46 Credit Unions Close their Doors in Q 1 2025

Forty-six credit unions managing over $3.7 billion in assets cancelled their charters in the first quarter.   The credit union’s data is from December 2024 call reports.  Because they closed their doors, the credit unions filed no data for March 2025.

This total of closings is much higher than the 35 mergers NCUA reported in the first quarter.

The 256,000 members with with $2.4 billion in loans, have now lost their own institution some with  histories serving generations.  List with loan totals.

These credit unions ranged in size from the $560 million LA Financial to as small as $3,000  Asbury FCU in DC. This pdf with ROA and net worth is shown from largest to smallest by assets.

Not Financial Failures

On this listing, the weighted average net worth of this group was 10.7% at December.  Many had equity ratios much higher than this.  Two had net worth exceeding 30% including Gibbs Aluminum (KY) at 33% and Telco Roswell New Mexico at 34%.

Only 7 had a net worth ration below the 7% well capitalized benchmark with the lowest two at 4.9% and 4.2% of assets. Six of these had negative ROA’s in 2024 but all were still solvent.

If these are not financial failures, why were the charters ended, largely by not entirely, via mergers?

Some would explaine that this is just the “creative destruction” that economists describe as an essential outcome from competition in a capitalist market system.  Underperformers are forced out of business and replaced with better options.  This is a necessary and healthy culling that makes capitalism strong, innovative  and prosperous for the greater community.

While there is an element of truth in this dynamic, cooperatives are supposed to be an alternative to the winner takes all mentality of market competition.  These coops are long standing with charters that go back over 100 years in some cases.

Two Jnternal System Weaknesses

I would suggest that these charter failures, and they are just that, of financially sound firms results more from cooperatives internal shortcomings, not external competition.

One critical deficiency is the lack of system support for some of these smaller credit unions who have decided to give up.  Surrendering charters versus adapting to new opportunities costs the industry between $100,000 to $500,000 each time a charter is lost.

Those amounts are the range of donated capital NCUA now requires for chartering a new credit union.  Thes 46 charters have a total “market” value as much as $23 million at the higher required capital level.  For example, Arise Community CU opened its doors on Juneteenth with over $1.0 million in capital donations.

New charters are extremely difficult to achieve with NCUA approving only 2-4 per year.  It would seem in everyone’s best interest, but especially leagues, CUSO’s, vendors and others supporting coop options  to find ways to preserve and transform existing charters to those willing to take the reins of leadership.  Press reports have said NCUA has over 90 new charter requests in various stages at this time. This suggests public interest in coops is still there.

Benign Neglect?

A tiny example of this system weakness, or neglect, is the smallest credit union on the list, Asbury at $3k and 100% capital.   The 100% net worth suggests that the credit union  has been self-liquidating for some time.  The credit union still has a web presence via a third party.  It was not invisible.

More tragically when one looks up Asbury’s history, the credit union was chartered in 1945–it is over 110 years old and insured by NCUA in 1972.  Virtually invisible and surviving, but  ignored, by the system that created it.

The More Common Deficiency: Leadership Failings

The second largest credit union failure is NextMark FCU (VA) with $550 million in assets and 16.3% net worth.  The CEO and board requested members approve a merger with Apple FCU, which took place in the first quarter.

The failure of this long-time, financially well-off and large institution illustrates a second aspect of the industry’s self-inflicted errors.  There was no compelling financial, business or other shortcoming motivating this charter closure.  The CEO Joseph Thomas had served as President/CEO since October 1994 a period of 30years and 4 months before becoming Executive Vice President at Apple via the merger he orchestrated.

During his thirty years as CEO Thomas also served on many industry organizations. These positions include: a CUNA board member for 8 years; a board member of CUMA a DC mortgage CUSO for 22 years; Board member and immediate past chairman of the Virginia Credit Union League for 12 years; board member Worldwide Foundation for Credit Unions 7 years to the present; and board member for the World Council of Credit Unions, 5 years. also continuing.

NextMark gave Thomas a platform and standing to aspire to these positions  of wide spread credit union national ane worldwide  responsibility. But now this opportunity and potential service paths are closed.  There is no successor CEO asThomas pulled up the ladder he climbed to participate in these other opportunities.  The independent charter ceased operations.

Mergers such as this destroy cooperative professional and volunteer leadership roles in communities, within the credit union system, across the country and, in this case, worldwide.  Fewer coop leader positions mean fewer voices and examples of professional excellence representing credit unions.

It is at best ironic that those who seemed to have benefited significantly from their CEO leadership role, would close this path that was opened for them.  What kind of leadership perspective did they bring to these other system responsibilities?

But this tragedy goes further than the  opportunities for credit union volunteers and professionals in their communities and beyond.  The following public comment is how one member analyzed this merger proposal. It clearly shows that members know this kind of ending is not why credit unions were founded.

Her description is one of betrayal, not just of the cooperative principles, but moral failings by those with fiduciary responsibility to the member-owners.  Here is her perceptive and I believe accurate description of what why this merger is so tragic and wrong for not only these members, but also America’s coop system (subheads added).

I recognize that the merger is likely a foregone conclusion, and the number of votes cast by members will be minimal.

My experience with the NextMark Federal Credit Union dates back to 1977 when it was known as the “Fairfax County Employees Credit Union.” Over the following 20 years of membership in the Credit Union and employment with the Fairfax County Government, I served several years as a member of the Credit Committee and the Supervisory Committee.

The general concept of a credit union, combined with a defined field of membership, the value of working toward the common good of the members, and loans based on character, were central to the success and satisfaction of the credit union members. The credit union grew, as did the Fairfax County employee base.

A Change of Focus

At some point in the late 90’s or early 2000’s, the field of membership expanded in scope, the name changed to the commercial generic “NextMark” and our credit union began to resemble a commercial bank, with limited on-line offerings and variable customer service. Nothing terrible, just a move far from the underlying values of the credit union movement.

The specific observations that I believe should merit regulatory review, are the substantial financial incentives offered to several key staff members, contingent on completion of the merger. The amounts seem very high, but of greater significance is that these payments are contingent on the merger, which these key staff members are urging members to approve. I am aware of nothing that casts any doubt on these key staff members’ sound character or integrity.

Gross Conflicts

The issue is a gross conflict of interest created through this incentive process. These senior staff and volunteer members have a fiduciary responsibility to the credit union members, including advising on significant business decisions and implementing structural changes, such as mergers. The existence of contingent incentive payments for completion of the merger would seem to conflict with the fiduciary responsibility to the members. It would seem that a more sound approach might be to delay the negotiation of pay and benefit incentives until after the membership vote.  

Old Fashioned Thinking

Maybe everything is fine just as it is, and such incentives are likely commonly accepted in the commercial banking and business arena. Credit Unions are supposed to be a little different – although that may just be old-fashioned thinking.  

End comment.

A final note on this merger:  Senior staff received “pay adjustment distributions to meet the continuing credit union’s salary bands, long term retention bonus, incentives already established, deferred compensation benefits, or severance opportunities” totaling almost $900,000.

The members received a $12 million bonus dividend for approving this combination and free transfer of their $409 million in loans and remaining equity to another firm.  How might these resources been re-invested in the credit union for members’ future or even seeding a dozen or more new coops?

The credit union cancelled its future and distributed a token portion of its value that members created  to be paid forward to benefit future generations.

Can a coop system with such behaviors routinely approved at all levels, ever hope to survive in the future?  Should it?