell you about it, you would never have known. They did not even send out an email notification or a notification with our statement. What the hell are you hiding Member One???

The proposed transaction announced in January 2024 is already hurting Member One’s local business reputation:

Just recently I was looking to move and purchase a home. When I talked to my realtor about financing the mortgage; I had planned on using Member One since I had loans with them in the past. My realtor told me they were not using Member One for any mortgage financing since they had announced the merger because of the uncertainty of they stability at this time. They also said they knew of other realtors not using Member One for the same reasons.

Freedom First is now charging for checking, I started to look at Member One, but seeing they are getting eaten by a larger credit union, I went in a different direction

I work for a local car dealership and found out that VACU doesn’t operate loans on Saturdays, thats going to hurt a lot of local business if we can’t get autoloans approved like they currently are at Member One.

Members’ Voices Amplified

The posts in the Member Voices portion of the website also contains comments from insiders, current and former employees:

I am currently an employee at MO at a branch and wish to remain nameless for fear of retaliation. VACU’s goal is to be a $10b CU within the next 5-6 years. MO is just a ‘cog’ in the wheel and there is no true benefit to merging for MO members. . .

Truthfully, there will be people let go at some point b/c of redundancy, while nothing will change at first, by Operational Day 1 in late 2025 or 2026, you will likely see fees change, call center moved to the one in Richmond.

And: As a former employee of MO, I recall discussions about a $10 billion deal some time ago. Initially promoted as ‘better together,’ the attitude shifted within weeks to a rush mentality focused on pushing through the merger, resembling more of a takeover than a mutually agreed merger. After getting ‘bad vibes’ from that, I left the company.

The opposition has been reported in a story on the local news radio WFIR July 24. The  report opens with  concern about Roanoke losing another local company through this “sell off.”  The credit union spokesperson replies that this is a merger of “two very healthy organizations” and that “bigger will be better” in responing to members’ criticisms.

Researching Virginia Credit Union’s Online Reputation

The opponents’ site provides links to multiple social media and other posts in a section called VACU Reviews And Information.  These 12 links include VACU’s own mobile app with 177 reviews and a rating of 2.6 out of 5. Other sites such as  Facebook, Yelp (2.2 score from 17 reviews) and Grassroots (3.5 score and 18% approve of CEO) all have similar low evaluations or scores of VACU’s services.

Needless to say, none of this rating information was provided to Member One voters being asked to transfer their future and all their collective resources to this new institution.  One wonders if there was any due diligence by the executives and board of the credit union.

So Why is This Merger Happening?

One member posed this question in a comment:  Why would our local credit union allow an outside credit union buy them out?

Two members posted their conclusions referring to  the Member Special MeetingNotice:

I read the top brass gets a big payout if the merger goes through. . .

Wow, looks like the c-suite gets a nice ‘bonus’, I bet other employees won’t see anything in the way of retention or bonus pay.

These comments refer to the $575,000 in bonuses ($250,000 to Frank Carter, CEO) listed for the five most highly compensated employees in the credit union in the Notice.

One member noted: The “incentives to stay” at the end of the meeting Notice seem extraordinary – why is such an incentive needed? There would certainly be others available to hire who are well qualified should these people choose not to stay. Well more than a half million dollars is being promised to these five individuals! That amount would best serve members in so many other ways. . .

Incomplete Information

But even this disclosure is incomplete and therefore misleading.   NCUA rules require that members be provided a “detailed description of all merger related financial arrangements.  This description must include recipient’s name and title as well as at a minimum, the amount of value of the merger-related financial arrangement expressed, where possible, as a dollar figure.” CFR $ 708b.106(b)(4)(v).

There is no disclosure of any contractual employment terms suggesting that these five are “at will” employees even though the Notice clearly states a bonus commitment and conditions.  It would be highly unusual for senior executives not to have a written contract from their new employer,  with their bonus benefits and future employment after the merger.  Those facts must be disclosed under the rule.

Secondly, Member One’s call reports list a Select Employee Retirement Plan (SERP) valued at $15.5 million and an employee life insurance fund valued at $16.5 million-a total of $32 million in benefits.  These plans’ vesting and/or payout terms will activate when Member One ceases to exist or under “change of control” clauses.  These changes in payment terms due to the merger were not disclosed.

This total compensation information is critical. CEO and executive pay  is readily available from the IRS 990 Form filed by Virginia Credit Union (VACU), as a state charter.  While an excerpt is printed in the website’s VACU Information section from CAUSE IQ, those totals are incomplete when the full VACU 990 for 2022 is analyzed.

That report’s 2022 Schedule J shows VACU’s CEOs total compensation as $2.216 million.  The top eight employees received $7.4 million in total or an average of $917,265 each (the top two received almost 50% of the amount).  VACU’s compensation approach from IRS 990 schedule O clearly states the credit union “has a compensation philosophy of paying salaries and benefits that are competitive with . . .peers in the credit union and financial industries (banks).”

As stated in the Notice, VACU CEO Chris Shockley will be President/CEO of the combined credit union.  Certainly his more recent compensation is relevant to Member One’s member-owner’s vote.

Transparency is critical for informed decisions as well as preventing self-dealing.   Member One owners should know what their leaders who made these decisions are paid now and promised in the future.  In addition to disclosing all self-interest there is another critical factor from this information.  Such data points to the character of the arrangers for this transaction.

The Values Questions

Is 2022  CEO Shockley’s total compensation of $2.2 million is almost double the amount of the total of all 18 community grants and donations made by his credit union in the same year of $1.22 million.  The phrase that “charity begins at home” would seem apt when it comes to how the leadership of VACU distributes net revenue between executives and the members in the community.

This example provides insight into one of  the benefits asserted in the Member Notice that “this merger will combine two established entities that share similar values and commitments to their members, people and culture.”  It raises the question  of what due diligence Member One Board chair Joesph Hopkins reviewed when signing this member Notice.   Or do these two boards’  understanding of fiduciary duty to members and the community only arise after their executives ambitions have been fully satisfied?

VACU has received publicity before about its implementation of coop democratic values.   In two posts The Fix is In and We Own VACU  members’ frustration in being totally ignored when submitting nominations for four board seats is described.  Member voting for directors is not the the standard VACU election process; rather the nomination committee only selects the number of their preferred candidates equal to the open seats, no outside nominations considered.  All chosen then confirmed by acclamation.

A Perpetual Coop Model?

One other perspective on the credit union model which is designed to be perpetual by paying members collective wealth forward to benefit future generations.

Member One is 84 years young in 2024.   The two senior executives, CEO Frank Carter mad EVP Jean Hopstetter  joined in 2008, or 16 years ago.  These two leaders have had their roles for less than 20% of the credit union’s history.

However their legacy is to end the credit union’s charter and turn its future over to a third party.  This is not succession planning failure.  Rather it is pulling up the ladder of opportunity so no one else will have the professional leadership and financial chances they have enjoyed.

The Consequences for the Cooperative System

As in other manipulated, self-serving mergers powered by self-interest, what happens in Roanoke will not stay in Roanoke.  VACU’s minuscule $575,000 personal payments to five Member One executives to acquire $155 million in equity and a $1.7 billion sound balance sheet will not go unnoticed.

This equity capital addition is vital to VACU as it reports a loss on the market value of its own investments of $153 million at March 2024.  The same FASB 115 adjustment for Member One  is zero.

The absence of any pretense of due diligence by Member One’s board and senior executives, the alienation of the members and Roanoke business community and the compromise of the values credit unions are supposed to reflect will resonate throughout the coop system and in political capitals locally and nationally.

Instead of credit union members being paid the full value of their ownership, a small number of executives will see the chance to cash out, to sell out the members, their community and the coop system.  VACU executives know the market value of what they are being gifted as they compare their performance with banks.  No other financial firm would ever propose such a deal to their owners-only a misguided credit union board. This backroom deal is the stuff of cutthroat capitalism, not cooperative purpose.

Where is NCUA?

The agency is fully aware of these events but have neither the courage or convictions to  implement their own merger rules.

All three board members love to debate diversity, equity and inclusion.  Only equity has no real application in practice.  Equity’s traditional understanding of fairness, transparency and equal opportunity has just become another form of virtue signaling.

When board members have have no vision for either cooperatives or for principled leadership, a certain segment in credit unions quickly learns that they can game the system for personal advantage.

If this seems like a harsh judgement, I challenge each board member and their senior staff to read the four page member notice in this case.  Then ask if they truly believe that the information presented is sufficient for any member, let alone an engaged analyst, to determine if this is a fair deal for the owners.

The basic regulatory approved disclosure document provided members  is nothing more than marketing rhetorical phrases filling out NCUA approved forms. There is no relevant information or facts to make an informed decision.  No other state or federal financial regulator would ever accept this superficial disclosure as adequate for owners’ deliberations.

I give the final assessment of this ongoing credit union system failing to a member.  This person sees clearly what any concerned credit union leader would recognize instantly about  this so-called merger proposal.  This common sense wisdom puts to shame the actions and inactions of the movers and approvers of this event:

I’m advocating for a “no” vote on the credit union merger because it’s crucial to preserve our community’s values and personalized service. Our credit union has thrived on being member-focused, providing tailored financial solutions and fostering a strong sense of community involvement.

A merger could jeopardize these qualities by potentially changing fees, terms, and services in ways that might not align with our original values. Maintaining our independence also ensures we retain decision-making power and governance autonomy, which are vital for keeping our institution accountable and responsive to our members’ needs.

Voting against the merger is about safeguarding what makes our credit union special and ensuring it continues to serve our community with integrity and dedication.

Amen

A note from IRS 990 Schedule O for 2022 stating VACU’s compensation philosophy:

PERIODICALLY, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS ENGAGES AN OUTSIDE CONSULTANT TO CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS TO ENSURE THE APPROPRIATENESS OF TOTAL COMPENSATION LEVELS.

THIS EVALUATION LOOKS AT THE AVERAGE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS OF EXECUTIVES AT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF COMPARABLE SIZE, INCLUDING BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS. THIS PHILOSOPHY RECOGNIZES THAT THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE ACHIEVE AND MAINTAIN THIS GOAL MUST BE BALANCED WITH THE OVERALL FINANCIAL HEALTH OF THE ORGANIZATION.

THE CREDIT UNION HAS A COMPENSATION PHILOSOPHY OF PAYING SALARIES AND BENEFITS THAT ARE COMPETITIVE WITH EMPLOYERS IN THE SURROUNDING METROPOLITAN AREAS AND WITH PEERS IN THE CREDIT UNION AND FINANCIAL INDUSTRIES.

ANNUALLY, EMPLOYEES RECEIVE PERFORMANCE REVIEWS WHICH DETERMINE MERIT INCREASES. THE PRESIDENT/CEO COMPENSATION IS APPROVED BY THE BOARD EVERY YEAR.

 

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Can Merger Incentives Be Replaced by Better Comp Plans?

Editor’s note: The following guest commentary is a response to the NCUA board’s July 18 proposed rule requiring written succession planning policies for all credit unions.  One rationale was that this action would reduce the number of mergers now occurring due to a lack of available CEO or board candidates at times of leadership transition.

By Ancin Cooley

The succession planning discussion during last week’s NCUA proposed rule is about who will control the future of an organization’s resources: the member-owners versus transferred to an outside third party’s control?

Here’s the key question to keep in mind as you read my views:

Is the members’ loss of their charter and capital comparable to the costs of Board/CEO succession planning by any measure?

Bridging the Gap: “The Middle Way”

The solutions below are born of fatigue from reading about merger abuses and pragmatism. I’d rather a Board give a CEO what they feel he or she has earned in a manner similar to community bank compensation versus that same CEO attempting to convince their Board to merge for a “backend” payout from the surviving institution.

If we don’t openly address “backend” payouts post-merger, we won’t have a serious conversation on this issue. (Source: CU Merger Update Part II: More Management Comp Deals, Some Member Payouts, Usual Reasons and, Sometimes, No Reasons are Cited for Combinations)

Practical Solutions for Succession Planning

Let’s get down to business.

  1. Incentivize CEOs with Bonuses for Succession Planning Tasks: Offer financial incentives to CEOs for the annual completion of board succession tasks. This ensures that succession planning remains a priority and is executed effectively. (A colleague on LinkedIn thought this was a horrible idea, stating that CEOs are already getting paid to do their jobs. I agree with her logic, but I have also been working in financial institutions for 20 years. It won’t happen without a carrot.)
  2. Allow CEOs to Benefit from Capital Growth: Create a system where CEOs can benefit from the internal capital growth within their organizations, fostering a sense of ownership and alignment with the credit union’s success. For example, if a CEO starts with $8 million in capital and grows it to $24 million by retirement, they should access some of those funds in the form of a “liquidity event.” This approach reduces the risk of CEOs seeking payouts through unnecessary mergers.

Implementing these actions addresses the “elephant in the room” of self-interest driven mergers while aligning personal and organizational outcomes. The goal:  fewer mergers and more stable, mission-driven leadership transitions.

Who is going to object to the solutions I’ve provided above?

  1. Credit unions that rely on one solution for their continued growth-more mergers
  2. Firms that provide secondary capital that support mergers
  3. Lawyers that offer merger services
  4. Financial firms, brokers and consultants that provide merger services

This collective group drives the marketing and PR surrounding mergers, shaping the narrative to their advantage. During the comment period, this same group will prompt state leagues to oppose what is truly in the best interest of the members, thus prioritizing their own financial gains.

The institutional efforts to grow via industry consolidation is a feasible external growth strategy. But it belongs in the banking open-market world, not the credit union cooperative model. Credit unions with merger growth plans are playing tackle at a flag football game.  Cooperatives were intended to be perpetual by paying results forward, a different outcome entirely from private wealth accumulation. 

Common Rebuffs Against Succession Planning

  1. Regulatory Burden:

Ah, the classic “regulatory burden” argument—how many times have we heard this one? It’s a tired refrain. But let’s break it down: What is the regulatory burden, and for whom? For the management teams who find it cumbersome? What if this so-called burden is a safeguard for the members?

If we truly embrace free markets, then if one CEO finds succession planning too burdensome, the members, through their directors, can find a CEO who sees it as a manageable task. The framing of regulatory burdens should always consider who is complaining and why.

During the recent open discussion on the matter, NCUA Board Member Kyle Hauptman mentioned a CEO who claimed that implementing succession planning would force his credit union to merge.

Is it the managers’ place to suggest to their members that putting effort into leadership continuity—to protect their charter—is going to result in a merger? Imagine if you owned a commercial building and asked your property manager to implement a succession plan. If your manager rebuffed with, “If you make me put this succession plan in place, we’ll be forced to sell the property,” what would your response be?

  1. Flexibility Concerns:

Some feel that a one-size-fits-all rule for succession planning would not consider each credit union’s unique needs. The NCUA proposal allows for broad discretion in implementation, enabling each credit union to tailor its succession plans according to its specific circumstances and needs.

  1. Cost of Implementation:

While developing and maintaining a succession plan involves some time and cost, these are minimal compared to loss of the charter. NCUA’s new charters are required to raise a minimum of $500,000 t0 $1.0 million to open for business.  Thus, the loss of any charter for the membership, the community and the credit union cooperative system is huge. 

Conclusion

Succession planning is not just a procedural necessity; it is an organizational imperative to ensure the continuity of the mission and values of credit unions. As we navigate the complexities of leadership transitions, let’s prioritize the long-term health and cooperative principles that define our organizations. By doing so, we can safeguard the future of credit unions and continue to serve our communities effectively.

Implementing practical solutions, such as incentivizing succession tasks and allowing CEOs to benefit from capital growth, can harmonize personal and organizational interests, leading to a more stable and mission-focused future.

In short, THERE AREN’T TOO MANY CREDIT UNION TRUE BELIEVERS LEFT. COOPERATIVE IDEALS SEEM TO BE A THING OF THE PAST. IF THE MOVEMENT HAS ANY CHANCE OF SURVIVING, FOLKS GOTTA GET PAID. 

P.S. To all the institutions relying on mergers as their primary driver of growth.

The day after the merger, all the problems that existed before your merger will still be there. Only now they’re scaled and compounded.

Mergers teach you one thing: how to merge. You haven’t learned how to execute a strategy, build your brand, or manage the risks of a larger organization. You haven’t developed a talent pipeline. And candidly, you won’t have time to address any of these issues because you’ll be too busy dealing with the residual effects of the merger, such as core integrations and member withdrawals.

Mergers should accelerate a strategy that’s already working, not as the ignition for your growth. God bless and happy hunting.

If you are interested in further conversation, please reach me at acooley@syncuc.com or check out my YouTube channel here.

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Knowing When It is Time to Leave Office

For the past month, the public has watched President Biden struggle whether to continue his campaign as more and more questioned his leadership capacity.   His predecessor took a more forceful effort to remain in office on January 6, 2021.

It is extraordinarily difficult for appointed or elected public officials to know when to leave their roles.  These public positions are prized for their power, perks and prestige.  Stepping out of the limelight is contrary to the ambition that brings most persons to seek roles of public responsibility in the first place.

Moreover appointed positions frequently confirm a person’s sense of special purpose or even even self-worth.  As former NCUA Board member McWatters commented about his colleagues’ views in May 2015:

“Regulatory wisdom is not metaphysically bestowed upon an NCUA board member once the gavel falls on his or her Senate confirmation. NCUA should not, accordingly, pretend that it’s a modern day Oracle of Delphi where all insight of the credit union community begins once you enter the doors at 1775 Duke Street in Alexandria, Virginia.”

Compounding the difficulty of moving on, is that one’s closest advisors brought to new positions of responsibility that will be lost, are hesitant to tell the “boss” it’s time to go. So their counsel is to remain until external events cause turnover.

The Two Exceptions

Every NCUA board member and chair have stayed beyond their established term until the administration moved to replace them.  There are two exceptions-the first two Chairs of the NCUA Board.

Larry Connell left his six year term on January 1, 1982 following the appointment of Ed Callahan as Chair the previous October.  He became CEO of Washington Mutual Savings Bank in Seattle.  The thrift had 37 branches and was the largest and oldest mutual savings bank in Washington.  For Larry it was a clear move up in terms of personal and professional opportunity.

At the February 1985 CUNA GAC meeting in Washington DC, Chairman Callahan announced that he and his two colleagues, Chip Filson and Bucky Sebastian, would be leaving NCUA to form a credit union consulting company.  Ed’s resignation was effective May 1, 1985 or over two years before the August 1987 end of his six-year term.

Ed’s explanation for why he believed it was time to move on is insightful. He said that he had done what he came to NCUA to accomplish.  In a May 1985 NCUA News interview he listed these as “the deregulation of Federal credit unions, the decentralization of the agency, the capitalization of the NCUSIF. The result was that “most people at NCUA have a good sense of where the Agency is going and how they fit into the picture.”

The Example for Today’s Leaders

In Callahan’s view, his role as Chair was done. “It’s all working. The team is in place. There is a sense of confidence in the Agency, and it has infected the credit union movement as well.”

Time to move on.  Government employment was not his career goal or personal ambition.

Ed and Larry’s examples of leaving with time left on their terms illustrates the character of these two initial chairmen.  Their professional lives and contributions were not defined by their time at NCUA.  Both continued to make meaningful impact in multiple future leadership roles.

I believe the logic Ed used to describe his decision is important for  leaders today.  He became chair with a purpose and a plan.  When the results were accomplished, his role as chair was complete.  His tenure was not arbitrarily defined by the term of an appointment.  Or the next election outcome.

Without a clearly defined purpose, leaders within government and credit unions will resort to cliches about safety and soundness or people helping people. Leaders whose purpose is simply responding to unfolding events will not know when their role should end. For change is always happening.

The instinct to perpetuate one’s time in a role and then referring to one’s experience as the basis for continuation, will lead to stagnation.  This is the common justification for renominating current board members to fill annual vacancies in credit union elections.

Knowing when it’s time to leave is as important a skill as the effort used to earn the position in the first place.

President Biden has been universally congratulated for his decision to give up his effort to remain in power.  Likewise Ed’s service has NCUA Chair of just under four years, is recalled as a special time of “partnership” between the agency and the credit union system.   Isn’t this outcome what democratic governance is intended to accomplish?

 

 

 

 

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The Value of “Look Backs”

Part Two of Community Capital,  Race, Equity and the Credit Union Movement is a case study of the abrupt liquidation in 2010 of a $750,000 credit union founded by the historic black fraternity, Alpha Kappa Psi.

The story is told from the viewpoint of the credit union participants. Co-author McCray presents eleven historical documents in the Appendix.  These  include the minutes of NCUA’s closed board meeting approving the liquidation and a 32 page transcript of the November 5, 2010 US District Court hearing in which the credit union challenged NCUA’s action.

Reading the documents along with the author’s descriptions presents two very different versions of events.  Ultimately the Judge in November ruled in favor of NCUA’s actions.

What is unusual in this case is the credit union’s perspective.  Rarely if ever do the board members and leaders of a credit union which is the target of an NCUA takeover, ever speak out.

Speaking Out

So what is the value of reviewing this event  14 years later?

As noted in the final excerpt below, the credit union raised a fundamental constitutional question about NCUA’s summary liquidation action that may have relevance today.

The details of the story and in the official record of both parties’ actions are not pretty.  NCUA examiners were at times arbitrary–for example going in and unilaterally changing the credit union’s 5300 call report for June 30.  The agency was informed of the approval of a $100,000 CDFI grant for the credit union, but acted before the funds could be disbursed.

NCUA’s characterizations of the credit union were uniformly negative, often with a factual basis, but absent any context or recognition of the credit union’s unique business model and the founders’ commitment.  The conflicts became personal-on both sides.

This story is a unique first hand account of regulatory and credit union failure.  When a credit union ceases operations, it is a shared responsibility by both NCUA and the coop. In this situation, the effort to merge the credit union with HOPE FCU  is apparently not even considered by the agency.

In every failure there are lessons that may lead to future improvements. However because NCUA is intimately involved in failures, before and after, the bureaucratic instinct is to get rid of the problem as quickly as possible to avoid any regulatory embarrassment or accountability.

The agency will then bring up these unexamined failures as “object lessons” when proposing new rules or as precedents for new authority over credit unions.

Most recently at last week’s NCUA board meeting  a new incentive compensation rule was justified by board members asserting such incentives had contributed to WesCorp’s and a California Credit union’s failures 16 years earlier.   Both references were at best misleading if not irrelevant to the actual problems causing each credit union’s demise.

For example, the fact that NCUA had a full time corporate examiner on site for years at WesCorp monitoring every aspect of the credit union and sending reports back to head office, went unmentioned.

When failures occur,  the regulator’s goal is just to move on.  In past open board meetings all three members  supported a look back at the agency’s management of the Corporate liquidation events.  But nothing has been done to learn from the largest NCUSIF losses in credit union history that in retrospect were based on dramatically erroneous projections of potential investment shortfalls.

Without independent review of regulatory actions and objective “look backs” with the benefit of known outcomes, the credit union system will continue to pay the costs of past failures with future ones.

Whatever one’s assessment of McCray’s description of the closing of Alpha Kappa Psi FCU, all should be thankful he and his colleagues made their points of view public.

The Due Process Arguments

A final excerpt from the Alpha Kappa Psi FCU liquidation-the legal appeal from pages 216-217:

Due process requires that legal proceedings must be carried out fairly and under established rules and principles. In the banking industry, courts have held that due process was satisfied by a post-deprivation hearing. However, the question here was, “Does being heard after the liquidation has already taken place satisfy Fifth Amendment due process requirements for a natural person credit union?”
Are the due process protection considerations the same for corporations as distinct from individuals in membership cooperatives?

Thus, this was a “case of first impression”—that is, a legally significant case that could establish a legal precedent because it was the first time this factual scenario would be considered by a federal court.

There are two fundamental differences between banks and natural person credit unions—individual association versus corporate form, and initial capitalization levels. Banks and credit unions differ greatly. First, banks are for-profit commercial enterprises, while credit unions are not-for-profit associations.

Second, banks are corporations. Natural-person credit unions are unincorporated associations of individuals. Third, the courts have long held that constitutional protections differ between corporations and individuals. The courts have only held that corporations are entitled to First Amendment protections. Hence, post deprivation hearings (i.e., after an action has resulted in loss of life, liberty, or property) do not violate banks’ due process rights since courts have not held that corporations are entitled to Fifth Amendment due process protections at all.

However, natural-person credit unions, as cooperative associations of individual members, are different. They have full constitutional rights and are entitled to individual due process protections. Thus, a post-deprivation hearing did not satisfy individual Fifth Amendment due process protections.

Therefore, KAPFCU believed that the NCUA liquidation and dissolution order was unconstitutional because it was based on a closed-door meeting, and because a post-deprivation hearing could not satisfy individual Fifth Amendment due process concerns as a natural-person credit union. KAPFCU believed its due-process rights were doubly violated.

 

 

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“Rush to Judgment”

An excerpt from Chapter 14 of Community Capital,  Race, Equity and the Credit Union Movement.  Co-author Michel McCray continues telling how NCUA closed  Kappa Alpha Psi FCU in 2010. (fourth in a total of five selections)

“The NCUA board members refused to dissolve KAPFCU at first,” I said. “They recognized that cash basis vs. accrual accounting increased expenses and created our net worth ratio problems.”

“That’s good.”

I explained, “Region IV officials convinced the NCUA board to liquidate KAPFCU based on a series of lies and false representations in an ex-parte proceeding.”

“Which is total bullshit.” Victor said, “We need to demand a personal meeting with Debbie Matz or get a hearing before the entire NCUA board.”

“They ain’t gonna listen to us, Vic,” I said. “They’re trying to screw us.”

“Well, if they won’t listen to us, then we need to get [Representative] Eddie Bernice Johnson,” Victor said, “and the whole freaking Congressional Black Caucus to reach out to NCUA on our behalf.”
“If that doesn’t work, Vic, we need to take them to court ASAP.”

Victor nods. “Who do we know in Washington, D.C.?”

Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX) wrote a letter to Debbie Matz requesting a meeting or emergency hearing for KAPFCU. NCUA officials ignored the emphatic request from a distinguishedCongressional Black Caucus member.

They also ignored KAPFCU’s frantic meeting request in a last-ditch effort to stop the surprise liquidation.

I issued a press release announcing KAPFCU’s decision to sue NCUA. If successful, KAPFCU v. NCUA could be the Brown v. Topeka Board of Education case of the credit union movement.(pages 201-202)

Tomorrow: the Court Hearing

 

 

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Confrontation: An NCUA Examiner and Credit Union Leader

In Community Capital,  Race, Equity and the Credit Union Movement co-author Michel McCray tells the story in Part 2 of the closing of Kappa Alpha Psi FCU in 2010.

He creates first person accounts and reconstructed dialogue of some of the events from the participants.  The following excerpt is from a quarterly  meeting between the NCUA examiner and Victor Russell who was leading the credit union.

Confrontation  (From Chapter 12, Alice in Wonderland)

An angry sun glared off the tinted glass of a small law office in Richardson, Texas. I waited for my cousin, the proprietor, to return. Tall in stature but slight in height, Julius Thompson is a brilliant attorney who is the general counsel for KAPFCU. He provides legal expertise and guidance to the fraternity enterprise. He also offers his offices, file cabinets, and conference room to support the KAPFCU effort.

Friends and family call him the “Godfather;” Julius Thompson, the bald barrister with a caramel coffee complexion. Julius has a knack for networking and connecting people. He also recruited me to assist KAPFCU with government relations and community development expertise to help grow the fledgling credit union. . .

At 6:02 p.m., an alabaster male with stern, square cheekbones and thin lips walked into the conference room at Julius Thompson PLLC to conduct the quarterly examination of KAPFCU, the only federally chartered Black-owned financial institution in the state. He wore a dark conservative suit, a busy patterned tie, and polished leather shoes. He was clean-shaven with amber hair and piercing cobalt eyes.

NCUA Supervisory Analyst Tony Rausch personified the Texan view towards minority-owned financial institutions. Privileged, aggressive, and assertive, his demeanor was best described as “typical Texan,” exuding his white male privilege. Empowered as a federal official, he was assertive regardless of whether he was right or wrong. Ultimately, being a “Fed” means that you never have to say you’re sorry.

A loud commotion erupted inside the conference room of the small legal office and real estate title plant. Tony Rausch, a “good ‘ol boy” from Texas, versus Victor Russell, a fast-talking hustler from Chicago. They congealed like oil and water. However, Victor had transformed from Chicagoan to Texan, donning ten-gallon hats and ornate belt-buckles with Italian suits—even Black people do rodeo in Texas.

During the regular quarterly examination, Victor Russell described the current operations of KAPFCU and his plans to increase revenues by origination fees for residential or commercial mortgage transactions. Tony’s eyebrows rose. “Slow down, Victor, before you try to jump into high finance. You guys are just sitting on your deposits. If you want more money, make more loans to your members.”

Victor sat upright, interlocking his fingers. “We are trying to mitigate our risk. In banking, we say, ‘know your customer.’ We know our members and make loans to individuals we know will pay us back.”
“Very good, because that’s the only way you can legitimately make money to generate revenues,” said Tony.

Victor argued that KAPFCU was not issuing or holding mortgages on the credit union’s balance sheet. Instead, KAPFCU would only make referral fee income by finding qualified borrowers for other financial institutions. Rausch balked at this and declared that KAPFCU could not generate mortgage fee income because of real estate risk. “I will not let you do that, Victor.”

“What do you mean, you won’t let us do this? You don’t run our credit union—we do!” Victor bellowed.
“That’s not how small credit unions operate.” Tony replied, “You must grow your loan portfolio. Make your money from member loans.”  (pages 180-181)

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A Book Illuminating Recent Credit Union Struggles

July 30, National Whistleblowers Appreciation Day, is the publishing date for Community Capital,  Race, Equity and the Credit Union Movement.  

Here is a brief excerpt by Clifford Rosenthal, one of the authors.  The book’s principal case study is in Part Two. It is the story of Kappa Alpha Psi FCU and its abrupt liquidation in 2010 as recounted by one of the participants, and co-author, Michael McCray

From The Historical Context, page 20, by Clifford Rosenthal (used with permission):

     On August 3, 2010, without notice, NCUA seized and liquidated KAPFCU, sending out checks to close member depositors accounts. KAPFCU was effectively dead and gone.

      Why was KAPFCU’s case so important? For decades before and since, a steady stream of liquidations and mergers decimated the ranks of Black and other credit unions serving communities of color. Our Federation lost many small credit unions, painfully including many Black credit unions with roots in the Civil Rights movement and even earlier.

    But KAPFCU did what no credit union in our movement had dared to do during my 30 years at the Federation: they fought the liquidation in federal court.

    KAPFCU’s fate could have been—should have been—different. Had KAPFCU prevailed in court, Michael argued, KAPFCU v. NCUA could have been the landmark Brown vs. Topeka Board of Education case for the credit union movement.

 On Vacation

Next week I will be away at a singing camp working on Ralph Vaughn Williams’ A Sea Symphony and Five Mystical Songs.  Upon returning, I will post a number of key moments from the book to illustrate both the content and the style.   It is a glimpse into NCUA actions long before the letters DEI were aligned together.

In the meantime it can be ordered on Amazon for those who can’t wait.

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Regulation as a Service

There is a growing use or reinterpretation of  business models where a critical product or solution is not managed in house, but rather outsourced to a third party.

“Software as a service,” a term with multiple meanings, is one example.  Another I learned about recently was “banking as a service.” In this configuration the chartering functions are separate  from the back office support operations, which are run totally by a third party.

In these “service” models, separate organizations integrate their special skills to achieve common purpose.

There was a time and indeed an era, when credit union regulation was seen as actual “public service.” That is regulators were to serve the operations, needs and success of the overall cooperative system.  Their role was integral and supportive. Regulators were not a distant authority merely keeping lookout for and, if necessary, the cleanup  business accidents.

Regulation as a Service

The following are the high points from an extended list in an NCUA Annual report  for how the Agency, in its word, “served” America’s credit unions that year.  There were two categories:  Benefits and Outreach.

For credit unions benefit:

NCUA’s efforts to reduce costs and implement efficiency resulted in federal credit union paying 2.9% of $1.3 million less in 1997 to support NCUA operations.

The second consecutive NCUSIF dividend which returned over $100 million to federally insured credit unions  last October.  . . is a tribute to the strength and sound management skills of today’s credit union community.

At NCUA a major contribution to efficiency was fully implementing the new Automated Integrated Regulatory Examination system (AIRES).  It is a critical component to improve the examination process for both NCUA and credit unions.

Outreach Initiated

Last year 12 federal credit unions and 12 NCUA examiners participated in a pilot program placing examiners behind the scenes  in credit unions for two weeks.The purpose was to provide examiners with first hand knowledge of daily credit union operations.

NCUA began asking credit unions to evaluate their NCUA exam in a brief one-page critique. The goal is to incorporate improvements and to promote open communications with credit unions.

A technical highlight was linking NCUA to the World Wide Web.

The agency . .. launched a major effort to achieve a diverse work force and improve our employee’s quality of life.

(Source:  Page 6  NCUA 1996 Annual Report)

A Public Servant vs. An Independent Regulator

Following the corporate crisis in 2008/09, the NCUA board stressed their independence from credit unions. The revised corporate rules were imposed, not created in consultations. Other examples were the initial refusal to publish and take comments on the agency budget and the secrecy of the NOL calculation.  And later on, the risk-based capital regulation.

These initiatives and publications (A Guide to Credit Union Mergers) and proposed rules (closing all home-based credit unions) were from a position that “NCUA knows best.”

While some regulators will have initiatives from their experience with credit unions, many NCUA board members have little or no prior first-hand knowledge.   As a result they seek answers in the statutes, by looking across town to other regulators, or sometimes simply following the political winds of the Administration (Free market or Consumer protection are recent examples).

Weathervanes Responding to Winds?

To overcome this inexperience and/or knowledge gap, regulation as a service is one way board members can align their priorities with credit union needs.  Without this focus, it is easy to set policy by default. Look for where the wind is blowing the hardest versus what would assist credit unions to better serve members.

Instead of service for the public, NCUA becomes another Washington DC governmental “authority” directing members’ lives.

The interesting part about the verbatim accomplishments reprinted above is that most of these initiatives were not new.   But they reflected an attitude of accountability and support for the credit union community.   Not a bad place for any policy or priority to start.

Editors note:  For an even older description of this service approach read the article, Changing Role of the Regulator: Relationship Based On Mutual Respect,  by CEO Frank Wielga on pages 14 in NCUA’s 1984 Annual Report )