An Observervation on the Difficulty of  Gaining a Credit Union Charter

Oscar Abello is the senior economic writer for Next City.  His focus is community initiatives that bring opportunities to those left behind by existing financial options.  New credit union charters are an area of special interest.

His latest story is A Long-Awaited Black-Led Credit Union Finally Gets the Green Light.  The subtitle is “after eight years of work, Arise Community Credit Union just secured Minnesota’s first state charter in over two decades.”

The announcement of this new charter’s background has been reported by the credit union press.  Abello’s story focuses on the difficulties of the process.   Here are some of his observations:

Chartering a new credit union today is like traversing a long-lost trail through the woods, one that used to be well-traveled but is now overgrown, littered with fallen trees and other obstacles no one has had to navigate in many years. Prior to 1970, there were 500 to 600 new credit unions chartered across the country every year. After a steep decline to near zero, the numbers have never recovered. Over the past 10 years, fewer than 30 new credit unions have been chartered across the country.

New Credit Union Charters

The annual number of new credit union charters issued nationwide by the federal government, as published in the annual reports from the NCUA.

According to Inclusiv, a network of credit unions that focus on community development, minority credit unions across the country are closing at the rate of one per week, making the new Arise Community Credit Union’s chartering even more urgent if that trend is to ever be reversed.  (Editor’s note: all credit unions close at a rate of more than three per week). . .

Arise hopes to fill in the gap left behind by other more conventional banks and even other credit unions. Predatory lenders have jumped into the gap left behind by the retreat of the mainstream banking system from certain communities. African Americans are twice as likely to live within 2.5 miles of a payday lending storefront, compared with all Minnesotans. . .

Chartering a new credit union is a huge lift. It’s been nearly eight years of organizing for Arise, but it’s not uncommon for aspiring credit union organizers to take multiple years between initial conversations to raising startup capital to finally getting a new charter. The Association for Black Economic Power also had to deal with a leadership transition along the way — it’s now led by Debra Hurston. The new credit union has its own CEO, Daniel Johnson, who has deep family ties and professional ties to the Northside of Minneapolis.

It would have been easier — and quicker — for Hurston if her group just brought in an existing bank or credit union as a partner organization to provide access to credit and basic financial services to the Northside.

But Hurston says in surveys, town halls and just informal conversations over the years, the Northside’s desire for its own institution has only gotten stronger.

“The mistrust in the banking community, it’s not a small thing, and it can’t be fixed overnight,” Hurston told me last year. “We’re starting from the wrong spot…if I have to protest in front of you to make you treat me right. Something’s not right about that. So no one from our communities has ever asked me if we should just partner with a larger bank.”

Insight for Those Who Care

Abello’s reporting should be a boon to the credit union community.  For as Robert Burns wrote of this ability to see what others may not:

O wad some Power the giftie gie us To see oursels as ithers see us! It wad frae mony a blunder free us, An’ foolish notion: What airs in dress an’ gait wad lea’e us, An’ ev’n devotion!

Music For Holy Week

Christ on the Mount of Olives, by Ludwig van Beethoven (1803)

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5ZKWcn7bqsQ&t=41s)

What Credit Union’s Can Learn from the FHLB System

This month the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a 27-page report analyzing the Federal Home Loan Bank System.

The significant chapters include an Overview, Financial Condition, Subsidies and Risks.

The FHLB system is the largest lender to credit unions. Hundreds of credit unions have capital invested in individual banks and rely on them as critical partners for liquidity and ALM management.  At 2023 credit union borrowings reached a peak in the system’s history:

The Central Liquidity Facility

How can the cooperatively owned, tax exempt FHLB, created to serve the savings and loan system, thrive with credit unions while their own funded CLF plays no role at all? Certainly, the borrowing demand is there.

At February 2024, the CLF reported $913 million in total assets, equity of $862 million and one loan for $1.0 million.

A 5% return on the fund’s retained earnings of $42 million would pay all CLF’s operating expenses.  It’s 4th quarter 2023 dividend of 4.62% trailed the overnight market by .75%. Why aren’t members even receiving a market return on their shares?

More importantly, what can credit unions learn from the CBO’s analysis and the system’s response?

The CBO and FHLB Summary

Ryan Donovan, CEO of the Council of the Federal Home Loan Banks posted a reply #FHLBank to the CBO report: “it does a fair job of acknowledging the many things we have been saying.” He singled out a number of key success factors:

Private investors — not the government or taxpayers — bear the cost of any “subsidy” associated with the FHLBank system.

The FHLBank system plays a valuable role in providing liquidity to its members, particularly during times of market stress.

The benefits the system provides accrue not only to the members but to borrowers and the public. In fact, it says,

“Lower financing costs on FHLBs’ debt are passed along through lower rates on advances than members would receive when borrowing in private debt markets. In turn, competition leads members to offer lower rates to borrowers.”

“Because members are both owners and customers of FHLBs, almost all of the subsidy (after afford-able housing payments are deducted) probably passes through to them, either in the form of low-cost advances or, to a lesser extent, through dividends.”

The existence of the FHLBank system “reduces mortgage rates and provides liquidity to the housing market, particularly during period of financial stress.”

The FHLBank system poses very little risk to taxpayers. If one accepts the CBO’s figure of $600 million in federal tax exemption, the roughly $1 billion that the FHLBanks will distribute in affordable housing and community development grants this year seems like a very good investment for taxpayers.   

Donovan concludes: The report stymies critics . . .because CBO makes clear FHLBanks pose little risk, they provide significant public benefit, the implicit guarantee is perceived by bond investors and the benefits of the system flow through to borrowers and communities.

The FHLBank system is poised to deliver $1 billion toward affordable housing and community development . . .We’re engaged every day with our members and other stakeholders on how those resources can be used most effectively.  (end)

All these housing and community benefits should be possible with the CLF.  Why isn’t this happening?  What might a CBO report on the CLF say? Would anyone care?

Music for Holy Week

With each daily post I will be adding excerpts from some of the great classical music inspired by this Holy Week. Today’s is the “Resurrexit” from Berlioz Messe Solennelle.

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K-RX0XtBBnw&t=29s)

 

 

 

Charter Conversions: What Is the State of Credit Union’s  Dual Chartering System?

One of the extraordinary advantages of a credit union charter is the choice of either a state or federal license.   This choice has been a critical aspect in credit union’s expanding role in the economy and responding to changing market conditions.

So when I recently received a letter from the CEO of Harvard University Employees Credit Union (HUECU) announcing a members’ special meeting to approve a conversion to a federal charter, I was very interested in why the change.

Was this a one-off situation or an indicator of an imbalance in charter choice in Massachusetts?

A Current Study

HUECU reported $1.2 billion in assets and loans of almost $1.1 billion, serving 55,000 members at December 2023.   Most operating ratios are in a stable to strong range:  Net worth 8.5% Delinquency .65%, ROA .28 and operating expenses of 2.74% of average assets.

The loan portfolio continues its healthy growth in three distinct components:  an alumni credit card with $44 million in balances, a $252 million student loan portfolio and $721 million real estate loans.

The CEO’s cover letter included five pages summarizing the pros and cons for the action:

Advantages:

  • Reduces multiple credit union exam and compliance requirements;
  • Potential flexibility with various initiatives, especially branching and CUSO investments;
  • MSIC insurance for all deposits above $250,000 will be continued, but is no longer required;
  • Easier to open branches outside the state;
  • A redefined and broader field of membership with a multiple FCU common bond to seek growth outside Massachusetts:
  • No state sales tax, lower supervisory fees, and elimination of state CRA compliance.

Disadvantages:

  • The costs of conversion including signage, changes in legal documents, and consultant’s fees totaling as much as $600,000;
  • Loss of local regulator accessibility and responsiveness;
  • Limited ability to influence national regulation and issues;
  • State law offers greater interest rate loan flexibility and longer maturities on other loans.

The special meeting requires a quorum of 18 members and a majority of votes by ballot or in person in favor to approve the conversion.

The CEO’s cover letter states the members will see no operational differences after the conversion.

In addition to my membership in the credit union, the CEO Craig Leonard encouraged members to call in with questions.   I was given his email, and we talked for an hour this past Monday.

He outlined three priorities which he hoped to accelerate with this step.

  • Faster growth,  beyond the Harvard community into other New England states and perhaps Florida;
  • Immediately draw in more savings especially as loan demand has always been plentiful—with an initial focus on the small business market;
  • Retain the Harvard name (Harvard Federal Credit Union), its strong brand and the relationship of its employees to the University and its benefit plans.

Craig said this topic had been raised several times as he perceived a lack of a “level playing field between state and federal” charters in Massachusetts.

The state is home to approximately 135 credit unions that rank it as the 12th largest in total credit union assets.   Of this total, 50 are state charters.

Both regulators have approved the credit union’s business plan forecast.   It is now up to the members.  Craig holds periodic town hall meetings with members because he believes “I work for you.”   This Special  meeting is March 26 at the Harvard Faculty Club.

While this may be a unique event, the balance and perceptions of charter advantages are an important metric on the soundness of the credit union system.

Whenever state or federal regulations become less responsive to their credit unions, charter change is a real option for many. It is one means of keeping regulatory accountability.  It is also a spur to keep the multiple state regulatory systems, individually  much smaller than NCUA. responsive to their local charters.

The State of Dual Chartering

The ability to convert from a state to a federal charter and vice versa remains a uniquely cooperative option.

In 2023 there were twelve charter conversions.  Nine state credit unions (from seven different states) converted to FCU’s, two federal charters went to state and one state chose ASI insurance versus the NCSIF.   The longest serving state charter was Mississippi’s Mutual Credit Union, founded in 1931. Two other Mississippi credit unions also converted to federal.

A choice of share insurance is also permitted in ten states which allow their charters to choose between ASI cooperative insurance or the NCUSIF.  This option remains central to a real choice as well as validating the underlying the 1% deposit design of the NCUSIF.

Dual chartering option creates a check and balance, even positive competition, among regulators.  It provides an opportunity for a credit union program as some states still do not have a charter option. However,  the state system can often change more quickly to meet new market and member needs when response by NCUA may take years or in some situations, never happen.

The dual system is a critical aspect of credit union history. The first credit union charter was in 1909 for St. Mary’s Bank.   Until the federal credit union act was passed in 1934, only state charters were available, and then limited to about two thirds of the states.

These state “startups” created multiple charter variations and operating authority.  As there was no single example, charter details and oversight were sometimes drawn from already operating financial examples.  For example, proxy voting is authorized by nine states, drawn from mutual S&L practice, but not an option for federal charters.

The Turning Point in Dual Chartering: The creation of the NCUSIF

The choice of either a fed or state charter from 1934 onward led to a 30-year period of rapid chartering across America.   The states were often the laboratories for change, innovation and system leadership with local leagues and chapters forming potent political state-wide organizations.  CUNA itself was an organization of state leagues, not individual credit unions.

The introduction of the NCUSIF in 1970 was led by a group of federal charters in the newly formed direct-member organization NAFCU in the late 1960’s. CUNA opposed this mandatory insurance requirement and supported multiple state-chartered alternatives to the federal program.

CUNA’s fundamental concern was that mandating federal  insurance would inevitably create a single regulatory system for all charters.  The diversity and choice created by dual chartering would be negated, if not lost all together.

The NCUSIF Override of State Options

This concern that the insurer could become a single regulator had a very quick example.  Bob Bianchini, who was simultaneously President of the Rhode Island League and a member of the state legislature, encountered  such an issue in the mid 1970’s.

NCUA refused to insure the NOW/checking accounts authorized for Rhode Island state charters.  In response, the credit unions formed their own state chartered deposit insurance corporation.  In Bob’s words:

The NCUA’s decision refusing to insure Rhode Island credit unions that offered checking account services to its members led to the creation of the private insurer RISDIC .. Seems to me there was never any specific law that would have led to that decision, but rather simply pandering to the commercial banking industry which claimed checking accounts fell strictly under their purview .. 

RISDIC would have never gotten off the ground if Rhode Island credit unions that provided checking accounts to its members, could have obtained NCUA insurance. 

The other RISDIC insured institutions were Loan & Investment companies. privately owned for profit financial institutions and it was one of those organization’s demise that led to RISDIC’s failure.

NCUA’s insurance power has led to other differences in regulatory interpretations. The insuring requirement has also been a major hurdle for groups seeking new charters.

Ultimately the major advantages of state charters continue to be their more accessible local regulatory oversight and the capacity to respond faster to changing market conditions.

The Final Word

The S&L crisis in the mid 1980’s resulted in that system’s failure of its state sponsored insurance options.  It led some credit union leaders to back away from the credit unions’ insurance choice.

In a 1986 speech to the credit union league xecutives (ACULE), former NCUA Chair  Ed Callahan, now  CEO of Callahan and Associates spoke to the group.  He described the importance of choice  saying that “the insurer is the regulator.”  His words are just as true today.  Scroll down to the video.

“The Best Damned System in the Country”

 

 

 

 

One State, a Credit Union CEO and Financial Literacy

According to the December 2023 Lane Report, a Kentucky Business Journal, there is change coming to the teaching of financial skills to students in the state:

Kentucky high schools maintain a C grade in a national report card on how well they teach personal finance, but by next year their grade may climb to a B.

Given a C in 2017, Kentucky maintains this grade in the updated 2023 National Report Card on State Efforts to Improve Financial Literacy in High Schools, issued by The Center for Financial Literacy at Champlain College in Burlington, Vt. . . 

John Pelletier, director of the Center for Financial Literacy, says that by 2028, 23 states are projected to have an A grade. . .

“Kentucky requires high school students to take vocational instruction, which includes personal finance concepts,” says Pelletier. “The Class of 2024 will be required to take one or more courses or programs with financial literacy content, but implementation will be up to school districts.”

Pelletier says state policy makers are responding to families without financial safety nets during the pandemic, as well as to advocacy by educators, administrators, parents and students. 

Prior to the passage of this bill in 2018, there was no specific financial literacy instruction requirement for high school graduation.

The Kentucky Department of Education now lists financial literacy resources on its website to assist schools implementing this requirement beginning in 2024.

The Advocacy Role by Credit Unions

At the recent GAC I spoke with a Kentucky credit union leader, a CEO for just ten years, who has put financial education at the center of the organization.

The credit union offers classes at  local high schools, for military retirees and veterans, and for employees of groups the credit union serves.

The CEO has taught some of these classes.  As a member and leader of the Kentucky league, the credit union community became advocates for this educational  priority in Kentucky schools.

This financial education concern was but one of  many initiatives this CEO shared about his short tenure.  What impressed me was his focus on “connecting” with the many constituents the credit union reaches.  He meets with the leaders of government and private organizations they serve, supports community and other credit unions in the state, and advocates for members’ financial well-being.

The History of Financial Education

His efforts are an example of a generation changing event.  His role is more than managing the financial trends of a credit union, but uplifting possibilities for all across the state.

What I didn’t realize was how difficult this education priority was until seeing this brief, five minute history of financial education in America.  It shows how educational priorities have changed since the Eisenhower era’s  focus on math and science. Today the emphasis on teaching financial life skills is one area of strong bipartisan support.

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0uvurQcj0fs)

This is how one CEO has provided leadership far beyond his membership.  Yet without his credit union’s example and the practice of what he was seeking, the effort might not have been as successful.

Now all Kentucky students, and their parents, have the prospect of a “B” or even an “A” in this most important understanding of  financial responsibilities throughout life.

The Oscar Nominated Film Every Credit Union Should See

Nominated as best documentary for this year’s Oscar awards, The Barber of Little Rock is a must see for every credit union believer.

The film is the story of Arlo Washington’s personal commitment  to bring financial services and hope to the black community of Little Rock, Arkansas.

The film produced by the New Yorker magazine is 35 minutes and can be watched online any time.

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1amOPUn49aM)

Story upon Story

Arlo is a barber who converts his basic role in the black community to one of broader service.  This story is told in this Next City article The Black Barber Opened the First Credit Union In Arkansas Since 1996. 

The film is Arlo’s first person account filled with dozens of examples of hardship. hope, and grant making through the CDFI he organized to make loans.

There are numerous examples of what it means “to be banking while black” and why there is little trust in the existing banking system. The film provides a brief history of black efforts for economic equality from the post civil war promise of “forty acres and a mule”  to modern day red lining in Little Rock-a city divided by inequality and a highway.

The film even shows learning empathy in the “two minute drill”  where two former incarcerated men learn to “see” each other’s hurts.

A Potential for Every Credit Union: Economic Justice Rights Wrongs

The film is a study in self-help.  It shows the need and power of putting money back into the community.  “A tree is known by the fruit it bears,” says Arlo. “If you have all the money and wealth you want, and don’t make an impact, what do you have?”

The film’s many residents assert multiple times  that economic opportunity brings freedom.  One says that if this (model) catches on, it will become a threat because people can see what they can do to be free.  There will be no more excuses for economic injustice.

People Trust Community FCU

The film’s story of Arlo’s efforts ends before the credit union he chartered is up and running.  There is a picture of the building and sign, but no recognition.

At December 2023, the credit union reported total assets of $4.4 million, loans of $326,410 and 445 members.  It has capital of 11% or $482,000.

The film was released just two months ago and has been viewed 352,000 times with 433 comments posted afterwards.

The impact of this enterprising person’s example  is extending far beyond the borders of Little Rock. It is a wakeup reminder for every existing credit union of the potential to change people’s lives and the trajectory of their community.

Viewing this current effort should be a catalyst for conversations in every credit union  trying to make a difference in their members’ lives.

 

 

Who Is responsible for Cooperative Democracy?

Tonight, I will attend a special meeting of the members of a coop in which I participate.  The purpose is to approve a change in the bylaws prior to the Annual Meeting.  The change will reduce the number of board members from 15 to 12.

The bylaws have not been updated in 20 years. All changes must be approved by the members. Some background for the change was sent in advance:

While there’s no fixed rule on the number of Directors a Board should have for a group like ours, what makes sense is to have a size that’s both large enough to bring sufficiently diverse viewpoints and skills to bear on accomplishing the work of developing, guiding, and managing the organization, and also small enough to function effectively.

Given that Board service is a three-year commitment, it has also become more difficult to find members willing to stand for election each year. Twelve members will still assure that the Board is flexible and diverse, and provide enough hands to do the work required, while not overtaxing our use of member volunteers.

All members are encouraged to attend.

Sound familiar?  Recruiting volunteer directors is a challenge for many organizations. What is different from credit union practice is that this bylaw change is being discussed and voted on by members.   One person, one vote,  A special meeting notice sent 60 days in advance.

Credit Union Democratic Practice

In almost all credit unions, bylaw changes are not voted on by members.  This is the purview of the Board, which then submits changes for regulatory approval.

Members may not know of changes, even when it affects their fundamental role as owners in  elections procedures or even the number of board members.

In a recent post I outlined how these non-public changes can go to the heart of member governance.

The two largest FCU’s quietly changed the required number of signatures for member nominations for the board.  In both situations the change removed the 500-signature standard bylaw and replaced it with a percentage of members.  For Navy this new signature requirement was 26,000 and for PenFed 5,800 based on their latest reported member counts.

Regional Director John Kutchey quoted in another context stated, the NCUA considers the right to participate in the director election process a fundamental, material right for members of a federally chartered credit union. 

However, this fundamental change in these two federal credit unions was done without member involvement or  any public discussion.

Democracy Depends on Participation

These behind the scenes reductions in member rights  is how coop democracy dies, one small step at a time.

Without member governance, boards act like self-perpetuating trustees, subject only to their own sense of duty, versus accountability to member-owners.

Democratic practice is hard, requires patience and can be frustrating.  But without it, the required annual board elections become a mere administrative re-appointment of self-selected nominees.

Governance is more than a democratic formality.  It is fundamental to safe and sound oversight.   By eliminating member involvement in these fundamental bylaw changes. NCUA is sowing seeds of future member discontent and failures of accountability.

The Annual Meeting Season

As credit unions enter this season of annual meetings and board elections, it is doing so in a political environment in which both camps claim the future of democracy is at stake.

What better way to remind members of our fundamental democratic belief for how we work together in society, than in our own credit union’s political process?

Credit Unions Before NCUA, America’s Credit Unions or Share Insurance

Before the organizational titans of today’s cooperative system were created, there were tens of thousands of credit unions chartered by ordinary men and women.  Who believed in extraordinary possibilities.

A living example of this belief is Rincones Presbyterian Credit union, chartered on January 1, 1960.  This founding predates the “origins” of most of today’s credit union leaders.

At yearend 2023,  the credit union was $5.2 million in assets with 804 members.  It has three employees with an average salary of $32,745. Last year their loan originations increased 15.7% to total $2.3 million, the majority for autos.

Rincones in Spanish means a “small secluded valley,” or literally a nook. Located in Chacon, an unincorporated area of New Mexico with an elevation of 8,166 feet, harsh winters have given the area the name “Little Alaska.”

Their vision and mission are printed on the sign marking their “head office.”

Would credit unions be even more successful if they followed the Trust of these founders?

After all, that is what we print on all of our coins and  currency.

A Study of US Credit Unions

“. . .our results indicate a serious misalignment between the legislation that establishes the credit union mission (a tax exemption in exchange for meeting the credit and savings needs of consumers, especially those of modest means) and the actual performance of credit unions under that legislation.

Brief extract from: Who Consumes the Credit Union Subsidies? (Queen’s Management School, Research Paper 2022/03 written May 10, 2022)

The Challenge

How would your credit union respond to this academic conclusion?

Signs of New Life and a Late Bloomer

An enclosure from a friend who said her church just endorsed this new credit union.

The cold last night did not stop the early daffodils.

Or crocuses.

A late bloomer indoors.  A December amaryllis from repotting last year’s bulb, but just deciding now to bloom.

 

How to Steal a Cooperative and Get Paid $60 million for Doing So

Preface:

This is a long blog, so I will summarize the main points for readers.

  1. Four senior employees and one newcomer of 121 Financial Credit Union will receive a minimum of $9,416,600  in future guaranteed salaries and benefits for merging their credit union with VyStar.  The required disclosures were less than a tenth of this number.
  2. VyStar is a credit union in a financial stall. Peak shares occurred in the first quarter of 2022 at $11.2 billion; at yearend 2023 they were $10.1 billion.  At that point, VyStar reports total borrowings over $2.6 billion including $200 million (corrected from earlier  billon) in subordinated debt to boost its capital ratio.  It bought a $280 million Florida bank in 2019 creating $28 million in goodwill, which suggests a price of approximately twice book value.  It announced its intent to purchase HSBI in 2021 for approximately 1.8 times book.  The transaction was cancelled in mid 2022 for failure to “receive timely regulatory approval.”
  3. In this merger, Vystar eliminates its very effective local competitor that has managed to secure 38% of its members who also have VyStar accounts.  And it gets paid $65 million in new capital versus giving cash to the credit union owners, as would be the case for bank owners, at multiple of their book value.  At year end 2023, VyStar’s ROA was .18% and its ROE 2.6%-both in need of this instant boost from this free gift of $700 million in assets.
  4. Other than the five employees listed, the remaining 130 are guaranteed nothing as they become a very small part of an organization which has 2,260 employees and whose locations will overlap some of 121’s existing branches.
  5. The members no longer have a choice of credit unions. This matters. In 2023, 21% of VyStar’s funding was from borrowings and $10 billion (79%) in member shares.  However when expensing the funding, the credit union paid 53% of its costs to the lenders and only 47% to the members whose savings are provided 80% of funding    VyStar is in thrall to external funding.

In contrast, 121 Financial has borrowings equal to 14% of its funding liabilities.  However, it paid 60% of its funding costs to members and 40% to lenders.  Members no longer get to choose the better deal which is why these combinations are accurately described as anti-competitive.

  1. NCUA is mentioned twice in the merger document. First as a place to post comments “to share with other members”– a digital and street address is given.  And again when “NCUA regulations require merging credit unions to disclose certain material changes in total compensation or benefits” the implication is that the regulator has reviewed the disclosures and announcement and that everything is being done according to Hoyle.

That is not the public rhetoric of Chairman Harper, who sees himself as an exemplar of consumer protection. Just last month in a credit union conference in Hawaii he talked forcefully about the need for credit unions to reexamine their overdraft fees (over which the agency has no authority) and reduce them when they unfairly charge members for the service.

The new board member Otsuka is a lawyer and has worked at the FDIC.  She should understand what the “slow walking” by regulators of an application, for example to buy a bank, means.  Also the fiduciary standards of directors for the “duty of care” and “duty of loyalty.”

An Election with No Vote Tally

Both may hide behind NCUA’s standard position, “well, the members voted for it.” However when members who opposed the merger asked to watch the votes as they were counted, the answer was no.  When they requested the final tally, the answer from staff was the vote would not be released and the ballots had been destroyed.

Once again democracy, in this case, credit union cooperative democracy goes to Florida to die.  Abetted by those appointees who champion the rights of consumers.

Why I am Writing about This

After the vote was announced I received two calls in early February from 121 members who were very, very angry.  They had put up spirited opposition including a website Stop the Merge and spent their own money on advertising.  They claimed to have been threatened in their employment if they continue to speak out after the vote.  All of their results from a mock online poll showed members opposed.

They had spoken to NCUA before the vote and had calls returned, but not any longer.   Their anger was palpable; they trusted no one; they did not have the ability to make their own case rationally.

They saw this event as a breach of trust by the credit union officials and the governmental oversight system that was supposed to protect them.  Neither caller had first hand knowledge of the credit union system or its press.  All they wanted from me was a lawyer’s name because they said a local firm wanted $25,000 to investigate and perhaps take up their case.

Was I a lawyer? No, a blogger.  “Oh, so you just want to make money off our story.”  I had to shout back to get them to start a dialogue, but said I would look into it.  The result was my blog Are Credit Union Members “American Idiots’?

These two members believe, and I think rightly so, the democratic system that they tried and supported has let them down.  They  played by the rules.  No one will listen to their cause, and it is hard, because they are very exasperated; perhaps a little paranoid.  They certainly feel alienated from the powers that be. And they are right to feel this way.

Information about the two credit unions continues to come in, but here is what we know so far.

The Rest of the Story

What follows is details to support the summaries above.

Who would not be attracted to a credit union whose mission statement is:

Growing together, prospering together.  

To empower our team to deliver innovative solutions through one-to-one service by focusing on he unique value of every member.  

To ensue organizational stability and financial wellness in our community since 1935.

Their home page video promises members they will be “a credit union for life.”

https://121fcu.org/about-121/

But its 89 year-long role as “Jacksonville’s hometown credit union, dedicated to delivering highly personalized financial services that benefit our members and community” is about to end on March 1 when the merger would be consummated.

In April 2023 the executive team of  121 Financial Credit Union first announced the credit union  would merge with VyStar Credit Union, also headquartered in Jacksonville.

Rarely do members join a credit union based on size, which is the prime difference between these two organizations.  Members choose based on convenience, price and service.  When they see and experience a local institution that expresses their hopes, as in the mission statements above, they become believers.  In this case for 89 years.

Many 121 members who were especially loyal strongly opposed the plan to end the charter. They took action and talked to NCUA about the process.  A number put up a website, Stop the Merge, complete with local advertising and publicity urging members to turn down the plan finally disclosed in the formal Member Notice Mailed dated November 30, 2023.

Why Did Management Choose to Give Up their Charter?

The Notice has not a single example of a better rate (savings or loan), fee or product that would benefit 121 Financial members.  There is lots of rhetoric about a bigger organization with a list of VyStar branches.

121 Financial is capable of offering the same system benefits VyStar promises.  In examples of community support, the much smaller credit union features its alliance with  the local  Jumbo Shrimp, a Triple-A minor league affiliate of the Miami Marlins.

Why This Merger is Occurring

I believe that when the full amounts of payments guaranteed to the five senior leaders in the form of salaries, bonuses, severance, and retirement are added together, the answer is simple: personal greed.  These five give up all their current credit union leadership positions, which they had held for less than five years, in return for “special project” roles. The remaining employees are guaranteed nothing.

The members lose everything they spent 89 years building.

$9.5 Million in Guaranteed Payments

But wait—doesn’t NCUA require that “certain material changes in total compensation and benefits of 15% or more of the five most highly compensated employees have received or will receive in connection” to be disclosed?  That is the literal requirement but obscures the full payoffs management has negotiated for itself when leaving their positions of responsibility.

David Marovich, CEO,  appointed full time CEO in March of  2020.  In a press interview (below) said he began merger discussions with the board in the fall of 2021.   The disclosures list a five year contract with a $16,000 salary increase, 2 first year bonuses totaling $245,00 and a supplemental retirement plan (SERP) for five more years at 40% of his final year’s salary.

Using the credit union’s IRS 990 filing for 2022 for these senior salaries, the minimum total payments  for this work and SERP is a minimum of $3,209, 600.

Paul Blackstone, COO since January 2020.  Receives a five-year contract with a $95,000 salary increase and two first year retention bonuses totaling $252,500, and a SERP that pays 35% of his final year’s salary for five years.   The minimum of these payments is $3,867,908.

Cyndi Koan, CFO since December 2019.  Receives a three-year contract with two first year retention bonuses totaling $70,000.  Total minimum payments $1,168,102.

Cathy Hufstetler,  Senior VP Lending since September 2019.  Will continue through conversion then retire and receive a one year severance of $273,000 and two first year bonuses totaling  $56,000.  Total minimum payments $602,000. She began at 121 Financial (Telco) in June 1991 and is the longest serving of the five employees listed.

Nichole Le Blanc, Executive Assistant to the C suite.  No start date given but  her previous experience listed in the Notice, leads one to believe it  to be very recent.  Receives a five-year contract with a $5,000 salary increase and two first year retention bonuses totaling $18,000.  Estimated minimum payments $569,000.

The total (salary data is from 2022) of these five guaranteed positions is a minimum $9,416,600.

In addition It should be noted that in 2022 the credit union began a SERP plan for the four senior positions that will fully vest all earned benefits upon merging.   In addition they will also receive all other retirement benefits that all employees of 121 Financial will vest  upon the charter closing. This is why Hufstetler, above,  has no retirement benefits from the merger. because of her 121 benefits package.

The Remaining 121’s Staff

The 121 website lists 17 employees (out of 140) in leadership positions.  Only the five most highly compensated are required to be disclosed according to NCUA’s rules.  So the others may have received a temporary incentive other than vesting 121 benefits.  It is not clear why Le Blanc, the apparent newcomer, was included in the guaranteed benefits given her relatively brief time at the credit union.

The average salary and benefit for VyStar and 121 Financial employees is the same for both credit unions at $97,000.   According to the notice VyStar committed to retain all 121 employees but for how long and under what work responsibilities will be determined.   For all seven 121 Financial locations, the only promise is that all “will remain open for a period of time” which does not sound very permanent.

Given the logic of acquisitions and the need for VyStar to turnaround its deteriorating performance, often the quickest savings is from employee attrition. The 121 employees may have other job opportunities, but they will lose their earned and established professional agency in joining an organization of 2,260 employees.

Will Members Get A better Deal?

A review the financing and business strategy of the two credit unions shows one is hellbent on geographic expansion in FL and GA with more branches-or acquisitions.  The other is Jacksonville’s home grown institution.

One relies on outside borrowings, the other on member funding. With 38% of 121’s members also with VyStar, they have elected to have a choice.  Now that is ended.

Moreover there is a question as to how this data was obtained.  Consumer privacy regulations would normally prohibit either credit union from accessing this information from public sources  no matter which credit union ran this comparison.

What Kind of Credit Union is VyStar?

VyStar’s business model is the antithesis of 121 Financial.  It is the country’s 13th largest with $13.6 billion in assets or twenty times the size of 121.   Both credit unions report very similar financial performance ratios at yearend 2023 with 121’s net worth and ROA running slightly above the larger credit union.

With 926,588 members and 91 branches compared to 49,000 and 7, VyStar’s strategic priority is growth.  Bank acquisitions and credit union mergers are one aspect of this effort.

In August 2019 the credit union announced:

VyStar received approval from the Florida Office of Financial Regulation (FLOFR) to significantly expand its field of membership by 27 counties – more than doubling the original 22 counties – to include all 49 counties of Central to North Florida. . .. In addition, VyStar received approval from the Georgia Department of Banking and Finance and the FLOFR to expand into four Southeast Georgia counties: Camden, Charlton, Glynn and Ware.

That same month VyStar announced the purchase and assumption of the $280 million Citizens State Bank in Perry, Florida.   Terms were not announced.  However, the credit union carries a $28 million goodwill intangible asset which occurs when an asset is acquired in excess of its book value.

In March 2021 VyStar agreed to purchase the $1.6 billion Heritage Southeast Bank (HSBI)in Jonesboro, GA, for an estimated $196 million or 1.8 times tangible book capital.  This effort was cancelled a year later due to the inability to receive timely regulatory approval.

In 2022 the credit union announced the addition of 15 more counties in FL and GA to its FOM.  In January 2023 it announced the merger with First Coast FCU, an $11.3 million firm.

Why This is a Great Deal for VyStar:  The Art of the Steal

In April 2023 when VyStar and 121 Financial announced their merger intention, the American Banker used the headline VyStar Credit Union to Merge with Local Competitor.

In addition to eliminating this local “home grown” competition, VyStar needed this $700 million to keep its growth ambitions going.  For the three years ending 2023 VyStar has had zero share growth, marked by a decline of 5% in 2023.  It has to do something so it turns to another acquisition to juice its growth.

In this way VyStar can instantly add $163 million in investments, $485 million in loans, $24 million in fixed assets (7 locations) and 50,000 member accounts.  And the best part is it will get paid $63 million in member capital for taking this long time operating entity off the hands of its existing leadership.

If this had been a bank purchase, the amount that would have to be paid to the owners would have been at least 1.5 times book or over $90 million in cash payments.  Why would a credit union ever buy a bank when you can steal a credit union?  Just arrange a couple of new senior positions for the senior team.  Can you imagine a bank’s owners giving their shares away free to another bank?

VyStar receives a free capital infusion and a $700 million operating entity.  The credit union’s owners whose loyalty and financial relationships built this very successful organization, receive nothing.  What’s worse, any member could have joined VyStar at any time they thought it was a better deal.  Instead the evidence suggests VyStar members go to 121 Financial because they prefer its local focus.

Should Credit Unions Care?

The easy answer is to keep one’s opinion silent.  This does not involve my members.  But this and similar precedents will end up destroying the reputation of thousands of credit union leaders who try to do the right thing, in the right way.  Because something is legal, does not mean it is right.

Note from two CEO’s joint press interview.

From an April 20,2023 article in the Jacksonville Daily Record by reporter  David Crumpler:  (Wolfburg is VyStar’s CEO)

Wolfburg said the merger “developed organically.”

He said the credit unions have long had a good relationship that existed when he joined VyStar in 2018 and was “started by our predecessors.”

Marovich said he and 121 Financial board members “have been working on this for about 18 months.

“I think our board felt that this was a good time (to think about a merger) and tried to determine who would be the best partners for this.”

The release said all 121 Financial members and its 140 employees will be invited to join VyStar.

“We do not want to disrupt the employees,” Wolfburg said.

“Those are employees who built that institution and who make the brand what is it, and have relationships with businesses and clients.”

There are no plans to make any decisions about keeping or closing branches over the coming year, Marovich said.

“VyStar has a good presence of branch locations, and expanded access was one of the things we’ve talked about,” he said.