Crossing Red Lines

“We crossed a lot of red lines.” That is how Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell described the host of actions by the central bank responding to the COVID economic shutdown.

Actions included lowering interest rates to near zero, conducting unlimited bond purchases, implementing emergency lending programs to business, state and large city governments.

There are more steps planned, novel in scope and speed. These include the main street credit program to make at-risk loans to medium-sized businesses, buying corporate bonds and the debt of states and large cities.

The purchase of non-investment grade debt held by Exchange Traded funds was perhaps the most controversial. Included in the initial $1.3 billion purchases were bonds issued by Hertz, J.C. Penny, Neiman Marcus and Whiting Petroleum all of which have filed for bankruptcy. The US Treasury has been allocated up to $75 billion to cover potential losses on these non-bank, lending initiatives.

The Opportunity of a Crisis

But THE red line crossed that preceded all of these central bank actions was changing the internal mind set of the Federal bureaucracy. “We don’t do this. Where is the authority? We’ve never done this before. How will it work? What if we fail?”

With over one in four workers laid off, unemployment is expected to exceed 20% for May. Powell justified his innovative approach partly by the fact that the burdens of job loss are falling on those least able to afford it. They are lower paid service workers whose ranks are disproportionately women and minorities.

But changing long standing, institutional economic realities is hard. All governmental leaders find bureaucracies reluctant to move in innovative ways or at the pace of events. The easiest thing is keep doing what you have always done. The result, no real change occurs. The status quo remains.

The opportunities for transformational change can be fleeting. Public moods move quickly. Political and vested interests rise up. New approaches can be lost if not seized “in the moment” as Chairman Powell did.

He courageously decided to “cross all the institutional red lines.” Without taking that risk, the whole recovery momentum would be much more difficult.

NCUA’s Withdrawal from the Cooperative System

This crisis is an opportunity for NCUA to reverse the past decade’s pattern of unilateral, isolated and often self-serving regulatory responses in its relationships with credit unions.

Among all financial institutions, the cooperative model uniquely depends on collaboration. It is not just the basis for initial chartering, but also a singular operational advantage.

All elements of the system have a mutual responsibility for safety and soundness. Since the NCUA’s 2009 takeover of the corporate network followed by liquidation of four of the five largest corporates, it has failed to seek solutions cooperatively with credit unions and in members’ best interests.

The disruptions to financial performance by the crisis should be a turning point in this relationship. No regulatory rule or waiver, or congressional legislation, can “de-risk” the consequences of the financial toxicity caused by the pandemic and national economic shutdown.

The regulatory impulse to get rid of problems through mergers and selling member-owners to someone else when the going gets tough is a slow-moving death spiral for the industry.

Cooperative workouts are not presumed to be fast, especially when relying on retained earnings. They take time – sometimes years. They are messy. Each is unique, personal in the details. They require sweat equity and occasionally, 208/NCUSIF assistance.

The purpose of the 1% NCUSIF redesign was to keep credit unions and the system whole. Since the 2009 crisis NCUA has used the resources of this unique cooperative fund to broker problems away and avoid leadership accountability.

Crossing Red Lines to Avoid Red Ink

Jerome Powell has acted fast to help troubled industries, individual business, states and cities work their way through catastrophic revenue shortfalls and unknowable future trends. To keep the cooperative system whole while transitioning this crisis, NCUA must do the same.

The Board should establish an expectation that no credit union charter should be lost because of the current pandemic. Credit unions who work with their member-owners in this transition should expect no less than 100% support from their regulator.

This is not a legal, but a commonsense judgment. Similar to the Fed, the full range of credit union resources should be available whether this be 208 waivers and/or direct NCUSIF capital contributions.

This is a moment for NCUA to highlight the cooperative model in all its member focused uniqueness. It will require NCUA staff to grasp the opportunity for innovation by working with credit union leaders in the trenches. If that bureaucratic “red line” or mindset can be crossed, then the outcome should be a lot less red ink when this is over.

Merger Math in Credit Unions: A Deeply Flawed Process   

Many credit unions profess a growth strategy based on merging other credit unions. Simple math shows this is a dubious strategy.

Simple Merger Math:

1 credit union + 1 credit union = 1 credit union

The facts are straight forward.

A merger of two sound, well-run credit unions does not grow anything. It changes no market share, initiates no new community relationships and invariably results in new costs and lost members.

Most importantly, real choice for members is lost. Frequently the merging members were eligible to join the surviving credit union. If the surviving firm was indeed a better deal it should be winning over these members. But an unspoken reality is mergers are initiated to eliminate unbeatable competitors.

By cancelling charters of long serving, independent institutions, generations of member goodwill and community relationships are ended. Career opportunities for employees are compromised. Leadership within the communities served and in the industry by the board and senior management is, if not totally eliminated, shifted to senior staff already engaged. Rarely does the surviving leadership team have the local connections of the merged credit union.

Finally, from a cooperative system standpoint, as resources are concentrated in fewer and fewer organizations there is less diversity in risk management. Fewer organizations remain to innovate and develop business strategies.

A Flawed Democratic Process For Members

These issues were again raised in a Facebook post this month about a recently announced merger.

From a member’s point of view, this long-time credit union executive posed vital questions about the explanation  for combining two long serving, multi-billion, very sound charters. His concerns included:

  • Weak, “boiler plate” business justifications;
  • Failure to fully disclose all costs incurred by the transaction;
  • The loss of distinctive institutional cultures and professional career opportunities
  • The destruction of an organization’s unique heritage and its hard-earned legacy of generational relationships with members;
  • The absence of specific, quantifiable and immediate member benefits;
  • The elimination of member choice when the options from a well-run credit union are eliminated.

The post asked if the generalized assertions of potential future institutional gains were sufficient to offset the added costs and real losses incurred by the members of the cancelled charter. His conclusion was the transparency of this transaction is woefully insufficient.

Properly Informing Members

To my knowledge, members have never voted against a proposed credit union merger. A few announced mergers have been withdrawn before reaching the member vote.

While information presented in merger proposals today may be legally compliant, it does not provide the facts for members to make an informed choice.

Rather these votes succeed because they are predicated on trusting relationships even as that confidence is used to ask members to give up their unique institution.

Unintended Consequences

Mergers completed without member benefit as the foremost criteria are a suspect foundation for a cooperative. It presumes that success depends on the accumulation of greater institutional resources, not the relationship with the member-owners. Seeking greater market power is a classic recipe of for-profit firms. That is not why cooperatives were created.

If these deeply flawed, problematic merger processes continue then the future math of credit union mergers may be simply:

1 credit union – 1 credit union = 0. No member-owned coops are left.

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Presenting the Right Message About Credit Unions in Today’s Crisis

The doomsayers are already at work. Commentators use the March 31 data to prove their theory that an economic Armageddon is just around the corner. The end of everything we value. Unless of course we adopt their solution: more government, reopen faster, etc.

This pandemic is a health and an economic crisis. However, the greatest danger may be a loss of confidence in the spirit of who we are. Anyone who understands what made America today and why credit unions were created, knows that we will persevere and sustain.

Avoiding Self-Fulling Prophecy

But we must be careful not to project ourselves into a self-fulfilling prophecy of demise. That occurs when short term numbers or the peak of a problem is assumed in models and presented as the “new normal.”

Persons with an agenda will use these scenarios to enhance their position, resources or reputations. This happened in the 2008-2009 crisis and we need to learn that lesson in this new one.

These kinds of forecasts are impossible to make with accuracy. For they ignore the capacity of leaders and organizations to change and create “new normals;” that is, their innovative capacity to change the core assumptions models employ.

The First Quarter Numbers: A Case in Point

The first quarter numbers for most credit unions will show declines in the traditional measures of financial performance. ROAs will fall or even be negative, loan loss reserves will go up. Growth may slow. Delinquencies will increase, but certainly not by as much as will be the case for the June 30 numbers.

So what do the numbers mean? The most important point is that credit unions are sharing the financial pain and uncertainty of their member owners. This is the basic fact that is creating these numbers.

Credit unions are stopping fees, lowering rates, offering skips pays, and many other efforts to help members transition the unanticipated immediate economic shutdown required to stop the COVID virus.

Unemployment will reach heights not seen since the Great Depression. On average over 16% of the labor force (over 30 million) lost work in just one month. Rent, auto and credit card payments will be slowed or missed.

The members don’t know what their future will be; neither does their credit union. The credit union goal is not to hit an ROA goal, but rather sustain member relationships.

A Transition in Thinking and in Financial Trends

Traditional financial performance can be a very imperfect measure for how credit unions are serving members. At this time the numbers that may be the most unusual could be those that show everything is OK using traditional measures. More relevant performance analysis should focus on how many members are being helped and in what ways. For the ultimate strength of any credit union is its members.

Today, leading credit unions are reimagining how their resources can be used for members whose financial circumstances changed outside their control. This requires patience, creativity and new ways to structure member relationships.

This crisis is more than pivoting to virtual distribution, remote delivery and zoom interviews; the most critical innovation may be in the way credit is conceived. Loan terms may be extended, rates reduced, or payments based on whatever income is available. Outstanding credit may be restructured into A and B payment “tranches” in which the subordinate B tranche is the write-down needed to keep the member in the home or auto. It is the tranche that could be forgiven if the member cannot find work at previous income levels.

Monitor, Not Forecasting

Periodic reporting of the facts is important to ensure the industry’s collective resources are sent to the areas of highest need. Some credit unions will be more threatened than others because of the circumstances of their member base or community. The NCUSIF was constructed so that capital could be used to help these firms recover.

The greatest danger is not from the crisis itself, but how we respond. In both credit unions and government, competence, expertise and leadership ability is crucial. There is no prior road map to a new normal. Those in positions of authority must act with intelligence, recognizing lessons from the past. Credit unions have never lacked resources in a crisis, What is more important is wise stewardship of these mutual resources.

Directing Traffic For Essential Service

Access to cash is members’ top financial worry in a crisis. Some are fortunate to have savings, steady income or retirement to draw upon. Others, living paycheck to paycheck, must rely on credit. These two options are illustrated from actual events. In person lobbies are closed. The CEO directs members to one of two “drive-throughs” serving everyone, regardless of circumstance.

Born in a Crisis

In 1932 during the national depression, workers at Wright Field in Dayton, Ohio decided to chip in 25¢ a week to help an ailing co-worker and his struggling family. Recognizing a great idea, they later took a quarter each payday to create a fund for fellow workers who might one day also need help. It was called “The Sunshine Fund.”

That shoebox of money became Wright-Patt Credit Union, Ohio’s largest, with over $5 billion in assets.

Those seeds planted 90 years ago now serve 400,000 members in central and southwestern Ohio during an economic shut down some are comparing to the Great Depression.

Managing a crisis like COVID-19, without any playbook or past experiences to draw from is challenging. The issues that come up are things most wouldn’t have imagined a few short months ago. For CEO Doug Fecher, there are only two rules: “Try to do the right thing as best you see it; and, do those things the very best you can. If we do those two things, we’ll be okay.”

The following excerpts from Fecher’s April 15 board crisis update documents the intensity of added activities undertaken in this “essential service.”

From CEO Fecher’s WPCU Weekly Board Update (with permission)

The big news this week is the government’s release of stimulus funds.

  • WPCU today received and posted about 81,000 ACH deposits for $147MM of government stimulus funds

Lending

  • We’ve processed 10,700 skip-a-pays for about $3.6 million in payment relief.
  • We’ve made 211 disaster relief loans totaling $260K.
  • First mortgage activity, especially refinancings due to lower rates, continues brisk with 240 closed mortgages so far this month.
  • We release full government payment proceeds to members even when members may have a balancing owing or negative deposit account balance with WPCU.
  • As of Friday, April 10th, we’ve processed 128 forbearances on 1st mortgage loans in the WPCU portfolio.

Commercial Lending

  • We have obtained SBA approval on 180 PPP applications for a total of $37MM in funding.
  • The PPP loans approved so far support nearly 4,600 jobs. Loan amounts range from approximately $300K to $2.8MM.
  • An additional fifty PPP applications are in process raising our total to $40MM.
  • About 300 commercial applications are in queue as of April 14th.

Partner Update

  • We have no employees confirmed with COVID-19.
  • Thirteen employees are in physician-directed self-quarantine.
  • We pay COVID-19 medical expenses for employees and family members on the WPCU health plan.
  • Absenteeism has decreased as more Partners have been moved to work from home. For example, member help center absenteeism fell to 1% this week, from 14% on March 30th.

Operating Updates

  • Transaction volume is much higher this week across the board. We received 7,376 calls into the member help center on April 14th, compared to 5,780 calls as of March 30th.
  • Member center and member help center activity jumped this week with the release of government stimulus checks. This is resulting in longer than usual lines in drive-thru lanes and on telephones.
  • We are seeing increased attempts at fraud.
  • Marketing communicates on everything from encouraging use of remote services, to fraud avoidance, to helping members with their government stimulus checks.

Liquidity as of April 13th

Our liquidity coverage ratio is 3.46.

This means we have almost three-and-a-half times the maximum cash draw down in the last thirty days in available liquidity.

CLF: The One Thing Necessary

As of December 2019, approximately 1,468 credit unions with total assets of $1.4 trillion reported membership in the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system. These totals represent 27% of credit unions by number, and 88% of total assets.

By comparison, there were 278 credit unions that were Central Liquidity Facility (CLF) members holding $115 billion or about 7.2% of assets.

While numbers for Federal Reserve membership are not readily available, since NCUA requires by rule that all credit unions over $250 million be members of either the CLF or Federal Reserve, one can presume the overwhelming majority have opted for Fed membership.

Why this choice? If the Fed and CLF are both “lenders of last resort” why is the CLF deemed so unappealing? How is the FHLB system so much more relevant for credit unions then their own liquidity backstop?

NCUA’s Appeal for Credit Unions to Join the CLF

In its April 2020 meeting, the NCUA board approved final rules to make the CLF more attractive to join. Some changes were the result of the CARES legislation. They included opening membership to Corporates directly while changing their agent roles, expanding lending purpose, and increasing the borrowing multiple based on contributed capital from 12 to 16 times.

Rule changes eliminated the six-month waiting period after joining to borrow, the ability to withdraw membership upon demand versus the current 6-24 months delay, easing collateral requirements, and allowing corporates to borrow for their balance sheet. Staff also outlined improved loan processing capabilities.

The three Board members made individual appeals urging credit unions to join up now. They explained that the CLF, as now capitalized, could be inadequate to the crisis even at a multiple of 32 times member shares. NCUA could need liquidity for the NCUSIF and the Federal Financing Bank is the most reliable source for funding in a crisis.

The One Missing Element

The CLF is a “mixed-ownership government corporation” managed by the NCUA. The credit unions supply all the capital upon which total borrowing capacity is determined. Funding is direct from the government’s financing bank, unlike the FHLB system which raises its borrowings in the open market.

If the CLF is to be relevant in the future, the “mix” of the credit union and NCUA roles needs to be reassessed.

The historic agreement in 1983 for the corporate system to fully fund the CLF’s capital requirements for all credit unions  was ended by NCUA in 2012.  The NCUA failed to provide a design for the CLF to become an integral partner with its credit union members-owners.

In contrast today the FHLB system is credit union’s preferred lender because they are member-centric in their operations. Members buy capital stock to borrow in good times and bad; they elect the board, and individual banks proactively develop products and services to serve their various members’ needs.

The CLF has been used solely as a regulatory tool by NCUA. In the Great Recession, the primary borrower was the NCUSIF which forwarded $10 billion to the balance sheets of WesCorp and US Central. An effort designed by leading credit unions to create a “protracted adjustment credit” program for credit unions to refinance members’ mortgage loans became stillborn when NCUA staff took over the initiative.

Non Routine Borrowings to Resolve Problems

Credit unions seeking liquidity assistance will almost always be under some form of financial stress. This can be due to market dislocations making  assets difficult to value, unplanned share outflows, or earnings pressures from increased delinquency or  sound loan growth options.

By “normal” operating criteria, credit unions needing liquidity will be under financial strain and often under examiner constraints. Recent NCUA practice is not to provide workouts with problem credit unions via NCUSIF 208 and CLF assistance. Rather NCUA prefers to direct the credit union to downsize to fit its reduced capital ratio.  For contrast, this was not the policy when the CLF was used to alleviate the stress from the non-earning receivers’ certificates issued by the FDIC after the Penn Square failure in 1982.

NCUA has not sought credit union input for changes to better fulfill CLF’s legislative purpose to ”encourage savings, support consumer and mortgage lending, and provide basic financial resources to all segments of the economy.”

If credit unions are to be asked to fund the CLF more fully, they must be included in the conversation about the CLF’s future.

Reversing an Historic Catastrophe

At year-end 2011 and until October 25, 2012, the CLF was fully funded and covered all credit unions for membership. At the 2011 annual CLF audit, it had an estimated draw of $49.8 billion from the Federal Financing Bank. Total credit union assets at that time were $974 billion.

NCUA described events following the audit in 2012 in the annual report: “Neither USC bridge nor NCUA were able to secure the transition of USC’s products and services to a successor entity, thereby leading the Board’s decision to wind-down and liquidate USC Bridge’s operations as of October 29, 2012.

Accordingly, USC Bridge discontinued its role as the agent group representative for CLF and CLF redeemed USC Bridge’s capital stock on October 25, 2012. The result of the liquidation of the agent group representative is that as of December 31, 2012, CLF membership comprised solely regular members and no agent membership is in place.”

NCUA controlled both the USC Bridge and the CLF. NCUA unilaterally shut down the CLF’s thirty-year record of covering every credit union in the cooperative system.  

US Central was never insolvent when liquidated by NCUA.  US Central’s asset management estate (AME) today reports a positive balance of over $1.7 billion.

The Challenge at This Time

Two of the three current board members were involved in these prior events. Rodney Hood was on the NCUA board that conserved US Central in April 2009, even though solvent and fully reserved for losses. From February 2011 Todd Harper was NCUA’s Director of Public Affairs and senior policy advisor to Chairman Matz when the CLF’s comprehensive industry role was terminated in October 2012.

If the Board can learn from these previous events to again develop a partnership with credit unions about the role of the CLF, they will rectify one of the most unfortunate actions ever taken by NCUA.

Credit unions’ strength is their ability to collaborate, work for shared purpose and exercise patience when resolving problems. If the Board reaches out and listens, real change can be made in the next covid congressional package that will be coming down the congressional pike.

Such a re-design could make the CLF central to the future of the cooperative system and enhance the role laid out for it by Congress. That would be a tremendous opportunity in the current crisis to reverse a mistake from the prior one. Is the Board up to the challenge this time?

Ending Autopilot Decision Making in Credit Union Mergers

No credit union merger proposal has ever been turned down by a vote of the members. In over 5,000 voluntary mergers over the last two decades, most were by credit unions that were financially sound.

So why has the voting process been so perfunctory, to the point of meaninglessness?

Why has this fundamental member-owner responsibility become so routine?

This is especially critical when much evidence exists in for-profit sector and financial services, that many mergers destroy value.

One reason why this exercise in cooperative democracy appears pointless is that the voting decisions is presented in such a way that members believe there is no real choice in the matter.

Members are given no economic facts or alternatives, and often given a nudge in the form of a special dividend to follow the course recommend by the Board and management to give up their charter.

In an article exploring why consumers may act contrary to their economic self-interest,  the authors provide the following observation from behavioral economics:

“While it may not sound like a lot of fun to think about the opportunity costs of every financial decision, we need to be careful and not get too caught up in an “autopilot” mode of decision making. Thinking about everything we could do with our money is hard. At the time you make a purchase, remember that you can spend the money only once. More costs exist, so you may miss future opportunities such as a more significant purchase, interest earned on savings, bill payments, or other possibilities. The difficulty of considering several options leads us to revert to mental shortcuts during our decision making.”

Surrendering control over an organization and legacy assets produced by the efforts of generations is hardly a routine decision. Might it be time to ask whether the so called voting process be re-evaluated based on cooperative values and fiduciary responsivity?

Heroes In a Time of Crisis: Investing in Staff and Members’ Well Being

The following is a coronavirus action plan from Doug Fecher, CEO of Wright-Patt Credit Union in Beavercreek, Ohio. He opens by honoring all those serving on the front lines, outlines changes in operations (details omitted) and summarizes the waiving of many member fees. The member actions below could reduce income by $50 million or more depending on the length of the crisis. This, he says, is why we have capital. “I’m sure there’s more we can do, and will do, but this is where we’re starting.”


Partners,

What is a hero?

No matter what the dictionary says, for me it is someone who simply answers the call. Often we think of saving a life, but actually most heroic acts are things we don’t usually think about at all. More often than not, heroes are those who take care of their neighbors when nobody else will.

Some people put themselves in position to perform heroic acts. Others find themselves thrust into the role– finding themselves at a crossroads of time, place, and opportunity where a decision must be made. Do I step up or not?

Being a hero doesn’t mean we don’t have fear – it means we do what we need to do despite being afraid.

Imagine life without our everyday heroes.

First responders, members of the military, nurses, and doctors are clearly heroes. But they aren’t the only ones. So understand me when I say, with all due respect to those obvious heroes, that I consider people like us – people who work in grocery stores, pharmacies, and other typical businesses who never thought that what they do is provide essential community services – those people can be heroes too.

And make no mistake – this includes all of you! You and your colleagues at WPCU who work in a business that provides one of the most essential services of all – peace of mind. At a time when you are worrying about your own families you are also being asked by the credit union to step up for others – to make sure members don’t run out of the cash they need to manage their own way through this terrible and unprecedented event.

None of this is easy. Everybody wants passionately to get it right. I want to assure you that we are doing everything we can to balance the interests of all our stakeholders to make the best decisions we can. Things are changing daily, even hourly, and so as they change so will the decisions we make to navigate our way through each day.

Heroes. That’s what I think you are, and I don’t think I’m overstating it. I cannot thank you enough.

Now let me update you on where we are today: [internal operations omitted]

Member Temporary Emergency Relief Services

We are putting in place a set of emergency relief services to help members cope with the economic hardship of job loss or reduced income. These services will be available as soon as practical (some require programming, etc. that may take a few days).

Emergency relief services include:

  • Temporary unemployment loans are available at 4% interest
  • Early withdrawal penalties on share certificates of deposit are waived (daily cash withdrawal limits apply).
  • Late fees on loans are waived.
  • Consumer credit card limits for creditworthy borrowers are automatically increased by $1,000.00; higher limits may be available by request.
  • Commercial credit card limits may be increased upon request.
  • Members are permitted to skip up to three consumer loan payments without penalty (Skip a pay may not be available on certain loans). Additional skip-payments may be granted upon request.
  • We are temporarily suspending new foreclosures and automobile repossessions. If you are having trouble paying your bills we urge you to contact us so that we can help.

We are also implementing a temporary change to member fees in order to provide further relief:

  • Share transfer fees for NSF/overdrafts are suspended.
  • NSF/overdrafts fees are suspended.
  • Member choice transaction fees are suspended.
  • Foreign ATM fees are suspended.

Thank you …

These are difficult times, but they are temporary. We will get through this even if we don’t know just how long it will last. Our community will become more used to a new normal way of doing things including accessing cash, and this will happen even before the crisis ends. Every day that passes brings us one day closer to this being over.

I hope you understand that the actions we are taking are to protect our partners and members as best we can. Truth be told I personally hate that we can’t just close shop and have everyone go home to wait this out. But if a home catches fire the firefighters will show up. If you go to a hospital there will be doctors and nurses waiting to care for you. If you need food or medicine there will be grocery and a pharmacy open to help you. And if you need cash or can’t pay your bills, buy basic supplies, or take care of your family, we are your credit union. We will be there for you too. Closing our business is just not an option.

And that’s why I think you all are heroes. It’s not something I say lightly, and so when I say thanks for all you’re doing, I hope understand the emotion and force of those words. I simply can’t thank you enough.

Doug Fecher, CEO

Learning at the Speed of the Crisis: A Cooperative Advantage

Everything Cancelled! That is the economic and social reality today from the coronavirus crisis. Except for one critical capacity-to learn at the speed of change.

Credit unions have three distinct strengths in the current crisis:

  1. They focus locally. Regardless of national guidelines or initiatives, all execution is local. Schools, businesses, health care and all services are led and delivered specifically for each community The community is the “home field” advantage of every credit union.
  2. Members come first, not a stock price or buybacks, or jousting for a corporate takeover as competitors weaken. Members are why we exist. Their financial health is each institutions’ “social capital” of trust.
  3. Collaboration, based on the principle of self-help, is our competitive advantage. Working together even with “social distancing” is integral to our system’s design.

Turning to Action

When asked about knowing the peak of the curve tracking the virus spread, NIH infectious disease expert Dr Fauci stated: “We don’t know about it until after the fact.”

In contrast to this post-event knowledge (hindsight is always 20:20) the cooperative advantage is the ability to share and learn from each other to proceed with confidence through each phase of a crisis. Real time sharing brings insight and foresight.

Every crisis, externally imposed or internally caused, goes through a similar, predictable cycle: Discovery/incident, growing realization of impact, uncertainty creating fear and doomsday predictions; responses-local and national; slow recovery, and step by step return to normalcy.

The greatest danger is to get stuck in judgments in one part of the cycle and assume that will be the situation forever. The best example is NCUA’s actions to the corporate investment portfolios in2008/09.

Learning occurs from first-hand intra-industry sharing about credit unions plans and actions. Often in real time webinars.

“Uninterrupted Service” and “There’s a lot we can do”

One CEO’s focus in his staff communications is to ”deliver uninterrupted service to members.” He further observed:

We are offering members a variety of ways to help them. We have a temporary income replacement loan with an interest rate of 2 or 3 percent. Also a few extra free skip-a-pays (we offer one free skip-a-pay per year as a matter of routine). Our Governor closed our schools for three weeks which is creating a childcare nightmare for our mostly parent-age employees so we are considering an interest-free loan for any extra childcare expenses they incur during the crisis (we need them to come to work if they can). 

So far not much of an issue for members – we’re getting some requests for assistance but only a handful so far. I expect this could increase significantly in coming months.

Our crisis team is meeting every day to re-assess and make new decisions. I’ve been around a long time and have never seen anything like this – this is worse than the great recession because of the panic around health. We will be fine – this is what we have capital for, right? We have a lot of it so there’s a lot we can do.

Keeping Credit Flowing-Lowest Borrowing Rates Ever

The Federal Reserve’s actions lowering short term rates to zero creates a potent borrowing and member lending opportunity for credit unions This morning’s fixed rate term loan advances from a FHLB ranged from .81% for one year to 1.02 for five years.

With this historically low cost of funds, credit unions can leverage their balance sheets to assist members to refinance outstanding loans. Refinanced loans have a payment history and can be secured. Lowering rates puts more cash in members’ hands or enables faster loan spay offs. Refi’s of home mortgages can benefit members years beyond the crisis.

Creating low cost short-term financing for those members and businesses subject to uncertainty is vital to an economic rebound. Credit unions have the local knowledge to direct their lending priorities where it is most needed in the community.

“An Essential Service” and “Being Good Neighbors”

I received the following excerpt in an email from a credit union:

Financial institutions are considered an essential service, so our branches are open to serve you during the shelter-in-place order impacting six Bay Area counties.

In a crisis, recovery starts from the bottom up, not the top down. While national funding can counter market’s liquidity panics, recoveries in retail sales, business re-openings and restoring normal patterns of commerce must occur locally. Dependable financial services are the oil to keep the wheels of commerce turning.

On Sunday I participated in a Zoom church gathering. The order of service was the same as if we were in the sanctuary, some music and congregational interaction through Zoom’s “gallery view.” The technology provided all regular service practices. By doing so it renewed a sense of community even without physical presence.

Learning inspires innovation. Another congregation announced in the midst of city-wide church closures in DC: “The church is not closed, but the church is changing its practices for the time being.” 

When everything is postponed or shutdown in our daily lives, all routines are unsettled.

Crisis can breed fear, even panic. One credit union reported a member who withdrew his entire share balance: $500,000.

Learning new ways to be good neighbors for our members, community and the coop system could be the most important outcome of this crisis experience. That would be an “essential service” lasting much longer than facilitating daily financial transactions.

Does Common Bond Matter Anymore?

Until the economic upheaval of the 1970s, the field of membership (common bond) was not only a legal requirement for a credit union charter. It was a practical necessity.

Credit unions for the entire 20th century were started with no financial capital. Rather, the sponsor support and subsidies as well as volunteers’ “sweat equity” enabled credit unions to slowly build up their financial capacity.

The employer based FOM was the dominant chartering model. With it came members on steady payrolls, space in the plant and personnel who would donate time to manage the daily interactions.

The field of membership was a way for beginning coops to focus their efforts on a market niche that provided a stable economic environment. Lending, long before FICO scores, was based on character and capacity. Character was determined by co-workers on the credit committee and capacity by how long you had been on the job.

The Unraveling of the FOM

Most states, and the federal regulator after 1934, interpreted the common bond literally. So, if a plant closed, a hospital merged or a business was sold, the credit union was deemed to have lost its organizing rationale and was liquidated.

From the late 1970s into the early years of the deregulation era, this rigidity resulted in closing credit unions, still financially viable, when their members were most in need. Mergers were not allowed of unlike common bonds. The dependence on stable employers was eroded by the changes in the economy that saw the Midwest manufacturing base decline into a so called rust belt. New service industries emerged which did not match the employment model of large manufacturing companies.

The Opening of the Common Bond

The economic disruption of the 1980s, the parallel deregulation of financial services and never-ending technology revolution have changed the traditional understanding of field of membership.

Today most credit unions have the ability to define their common bond in a way that matches their business goals. A few still retain a narrow common definition such as State Farm FCU, $4.2 billion in Bloomington, IL. Others such as Pentagon FCU claim a potential field of membership of 329 million. Or in other words, every American.

So does the common bond matter? Some competitors think so. One startup fintech serving the student loan market named itself Common Bond. On its website the company promotes itself with a values and social purpose philosophy versus what one might expect as offering the “best loan rates.”

The Common Bond Today

Ed Callahan, the former NCUA chair was sometimes accused of destroying the common bond. He would reply, “I don’t believe in THE common bond. I believe in A common bond.”

The focus Ed referred to is interpreted many ways by credit unions. Some like Ironworkers USA FCU turned its whole fortunes around by doubling down by serving more union members across the country. Many credit unions have embraced community charters even if they retain a core, legacy focus on an original sponsor.

Some credit unions reinterpret the common bond by rebranding with aspirational names: Xplore, Aspire, Brotherhood, Team 1. Others build a commitment around purpose or serving a particular need in the community such as Credit Human. Some focus on the cooperative message of ownership: My Credit Union or Western Cooperative.

What Common Bond Means

Time and again this topic arises in every credit union’s strategic journey. It is a core element of cooperative design. There is no single, clear working definition. But examples and history help us understand the importance of thinking clearly about this self-description. For it is the foundation of a credit union, not merely a legal license. Without this definition, the cooperative design becomes aimless, prey to the fates of fortune and chance. That’s not what members hope to find when they join a credit union.

The Cooperative System’s Unique Capabilities In a Crisis

Since the era of deregulation, the credit union system has navigated multiple national and local crises. These include the October 1987 stock market shock, the meltdown of the S&L system, the bankruptcy and government rescue of the FDIC and FSLIC, the Y2K uncertainty, the 9/11 terrorist attack, and the Great Recession of 2008/09.

Now the coronavirus threatens national physical and economic security.

There are three vital responses that characterize credit union capabilities in a crisis.

1. Liquidity

The number one priority for both credit unions and their members. As economic uncertainty mounts, markets begin to tighten, there is no longer rational pricing, and everyone starts to hoard cash. Consumer spending slows, job losses mount and business revenue becomes less certain.

The most important action credit unions take is to keep credit flowing. Actions include supporting members’ credit requests, financing purchases such as cars and housing, and marketing lower interest rates to help members refinance higher rate loans.

2. Act Counter-Cyclically

Credit unions are designed for crises. Cooperatives’ unique structure enables them to act counter cyclically and therefore stand against the market pressures to put institutional financial priority ahead of member interests. Credit unions are the solution to many of the individual and community economic strains a crisis brings. By keeping the loan windows open and liquidity available at normal rates, market failures can be ameliorated and the time to recovery shortened.

3. National Legislation

The national legislation that accompanies a crisis should be an opportunity to enhance the cooperative model, not queue up at the federal trough seeking taxpayer funds for an industry built on the concept of self-help.

Significant legislation to upgrade the cooperative system historically occurs once each decade. Given the rivalry with banking groups and conflicting treasury priorities, it is difficult to predict when and how any opportunity will occur.

Rather than being caught up in the bailout legislative frenzy, this is the time to upgrade the cooperative system. Necessary bold changes could include:

    1. The redesign of the CLF to bring governance by the member owners and to enhance purpose by enabling cooperative access to the secondary market via the CLF.
    2. Explicit recognition of member-owner rights in cooperative governance.
    3. Enhanced accountability and transparency by NCUA for use of member funds and the agency’s responsibility in advancing cooperative solutions.

Not Letting a Crisis Go to Waste

The urgency of a crisis can cause responsible parties to focus only on the immediate challenges and not broader opportunities. Restoring the status quo can dominate the immediate agenda.

Credit unions were created to transform market options for members. During the Depression they were a national policy response resulting in the passage of the FCU Act.

Credit unions can respond to crisis in ways firms worried about share prices and market reactions cannot. Their member ownership structure ensures credibility by placing members’ interest first. The cooperative financial structure permits patience to persevere through the cycles of value that accompany every crisis.

Leaders Who Believe in the Power of Self-Help

These features mean that credit unions, in crisis, can demonstrate practically and forcefully why America needs cooperative solutions more than ever.

The key to realizing these crisis advantages is leadership. Can the persons responsible avoid getting caught in the panics that ensue? Will leaders listen and collaborate with credit unions on the front lines already responding with creativity and resilience? Will they promote the cooperative solutions or revert to practiced roles promoting personal or political advantage?

The cooperative message is that we are not prisoners of fate in a crisis. Credit unions demonstrate the many ways to overcome the doubts of today for a better tomorrow.